FRONTEX

Eastern Borders
Annual Risk Analysis 2013

Imatra

Vaalimaa Nuijamaa

Narva St. Petersburg

Russia
138.1

ESTONIA

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

Terehova

Moscow

Medininkai
Minsk

Kuznica

Belarus
9.5

POLAND

Terespol

Dorohusk

Medyka Korczowa

Vvsné

Kiev

Ukraine

CZECH
REPUBLIC

Eastern Borders

Annual Risk Analysis 2013

Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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List of abbreviations used

ARA	Annual Risk Analysis
BCP	border-crossing point
CBŚ	Centralne Biuro Śledcze (Polish Central Bureau of Investigation)
CCTV	closed-circuit television
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EB	Eastern Borders
EBC	Eastern Borders Conference
EB-RAN	Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
FSKN	Russian Federal Service for Control of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FMS	Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
GDP	gross domestic product
GPS	Global Positioning System
JO	Joint Operation
LBTA	local border traffic agreement
MS	Member State
OCG	organised crime group
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
RFI	request for information
SIS	Schengen Information System
UAH	Ukrainian hryvnia
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USD	United States dollar
VIN	Vehicle Identification Number
VIS	Visa Information System
WTO	World Trade Organization

Executive summary

In 2012, border security at the borders between Member States and Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation (common borders) was shaped by several interlinking factors.

First, overall regular passenger flows continued to grow in 2012, most notably at the Polish-Russian (+70%) and Norwegian-Russian (roughly +30%) borders. The growth was driven by expanding legal travel channels and long-term economic developments in the Russian Federation, both encouraging the mobility of people and goods.

Second, and somewhat connected to regular passenger flows, the smuggling of excise and illicit goods remained a major threat to border security. Data collected within the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), as well as during Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations, indicate that the smuggling of tobacco products and petrol was especially common. Additionally, cross-border criminal activities also included attempts to smuggle stolen vehicles and, perhaps to a lesser extent, illicit drugs. Smuggling occurred primarily through official border-crossing points (BCPs); however, a variety of *modi operandi* were also detected at green borders (between BCPs).

Third, there were more irregular movements of people across the common borders in 2012. This observation in substantiated by an increasing number of detected illegal border-crossings between BCPs, more refusals of entry issued by Member States and more detections of people trying to exit the EU while

no longer fulfilling conditions of stay (the so-called illegal stay on exit).

Member States reported 1 597 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, or 52% more compared to 2011, mostly due to Somalis, Afghans and Vietnamese arriving from Ukraine or Belarus. However, Georgians remained the most frequently detected nationality with a 21% share of the total number of detections.

Although most detections of illegal border-crossing occurred at the Slovakian-Ukrainian border, the growth of detections was most pronounced in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Regardless of this growth, the detections of illegal border-crossing along the 6 000-kilometre common borders accounted for only 2% of all illegal border-crossings at the EU's external borders during 2012.

On the other hand, more than one-third (34%) of all refusals of entry into the EU in 2012 were issued by Member States' authorities at the common borders. Out of almost 40 000 (up from 30 848 in 2011) refusals of entry, Poland's share was 70% of this total.

The phenomenon of migrants detected for illegal stay on exit to Ukraine from Hungary or Poland also grew during 2012. This could be somewhat related to worsening job opportunities in traditional destination Member States for Ukrainian migrants (e.g. Italy, Spain and Poland). Hungary and Poland indicated that some detected overstayers had entered the EU as early as in 2003.

1. Background and methodology

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (Frontex) created the concept of Eastern Borders Conference (EBC) in August 2008. The EBC was designed as a regular activity/forum where specific challenges related to irregular migration at the eastern borders of the EU could be addressed by the FRAN (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) and the relevant neighbouring third countries.

By 2009 Frontex had signed cooperation arrangements with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus. Subsequently, Frontex proposed to set up a permanent Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), to be comprised of the competent Border Control Authorities from the four countries and the Risk Analysis Unit of Frontex. Additional agreements were later signed allowing for the establishment of regular information exchange and joint analytical activities: with Moldova in March 2009 (Cooperation Plan), with Ukraine in November 2010 (Mechanism on information exchange for risk analysis cooperation) and with Belarus in November 2010 (Memorandum on regular exchange of information and joint analytical activities). Importantly, the Russian Federation opted to stay out of the EB-RAN.*

1.1. Data collection and additional information

The core of this risk analysis consists of the EB-RAN and monthly statistical data from neighbouring FRAN members: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania (only common borders) covering the year 2012. There are five key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) detections of facilitators, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) refusals of entry and (5) asylum applications. The last indicator used in previous reports (detections of false documents) is now covered by the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) with its statistical templates. Unlike previous years, instead of the FRAN indicator on the use of false documents reported by Member States, EDF-RAN templates are only reported by Member State BCPs, which resulted in a lower number of reported cases. In addition, this Eastern Borders Annual Risk Analysis (EB-ARA) will follow the notion of risk as defined by the updated Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM), introduced in 2012.

As the statistical data from the Russian Federation were not broken down by border section, they were used only as a background material.

All EB-RAN countries were addressed, prior to the expert meeting of 21 March 2013, with a Request for Information (RFI) covering the main risks defined in 2012 in accordance with CIRAM methodology. Answers were received from Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

Other sources were used, in particular, bi-monthly analytical reports from Member States, FRAN Quarterlies, Tailored Risk Analyses produced in 2012 and Frontex reporting from different Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex.

Open sources were also effectively exploited. Among others, these sources included reports issued by government agencies, EU institu-

* Even though the Russian Federation stays out of the Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network, whenever EB-RAN countries are mentioned in the report, the term covers Ukraine, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Belarus, unless otherwise indicated.

tions and international or non-governmental organisations.

This Annual Risk Analysis builds up on the knowledge from three Eastern Borders Annual Overviews from 2010–2012.

1.2. Quality of available data

Consistent with other law-enforcement indicators, variation in administrative data related to border control depends on several factors. In this case, the number of detections of illegal border-crossing and refusals of entry are both functions of the amount of effort spent detecting migrants and the flow of irregular migrants. For example, increased detections of illegal border-crossing might be due to an actual increase in the flow of irregular migrants or they may in fact be an outcome of more resources made available to detect migrants. In exceptional cases, an influx of resources may produce an increase in reported detections while effectively masking the actual decrease in the flow of migrants resulting from a strong deterrent effect.

Similar issues should be taken into account regarding the number of detections of cross-border crime at the borders. Higher numbers of detections at a particular BCP might indicate a surge in criminality, but may also be the result of more efficient border controls and/or the presence of specialists whose expertise in a certain area (e.g. the identification of stolen vehicles) may raise the number of detections.

The statistical data used for this analysis should not be considered as official statistics but rather as information management to support the planning of joint operational activities. The data might, therefore, occa-sionally vary from data published officially by national authorities.

The use of slightly adapted FRAN monthly statistical templates by EB-RAN countries created some compatibility issues between the FRAN and EB-RAN data sets. In particular, reasons for refusals of entry (Indicator 4) are standardised for FRAN members (Schengen Borders Code), but vary among EB-RAN members according to national legislation. Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (Indicator 1B), as reported by EB-RAN countries, should also be analysed with caution since they may also include figures on persons using forged documents (Indicator 6). It should also be taken into consideration that figures for illegal stay (Indicator 3) refer only to detections at the border on exit of persons overstaying in a particular country.

1.3. Application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model

A key development in the CIRAM update released in 2011 is the adoption of the management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and impact (see Fig. 1). Such an approach endeavours to emphasise risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within the constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment. According to the model, a 'threat' is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; 'vulnerability' is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat, and 'impact' is determined as the potential consequences of the threat. In this way, the structured and systematic breakdown of risk is presented in the risk assessment chapter.

Figure 1. **Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)**

RISK		
Threat	**Vulnerability**	**Impact**
Magnitude and likelihood	**Level of vulnerability (EU, Member State of entry/destination)**	**Level of impact of the threat (EU, Member State of entry/destination)**
Modus operandi	Border permeability (terrain, infrastructure, capabilities, flows)	Border and internal security
Who, where, when	Operational activities (staff, training, interoperability)	Ability to manage legitimate passenger flow at border
Trends and predictions (increase, decrease, stable, historical)	Effectiveness of countermeasures	Humanitarian impact
Push factors	Pull factors	
Routes (difficulty and distance), access to facilitation		

2. Situation at the common borders – the context

Table 1. **Summary of FRAN, EB-RAN* and selected Member States** indicators for 2012**

Indicator	EU Totals	EU MSs (eastern land borders only)	% of EU total	EB-RAN
Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	77 437	1 597	2.1%	3 702
Clandestine entries	591	5	0.8%	6
Facilitators	7 720	39	0.5%	96
Illegal stay	344 928	7 761	2.3%	32 373
Refusals of entry	115 305	39 749	34%	28 588
Applications for asylum	272 208	30 460	11%	271
False travel documents	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	236
Return decision issued	269 949	36 973	14%	n.a.
Effective returns	159 490	20 461	13%	n.a.

* 2012 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine
** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Figure 2. **EB-RAN and FRAN indicators – common borders**

Monthly applications for international protection reported by EB-RAN countries

Monthly detections of facilitators reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Monthly detections of illegal stayers reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Monthly applications for international protection reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Monthly detections of persons using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the territories of EB-RAN countries

Monthly detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Monthly refusals fo entry reported by EB-RAN and FRAN neighbouring countries

Source: WB-RAN and FRAN data as of 18 February 2013

General map of the region

Main BCPs between
EB-RAN countries and the EU

Regional borders

Common borders

Pan-European Transport Corridors

Storskog

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Niirala

Imatra

Vaalimaa   Nuijamaa

Narva   St. Petersburg

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REPUBLIC

Medyka   Korczowa

Vysné
Nemecké   Ubla
Záhony

SLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

Chişinău

Sculeni
Albita

ROMANIA

Galati

Moscow

Kiev

Ukraine
44.9

Moldova
**3.7**

Source: Open source data, ESRI geodata

Figure 3. **Common borders stretch from the Barents Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south**

2.1. Border controls

Regular passenger flows

The total number of regular border-crossings at the common borders was 69 million in 2012 (FRAN data). There was a significant growth recorded especially at some border sections between Members States and the Russian Federation. Depending on the border section, the main reasons for growth include the following factors: (a) increased visa issuance by Member States, (b) implementation of local border traffic agreements (LBTA), and (c) overall growth of shopping-related cross-border travel by both EU and EB-RAN country nationals.

The Polish-Ukrainian section remained the busiest common border with roughly 15 million border-crossings (+8%). However, here the number of border-crossings has not yet reached the level of the period before Poland's Schengen membership. At this border section, the peak volume of traffic was recorded in 2006 with 19.4 million border-crossings. Traffic volume dropped to 11.6 million in 2009, but the local border traffic agreement with Ukraine has now partially compensated for this drop. According to the latest data available from the Polish Border Guard, there were 4.3 million border-crossings made under the LBTA in the first three quarters of 2012 alone.

The Polish-Russian border recorded the most significant growth of +70% (4.1 million). Likewise, the traffic grew almost 30% in year-on-year terms at the Norwegian-Russian border (from a low base though). At both these border sections, local border traffic agreements (LBTA) came into effect during the summer of 2012.

Growth also continued at the Finnish-Russian border (+13%, 12 million), even though it was slower than in the previous year (+27% in 2011). Finnish visa issuance in the Russian

Figure 4. **Shares of different border sections on the total number of regular border crossings**

Source: ARA 2013, RFI for passenger data

Federation reached roughly 1.3 million visas in 2012, the majority of which were multiple entry one-year visas. However, the main long-term factor behind the growth of border traffic at Russian borders is economic growth and the rising purchasing power of Russian citizens that has facilitated foreign travel and cross-border mobility in general.

Therefore, the growth of border traffic was mainly driven by the increased border-crossing by Russian nationals making short-stay visits in Finland. For example, according to surveys conducted at the Finnish side of the border, 77% of the Russian nationals told that their reason to enter Finland was shopping. Indeed, it is estimated that Russian tourists spent over EUR 1 billion on goods and services in Finland during 2012.

The impact of customs regulations and changes to the prices of goods, such as petrol, on the volume of border traffic at some border sections is difficult to predict. By and large, judging on the increased visa issuance, local border traffic agreements and the growing number of Russian nationals

Regular passenger flows at common borders in 2012


Source: ARA 2013, RFI for passenger data

Figure 5. **Regular border traffic at the common borders**

obtaining passports for foreign travel (see box), there seems to be a potential for further growth of cross-border traffic at the common borders in 2013. There is also a potential for growth in regular passenger ferry traffic between St. Petersburg and Helsinki, and between Tallinn and Stockholm, facilitated in part by the 72-hour visa-freedom in the Russian Federation for cruise passengers.

Composition of regular passenger flows

There are significant variations between different border sections at the common border in terms of composition of passenger flow. The Polish-Belarusian border had the lowest share of EU nationals (11%) among the border sections. This is mostly due to two factors. First, there is a large volume of transit traffic going through this section, such as international railway connections from Moscow, via Minsk, to Poland. Second, this border section has the busiest lorry traffic among Polish borders with a million registered border-crossings, followed by the border with Ukraine (0.7 million crossings). Heavy lorries are mainly operated by non-EU nationals.

The Polish-Ukrainian border section recorded a 19% share of EU nationals. In this case, Ukrainian local border traffic users represent a large share of border-crossers (shopping tourism). At the Estonian-Russian and Finnish-Russian border, the share of EU nationals was almost 30% of the total regular traffic, at least partly due to the growing shopping-related travel by Russian nationals.


Source: Open sources

Figure 6. **Local border traffic agreements between eastern border Member States and neighbouring countries**

Interest in international travel grows in the Russian Federation

One important factor increasing the travel potential in the Russian Federation is the growth in the number of passports. The Russian Migration Service (FMS) informed that in 2012 Russians applied for and were issued about 7 million passports, of which 4.8 million were of the new biometric type. The FMS also confirmed that the first Russian passports with fingerprints would be issued starting from 1 July, 2013. However, the FMS continues to issue both the old type of passports valid for five years and the new biometric ones, which are valid for ten years.

While the total number of passports in the Russian Federation was estimated at only about 20 million just a few years ago, at the present issuance rate this number will more than double in less than a decade. The growing number of passports will strongly increase the potential for cross-border traffic towards the EU.

Figure 7. **Share of EU nationals within the total volume of regular border-crossings by border sections**

■ EU citizens ■ non-EU citizens

* http://www.mf.gov.pl/
documents/764034/1394761/
Biuletyn+za+I-
III+kwarta%C5%82+2012r

Increasing regular passenger flow – especially when connected to tourism – does not pose a security risk as such. However, the growth of traffic creates challenges for the infrastructure and personnel of BCPs. This requires efforts from the border authorities on both sides of the border to plan and coordinate resources and the development of infrastructure in the most efficient way.

Regular flow of goods

The economic growth of eastern border countries has resulted in an increased volume of imports, which in turn is reflected as increased cargo traffic at the common borders. In the Russian Federation alone the value of imports has grown from USD 76.1 billion in 2003 to USD 323.2 billion in 2011. The Russian Federation's WTO membership is expected to enhance its imports further in the long term. A large part of these imports are transported through Pan-European Corridors that connect the Western and Eastern Europe, as well as North and South via Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (see Fig. 3).

The data concerning the number of issued export goods' confirmations by Poland shows, for example, that of the total 1.4 million con-

firmations, the customs office in Biała Podlaska alone issued 0.75 million. The volume of 4 million vehicles crossing the Polish-Belarusian border includes 1 million cargo vehicles and 15 000 cargo trains. This border section has also the highest share of passenger trains at EU external borders (6 160).*

At the Finnish-Russian borders the number of lorries crossing the border has not yet reached the levels of 2008, when over 500 000 lorries with cargo left for the Russian Federation through Finnish borders. One of the main reasons is the expansion of major Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland, such as Ust-Luga, which have taken part of the traffic previously transiting through Finland straight to the Russian Federation.

Indeed, the Baltic will remain the Russian Federation's main sea route for foreign trade in the coming years, both in terms of imports and exports. The Russian Federation's Baltic ports already handle nearly half of the imports arriving by sea. Major capacity growth is expected in Ust-Luga as well as at the ports of St. Petersburg and Bronka. While the growth of traffic to Russian ports is likely to take some pressure off the land borders, it will increase the need for maritime cooperation between coast guards in the region.

Additionally, Baltic countries receive a significant volume of cargo traffic transiting to the Kaliningrad Oblast, using special permissions for border-crossing (Facilitated Transit Document and Facilitated Rail Transit Document). In both cases these documents introduced by Council Regulation (EC) 693/2003 allow direct transit overland to third-country nationals travelling between two parts of their country (which are not geographically contiguous).

As in the case of passenger traffic, cargo traffic at the common borders does pose a challenge to the capacity of different BCPs. Some

Figure 8. **Estonian example of web-portal indented to speed-up the customs checks and shortens the queues of lorries**

solutions to this challenge can be offered by technology: automated border checks, which have already been launched at some BCPs at the Finnish border with the Russian Federation, full use of possible advanced passenger information and web-portals allowing vehicles waiting for customs control to register in advance (see Fig. 8).

Enhanced cooperation and sharing of tasks between border guards and customs officers is another effective measure. At the Nuijamaa BCP in Finland this has made it possible to introduce 'one-stop-checks' of commercial and vehicle traffic, whereby one officer inspects both transported goods and travel documents (first-line checks). The use of common databases and information systems by the Customs, Border Guards and traffic police made the use of resources more efficient, while also increasing the speed of border checks.

2.2. Institutional factors affecting border controls

Increasing visa issuance

There were 5 556 941 short-term visas issued by Member States (excluding the UK and Ireland) in the Russian Federation during 2011.** The number represents a 24% increase compared to the previous year. This significant increase is similar to the increase of 28% observed between 2009 and 2010. In total, short-term visas issued in the Russian Federation accounted for 41% of all category C visas issued by Member States in 2011. Ukraine followed with 1 270 157 visas issued in 2011, marking an increase of 20% compared to 2010.

Finland issued by far the largest number of visas (1 182 876) in the Russian Federation, followed by Spain (699 815), Italy (579 492) and Greece (513 223). Poland was the biggest issuer of visas in Ukraine (369 893).

Visa liberalisation process

The EU is currently engaged in visa dialogues with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. As witnessed in the case of other LBTAs, important changes in the level of border traffic intensity can be expected should visa obligations be abolished for the three mentioned countries.

According to the European Commission, Moldova has progressed on its commitments related to the liberalisation of the visa regime. In case of Ukraine, the process has been delayed. However, the European Commission noted the legislative progress made by Ukraine in 2013.

Visa dialogue between the EU and the Russian Federation entered into an implementation phase of the Common Steps*, which were agreed on at the end of 2011. Field missions were implemented both by the EU and the Russian Federation. While the timetable leading to actual negotiations and to possible visa liberalisation is not yet determined, a preliminary analysis of its impact shows that visa liberalisation between the Russian Federation and the EU would be, up to this date, the single largest institutional change affecting the common borders.

Steady growth of traffic at the Finnish-Russian land border coupled with the recent figures from the Polish-Russian land border suggest that the potential for a further increase in regular traffic is substantial.

* For more information on Common Steps please visit http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2013/20130311_02_en.htm

** At the time of writing of this report data on EU visa issuance for 2012 were not yet available. Visa data are collected on the basis of the place where the application is made rather than the nationality of the visa applicant. Thus, for instance, applications made in the Russian Federation do not necessarily concern only Russian nationals. However, the data can be used as the most suitable approximation of the number of visas issued to citizens of that country.

In addition, the nature of the border checks would change since the vetting of travellers would become the full responsibility of border authorities. This would affect most border checks performed at those border sections that currently receive the most travellers crossing the border under visa obligation (i.e. Estonia-Russian Federation, Finland-Russian Federation).

UEFA Football Championship 2012

The UEFA Football Championship hosted by Poland and Ukraine in June-July 2012 was the most important mass sporting event affecting the common borders during that year. Both countries simplified border checks by the setting up of one-stop controls at the BCPs on the Polish side of the border to facilitate border-crossing for the supporters. Ukraine and Moldova launched a common operation and reported incidents to Frontex. Additionally, Ukraine, in cooperation with Belarus and the Russian Federation, prepared simplifications for passengers at its borders with these countries.

During the event the main challenges for border authorities were how to tackle problems with expected increases in regular traffic and how to prevent potential disturbances caused by supporters at the BCPs. Simplifications in border controls agreed between Poland and Ukraine ensured the smooth functioning of border checks for supporters going to the matches. In addition, the presence of Guest Officers from the countries participating in the sporting event had a positive effect on the supporters.

Similarly to previous experiences during other big sporting events, information from the Frontex-coordinated Joint Operation EuroCup 2012 suggested no increase in the number of incidents linked to trafficking in human beings or migrants trying to use false documents under the pretence that they were football supporters.

2.3. The main migratory movements in the region

There are two main migratory systems affecting both EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States in the area. They are driven by several factors, such as economic development, demand for labour, wage differences, geography and important historical or linguistic ties. Importantly, the first one attracts migrants to the Russian Federation, while the other draws migrants to the EU. These migratory movements are mostly legal, however, they do include irregular elements such as illegal border-crossing, illegal work, abuse of social benefits system and overstaying.

Destination: the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation remains by far the main destination country for CIS-country migrants. This preference may be explained by good work opportunities, close historic and linguistic ties, large migrant communities existing in the Russian Federation, cheap travel options and relatively easy legal entry into the Russian Federation.

The growth of the Russian economy and structural changes in labour demand have transformed the Russian labour market over the past decade. Sectors such as construction and services have grown substantially and are increasingly dependent on foreign labour, which is readily available in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, as well as in Moldova and Ukraine.

Estimates of the size of the foreign labour force (both legal and irregular) in the Russian Federation vary. The Russian Federal Migration Service puts the number of irregular labour migrants in the Russian Federation at 4 mil-

lion.* According to the OECD, irregular and temporary migrants make up roughly 7% (or about 4.25 million) of the Russian Federation's 75-million-strong workforce, a larger share than in any other OECD member country.

Pull factors for irregular migrants to seek employment in the Russian Federation are strong due to important wage differences between the origin and destination countries. For example, the average monthly income in Tajikistan was roughly USD 100 in 2012 (OECD data), while in the Russian Federation the average monthly wage was already over USD 800 in 2011. Moreover, many Central Asian countries are heavily dependent on exporting labour. According to Tajikistan's Finance Ministry, in 2012 Tajik migrants working in the Russian Federation sent home USD 3.8 billion in remittances, which is a 31% year-on-year increase and equals 47% of the country's GDP.

Russian migration policies have aimed to regulate irregular migration by introducing heavier fines for employers using illegal workforce, and long entry bans for migrants detected working illegally in the Russian Federation. In December 2012, compulsory Russian language tests were introduced as a precondition for receiving a work permit in the service sector (such as public utilities, trade and consumer services).

On the other hand, the New Migration Policy Concept adopted in 2012 does acknowledge the need of a foreign workforce in the Russian Federation and clearly aims at better and more simplified processes for regulating highly-skilled migration.

Destination: the EU

This migratory system is driven by the economic situation in the originating countries, seasonal demand for labour in the destination countries and wage differences between them. The destination countries in the EU can be divided into those in the immediate proximity (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and those hosting significant diasporas from Ukraine and Moldova (Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany). This distinction is important in terms of intended duration of migration, with those preferring neighbouring Member States clearly engaged in a more circular migratory pattern. Europe's economic crisis entered its third year in 2012 and a modest recovery is forecast for 2013: it can be assessed that the labour demand in many Member States will remain low, thus influencing labour migration from CIS countries.

Situation in major migration source and transit countries

■ **Georgia**

Georgia has become one of the most important source countries of irregular migration through the common borders. Recent migratory flows from Georgia to the EU seem to be driven by worsening economic situation in Georgia and increasingly limited options for Georgians to work and/or settle in the Russian Federation, traditionally their most popular labour migration choice. Official data indicate that Georgia has an economically active population of 1.95 million (labour force; GeoStat) and 295 000 unemployed. Although according to official statistics (GeoStat) the unemployment rate was 16.5% in 2011, some surveys point to much higher rates in reality.

When travelling towards the EU, most would-be migrants from Georgia transit through Belarus. The main reason for choosing Belarus as a transit country is the visa-free regime between Georgia and Belarus. Belarus is also the main transit country for Georgian labour migrants going to the Russian Federation due to non-existent border controls between Belarus and the Russian Federation.

The EU started to become a major migration destination for Georgian nationals after 2009, when some EU countries simplified labour regulations for workers. Many migrants from Georgia heading towards the EU also applied for asylum in the first wave of migration, very often claiming that they were discriminated against because of their religion (Yezidi). However, further interviews in Poland showed that such statements were unsubstantiated.

■ **Ukraine**

Ukraine is the central transit and origin country of irregular migration at the common borders. Migration for labour purposes is common in Ukraine and, similarly to Georgians, Ukrainian migrants target both Member States and the Russian Federation/Belarus. The main driver for migration is the difference in wages: the average monthly wage in Ukraine during 2012 was UAH 3 000 (~EUR 275).

Eurostat data suggests that almost 650 000 Ukraine-born persons were legally residing in the EU at the end of 2010. Almost 90% of them were registered in only six Member States: Italy, Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary and Poland. Higher wages, frequent regularisation programmes and a large diaspora are often mentioned as important factors for choosing these Member States as destinations.

The Zakarpatia region, with slightly more than one million inhabitants, is one of the regions with the highest share of labour migrants. Their preference is to migrate to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, due to language similarities with Ukrainian. The lack of employment opportunities in the border areas can also be considered as a factor enticing the local population to take part in smuggling activities and facilitation of irregular migration.

In 2007 Poland introduced a procedure that allows labour migrants from Ukraine (as well as Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Georgia) to work legally in Poland without the need to obtain a work permit. This simplified access to the Polish labour market is valid for no longer than six months within a 12-month period.

Ukraine also remained the main transit country for irregular migrants from Somalia, Afghanistan and Eritrea. Migrants from non-CIS countries mainly travel to Ukraine through legal travel channels with student, business or tourist visas, transiting from the Russian Federation and often also crossing the border between the Russian Federation and Ukraine illegally with the help of facilitators.

■ **Belarus**

Use of Belarus as a transit country for irregular migration has become increasingly common in recent years. In 2011 Belarus was an important transit country for Georgians due to factors such as the Belarusian visa-free regime with Georgia, lack of border controls at the Belarusian-Russian border, as well as good travel connections, i.e. relatively cheap flights from Tbilisi to Minsk (EUR 179 one-way flight by Belavia). In 2012 the route was increasingly used also by other nationalities, such as Afghans and Vietnamese.

An additional issue in Belarus appeared to be corruption, as reported in the media and acknowledged by the Belarusian president himself. As disclosed during a trial that begun in September 2012 in Poland, some officers of the State Border Service may have been involved in the smuggling of 1 300 migrants to Poland between 2000 and 2008.

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3. Annual risk assessment

This risk assessment is guided by the CIRAM working definition of risk as a function of three main components: threat, vulnerability and impact. A systematic examination of each component allows for classifying risks into categories of significance. Establishing a general context in which border authorities from EB-RAN countries and the neighbouring Member States operated during 2012 is therefore important for identifying the main border security risks.

To narrow down the selection, a detailed analysis of the available monthly statistical data (both FRAN and EB-RAN), Frontex operational data, bi-monthly reports and previous EB-RAN annual risk analyses was performed.

Each identified risk is described in detail. At the beginning of the section devoted to each risk, a summary risk table is added to offer a quick overview of the issues at stake.

The following three main risks should be considered:

1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods;

2. Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries;

3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries.

3.1. Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods

Risk name	Risk of cross-border smuggling and exploitation of green/blue borders as a point of entry for smuggled goods
Threat	Smuggling of tobacco, oil products and other excise goods to EU countries and trafficking of stolen vehicles on exit from Europe
Impact	Queues and safety measures at BCPs
	Loss of tax revenue, health hazard
Mitigation	Regular cooperation of Member States with EB-RAN countries; joint operations of border control authorities, customs services, police forces and EB-RAN countries targeted at dismantling organised crime groups dealing with smuggling of cigarettes and stolen vehicles.

3.1.1. Description of the threat

EB-RAN data, as well as information from Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations indicate that smuggling of tobacco products, trafficking in stolen vehicles and, to lesser extent, smuggling of drugs and petroleum products remain the most significant threat to border security at the common borders.

Smuggling of tobacco

Smuggling of tobacco products continues to be a lucrative business for those involved. According to the observations made during the Frontex-coordinated Joint Operation Focal Points Land 2012, the common borders are one of the most important entry points for smuggled cigarettes into the EU, followed by the Balkan Peninsula.

Available information from Romania, Lithuania and Poland suggests that most smuggled cigarettes are sold on the local markets (60–70%). This is supported also by a recent academic study* which suggested that the proportion of illicit cigarettes in the EU was higher among countries sharing a land or sea border with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus or Moldova. In this research the highest share of illicit cigarettes among EU countries at the common borders was recorded in Latvia (37.8%) and the lowest in

* Illicit cigarettes and hand-rolled tobacco in 18 European countries: a cross-sectional survey. Tobacco Control, published online first, 10 December 2012

Finland (1.9%). Interestingly, the study did not find any direct correlation between the price difference and the prevalence of illicit cigarettes. This suggests that other factors, including the ease and cost of operating in a country, industry participation, the level of organisation of the criminal groups, the likelihood of being caught, and the corruption levels are also important factors affecting the smuggling and marketing of illicit cigarettes.

Modi operandi of tobacco smugglers at the common borders remain quite diverse and it is difficult to assess possible changes in this respect. Smuggling methods range from operations carried out by individuals (the so-called 'ant smugglers') to large scale en-

Figure 9. **Tobacco smuggling by route**

Source: JO Focal Points Land

terprises involving organised groups using trains and lorries, where larger amounts of cigarettes may be hidden.

The JO Focal Points Land 2012 reported the highest number of smuggling incidents at the Polish-Belarusian border, followed by the Polish-Ukrainian border and the Romanian-Moldovan border. However, as the JO Focal Points Land 2012 has shown, border sections with the highest number of detected incidents did not necessarily record the highest amounts of smuggled cigarettes, i.e. at these BCPs the cigarettes were mostly smuggled in small quantities.

At some other border sections there are indications that tobacco smuggling through BCPs is getting more organised and the detected amounts of cigarettes tend to be larger. According to the Finnish Customs, detections of cigarettes roughly doubled in 2012 in comparison with the last year (42.5 million cigarettes). Smugglers typically hide their cigarettes in passenger cars. In one accident, as many as 250 cartons were found stuffed into the hollow structures of a passenger vehicle.

There are also cases of organised 'ant smuggling'. For example, a busload of people are given a carton each and ordered/asked to bring them 'legally' across the border, where they are reclaimed for further resale purposes.

Depending on weather conditions and the season, a variety of vehicles, such as off-road cars, horse carts or sleighs and snow scooters, are used for the transport of cigarettes to the vicinity of the border line, where they are subsequently carried to the other side. At border rivers, smugglers often use small boats or rafts and have GPS devices to track the delivery.

Cigarette smuggling case leading to several charges in Poland

The Eastern Borders Annual Overview 2012 presented a case from September 2011 reported by the Polish Border Guard where two lorries were discovered fully packed with smuggled cigarettes. In 2012, after a year-long investigation, Police Central Bureau of Investigation (CBŚ) charged 17 persons, all Polish nationals. According to the investigation, cigarettes worth EUR 15 million were smuggled in 2010–2012 from the Russian Federation, Lithuania and Belarus. The main destination was Poland and, to lesser extent, other Member States. CBŚ assessed that the criminal group's income was around EUR 400 000.

The investigation started after border authorities detected the first shipment in Suwałki in March 2011 in a lorry, which, according to the international consignment documents, was carrying colouring agents for tyres. In reality, the lorry was packed with cigarettes worth of EUR 1.3 million.

New developments

Considering the transport modality of smuggled cigarettes, there seems to be a shift

Smuggling of vehicles

OTHER 35%
BMW 25%
VW 19%
DAF 3%
OPEL 4%
TOYOTA 4%
LEXUS 4%
AUDI 6%

Source: JO Focal Points data

Figure 10. **The main routes used for the smuggling of stolen vehicles in 2012**

away from the use of passenger trains to cargo trains. While passenger trains were traditionally used for smuggling cigarettes in specially-built secret compartments, Member States bordering Belarus reported an increasing number of cigarettes hidden in loads of cargo (wood, coal). Belarusian media also indicated Latvia as the most common direction of such smuggling activities.

A new *modus operandi* was also identified involving the use of cargo planes. Namely, a crew of a Russian cargo plane smuggled about 4 million cigarettes to Finland on their weekly flights to the country during 2012, resulting in substantial losses in tax revenue.

The total number of detected cigarette smuggling cases at the green borders is unknown

but is believed to be considerable, especially at some border sections, such as the Belarusian border with Latvia and Lithuania. In the northern part of the common borders (Finnish and Norwegian borders with the Russian Federation) no detections of illegal border-crossing connected with smuggling were made. However, an increasing risk of smuggling by small pleasure or fishing boats was mentioned in connection to the blue borders in the Baltic Sea.

Organised crime groups have even resorted to creating purpose-built tunnels. In early July 2012, Slovak authorities discovered a 700-metre smuggling tunnel leading from the western Ukrainian town of Uzhgorod into Slovak territory. The tunnel was used for smuggling cigarettes. It was a sophisticated construction and contained basic railway tracks for

swift transportation of contraband under the border. During their raid, the Slovak police also seized 2.5 million cigarettes.

Further information received from the Slovak authorities contradicted initial media reports and confirmed that the tunnel had not been used for trafficking human beings or smuggling irregular migrants. The cigarettes seized during the police operation were intended for distribution in the Slovak market as well as in other Member States, primarily the Czech Republic and Germany. The investigation of two Slovak suspects is still ongoing.

Smuggling of vehicles

The main destinations for stolen vehicles, according to Europol, are the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Ukraine, Pakistan and North Africa. Destinations are strongly dependent on the organised crime groups composed of the nationals from these countries.

While vehicles were stolen across the EU, the Schengen Information System (SIS) indicated the highest number of vehicles were stolen in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy.

In the course of the JO Focal Points Land, 197 stolen cars, vans, lorries, trailers and motorbikes were identified through their vehicle identification number (VIN), with Volkswagen and Mercedes being the most popular brands. During 2012, the Polish-Ukrainian border section reported most of the cases.

The most commonly used *modus operandi*, like in the previous year, consisted in the use of falsified documents. This was followed by the smuggling of vehicles dismantled into parts, transportation of vehicles on a platform trailer or a train, abuse of lease agreements and, less frequently, altering the VIN.

Used cars smuggled from Lithuania to Belarus

In September 2012, the Belarusian State Border Service on its official website presented the case of the detection of five cars. The cars were detected while being smuggled through the green border from Lithuania to Belarus. The cars were not stolen and the reason for smuggling them through the green border was an attempt to evade tax and customs duties.

In the past two years Moldova has reported an increasing number of cars detected at the BCPs heading to Moldova with false notary documents or false registration documents. In the case of Moldova, cars with Lithuanian number plates were smuggled through the Russian Federation and Ukraine to Moldova.

In the course of 2012 Latvian authorities also reported an increased use of high-quality counterfeit vehicle registration documents at the border section with the Russian Federation. This method was employed by vehicle smugglers to circumvent duties payable upon import/export to Belarus, exploiting the absence of border and customs checks between the Russian Federation and Belarus.

As presented in Figure 10, the most common brands detected at the common borders on exit from the EU were Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes and Audi. Focal Points data also suggest a shift from luxury cars to cheaper compact cars, which were mostly stolen and frequently disassembled into parts. According to open sources, the top brands at the re-

gional borders (between Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation) were BMW, Volkswagen, Audi, Lexus and Toyota.

Smuggling of petroleum products

Smuggling of petroleum products is mainly reported both at the common borders and the Ukrainian border with the Russian Federation. *Modi operandi* used differ depending on the region: at the border with the EU smugglers, who are mainly EU nationals, carry fuel in additionally constructed fuel tanks, canisters or in tanker lorries. At the Ukrainian-Russian border fuel is mostly smuggled in barrels.

In 2012, Polish customs authorities detected a facility where Belarusian smugglers unloaded the smuggled fuel. The facility was protected by CCTV cameras and equipped with devices allowing for loading and unloading the fuel. Some 3 000 litres of fuel were found in the storage tanks. According to the Polish Organisation of Oil Industry and Trade around 5–7% of the total oil market in Poland consists of smuggled fuel.

According to Estonian sources, around 12 million litres of cheap petrol is smuggled each year from the Russian Federation to Estonia. In response to small-scale smuggling of petrol, Estonian Customs started to control persons who crossed the border to the Russian Federation most frequently during 2012. These measures implemented by Estonian Customs led to a 90% decrease (by mid-June 2012) in traffic linked to petrol smuggling.

Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of drugs, as indicated by the number of detected cases at common borders, remains relatively limited*. According to the UNODC, part of the drugs smuggled

* The number of detections made during the JO Focal Points Land at major BCPs was low in 2012. Only six cases (Terespol, Grzechotki and Narva) were reported (two cases of amphetamine, three cases of marihuana and one case of 256 g of hashish).

> **Heroin detected at the Polish-Ukrainian border**
>
> Ukrainian border guards detected 9.5 kg of heroin at the BCP Rava Ruska-Hrebenne at the end of May 2012. A Polish national, who was suspected of smuggling, explained that he was not the owner of the drugs and that he was travelling to Lviv to buy the tickets for the UEFA European Championship 2012. According to his story his van had broken down on the way to Lviv and was repaired there. The Polish national stated that he was unaware of drugs hidden in the fuel tank. The heroin, packed in 20 parcels, was attached to the inner walls of the fuel tank.

on the so-called northern route from Afghanistan and Tajikistan/Kyrgyzstan towards the Russian Federation are transported further across the common borders to the EU. However, there is no data available to Frontex that would allow assessing the extent of this phenomenon. The biggest shipment of heroin through the common borders was reported by Ukrainian and Polish open sources in May 2012 (see box).

On the other hand, the Russian Federation is a major destination for illicit drug trafficking from Central Asia. According to the Russian Federal Service for Control of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (FSKN), a total of nearly 4.5 tonnes of Afghan heroin and highly concentrated hashish were seized in the Russian Federation in 2011. The removal of customs barriers between the states participating in the Customs Union with the Russian Federation may have further facilitated the transport of illicit shipments through Central Asia to the Russian market.

The Russian Federation – and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Belarus and Ukraine – have become also destination countries for synthetic drugs (e.g. amphetamines) and cocaine smuggled from and through the EU. Interestingly, hashish is also smuggled to the Russian Federation transiting through EU countries. This is mostly due to the diversification of the Russian drug market and a growing demand for 'high quality' narcotics in the country.

The only border section, where drug detections seem to be more frequent is the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. According to open sources, 46 incidents of drugs smuggling, where mainly marihuana was smuggled from Ukraine to the Russian Federation, were detected from January to December 2012 at this border section. Most of the cases were reported in trains going from different Ukrainian cities to Moscow. The amount of detected drugs varied from 10 g to 4–5 kg. This may indicate that drugs arrive in Ukraine not through common borders with the EU, but directly to Ukrainian harbours or airports from which they are further transported to the Russian Federation. According to official Ukrainian sources, the amount of seized drugs grew in 2012 to 194 kg.

3.2. Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries

Risk name	Risk of significant irregular migration flows from non-CIS countries
Threat	Document fraud, abuse of legal travel channels, illegal border-crossing, new OCGs producing false documents
Impact	More second-line checks
	Staff redirected to surveillance
	Abuse of social benefits system
	Internal security problems
Mitigation	Focus on main identified *modi operandi*, cooperation with neighbouring countries and with destination countries on ongoing investigations against facilitators/OCGs

3.2.1. Description of the threat

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

In 2012, Member States reported 886 detections of illegal border-crossing by migrants arriving from non-CIS countries. All detections were made at common borders in the direction of the EU. In terms of yearly comparison, this represented a worrying 179% increase in relation to 2011 and additional 237% compared to 2010.

According to data from both sides of the common borders, the most active border section in 2012 was the border between Slovakia and Ukraine (+57% compared to 2011). This border section was followed by the Lithuanian-Belarusian border with (+242% compared to 2011), the Romanian-Moldovan border (+228% compared to 2011) and the Polish-Belarusian border (+568% compared to 2011).

There is no obvious single reason for the rise in detections in 2012. Rather, the trend was produced by a combination of factors that include more active facilitation networks (in Moscow and elsewhere), changes in border assets deployed (Belarus, see box) and several different pull and push factors depending on the detected nationality.

The northern end of the common borders (Finland, Norway) remained more peaceful in terms of illegal border-crossings. This is at least partly due to the close cooperation and efficient work of the Russian Border Service both at the border and the pre-frontier areas. Top nationalities of the migrants detected by Russian authorities were Syrians and Algerians (53%).

Main nationalities

Somalis and Afghans remained the main detected nationalities in 2012 accounting together for 47% of the total for non-CIS group on both sides of the common borders. However, two other nationalities emerged to account for 21% of all detections – namely Vietnamese (187 detections) and Bangladesh nationals (100 detections).

Somali nationals were the largest group of non-CIS migrants with numbers on both sides of the common borders up by 70% compared to 2011. However, Somalis were almost exclusively reported at the Slovakian-Ukrainian border (93% of all detected Somalia nationals on both sides of the common borders). Ukrainian border authorities stress that some Somali migrants were often detected repeatedly; sometimes the same migrant was

prevented from illegally entering Slovakia as many as three times.

Afghan nationals were the second most commonly detected nationality, with a 15% increase compared to 2011. In terms of routing, there was a partial shift away from Slovakian-Ukrainian border towards Belarusian borders with Poland, Lithuania and towards the Moldovan border with Romania.

The number of detected Vietnamese nationals grew significantly from 34 in 2011 to 187 in 2012, which made Vietnamese the third most commonly detected nationality in 2012. The Lithuanian-Belarusian border, the Estonian-Russian border and the Polish borders with Belarus and Ukraine were the most affected. Vietnamese migrants indicated Germany and Poland as their destination countries.

It is likely that some Vietnamese nationals may have worked in the Russian Federation prior to attempting illegal border-crossing into the EU. Low salaries and hard working conditions as well as problems with working permits may have contributed to their decision to leave the Russian Federation for the EU. Namely, Russian media reported cases of Vietnamese irregular workers detected

Diplomatic dispute between the EU and Belarus

In February 2012, an ongoing diplomatic dispute between the EU and Belarus escalated further. Ambassadors from Member States were ordered to leave the country soon after the EU had included an additional 200 persons from the Belarusian public administration on the entry ban list. A Belarusian foreign ministry spokesman later said that the ambassadors were no longer welcome in Belarus.

At the same time, the Belarusian State Border Service (SBS) received new duties during March 2012. It was tasked to prioritise the control of the traffic in the direction to Belarus and to relax the checks towards the EU. The new tasking resulted in a redeployment of State Border Service officers from the border with Poland to the one with Ukraine. As explained by the SBS, Belarus wanted to strengthen its border control with Ukraine during the UEFA Euro 2012. The dispute between Belarus and the EU affected local cooperation between border authorities of Belarus and the neighbouring Member States. Furthermore, at the beginning of April 2012, both Lithuania and Poland started to report increasing number of Georgian and Afghan nationals crossing illegally the green borders from Belarus.

Detected migrants stated that they had travelled on trains and/or buses from Afghanistan, via the Russian Federation (Moscow) to Belarus. In Belarus they were contacted by facilitators offering help with illegal border-crossing for USD 2 000–12 000.

Figure 11. **Comparison of monthly detections of illegal border-crossing by non-CIS nationals in 2011 and 2012 at the eastern land borders**

Source: FRAN data on Easter Border route, as for 13 March 2013

Top five non-CIS nationalities detected illegally crossing the common borders between BCPs


Source: FRAN data as of 20 March 2013

Figure 12. **The share of detections of given nationality at selected border sections in relation to the total number of detections of that nationality at the common borders**

in large clothes factories. In some cases they were confined to their working places and had no freedom of movement.

In September 2012, Belarusian media published news on a camp of irregular migrants from Vietnam. The camp was detected in a forested area close to the three-border section (Belarusian-Lithuanian-Polish) of Grodno region. Officers found a group of 36 Vietnamese persons, all around 30 years old. They had neither passports nor money. The Vietnamese had arrived from Moscow, travelling by regular buses.

The Romanian-Moldovan border was the main entry point for Bangladeshis, followed by the Slovakian-Ukrainian border. The rest of the cases were reported at the borders of Ukraine with Hungary and Poland. All detections of Bangladeshi nationals at the Romanian-Moldovan border occurred in the first half of 2012, after which the phenomenon stopped completely. Migrants had travelled legally to Moldova by air and subsequently contacted facilitators to illegally cross the border to Romania.

New developments

Ukraine remains the main transit country for non-CIS irregular migrants aiming to reach the EU through the common borders. However, there is a notable growth in the use of routes transiting Belarus to Lithuania and Poland and from the Russian Federation towards Baltic Member States.

Attempts of clandestine border-crossings by Vietnamese nationals at the BCPs should also be mentioned as a new phenomenon. In October 2012, Poland reported one case with three Vietnamese hidden in a lorry detected at the Polish-Belarusian border. The second case that involved two groups of Vietnamese detected at the border between Belarus and Poland was reported by the Belarusian media in December 2012. Four migrants were hidden under a lorry trailer, which they had most likely boarded at a service station. The second group of migrants was detected close to the road leading to the BCP in question.

European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network

Despite the recognised seriousness of document fraud, until recently there was no regular or consolidated information exchange among Member States and there were no overall analyses of trends in the field of document fraud at the EU level. To address this information gap and following on from the success of an earlier pilot study, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed in early 2012 to serve as a platform for information exchange among Member States.

The third significant development was a 47% drop (compared to 2011) of detected document fraudsters from non-CIS countries while trying to enter the EU across the common borders (from 1 106 in 2011 to 586 in 2012). Most continued to be nationals the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon. In addition to the drop, there was also a shift away from Russian to Ukrainian borders with Member States. The enhanced cooperation of Latvian authorities with their Russian partners as well as with the transport companies (railways) likely caused this shift.

3.3. Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries

Risk name	Risk of sustained irregular migration flows from CIS countries*
Threat	Document fraud, illegal border-crossing, abuse of legal travel channels
Impact	More second-line checks
	Rising demand for fraudulent travel and supporting documents
	Growth of informal economy
	Loss of tax revenue
Mitigation	Cooperation with neighbouring countries and with destination countries; allocation of resources; change of old surveillance systems to new ones or installation in locations where the surveillance systems are currently not present

3.3.1. Description of the threat

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

The prevailing *modi operandi* for the illegal border-crossing of migrants from CIS countries are very different from non-CIS nationals. They mainly cross the border in small groups (of two–three persons) or individually. CIS migrants also rarely use facilitation services; they are prepared and equipped with maps, compasses, change of clothes and they are able to communicate in Russian language.

There were 1 615 CIS nationals detected making an illegal border crossing at the common borders in 2012. The overall number, while 10% lower compared to 2011, hides significant variations among different border sections.

Among the common borders, the Lithuanian-Belarusian border was ranked first with 353 detections, followed by the Slovakian border with Ukraine with 290 and the Polish-Ukrainian border with 195 detections. The Latvian-Belarusian border reported the highest increase with a staggering 419% (135 detections) rise compared to 2011. The shift of this irregular flow from Ukraine to Belarus was mainly caused by Georgians using direct flights from Tbilisi to Minsk on their way towards Lithuania. Other sections that saw increases included the Estonian-Russian border and the Polish-Belarusian border.

Abuse of legal travel channels

Overstaying

Overstaying the validity of visa is a common *modus operandi* used by CIS migrants. Some 7 761 overstayers (mostly Ukrainians) or 12% more compared to 2011 were detected exiting the EU at the common land borders during 2012. The main affected border section was the border between Poland and Ukraine (+27% compared to 2011) and border between Hungary and Ukraine (+17% compared to 2011).

The most affected regional borders were those between Ukraine and the Russian Fed-

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False entry/exit stamps

Migrants travelling on this route often use falsified entry/exit stamps to conceal the fact that they had overstayed. They are mainly reported at the Polish and Slovak borders with Ukraine (together 67% of all detected false entry/exit stamps along the common borders in 2012). The main reason for falsifying these stamps is to fabricate evidence that the migrant had not overstayed on his/her last visit when applying for a new visa.

Visas issued to EB-RAN nationals in 2011 by issuing Member State

Russian Federation
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova

In circles total visas issued
by given Member State

1 195 315

FINLAND

POLAND

830 717

BULGARIA

639 592

ITALY

658 676

SPAIN

752 864

Source: European Commission 2012

Figure 13. **Visas issued in 2011 to nationals of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova by issuing Member State***

eration. All other regional borders reported a stable trend of detections of overstayers (6 361 in 2011 compared to 6 713 in 2012). Russians were the top nationality detected for overstaying on exit from Ukraine to the Russian Federation (a 52% share), followed by Azerbaijan, Armenia and Uzbekistan nationals (together a 38% share).

Detections of overstayers at Moldovan and Ukrainian airports increased by 32% compared to 2011 (from 9 100 in 2011 to 12 000 in 2012). The profile shows different nationalities with the most reported nationalities being Georgian, Uzbek, Armenian, Azeri, Chinese and Turkish.

Figure 14. **Asylum applications by Russian nationals in 2011 with the indication of the share of positive decisions issued by Member States**

Abuse of legalisation programmes

Different legalisation programmes in Member States may act as pull factors for irregular migration. For example, the 2012 legalisation in Poland produced a phenomenon which Polish authorities called 'amnesty tourism'. Legalisation conducted during first half of 2012 resulted in 9 500 applications for legalisation, mostly from Ukrainian nationals.

However, Poland reported that this number included nationals from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Egypt, who had travelled from other Member States (France, Belgium, Italy as mentioned in outcomes of one the inves-

tigations against facilitator from India), often lured by facilitators.

Obtaining visa under false pretences

Many migrants obtaining visas under false pretences come from CIS countries. There are companies and individuals in Member States who, in exchange for money, provide visa applicants (in Ukraine, for example) with necessary documents or even fictitious invitation letters. Member States' consular authorities in Ukraine seek to counter this abuse by strengthening the capacity of their staff at consular sections and improving the technical equipment needed to detect false supporting documents.

Statements received during second-line interviews with many Ukrainians who were refused entry to Poland suggest that their real destinations – mainly Germany, Italy or Austria – were almost always different to the one mentioned in their visa application. Refusals of entry at the external border of the EU are therefore a good indication of the extent of this type of abuse.

Refusals of entry

In 2012, the number of refusals issued by Member States at common borders increased (39 749) after two years of decline. This was mostly due to a sharp 49% increase in refusals of entry issued by Poland. Ukrainian nationals were, like in previous years, the top nationality refused entry in 2012 (16 668 or 42% of total). The most common reason for refusal of entry was a lack of appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay.

Georgian nationals, ranking second with almost 8 900 refusals of entry, were mainly trying to enter Member States without proper documents (lack of visa or residence permits; 7 365 refused in 2012), followed by those who were refused due to alerts in databases (roughly 1 150). As reported by several Member States, the actual number of persons refused entry is lower given that Georgians often engage in multiple unsuccessful attempts to enter the EU. In response, many Georgians subsequently opt to attempt illegal border-crossing or submit asylum applications.

Russian nationals, who were the third most often refused nationality at the common borders (7 000), were refused entry mostly due to a lack of proper documents (almost 5 400 refused). As in previous years, the peak of refusals started in August and lasted till the end of the year, indicating a possible link with seasonal work.

4. Outlook

Regular traffic

Regular traffic flows are likely to continue to grow in 2013, facilitated by visa issuance, local border traffic agreements and general rise of international travel in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Moldova. While the growth of regular traffic is not a threat as such, it does pose a challenge to the infrastructure and personnel of BCPs at common borders. To maintain efficient border checks and at the same time keep bona fide traffic smooth will be increasingly a challenge for border control authorities in 2013 and 2014.

Cross-border crime

Price differences for certain excise goods like petrol and cigarettes will continue to drive smuggling activities. Other important facilitating factors will be (a) increasing level of organisation of different criminal groups, (b) corruption, and (c) high unemployment in many regions adjacent to the common borders.

The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus will remain important markets for stolen vehicles. The methods of smuggling vehicles from the EU will vary greatly and will adapt to mitigation measures taken at different borders.

Heroin trafficking on route from Afghanistan towards the Russian Federation and further westwards is likely to grow, driven by demand in the Russian Federation and the EU.

Irregular migration

Facilitators will be ready to use possible changes to border enforcement efforts to their advantage, as the diplomatic dispute and the following developments at the border between the EU and Belarus in 2012 showed.

High unemployment in the EU is likely to result in continuing return migration by Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals. The phenomenon will include use of false entry/exit stamps in attempts to hide overstay in the EU.

Geopolitical developments in Afghanistan, the Middle East (Syria), and Africa (Egypt, Mali) continue to create a general risk of irregular movements towards the EU. A small proportion of this flow is likely to use Ukraine, Belarus or the Russian Federation as transit points for onward movement to the EU. The actual size of it remains difficult to predict.

5. Statistical annex

Explanatory note:

Detections reported by Member States for illegal border-crossing between BCPs, illegal border-crossing at BCPs and refusals of entry are detections/refusals at the common land borders on entry only. For facilitators, detections at the common land borders on entry and exit are included. For illegal stay, only detections at the common land borders on exit are included. For asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are included.

For EB-RAN countries, all indicators – save for refusals of entry – include detections/applications on exit and entry at the land, sea and air borders.

Each section of the table (reporting country, border type, place of detection, top five border section and top ten nationalities) refers to total detections reported by EB-RAN countries and to neighbouring land border detections reported by Member States.

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type					
Land	6 149	5 731	5 257	99	-8.3
Sea	60	41	42	0.8	2.4
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	2 077	2 023	1 475	28	-27
Moldova	1 933	1 384	937	18	-32
Georgia	431	544	645	12	19
Russian Federation	677	590	510	9.6	-14
Somalia	127	201	342	6.5	70
Afghanistan	259	268	328	6.2	22
Belarus	237	266	198	3.7	-26
Vietnam	58	42	193	3.6	360
Bangladesh	3	15	100	1.9	567
Not specified	30	36	86	1.6	139
Others	377	403	485	9.2	20
Total	**6 209**	**5 772**	**5 299**		**-8.2**

Annex Table 2. **Illegal border-crossing at BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type					
Land	2 297	2 555	2 099	94	-18
Air	193	158	107	4.8	-32
Sea	0	37	30	1.3	-19
Top Ten Nationalities					
Ukraine	1 175	1 495	1 192	53	-20
Moldova	580	624	566	25	-9.3
Russian Federation	187	139	98	4.4	-29
Romania	42	77	73	3.3	-5.2
Tajikistan	118	90	53	2.4	-41
Belarus	62	37	43	1.9	16
Kyrgyzstan	99	81	34	1.5	-58
Not specified	49	29	24	1.1	-17
Poland	12	9	11	0.5	22
Georgia	10	8	10	0.4	25
Others	156	161	132	5.9	-18
Total	**2 490**	**2 750**	**2 236**		**- 19**

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection					
Land	248	160	124	92	-23
Air	13	6	9	6.7	50
Sea	3	0	2	1.5	*n.a.*
Top Ten Nationalities					**Reporting Country**
Ukraine	92	53	53	39	*0*
Russian Federation	24	17	14	10	-18
Moldova	29	13	10	7.4	-23
Lithuania	10	20	7	5.2	-65
Poland	16	10	6	4.4	-40
Belarus	4	3	4	3.0	33
Not specified	2	1	4	3.0	300
Germany	0	2	4	3.0	100
Georgia	2	0	4	3.0	*n.a.*
Estonia	0	0	3	2.2	*n.a.*
Others	85	47	26	19	-45
Total	**264**	**166**	**135**		**-19**

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Place of Detection					
Land	18 238	20 449	24 176	60	18
Air	12 387	11 809	14 013	35	19
Between BCPs	1 055	867	699	1.7	-19
Inland	102	613	678	1.7	11
Sea	477	565	568	1.4	0.5
Top Ten Nationalities					**Reporting Country**
Russian Federation	5 318	5 842	7 051	18	21
Ukraine	4 230	6 115	6 883	17	13
Georgia	6 110	4 976	4 187	10	-16
Uzbekistan	1 279	1 581	2 889	7.2	83
Azerbaijan	1 371	1 384	2 345	5.8	69
Moldova	3 556	2 538	2 139	5.3	-16
Armenia	1 312	1 480	1 677	4.2	13
Belarus	948	1 232	1 534	3.8	25
Turkey	711	777	1 359	3.4	75
Lithuania	814	894	906	2.3	1.3
Others	6 610	7 484	9 164	23	22
Total	**32 259**	**34 303**	**40 134**		**17**

Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Border Type					
Land	65 417	52 813	62 463	91	18
Sea	3 297	3 073	3 184	4.7	3.6
Air	2 840	2 657	2 690	3.9	1.2
Top Ten Nationalities					**Reporting Country**
Ukraine	18 823	16 303	19 182	28	18
Georgia	4 668	4 169	9 640	14	131
Russian Federation	7 652	7 506	9 226	14	23
Lithuania	2 472	3 942	5 259	7.7	33
Belarus	5 736	5 947	4 972	7.3	-16
Moldova	9 202	5 387	3 608	5.3	-33
Tajikistan	2 127	825	1 889	2.8	129
Armenia	1 667	1 014	1 217	1.8	20
Uzbekistan	6 272	1 930	1 169	1.7	-39
Not specified	711	793	1 085	1.6	37
Others	12 233	10 727	11 090	16	3.4
Total	**71 563**	**58 543**	**68 337**		**17**

Annex Table 6. **Applications for asylum**

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year
Top Ten Nationalities					**Reporting Country**
Russian Federation	6 019	5 074	6 801	22	34
Georgia	1 622	2 363	3 900	13	65
Afghanistan	2 478	2 438	2 936	9.6	20
Somalia	2 127	2 767	2 745	8.9	-0.8
Eritrea	1 728	1 266	1 224	4.0	-3.3
Syria	229	523	1 212	3.9	132
Iraq	1 216	1 116	1 170	3.8	4.8
Pakistan	283	484	966	3.1	100
Algeria	248	719	901	2.9	25
Iran	710	578	673	2.2	16
Others	8 218	6 867	8 203	27	19
Total	**24 878**	**24 195**	**30 731**		**27**

Annex Table 7. **Document fraud**

Document fraud by place of detection, type of document and country of issuance

	2010	2011	2012	Share of total	% change on prev. year	Highest Share
Place of Detection						Nationality
Land	268	193	139	59	-28	Ukraine (59%)
Air	167	135	96	41	-29	Moldova (18%)
Sea	20	8	1	0.4	-88	Philippines
Type of Document						Nationality
Passport	395	248	189	80	-24	Ukraine (45%)
Not specified	34	60	26	11	-57	Georgia (31%)
Visa	11	13	10	4.2	-23	Iran (40%)
Identity card	8	12	8	3.4	-33	Moldova (63%)
Residence permit	7	3	3	1.3	0	Moldova (67%)
Top Ten Nationalities						Nationality
Ukraine	258	139	91	39	-35	Ukraine (92%)
Moldova	81	47	33	14	-30	Moldova (91%)
Georgia	18	36	23	9.7	-36	Ukraine (52%)
Armenia	2	10	13	5.5	30	Ukraine (62%)
Turkey	10	20	12	5.1	-40	Ukraine (100%)
Syria	20	3	7	3.0	133	Ukraine (86%)
Russian Federation	15	11	7	3.0	-36	Moldova (43%)
Cameroon	3	3	5	2.1	67	Ukraine (80%)
Not specified	2	3	4	1.7	33	Ukraine
Iran	4	4	4	1.7	0	Moldova
Others	42	60	37	16	-38	Ukraine (70%)
Top Ten Countries of Issuance						Nationality
Ukraine	236	122	76	32	-38	Ukraine (93%)
Not specified	32	60	27	11	-55	Georgia (30%)
Romania	20	22	17	7.2	-23	Moldova (94%)
Turkey	3	14	13	5.5	-7.1	Turkey (69%)
Georgia	2	4	13	5.5	225	Georgia
Lithuania	16	11	8	3.4	-27	Ukraine (63%)
Moldova	30	10	8	3.4	-20	Moldova (88%)
Bulgaria	20	7	8	3.4	14	Turkey (38%)
Armenia	0	3	7	3.0	133	Armenia
Belgium	3	1	6	2.5	500	Congo (50%)
Others	93	82	53	22	-35	Moldova (15%)
Total	**455**	**336**	**236**		**-30**	

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