(1)

The COVID‐19 pandemic has very damaging effects on economic and financial stability in the enlargement and neighbourhood regions. Partners are currently facing a weak and rapidly worsening balance‐of‐payments and fiscal situation, with the economy moving into recession. There is a strong case for the Union to move quickly and decisively in support of those economies. This Decision therefore covers ten partners: the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (*), Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia in the enlargement region; Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the Eastern neighbourhood and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Tunisia in the Southern neighbourhood (the ‘partners’).

(2)

The urgency of the assistance is related to the partners’ immediate need for funds in addition to those which will be provided through other Union instruments and by international financial institutions, Member States and other bilateral donors. This is necessary in order to allow short‐term policy space for the partners’ authorities to implement measures to counter the economic fallout from the COVID‐19 pandemic.

(3)

The authorities of each partner and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have already agreed on a programme that will be supported by a credit arrangement with the IMF or are expected to agree shortly on such a programme.

(4)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should be an exceptional financial instrument of untied and undesignated balance‐of‐payments support, which aims to address the beneficiary’s immediate external financing needs in tandem with a non‐precautionary IMF credit arrangement that is subject to an agreed programme of economic reforms. In the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic, the Union’s macro‐financial assistance should also be available to partners that benefit from emergency funding from the IMF, which can come without prior actions and/or conditionality, such as through the Rapid Financing Instrument. That assistance should therefore be shorter in duration, limited to two disbursements and underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing a limited set of reform measures.

(5)

Financial support from the Union to the partners is consistent with the Union’s enlargement and neighbourhood policies.

(6)

Given that the partners are either accession or pre‐accession partners, or covered by the European Neighbourhood policy, they are eligible to receive the Union’s macro‐financial assistance.

(7)

Given that the drastically worsening external financing needs of the partners are expected to be well above the resources that will be provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union’s macro‐financial assistance to be provided to the partners is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to the partners’ requests to support economic stabilisation. The Union’s macro‐financial assistance would support economic stabilisation, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s credit arrangement.

(8)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for the partners, thereby supporting renewed economic and social development.

(9)

The amount of the Union’s macro‐financial assistance is based on a preliminary estimate of each partner’s residual external financing needs and takes into account its capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should complement the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance also takes into account the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre‐existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments and the added value of the overall Union involvement.

(10)

The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro‐financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of, and the measures taken within, the different areas of external action and other relevant Union policies.

(11)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy regarding the partners. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro‐financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and to ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

(12)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should support the partners’ commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as their commitment to the principles of open, rule‐based and fair trade.

(13)

A precondition for granting the Union’s macro‐financial assistance should be that the partners respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi‐party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro‐financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in the partners and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable growth and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor both the fulfilment of the preconditions and the achievement of those objectives.

(14)

In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro‐financial assistance are protected efficiently, the partners should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. In addition, provision should be made for the Commission to carry out checks, for the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences.

(15)

Release of the Union’s macro‐financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and of the Council as budgetary authority.

(16)

The amounts of the provision required for macro‐financial assistance should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multi‐annual financial framework.

(17)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with the relevant documents.

(18)

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2).

(19)

The Union’s macro‐financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (the ‘MOU’). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the authorities of the partners under the supervision of the committee of representatives of Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro‐financial assistance to each partner, the advisory procedure should apply to the adoption of the MOU with Montenegro, while the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MOU with the other partners covered by this Decision, and correspondingly to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

(20)

Since the objective of this Decision, namely to support the economies of partners who are currently facing a weak and rapidly worsening balance‐of‐payments and fiscal situation, with the economy moving into recession, as a consequence of the COVID‐19 pandemic, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

(21)

In view of the urgency entailed by the exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID‐19 pandemic and the associated economic consequences, it was considered to be appropriate to provide for an exception to the eight‐week period referred to in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, annexed to the TEU, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

(22)

This Decision should enter into force as a matter of urgency on the date following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,