

# FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2015

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4







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QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2015



Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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Throughout the report, references to Kosovo\* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.



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## List of abbreviations used

<b>BCP</b>	border crossing point
<b>CIRCA</b>	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
<b>EDF-RAN</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>FAS</b>	Faroe Islands
<b>FIS</b>	French International Ship Register
<b>FOC</b>	flag of convenience
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>Frontex</b>	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
<b>GBP</b>	British pound
<b>GIS</b>	German International Ship Register
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ID</b>	identity document
<b>ICONet</b>	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
<b>ITF</b>	International Transport Workers' Federation
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>JORA</b>	Joint Operations Reporting Application
<b>n.a.</b>	not available
<b>Q/Qtr</b>	quarter of the year
<b>RAU</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
<b>SAC</b>	Schengen Associated Country
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>VIS</b>	Visa Information System

# Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore,

some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities of Member State border-control authorities undertaken to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.

Starting with the previous issue, the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit has implemented a

number of changes to present the analysis of migration related indicators in the FRAN Quarterly in a more concise and focused way. The first part provides a **Situational Overview**, broken down by main areas of work of border control authorities and police activities related to irregular migration.

- **Surveillance**, describing and analysing trends in detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs;
- **Border checks**, describing detections reported during checks at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles or refused entry);
- **Fraudulent documents**, describing trends and pattern related to document fraud at the border and in the EU;
- **Situation in the EU**, examining developments related to persons applying for asylum and those detected staying illegally, facilitators, return decisions and effective returns.

The second thematic part of the report consists of up to five featured analyses, examining trends and patterns of irregular migration in a more comprehensive manner. Eventually it is hoped that some of the featured analysis topics would be developed by external contributors (FRAN members, EU agencies and international institutions).

# Methodology

The current 28th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2015 and exchanged between 31 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN). The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly changes of eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2008. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end-of-year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 28th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 25 July 2015. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud at the external borders and on all international flights.

At the beginning of 2014, Member States started to regularly collect quantitative information on indicators related to secondary movements. In addition, in July 2014, Frontex organised a workshop for Member State experts to gather their expertise and analyse available data. Their input was essential for the analysis of intra-EU/Schengen secondary movements of undocumented migrants.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK and Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under categories of 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices: nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.


## Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, also to the analysts who compile analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

# FRAN indicators

## Q2 2015

Reported cases



In Q2 2015, all indicators showed increasing trends compared with the situation a year ago. Compared with Q2 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing at the external borders increased by more than 140% and the number of asylum applicants – by two thirds. In relation to the previous quarter all indicators except for illegal border-crossing at BCPs went up, which was traditionally expected after the winter months. Furthermore, five important indicators (asylum, apprehended facilitators, detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, illegal stay and effective returns) reached their **highest ever recorded levels** since data collection for the respective indicators began.

While the migratory pressure at the EU's external borders in general has further increased, its distribution among particular border sections has also been shifting. For instance, compared to other routes, the share of detections of **illegal border-crossing detected at the EU external borders with Turkey has substantially increased** and reached the highest level in FRAN data collection history. The increase was mostly reported from the Eastern Aegean Sea, where the majority of migrants were Syrian and Afghan nationals. Lesbos, Chios and Kos were among the most targeted islands.

Also **irregular migration on the Western Balkan route has reached its highest level** since Frontex started its data collection. After a substantial decline in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Balkans in March 2015 (which was mainly caused by fewer Kosovo\* migrants on their way to Western Europe), irregular migration flow

composed of Afghans, Syrians, Pakistanis and other non-regional nationalities has reached new record levels by June 2015. *Subsequent to the reporting period, the level of irregular migration on the Western Balkan route hit new records in two consecutive months (July and August).*

After the winter season, migratory flows **across the Central Mediterranean Sea have gained momentum**, exceeding the already high number of detections reported during the second quarter of 2014. The number of Eritrean migrants returned to the same level as one year ago, while the number of Syrians detected in the Central Mediterranean represented only around one-third of the level reported back in Q2 2014.


In the reporting period, **detections of illegal stay were almost 40% higher** than during the same quarter of 2014 and amounted to more than 140 000 persons reported in the EU/Schengen area, i.e. the highest number of detections of illegal stay since FRAN data collection began in 2007. Most persons detected for illegal stay were Syrians, Afghans and Eritreans. This composition of nationalities suggests that by and large they had previously entered the EU crossing the border illegally.

In line with the larger number of migrants illegally arriving in the EU, the figure related to detections of **facilitators of irregular migration has also reached the highest level** since FRAN data collection began. In Q2 2015, their number was around 20% higher than in Q1 2015. Among other reasons, this was due to more Syrian, Serb, and Albanian facilitators detected by Member States.

## Latest situation

## Trend

Monthly trends, January 2011 to June 2015




# Surveillance

## Routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's external borders, Q2 2015

**170 155**  
(68 867)

Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2014



FRAN data for the period between April and June 2015 shows an over twofold increase in overall detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period of 2014. With 170 155 detections in Q2 2015, Member States reported the highest number of illegal border-crossings since FRAN data collection began in 2007, clearly exceeding the previous record of more than 112 000 irregular migrants reported in Q3 2014.

### Strong increase in irregular migration on the Eastern Mediterranean route

In the second quarter of 2015, the number of irregular migrants detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route reached unprecedented levels. A record number of 68 178 illegal border-crossings were reported from the EU's external borders with Turkey, which represents an increase of over 380% compared with the previous quarter and more than 670% in relation to the same period of 2014. As much as 98% of the illegal border-crossings on this route were reported from the East-

ern Aegean islands. Around 58% of the irregular migrants were of Syrian nationality. The total number of Afghans also increased significantly, but their share of about a quarter of all detections has remained at the same level as during the previous 12 months.

### Influx of migrants from Turkey leads to secondary movements across the Western Balkans

Many irregular migrants who had arrived in Greece or Bulgaria decided to continue their journey across Western Balkan countries towards Western and Northern Europe. The numbers of persons detected illegally crossing the EU's external border from Serbia increased 12-fold compared with the same period in 2014 and by 5% compared to the last quarter, reaching the highest level since FRAN data collection began in 2007. Almost all apprehensions were reported by Hungary.

In contrast to last winter, the share of migrants from Kosovo\* and other Western


Balkan countries has shrunk to below 3% of all irregular migrants detected on this route. International cooperation and the common efforts of Member States, Serbia and Kosovo\* to prevent large groups of people from leaving the region and migrating to the EU has shown to be effective. On the other hand, already in June, the increase in non-regional migrants has by far exceeded the flow of persons from Kosovo\* recorded during the first quarter of 2015.

With 40% and 30%, Afghans and Syrians were the most detected nationalities of migrants detected on the Western Balkan route. Compared with the same period of 2014, the number of Syrians reported on this route has increased 20-fold, while the number of detected Afghans was 17 times higher than in Q2 2014. Notably, compared to one year ago, also the number of sub-Saharan Africans detected on this route has seen a sixfold increase to almost 1 900 detections during the reporting period, with Congolese and Cameroonians ranking top among African nationalities.



## Trend

### Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, 2014–2015




### Detection numbers in the Central Mediterranean exceed the exceptional levels of Q2 2014

With the end of the winter season, migratory flows across the Central Mediterranean Sea have gained momentum, exceeding the already high number of detections reported during the second quarter of 2014 (+13%). Compared to the previous quarter, the number of illegal border-crossings reported by Italy and Malta has increased almost sixfold. Compared to the second quarter of 2014, there were a number of changes in the proportion of nationalities.

On the one hand, the number of Syrians detected in the Central Mediterranean only represented around one-third of the level reported one year ago. For Syrians, the journey to Libya and Italy has become less attractive than the cheaper and less dangerous Eastern Mediterranean route.

## Nationalities



On the other hand, the number of detected sub-Saharan Africans was about 20% percent higher than in the same period of 2014. In particular, Nigerians were reported in significantly higher numbers. Moreover, irregular migrants from the Horn of Africa, in particular Eritreans, but increasingly also Somalis and Ethiopians, tried to cross the Central Mediterranean in higher numbers than one year ago.

### Steady increase in detections of irregular migration between Morocco and Spain

Although migration on the Western Mediterranean route remains relatively low, detections of illegal border-crossing have increased compared with both the previous quarter and the second quarter of 2014. There were 3 890 detections in the second quarter of 2015 – almost 40% more than during the previous quarter and 160% more than one year ago – which was the highest level of any previous second quarter since FRAN data collection began.

The fastest increase was reported in the case of Syrian nationals, whose detections surged during the reporting period, accounting for over 50% of all detections on this route. After substantial increases in the migration pressure at the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, the sea route has also gained more significance, with the number of detections roughly twice as high as in the previous quarter and the corresponding period last year. Large increases in detections were especially reported near the Spanish city of Almeria.

### Increased detections at eastern border

Detections of illegal crossings of the eastern external borders of the EU doubled compared to both the previous quarter and the second quarter of 2014. However, in comparison with other routes, the migration pressure at these border sections remains at a relatively low level of around 500 detections. The most significant rise was reported from the border with Ukraine.

# Border checks

## Clandestine entries

**Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles), Q2 2015**

**Total: 804** (624)  
Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2014




## Refusals of entry

**Refusals per border type, Q2 2015**


(only values higher than 500 are stipulated)

Land (■)  
Sea (■)



**Total: 28 189** (27 135)  
Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2014

Air



**Trend of the total**

	Land	Sea	Air
Q2 2014	14 375	1 242	11 518
Q2 2015	15 439	1 318	11 432

### Long-term increase in migrants entering the EU hidden in lorries, buses and trains

In the second quarter of 2015, the total number of detections of migrants trying to enter the EU through BCPs clandestinely was about one-third higher than one year before, but at the same time around 25% lower than during the peak of the previous quarter. 804 persons attempted to cross the external borders of the EU hiding in lorries or trains between April and June 2015. Again, most clandestine irregular migrants were reported from South-East Europe, mainly attempting to enter the EU from Turkey.

Thus, most detections of clandestine entry (almost 90%) were once again reported by Bulgaria, through which a large share of the migratory flow transiting Turkey is channelled. The Bulgarian BCPs most affected by clandestine entries were Kapitan

Andreevo and Lesovo. Illegal border-crossing through BCPs was an option used by migrants who had previously attempted to cross the green border from Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria unsuccessfully or had been deterred by these countries' intensified police operations and surveillance of their external EU borders.

Moreover, many migrants decided to attempt a clandestine entry to the EU due to the fact that an illegal crossing of the Greek border river Evros was made difficult by the seasonal high tide at the beginning of the reporting period. The number of persons detected for clandestine entry is likely to stay at the current high level or even to rise in the future, as Bulgaria also announced its plans to extend the existing technical obstacle along its border to Turkey.

### Most refusals of entry issued to Ukrainian nationals

In Q2 2015, 28 189 refusals of entry at the EU external borders were reported, which is not a significantly higher number than both during the previous quarter and in the same period last year. A substantial increase of around 60% in relation to Q2 2014 was observed for refusals issued to Ukrainian nationals, 80% of whom were refused at the Polish border. The number of refused Ukrainians also increased at the Romanian, Slovakian, British and Lithuanian external borders. In most cases Ukrainians were not let into the EU because they could not present appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay.

Notably, changes in the number of refusals issued appear to be an early indicator for detections of illegal stay of Ukrainians in Poland. Since 2014, hikes in the num-



## Illegal stayers on exit

**Total: 15 405** (11 298)

Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2014


### Number of detections, Q2 2015

(only values higher than 300 are stipulated)

○ 500 ○ 10-100 ○ 1-10

Type of border section:

● Land ● Sea ● Air ■ no data



bers of refusal have been followed by increased detections of illegal stay with a 1–2 month delay.

The number of refusals issued to Albanians rose by more than 10% compared to the last quarter, especially at the Greek and Hungarian borders. The majority of Albanian nationals was refused because of an alert existing in the SIS or a national register. The increasing issuance of refusals to Albanian nationals is clearly in line with a general upward trend of Albanian migration, which is also reflected in an increasing number of asylum applications and detections of illegal stay. Refusals were also issued to a higher number of other nationals from the region, including Bosnian and Turkish citizens, especially by Croatia and Bulgaria/Greece, respectively. The stated reason for refusal was mainly a lack of appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay.

### Most illegal stayers on exit detected at German airports

During the reporting period, more than 15 400 persons were detected on exit from the EU or Schengen area without a permission to stay. The current level represents an increase of around 20% compared to last quarter. The FRAN data collection does not cover the reason for illegal stay, so the cases of illegal stay detected on exit include migrants who had either crossed the border to the EU/Schengen Associated Countries illegally, abused legal channels, or initially entered the EU/Schengen Associated Countries legally but no longer fulfilled the conditions of stay or residence.

In Q2 2015, most detections of illegal stay were related to persons leaving the EU through German airports. Compared to the same period in 2014, the reported number increased by more than one-

third. The increase was to a very large extent caused by Kosovo\* citizens trying to leave through German airports without a residence permit or a valid visa. In the whole EU/Schengen area, almost 1 100 illegal stayers from Kosovo\* were detected on exit, indicating a significant return flow after the winter season of those who had previously entered the EU illegally.




The highest number of detections of illegal stay on exit was related to Ukrainian nationals. A large majority of the almost 2 500 Ukrainians was reported from external land BCPs in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. The comparably low number of illegal border-crossings of Ukrainians indicates that most Ukrainian irregular migrants had entered the EU legally and then overstayed, or had entered the EU through the abuse of legal means, such as fraudulently obtained work or business visas.


# Fraudulent documents

## Detections (at external and internal borders)

**Number of detected fraudulent documents per Member State, Q2 2015**

Direction:  
 exit  
 entry

 150  
 50  
 10



### Increased document fraud detections on intra-EU movements

In Q2 2015, the overall number of document fraud cases reported in the EDF-RAN was only slightly higher than last quarter, reaching 6 054 detected documents. Compared to the same period of last year, however, detections decreased by 8%. This was mainly due to a substantial decrease in detections on entry from third countries, but fewer cases of document fraud were also reported on other travel directions. On intra-Schengen flights, the number of detections decreased from over 2 000 in Q2 2014 to below 1 500 in Q2 2015, after a winter low of just under 1 000 in Q1 2014.

The current decrease in false document use to board intra-Schengen flights compared with one year ago was primarily re-

lated to fewer Eritreans detected with false documents on flights from Italy to northern Europe. During Q2 2014, Member States reported as many as 751 false documents presented by Eritrean nationals who had previously crossed the external borders illegally and used fraudulent documents on secondary movements to their final destinations. During the reporting period, this number fell to 40 detections. A similar reduction can also be seen for Somali nationals. Fraudsters of both nationalities were mainly detected with Italian travel documents.


The number of document fraud detections made on movements from the Schengen area to the Common Travel Area consisting of the UK and Ireland were more than 88% higher than one year ago, reaching 1 134 cases. Most cases were related to Al-

banians attempting to reach the UK from the Italian airports mainly using Italian and Greek counterfeit travel documents. The number of Albanian and Ukrainian nationals presenting false documents travelling from France to the UK increased more than three- and sevenfold, respectively, compared to Q2 2014, together resulting in around 100 cases reported in Q2 2015.

### On entry from third countries, Istanbul top departure airport again

In the second quarter of 2015, the number of detections of document fraud on arrival in the EU/Schengen Associated Countries from third countries substantially decreased, falling by 15% compared to the same period in 2014. At EU level, of the 99 nationalities detected using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU

## Nationality of users



or Schengen area from a third country, the most commonly detected were Ukrainians (364), Syrians (197) and Moroccans (181).

As in the previous months, most detections were reported from air routes. At almost 200 detections, the number of detections of document fraud from Istanbul remained at the same level as in the previous quarter.

Syrian nationals remained the most prevalent nationality using fraudulent documents at the air border, although the number of related detections on flights from third countries was only half as high as during the same period of 2014 (135).

In Q2 2015, the embarkation country with the largest increase in detections compared to previous quarters was the Do-

minican Republic. Spain reported 80% of the nearly 100 cases of document fraud, stating the assumed nationalities of most of the document bearers as unknown, the Dominican Republic or Iraq.

### At land borders, most detections of document fraud from Morocco and Ukraine

As regarding land routes, the most targeted border section was that between Ukraine and Poland. The detected number of Ukrainians who attempted to cross the external land borders to the EU with fraudulent documents was more than two times as high as one year ago. Most cases were related to fraudulently obtained Polish visas presented at the BCPs at the Polish-Ukrainian section.


The number of fraudulently obtained visas presented at this border, however, might decrease in the long term, due to the recent launch of the VIS in Ukraine and legislative changes in Poland effective as of June 2015, which introduced a new template for invitations generated and stored in a central national registry (confirming the purpose of travel and justifying visa issuance).

Between Morocco and Spain, detections of document fraud decreased by nearly one third compared to both one Q2 2014 and Q1 2015. Syrian and Moroccan impostors, of whom relatively large numbers were detected during the last twelve months, have returned to far lower levels.

# Situation in the EU


## Illegal stayers

Number of detected cases, Q2 2015



## Facilitators

Number of detected persons, Q2 2015 compared with Q2 2014



In Q2 2015, detections of illegal stay were almost 40% higher than during the same quarter of 2014 and amounted to more than 140 000 persons reported in the EU/Schengen area. This is the highest number of detections of illegal stay since FRAN data collection began in 2007. Most persons detected for illegal stay were from Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea. As in Q4 2014, Germany, Sweden and France were the top countries for detections of illegal stay, reporting almost 50% percent of the total EU/SAC number, followed by Spain and Austria.

This particularly large number of detections is a consequence of the high migration pressure on almost all routes in the beginning of the summer season. Thus, most cases of illegal stay are indeed related to irregular intra-Schengen movements, which follow an illegal crossing of the EU external borders or a prior asylum application in another Member State.

### Most detections of illegal stay and asylum applications concentrated on top-reporting Member States


In Q2 2015, the number of detected undocumented Syrian nationals increased compared to last quarter and the same period of 2014, exceeding 23 000 detections. Most of these detections were made in Germany, leading to a number almost three times as high as one year ago. Detections almost tripled also in Greece, but on a lower level. The rate of growth shows to be most extreme in Hungary, where number of Syrian nationals detected for illegal stay increased more than 100 in Q2 2014 to more than 2 000 during the reporting period.

Also some of the lower ranking countries reported significant increases related to this nationality. An 16-fold increase to more than 200 detections was reported from the Czech Republic and a fourfold increase to over 120 detections from Ro-

mania. This trend may point to a future evolution of alternative intra-Schengen migration routes, avoiding increased police checks and cooperation along the traditional Western Balkans route and on its continuation across Hungary, Austria to Western European countries.

Subsequent to the reporting period, national police authorities reported several cases of overloaded vehicle transporting far too large migrant groups clandestinely. In mid-July, Austrian police freed 54 migrants from a van coming from the Serbian-Hungarian border. Several passengers were in a serious physical condition and needed medical assistance after the six-hour journey.

On 27 August, Austria reported a tragic case involving 71 people who suffocated due to a lack of oxygen in the storage space of an abandoned cooling van coming from Hungary.



### Asylum applications on the highest level of any previous second quarter

In Q2 2015, Member States reported more than 187 000 asylum applications, which is the highest number of any previous quarter since FRAN data collection began in 2007 and 65% more than during the same period of 2014. Two-thirds submitted their application in the top-three countries Germany, Hungary and Sweden. Hungary was also the country where the asylum indicator grew fastest (12-fold compared to Q2 2014). On the other hand, figures from Sweden were 16% lower than one year ago, when it still was the second-ranking asylum destination.

Syrians were again the top-ranking asylum nationality in the EU/Schengen area with more than 37 000 applications in the reporting period, which is by two thirds more than in Q2 2014. Afghan and Iraqi nationals submitted the highest number of asylum applications (23 408 and 10 340 respectively) since FRAN data collection began, being in line with the large migration flows of these nationalities along the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes. Although not reaching last year's peak level, also Eritreans resumed

to apply for asylum in higher numbers again, reaching almost 12 000 in Q2 2015.

While the record number of almost 50 000 asylum applications of persons from Kosovo\* in Q1 2015 has returned to lower levels during the reporting period, the number of Albanian nationals applying for asylum has been more than five times higher than during the same period of 2014 and reached 17 197 reported asylum applications. Compared to one year ago, the total number of asylum applicants from the Western Balkans, 87% of which were submitted in Germany, has more than tripled.

### Number of effective returns at the same level as in 2014

In Q2 2015, Member State authorities issued 72 168 decisions to third country nationals with an obligation to leave the EU following an administrative or judicial decision. This is 13% more than the in the previous quarter and 20% more than one year ago.

During the reporting period, almost 43 000 effective returns took place, which is 13% more than in the previous quarter, and almost the same level as dur-

ing the same period of 2014. In general, the increase was especially due to more Albanian nationals returned by Greece, more Ukrainian nationals returned by Poland and more persons from Kosovo\* returned by Germany. EU/SAC-wide, the number of effectively returned persons from Kosovo\* has increased from 1 782 in Q1 2015 to more than 3 396 in the reporting period.

### Record number of arrested facilitators

Figures related to detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been on the highest level since FRAN data collection began in 2007. In Q2 2015, 3 162 facilitators were apprehended, around 20% more than in Q1 2015. Most were of Moroccan, Spanish and Albanian nationality. Intensified investigations of Spanish law enforcement authorities in the activities of criminal networks smuggling large numbers of migrants from Morocco were apparently effective and resulted in an increased number of arrests. Also in Italy, the number of arrested facilitators has been far above the average of previous reporting periods. The majority of apprehensions in Italy were related to Italian and Eritrean nationals.



### Eastern Mediterranean route

# Record number of migrants arriving on Lesbos, Chios and Samos

- Increase caused by higher numbers of claimed Syrian and Afghan migrants
- Lack of reception capacity due to the extremely high number of arrivals in Greece

The way across the EU external borders from Turkey has been the irregular migratory route with strongest increase in migrant detections compared to one year ago. More than 65 000 illegal border-crossings were reported by Bulgaria and Greece during the reporting period, which represents a 690% increase in relation to the second quarter of 2014. *Subsequent to the reporting period, in July and August, almost 50 000 and 100 000 migrants, respectively, were reported from the Eastern Mediterranean route.*

The rise has been particularly significant in the Eastern Aegean Sea. The proportion of irregular migrants departing from the Turkish coast in contrast to illegal land border-crossings has never been higher since FRAN data collection began: 97% of all irregular migrants at the Eastern Mediterranean route have been detected at or near one of the Greek islands.

The increase has mainly been caused by higher numbers of Syrian and Afghan migrants trying to reach the EU. Before reaching the EU borders, many migrants have been waiting in Izmir for an opportunity to cross over to Greece.

Around a third of the migrants detected in the Eastern Aegean were detected on land, on the Greek islands, the other two-thirds at sea, close to the Greek maritime border. The migrants mostly used inflatable boats to reach Greek land. A detailed look at the situation in the Eastern Aegean shows that each of the most targeted islands distinguish themselves from each other in terms of the migrant profiles.

The island with the largest increase in irregular migration since the beginning of

the year has clearly been **Lesbos**. The island, located in the north-eastern Aegean Sea, is the third largest Greek Island and has a population of around 86 000 inhabitants. In the second quarter of 2015, around every fifth migrant having reached the European Union illegally has arrived through Lesbos. Of all Pakistani irregular migrants that have arrived in the EU illegally in Q2 2015, even more than 40% have reached the EU through the island.

In total, 29 016 irregular migrants have been reported from Lesbos during the reporting period compared to 5 165 in the previous quarter and 2 138 in during the same period of 2014. As long as the migratory pressure remains on this high level, the detention centre in Lesbos functions as a reception centre where medical assistance, registration and fingerprinting for the Eurodac system takes place.

Lesbos is not only targeted by an increasing number of Syrian migrants, also the share of Afghan and Pakistani migrants is higher than on any other island in the Aegean sea. The migrant nationalities distinguish themselves from each other in their routes towards Lesbos. Most Afghan migrants arrive directly from Istanbul or via Canakkale at departure areas north of Lesbos.

As opposed to Afghans, most Syrian and other migrants arrive from Izmir, which is the main hub for these nationalities coming from Istanbul or from Mersin.


The emergence of Izmir as a migrant hub also had a significant effect on **Chios**, the fifth-largest Greek island with a population of more than 50 000 inhabitants. During the reporting period, the level of detections of irregular migration was 14



© Frontex

Figure 1. Migrants having arrived on Lesbos

Figure 2. Islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea most targeted by irregular migrants coming from Turkey in Q2 2015



times higher than during the same period of 2014 and seven times higher than during the previous quarter. In comparison to Lesbos, the proportion of Syrian migrants among all nationalities was far higher, reaching 80%.

Unlike in Chios, the majority of the apprehensions in **Kos** took place at sea. Also Kos has seen an enormous growth in migration pressure. The number of detected migrants grew from 149 one year ago to 8 568 during the reporting period, of which 73% were Syrians and 14% Afghans.

**Samos** is insofar interesting as it is one of the few islands where the majority of migrants who arrived in Q2 2015 is of Afghan nationality. Prior to boarding rubber dinghies to Greek islands, migrants are transported by bus from Istanbul to Izmir

(around eight hours) and then taken by minibuses to rural coastal areas.

Not only on the three abovementioned islands, Greece lacks reception capacity due to the extremely high number of arrivals. As a rule, the Greek authorities release the irregular migrants after registration and let them travel onwards to mainland Greece, from where they move further mainly via Western Balkan countries towards their final destinations in the EU Member States.



Figure 3. On the street on the Greek island of Kos

### Western Balkans route

# Record number of Afghan and Syrian migrants trying to reach the EU from Serbia

- Migrants who have entered Greece and Bulgaria from Turkey try to reach Western EU Member States via the Western Balkan countries
- New Hungarian measures to reduce irregular migration at its border with Serbia

After a substantial decline in detections of illegal border-crossings on the Western Balkans in March 2015, which was mainly caused by fewer migrants from Kosovo\* on their way to Western Europe, irregular migration composed of Afghans, Syrians, Pakistanis and other non-regional nationalities has reached new record levels by June 2015.

In the second quarter, 34 775 detections were reported from the Member States bordering the Western Balkans, the highest number since Frontex started its data collection. The level of irregular migration on this route is 5% higher than during Q1 2015 and 24% higher than during the second quarter of 2014. *Subsequent to the reporting period, during the months of July and August another 35 000 and 50 000 migrants, respectively, were reported from the Western Balkans route.*

Most of the non-regional migrants detected on the Western Balkans route have previously travelled on the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey, mostly via the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands. An increase in migration pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean, as registered in 2015, usually also leads to a higher number of migrants detected at the EU's external borders with the Western Balkans.

As in previous months, nearly all irregular migrant apprehensions registered in the second quarter were reported from the Hungarian land border and the rest from the Croatian land border with Serbia. Most detections were related to Afghans, whose number was more than 16 times higher than one year ago and reached 13 940, followed by 10 134 persons from Syria.

The example of Syrian migrants shows an increasing preference for the less cost-in-

tensive journey from Turkey through the Western Balkans in contrast to the dangerous sea crossings from Libya to Italy. While during the second quarter of 2014, more than one half of all detections of Syrian nationals were reported from the Central Mediterranean sea, the share reached roughly only 8% during the reporting period. The remaining Syrian migrants chose to travel along the Eastern Mediterranean route and across South-eastern Europe.

Information obtained from interviews indicated that many non-regional migrants are aware of the pending changes in the migration and asylum policy announced by the Hungarian government (see box). Many of these migrants, especially Syrians living in Turkey attempted to enter the EU from the Western Balkans before these measures were adopted.

Prior to the measures taken by Hungary and reacting to this increasing pressure at its own borders (up to 3 000 illegal border-crossings from Greece per day), the authorities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia amended the Law on Asylum by introducing a new provision that allows irregular migrants to legalise their stay in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for a 72-hour period after they express their wish to apply for international protection.

These measures are likely to increase the migratory pressure on Serbia and its EU neighbours. This policy change also shows the abandonment of a credible border enforcement strategy in light of the circumstances of large and sustained migratory flows, which may lead to a possible domino effect of sometimes reinforcing, sometimes contradicting new policies and measures by each of the affected countries in the region.




© Hungarian Police

Figure 4. Afghan migrants detected by Hungarian police in August while walking along the highway M1 to Austria



Figure 5. Main subroutes used by non-regional migrants through the Western Balkans



### New legislative measures on migration approved by the Hungarian Parliament

On 6 July, the Hungarian Parliament has approved a set of measures addressing the increasing number of irregular migrants entering the country. The legislation provides the framework for the construction of a fence along the country's southern border with Serbia.

The law shortens the time frame for asylum decisions and will allow Budapest to reject claims from migrants from safe third countries or those who have passed through these on their journey.

The list of these countries is going to be drawn up by the Hungarian government. Moreover, the legislative package contains the following measures:

- The detention of the asylum seeker until a judicial asylum procedure is complete,
- The refusal of an asylum request for a number of reasons, including aiding, abetting, and perpetrating terrorist acts as well as the financing of terrorism,
- The limitation of the permission to stay in Hungary in case of repeated asylum applications,
- The obligation for the migrants to do 'everything in their power to identify themselves' in the absence of identity documents.

# Trafficking in Human Beings

## Human trafficking and labour exploitation on merchant vessels

- Trafficking on all types of merchant vessels including cargo ships, fishing boats and sometimes passenger ships affects thousands of victims
- Detection of potential victims extremely challenging due to the high number of regular seafarers travelling into the EU

In November 2014, *The Independent* published a story about a Filipino taxi driver who came to work on a fishing trawler in Northern Ireland. Before arrival to the UK, he had paid a trafficker more than GBP 2 000 (ca EUR 2 800) to secure a visa and work placement. The contract promised an attractive salary of GBP 700 (ca EUR 1 000) and 48-hour working week. However, once aboard the trawler, he realised that none of the recruiter's promises were true. He was forced to work up to 20 hours a day and was subject to verbal abuse if he did not work fast enough. Food was scarcely available and the living conditions were squalid and hazardous. He had no working visa in the UK and thus, he would have faced deportation if he had escaped to the mainland.

One day, he accidentally cut his finger at work and after requesting help from the skipper, he was abandoned in a Scottish port. Luckily, he found assistance from local charities. After two and half months of work on the fishing trawler, he had earned less than GBP 100 (EUR 143). His case is currently investigated by the Police of Scotland, and those involved in the exploitation are likely to face charges of human trafficking and slave-keeping.

According to various estimates, thousands of seafarers are trafficked for labour exploitation on merchant vessels each year. The European Union is also affected by the problem as several European member states are reporting about detections of potential and confirmed cases of trafficked seafarers. Victims of sea-based trafficking originate from many countries, but in largest numbers from the Philippines, Indonesia, China, Ghana, the Russian Federation and Ukraine – the world's main suppliers

of regular seafarers. Trafficking takes place on all types of merchant vessels including cargo ships, fishing boats and sometimes passenger ships. As with labour trafficking inland, trafficked seafarers are most commonly exploited with the methods of debt bondage, underpayment or non-payment of salaries, extremely long working hours, miserable and dangerous working conditions, confiscation of documents and restricted communication with the outside world. Most commonly, vessels employing trafficked crew are old, in poor condition and registered under flags of convenience (FOC) to countries with substandard employment rights.\* Some seafarers working on the 'modern slave ships' have died after their unseaworthy ships have sunk in the rough seas. Some of the reported incidents have taken place at the Black Sea, not far away from the EU territorial waters.

Maritime human trafficking is of concern to the EU external borders in several scenarios. Firstly, many seafarers are travelling from outside of the EU to embark on their ships at ports of the member states. Secondly, trafficking and labour exploitation is not occurring only in the international waters, but also on territorial waters of the EU member states. In the latter case, the seafarers would need an appropriate work visa to be legally employed in the member state. Thirdly, seafarers in distress on board are often trapped in their ships in the coastal waters of the EU as port authorities may refuse disembarkation of seafarers who lack appropriate visas or Seaman's Discharge Books. Often, traffickers confiscate the seafarer's documents to deter them from escaping. In several incidents across the EU, supported exploited and abandoned seafarers have been able to disembark and return home



Figure 6. Example of a seafarers' identity document from the Republic of Azerbaijan

only after an intervention for example by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF).

As in general with human trafficking, early identification of potential victims as part of the border control procedures can spare many seafarers from exploitation. Yet, detection of potential victims is extremely

challenging due to the high number of regular seafarers travelling into the EU each year. For example, based on the current state of knowledge, the majority of the trafficked seafarers are travelling with genuine – although in some cases, fraudulently obtained – passports and visas. Thus, document data are not – at least, on its own – sufficient to help with the

detection of possible victims. Rather, a combination of certain first and second-line indicators along with a specific type of personal history may be useful for detecting at least some of the potential victims. The following table gives an overview of the indicators within these categories.

FIRST-LINE	SECOND-LINE	PERSONAL HISTORY
<p data-bbox="185 878 411 904"><b>Travel documents</b></p> <ul data-bbox="124 936 464 1263" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Genuine passports with join ship or transit visas</li> <li>• Genuine passports with short-term visit visas</li> <li>• Contract Seaman's Discharge Books</li> <li>• Counterfeit Seaman's Discharge Books and counterfeit certificates of competence</li> </ul> <p data-bbox="134 1294 464 1321"><b>Declared purpose of travel</b></p> <ul data-bbox="124 1352 453 1608" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joining a ship (usually supported by a written and signed contract of employment from a crewing agency)</li> <li>• Work (also supported by a contract of employment)</li> <li>• Tourism</li> </ul>	<p data-bbox="571 878 963 904"><b>Conclusions from the interview</b></p> <ul data-bbox="564 936 970 1608" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is going to work on a vessel that is sailing under a flag of convenience*</li> <li>• Has paid a recruitment fee, bribe or any other type of payment (such as a fee for medical examinations) to the crewing agent or another party**</li> <li>• Is traveling to work with a short-term visit visa and has no transit visa or Seaman's Discharge Book</li> <li>• Final destination is not in the country that issued the Schengen-visa</li> <li>• Has not made the visa nor travel arrangements himself and is unable to say details about the travel documents (such as issuing authority)</li> <li>• Has weak command of English (apart from a few memorised statements)</li> </ul>	<p data-bbox="1123 878 1347 904"><b>Victim risk profile</b></p> <ul data-bbox="1059 936 1410 1442" style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Male in working age, 18–65 years old</li> <li>• In a low-paid profession, unemployed, underemployed or in wage arrears</li> <li>• Sole breadwinner in his family and under pressure to bring money home</li> <li>• Seafarers from Indonesia, Philippines and other East and Southeast Asian countries usually have no previous experience of maritime work (However, this is rarely the case with East European seafarers)</li> </ul>

\* The following countries and registers are declared as FOC according to the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF): Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba (Netherlands) Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canary Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Comoros, Curacao (Netherlands) Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Faroe Islands (FAS), French International Ship Register (FIS), German International Ship Register (GIS), Georgia, Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands (USA), Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, North Korea, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, St Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu

\*\* Ratifying member states of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers Convention (Revised) and Recommendation of 1996 shall 'ensure that no fees or other charges for recruitment or for providing employment to seafarers are borne directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the seafarer.' (Source: [http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS\\_008074/lang--en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_008074/lang--en/index.htm))



# STATISTICAL ANNEX

## LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 4 August 2015, unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and nationality at the external borders

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>All Borders</b>									
Syria	4 771	14 090	37 894	22 414	13 989	<b>54 923</b>	290	293	32
Afghanistan	2 054	2 916	7 854	9 308	6 862	<b>31 022</b>	964	352	18
Eritrea	1 837	17 008	13 712	2 029	1 081	<b>17 440</b>	2.5	1 513	10
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	619	11 093	12 139	2 490	428	<b>8 780</b>	-21	1 951	5.2
Pakistan	689	649	1 819	902	1 063	<b>7 793</b>	1 101	633	4.6
Nigeria	631	2 054	3 847	2 183	1 088	<b>7 436</b>	262	583	4.4
Somalia	1 297	1 906	2 282	2 191	1 664	<b>6 293</b>	230	278	3.7
Iraq	50	114	675	1 271	1 561	<b>5 321</b>	4 568	241	3.1
Sudan	133	715	1 862	842	332	<b>3 511</b>	391	958	2.1
Albania	1 505	2 239	2 372	3 207	2 033	<b>2 885</b>	29	42	1.7
Others	8 452	16 083	28 062	33 272	32 284	<b>24 751</b>	54	-23	15
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>22 038</b>	<b>68 867</b>	<b>112 518</b>	<b>80 109</b>	<b>62 385</b>	<b>170 155</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Afghanistan	1 362	1 062	2 181	4 840	4 308	<b>14 455</b>	1261	236	34
Syria	1 373	1 599	4 330	5 169	5 307	<b>13 675</b>	755	158	32
Albania	1 470	2 221	2 370	3 207	2 032	<b>2 878</b>	30	42	6.8
Pakistan	71	89	107	288	688	<b>2 803</b>	3 049	307	6.6
Iraq	41	80	292	526	1 182	<b>2 375</b>	2 869	101	5.6
Bangladesh	31	27	78	175	294	<b>746</b>	2 663	154	1.8
Palestine	29	92	361	502	272	<b>587</b>	538	116	1.4
Congo	31	66	19	22	55	<b>530</b>	703	864	1.2
Kosovo*	507	689	3 304	17 569	22 631	<b>515</b>	-25	-98	1.2
Iran	50	42	76	94	166	<b>364</b>	767	119	0.9
Others	2 187	1 745	1 468	1 496	1 819	<b>3 666</b>	110	102	8.6
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>7 152</b>	<b>7 712</b>	<b>14 586</b>	<b>33 888</b>	<b>38 754</b>	<b>42 594</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Syria	3 398	12 491	33 564	17 245	8 682	<b>41 248</b>	230	375	32
Eritrea	1 774	16 941	13 637	1 971	1 028	<b>17 295</b>	2.1	1 582	14
Afghanistan	692	1 854	5 673	4 468	2 554	<b>16 567</b>	794	549	13
Unspecified sub-Saharan nationals	619	11 093	12 139	2 490	428	<b>8 780</b>	-21	1 951	6.9
Nigeria	609	1 989	3 780	2 112	1 026	<b>7 124</b>	258	594	5.6
Somalia	1 223	1 827	2 242	2 148	1 547	<b>6 047</b>	231	291	4.7
Pakistan	618	560	1 712	614	375	<b>4 990</b>	791	1 231	3.9
Sudan	89	689	1 836	818	310	<b>3 445</b>	400	1 011	2.7
Iraq	9	34	383	745	379	<b>2 946</b>	8 565	677	2.3
Gambia	1 328	2 101	2 655	2 558	1 471	<b>2 436</b>	16	66	1.9
Others	4 527	11 576	20 311	11 052	5 831	<b>16 683</b>	44	186	1.3
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>14 886</b>	<b>61 155</b>	<b>97 932</b>	<b>46 221</b>	<b>23 631</b>	<b>127 561</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Border type</b>									
Land	301	589	949	1 133	1 102	798	35	-28	99
Sea	10	35	16	19	1	6	-83	500	0.7
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Syria	79	250	247	515	531	425	70	-20	53
Afghanistan	35	138	411	438	364	259	88	-29	32
Pakistan	10	9	12	32	41	34	278	-17	4.2
Algeria	9	52	41	18	15	28	-46	87	3.5
Guinea	10	17	25	14	28	14	-18	-50	1.7
Myanmar	2	25	39	17	3	12	-52	300	1.5
Iraq	4	6	5	70	98	8	33	-92	1
Morocco	6	9	1	0	0	6	-33	n.a.	0.7
Tunisia	3	9	1	1	4	5	-44	25	0.6
Georgia	0	3	1	0	0	2	-33	n.a.	0.2
Others	153	106	182	47	19	11	-90	-42	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>624</b>	<b>965</b>	<b>1 152</b>	<b>1 103</b>	<b>804</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-27</b>	<b>100</b>

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Place of Detection</b>									
Inland	1 178	1 932	1 742	1 976	918	1 436	-26	56.0	45
Land	227	215	465	307	1 086	1 184	451	9	37
Land Intra EU	249	170	195	197	306	252	48	-18	8
Sea	144	155	177	109	228	215	39	-5.7	6.8
Air	95	79	77	88	73	75	-5.1	2.7	2.4
Not specified	125	90	157	85	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Morocco	91	222	334	312	278	276	24	-0.7	8.7
Spain	117	167	110	116	177	183	9.6	3.4	5.8
Albania	87	96	94	136	123	158	65.0	28	5.0
Serbia	69	64	80	71	101	144	125	43	4.6
France	100	115	99	103	154	134	17	-13	4.2
Romania	58	61	85	71	100	113	85	13	3.6
Syria	62	100	109	127	68	113	13	66	3.6
Bulgaria	68	72	114	68	64	107	49	67	3.4
Italy	137	134	99	117	88	105	-22	19	3.3
Pakistan	74	70	61	58	67	99	41	48	3.1
Others	1 155	1 540	1 628	1 583	1 391	1 730	12	24	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 018</b>	<b>2 641</b>	<b>2 813</b>	<b>2 762</b>	<b>2 611</b>	<b>3 162</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100</b>

#### Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Place of detection</b>									
Inland	74 930	88 901	111 411	108 265	96 780	<b>124 531</b>	40	29	88
Air	6 998	6 931	10 199	9 661	8 485	<b>9 467</b>	37	12	6.7
Land	2 779	3 192	5 207	4 167	2 977	<b>4 473</b>	40	50	3.2
Land Intra EU	960	921	1 028	1 020	1 022	<b>1 256</b>	36	23	0.9
Not specified	32	726	530	1 084	862	<b>815</b>	12	-5.5	0.6
Between BCPS	1 792	128	176	64	291	<b>356</b>	178	22	0.3
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Syria	11 159	14 771	25 924	22 869	12 307	<b>23 367</b>	58	90	17
Afghanistan	4 866	3 741	6 141	8 645	7 920	<b>15 860</b>	324	100	11
Eritrea	2 220	12 072	13 677	6 508	3 734	<b>12 858</b>	6.5	244.0	9.1
Albania	4 483	4 688	4 733	6 379	6 603	<b>7 700</b>	64	17	5.5
Iraq	1 333	1 402	2 038	3 004	3 751	<b>7 240</b>	416	93	5.1
Morocco	6 123	6 082	6 595	6 529	7 076	<b>6 339</b>	4.2	-10	4.5
Ukraine	2 828	3 456	5 029	5 431	4 492	<b>5 427</b>	57	21	3.8
Pakistan	2 825	2 686	3 339	2 800	3 282	<b>4 572</b>	70	39.0	3.2
Somalia	1 620	2 512	2 663	2 390	2 206	<b>3 902</b>	55	77	2.8
Algeria	3 591	3 006	3 154	3 242	3 150	<b>3 202</b>	6.5	1.7	2.3
Others	46 566	46 522	55 534	56 604	56 013	<b>50 569</b>	8.7	-9.7	36
<b>Total</b>	<b>87 614</b>	<b>100 938</b>	<b>128 827</b>	<b>124 401</b>	<b>110 534</b>	<b>141 036</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>



Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry

Refusals reported by border type at the external borders

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>All Borders</b>									
Ukraine	3 181	3 854	5 201	4 578	5 393	<b>6 094</b>	58	13	22
Albania	2 980	3 343	3 028	3 650	3 327	<b>3 646</b>	9.1	9.6	13
Russian Federation	2 072	2 534	3 351	2 815	1 665	<b>2 181</b>	-14	31	7.7
Serbia	2 151	2 075	2 154	2 277	1 838	<b>1 665</b>	-20	-9.4	5.9
Belarus	1 116	1 191	1 470	1 394	901	<b>1 119</b>	-6	24	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 027	944	1 060	979	964	<b>1 023</b>	8.4	6.1	3.6
Morocco	1 392	1 063	1 122	862	998	<b>1 007</b>	-5.3	0.9	3.6
Algeria	643	753	623	711	716	<b>674</b>	-10	-5.9	2.4
Turkey	645	597	1 137	669	589	<b>670</b>	12	14	2.4
Brazil	605	620	451	637	709	<b>669</b>	7.9	-5.6	2.4
Others	9 445	10 161	11 545	12 781	10 324	<b>9 441</b>	-7.1	-8.6	33
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>25 257</b>	<b>27 135</b>	<b>31 142</b>	<b>31 353</b>	<b>27 424</b>	<b>28 189</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Ukraine	2 997	3 481	4 842	4 253	5 046	<b>5 704</b>	64	13	37
Albania	1 443	1 883	1 782	1 897	1 539	<b>1 903</b>	1.1	24	12
Russian Federation	1 718	2 048	2 818	2 429	1 378	<b>1 795</b>	-12	30	12
Serbia	1 933	1 852	1 978	2 105	1 633	<b>1 447</b>	-22	-11	9.4
Belarus	1 088	1 158	1 405	1 358	861	<b>1 086</b>	-6.2	26	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	986	912	1 014	931	907	<b>975</b>	6.9	7.5	6.3
Morocco	1 012	697	735	531	543	<b>603</b>	-13	11	3.9
FYR Macedonia	435	399	466	407	388	<b>381</b>	-4.5	-1.8	2.5
Turkey	218	261	779	376	258	<b>352</b>	35	36	2.3
Georgia	701	860	1 141	2 014	150	<b>281</b>	-67	87	1.8
Others	752	824	1 259	1 523	1 069	<b>912</b>	11	-15	5.9
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>13 283</b>	<b>14 375</b>	<b>18 219</b>	<b>17 824</b>	<b>13 772</b>	<b>15 439</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Air Borders</b>									
Albania	1 014	923	710	1 115	1 113	<b>1 113</b>	21	0	9.7
Brazil	602	606	439	628	706	<b>648</b>	6.9	-8.2	5.7
Algeria	624	724	602	692	697	<b>640</b>	-12	-8.2	5.6
USA	549	609	622	527	600	<b>386</b>	-37	-36	3.4
Not specified	445	375	326	522	339	<b>370</b>	-1.3	9.1	3.2
Ukraine	180	315	330	299	322	<b>362</b>	15	12	3.2
China	226	291	472	433	416	<b>353</b>	21	-15	3.1
Russian Federation	327	415	467	375	277	<b>349</b>	-16	26	3.1
Honduras	207	223	129	260	306	<b>318</b>	43	3.9	2.8
Nigeria	351	389	420	493	406	<b>306</b>	-21	-25	2.7
Others	6 434	6 648	6 948	7 006	7 208	<b>6 587</b>	-0.9	-8.6	58
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>10 959</b>	<b>11 518</b>	<b>11 465</b>	<b>12 350</b>	<b>12 390</b>	<b>11 432</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>-7.7</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Albania	523	537	536	638	675	<b>630</b>	17	-6.7	48
Morocco	153	145	172	101	133	<b>123</b>	-15	-7.5	9.3
Turkey	23	39	113	13	34	<b>77</b>	97	126	5.8
Tunisia	33	25	35	43	47	<b>57</b>	128	21	4.3
Russian Federation	27	71	66	11	10	<b>37</b>	-48	270	2.8
Syria	12	27	53	41	24	<b>32</b>	19	33	2.4
Algeria	14	23	18	17	18	<b>31</b>	35	72	2.4
India	14	13	34	22	27	<b>29</b>	123	7.4	2.2
Ukraine	4	58	29	26	25	<b>28</b>	-52	12	2.1
Afghanistan	10	4	28	14	81	<b>28</b>	600	-65	2.1
Others	202	300	374	253	188	<b>246</b>	-18	31	19
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 015</b>	<b>1 242</b>	<b>1 458</b>	<b>1 179</b>	<b>1 262</b>	<b>1 318</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>100</b>

## Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2015 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>												
Ukraine	6 094	26	58	1 504	2	3 204	235	418	195	27	459	<b>6 128</b>
Albania	3 646	27	53	187	1	1 095	143	792	1 118	46	208	<b>3 670</b>
Russian Federation	2 181	29	3	1 326	1	303	82	102	51	228	124	<b>2 249</b>
Serbia	1 665	71	13	91	0	284	495	288	403	11	10	<b>1 666</b>
Belarus	1 119	27	0	470	2	123	46	251	23	85	101	<b>1 128</b>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 023	214	1	31	0	365	14	328	39	29	2	<b>1 023</b>
Morocco	1 007	276	18	226	18	123	5	58	184	89	11	<b>1 008</b>
Algeria	674	13	16	61	3	355	6	189	8	2	29	<b>682</b>
Turkey	670	64	3	379	6	79	64	26	19	8	24	<b>672</b>
Brazil	669	9	7	152	0	313	30	36	136	4	192	<b>879</b>
Others	9 441	608	367	2 504	174	2 913	263	548	473	115	1 889	<b>9 854</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>28 189</b>	<b>1 364</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>6 931</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>9 157</b>	<b>1 383</b>	<b>3 036</b>	<b>2 649</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>3 049</b>	<b>28 959</b>

\* Data for Austria and Belgium for June 2015 are not yet available

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

**A** has no valid travel document(s);

**B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;

**C** has no valid visa or residence permit;

**D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;

**E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;

**F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;

**G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;

**H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;

**I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.

Annex Table 7. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on			
							year ago	prev. Qtr		
<b>All Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	5 720	6 145	5 988	6 714	8 386	<b>9 157</b>	49	9.2	32	Ukraine (35%)
C) No valid visa	6 754	8 173	10 175	9 739	6 286	<b>6 931</b>	-15	10	24	Ukraine (22%)
Reason not available	2 730	3 291	4 487	4 264	3 926	<b>3 049</b>	-7.4	-22	11	Ukraine (15%)
G) No subsistence	2 574	2 789	2 538	2 969	2 857	<b>3 036</b>	8.9	6.3	10	Albania (26%)
H) Alert issued	2 904	3 106	3 302	3 370	2 694	<b>2 649</b>	-15	-1.7	9.1	Albania (42%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 806	1 575	1 941	1 897	1 615	<b>1 383</b>	-12	-14	4.8	Serbia (36%)
A) No valid document	1 669	1 657	1 753	1 254	1 150	<b>1 364</b>	-18	19	4.7	Morocco (20%)
I) Threat	662	749	648	694	711	<b>644</b>	-14	-9.4	2.2	Russian Fed. (35%)
B) False document	548	563	396	545	674	<b>539</b>	-4.3	-20	1.9	Ukraine (11%)
D) False visa	295	303	254	287	211	<b>207</b>	-32	-1.9	0.7	Morocco (8.7%)
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>25 662</b>	<b>28 351</b>	<b>31 482</b>	<b>31 733</b>	<b>28 510</b>	<b>28 959</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Land Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	2 184	2 431	3 030	3 043	3 954	<b>4 795</b>	97	21	31	Ukraine (63%)
C) No valid visa	4 763	5 437	7 490	7 505	3 804	<b>4 287</b>	-21	13	28	Ukraine (33%)
G) No subsistence	1 643	1 783	1 554	1 614	1 651	<b>1 897</b>	6.4	15	12	Albania (29%)
H) Alert issued	1 972	2 184	2 434	2 504	1 610	<b>1 668</b>	-24	3.6	11	Albania (41%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 258	1 211	1 578	1 519	1 156	<b>1 065</b>	-12	-7.9	6.9	Serbia (45%)
A) No valid document	958	838	921	558	542	<b>671</b>	-20	24	4.3	Morocco (38%)
Reason not available	7	185	665	570	640	<b>553</b>	199	-14	3.6	Ukraine (69%)
I) Threat	393	366	423	433	496	<b>441</b>	20	-11	2.8	Russian Fed. (46%)
B) False document	133	101	97	62	83	<b>108</b>	6.9	30	0.7	Ukraine (49%)
D) False visa	49	43	44	40	37	<b>25</b>	-42	-32	0.2	Morocco (20%)
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>13 360</b>	<b>14 579</b>	<b>18 236</b>	<b>17 848</b>	<b>13 973</b>	<b>15 510</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Air Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	3 320	3 447	2 674	3 444	3 987	<b>3 848</b>	12	-3.5	33	Albania (10%)
C) No valid visa	1 889	2 554	2 457	2 129	2 225	<b>2 316</b>	-9.3	4.1	20	Russian Fed. (7.9%)
Reason not available	2 605	2 912	3 617	3 507	3 148	<b>2 273</b>	-22	-28	20	USA (13%)
G) No subsistence	811	861	860	1 117	956	<b>985</b>	14	3	8.5	Algeria (19%)
H) Alert issued	623	707	599	627	675	<b>647</b>	-8.5	-4.1	5.6	Albania (34%)
A) No valid document	612	658	582	591	518	<b>542</b>	-18	4.6	4.7	Not specified (24%)
B) False document	401	453	279	467	486	<b>333</b>	-26	-31	2.9	Not specified (14%)
F) Over 3 month stay	486	353	349	377	444	<b>303</b>	-14	-32	2.6	Turkey (14%)
D) False visa	220	233	184	217	158	<b>168</b>	-28	6.3	1.5	Sri Lanka (7.1%)
I) Threat	246	353	185	230	190	<b>165</b>	-53	-13	1.4	Suriname (18%)
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>11 213</b>	<b>12 531</b>	<b>11 786</b>	<b>12 706</b>	<b>12 787</b>	<b>11 580</b>	<b>-7.6</b>	<b>-9.4</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Sea Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	209	267	284	227	315	<b>318</b>	19	1	24	Albania (70%)
H) Alert issued	259	215	269	239	299	<b>256</b>	19	-14	19	Albania (80%)
Reason not available	118	194	205	187	128	<b>214</b>	10	67	16	Albania (17%)
C) No valid visa	95	182	228	105	143	<b>184</b>	1.1	29	14	Tunisia (19%)
G) No subsistence	119	145	124	238	247	<b>151</b>	4.1	-39	11	Albania (95%)
A) No valid document	99	161	250	105	79	<b>118</b>	-27	49	9	Turkey (24%)
I) Threat	23	30	40	31	25	<b>38</b>	27	52	2.9	Albania (47%)
F) Over 3-month stay	62	11	14	1	13	<b>15</b>	36	15	1.1	Russian Fed. (47%)
B) False document	10	9	20	16	6	<b>13</b>	44	117	1	Syria (38%)
D) False visa	23	27	26	30	9	<b>11</b>	-59	22	0.8	Morocco (45%)
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 017</b>	<b>1 241</b>	<b>1 460</b>	<b>1 179</b>	<b>1 264</b>	<b>1 318</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>100</b>	

## Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Syria	18 001	22 259	40 752	40 240	28 987	<b>37 293</b>	68	29	20
Afghanistan	7 994	6 708	10 347	14 611	13 477	<b>23 408</b>	249	74	12
Albania	3 248	3 212	3 023	3 876	7 784	<b>17 197</b>	435	121	9.2
Eritrea	3 747	14 020	18 900	8 372	3 782	<b>11 924</b>	-15	215	6.4
Iraq	2 671	2 719	5 271	5 501	6 912	<b>10 340</b>	280	50	5.5
Kosovo*	2 093	1 839	5 473	24 066	49 213	<b>9 066</b>	393	-82	4.8
Pakistan	4 331	4 116	5 097	5 386	5 038	<b>7 524</b>	83	49	4
Nigeria	3 094	4 617	5 401	5 783	4 203	<b>5 612</b>	22	34	3
Not specified	3 737	5 988	9 658	9 621	6 069	<b>4 970</b>	-17	-18	2.7
Somalia	4 080	4 388	4 684	3 841	3 723	<b>4 773</b>	8.8	28	2.5
Others	40 945	43 463	55 464	59 418	52 363	<b>55 330</b>	27.0	5.7	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>93 941</b>	<b>113 329</b>	<b>164 070</b>	<b>180 715</b>	<b>181 551</b>	<b>187 437</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

## Annex Table 9. Document fraud

Fraudulent documents detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on			
							year ago	prev. Qtr		
<b>Border Type</b>										
Air	1 677	1 581	1 525	1 728	1 488	<b>1 292</b>	-18	-13	63	Not specified (20%)
Land	432	607	749	696	660	<b>703</b>	16	6.5	35	Ukraine (49%)
Sea	110	127	114	74	35	<b>40</b>	-69	14	2	Bolivia (35%)
Not specified	0	0	0	1	4	<b>0</b>	n.a.	n.a.		
<b>Top Ten Nationalities Claimed</b>										
Ukraine	109	132	160	118	152	<b>364</b>	176	139	18	Poland (79%)
Not specified	163	181	163	235	176	<b>267</b>	48	52	13	Spain (37%)
Syria	243	449	348	407	258	<b>179</b>	-60	-31	8.8	Spain (32%)
Morocco	143	120	282	222	194	<b>162</b>	35	-16	8	Spain (82%)
Albania	190	133	115	135	155	<b>90</b>	-32	-42	4.4	Spain (31%)
Iraq	62	32	87	157	55	<b>73</b>	128	33	3.6	Bulgaria (34%)
Sri Lanka	62	87	108	58	65	<b>72</b>	-17	11	3.5	Italy (65%)
Iran	57	56	75	75	110	<b>65</b>	16	-41	3.2	Spain (29%)
Nigeria	141	137	106	132	158	<b>55</b>	-60	-65	2.7	UK (56%)
Senegal	54	66	43	71	47	<b>35</b>	-47	-26	1.7	Spain (29%)
Others	995	922	901	889	817	<b>673</b>	-27	-18	33	Spain (22%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 219</b>	<b>2 315</b>	<b>2 388</b>	<b>2 499</b>	<b>2 187</b>	<b>2 035</b>	<b>-12</b>	<b>-7</b>	<b>100</b>	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
<b>Passports</b>	<b>1 120</b>	<b>1 271</b>	<b>1 233</b>	<b>1 331</b>	<b>1 157</b>	<b>978</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>42</b>
Authentic	357	458	449	424	428	397	-13	-7.2	41
Forged	474	481	529	571	481	357	-26	-26	37
No more details	115	137	79	127	92	101	-26	9.8	10
Counterfeit	157	182	144	180	128	94	-48	-27	10
Stolen blank	17	12	32	29	28	28	133	0	2.9
Pseudo	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	n.a.	0.1
<b>ID cards</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>13</b>
Counterfeit	109	122	126	157	107	129	5.7	21	45
Authentic	103	145	142	123	89	97	-33	9	34
Stolen blank	20	34	25	43	28	24	-29	-14	8.3
Forged	42	41	30	45	22	22	-46	0	7.6
No more details	10	17	16	59	12	11	-35	-8.3	3.8
Pseudo	1	1	1	3	8	6	n.a.	-25	2.1
<b>Visa</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>21</b>
Authentic	118	119	150	160	155	318	167	105	64
Counterfeit	172	194	236	234	263	130	-33	-51	26
Forged	42	40	38	34	31	26	-35	-16	5.2
No more details	19	18	10	20	12	13	-28	8.3	2.6
Stolen blank	3	2	6	1	10	8	300	-20	1.6
Pseudo	0	0	0	0	1	1	n.a.	0	0.2
<b>Residence permits</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>13</b>
Counterfeit	166	178	165	161	150	114	-36	-24	39
Authentic	112	102	110	82	91	108	5.9	19	37
Forged	28	19	26	48	39	35	84	-10	12
Stolen blank	67	35	42	45	35	24	-31	-31	8.1
No more details	11	30	36	41	17	14	-53	-18	4.7
Pseudo	0	1	1	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	
<b>Stamps</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>-27</b>	<b>-16</b>	<b>9.2</b>
Counterfeit	228	199	190	167	169	150	-25	-11	71
Forged	49	75	60	43	76	52	-31	-32	25
No more details	4	15	5	12	6	10	-33	67	4.7
<b>Other</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-31</b>	<b>-30</b>	<b>1.8</b>
Counterfeit	31	37	46	33	39	30	-19	-23	71
Authentic	13	11	10	11	17	4	-64	-76	10
Forged	4	4	6	4	3	3	-25	0	7.1
Stolen blank	0	0	1	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8
Pseudo	2	4	0	1	1	2	-50	100	4.8
No more details	0	5	0	10	0	1	-80	n.a.	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 474</b>	<b>2 718</b>	<b>2 711</b>	<b>2 868</b>	<b>2 538</b>	<b>2 312</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-8.9</b>	

Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr		
<b>Passports</b>	<b>1 120</b>	<b>1 271</b>	<b>1 233</b>	<b>1 331</b>	<b>1 157</b>	<b>978</b>	<b>-23</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>Not specified (22%)</b>
MAR-Authentic	17	134	102	148	108	69	-49	-36	7.1	Syria (77%)
FRA-Authentic	44	44	45	52	63	64	45	1.6	6.5	Not specified (47%)
MLI-Authentic	23	15	20	10	17	27	80	59	2.8	Not specified (74%)
SWE-Authentic	40	41	39	25	17	25	-39	47	2.6	Not specified (40%)
ESP-Authentic	32	41	39	34	38	23	-44	-39	2.4	Not specified (39%)
NGA-Authentic	10	11	6	15	14	19	73	36	1.9	Not specified (63%)
GRC-Forged	46	17	22	29	11	18	5.9	64	1.8	Syria (22%)
GBR-Forged	33	20	16	18	10	18	-10	80	1.8	Not specified (28%)
ISR-Counterfeit	7	49	30	70	64	17	-65	-73	1.7	Israel (35%)
SEN-Forged	12	21	18	34	26	17	-19	-35	1.7	Senegal (65%)
Others	856	878	896	896	789	681	-22	-14	70	Not specified (18%)
<b>ID cards</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Morocco (23%)</b>
ESP-Authentic	41	97	85	76	55	50	-48	-9.1	17	Morocco (66%)
ITA-Counterfeit	15	34	24	23	32	28	-18	-13	9.7	Morocco (21%)
ITA-Stolen blank	20	32	24	43	27	24	-25	-11	8.3	Albania (58%)
ROU-Counterfeit	5	14	4	17	13	18	29	38	6.2	Albania (39%)
GRC-Counterfeit	25	14	15	27	12	14	0	17	4.8	Not specified (43%)
BEL-Counterfeit	8	13	13	21	10	14	7.7	40	4.8	Morocco (50%)
FRA-Authentic	15	18	23	22	8	14	-22	75	4.8	Not specified (36%)
TUR-Counterfeit	3	0	19	11	1	10	n.a.	900	3.5	Iraq (40%)
FRA-Counterfeit	9	4	13	9	5	10	150	100	3.5	Algeria (30%)
ITA-Authentic	6	4	5	3	5	8	100	60	2.8	Albania (38%)
Others	138	129	115	178	98	99	-23	1	34	Albania (17%)
<b>Visa</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>Ukraine (51%)</b>
POL-Authentic	73	82	113	89	107	268	227	150	54	Ukraine (91%)
FRA-Counterfeit	45	41	42	99	51	28	-32	-45	5.6	Sri Lanka (43%)
ITA-Counterfeit	50	62	106	18	52	23	-63	-56	4.6	Sri Lanka (43%)
DEU-Counterfeit	24	37	36	37	10	19	-49	90	3.8	Iraq (37%)
FRA-Authentic	15	9	10	24	13	18	100	38	3.6	Not specified (44%)
ESP-Counterfeit	17	16	21	28	35	12	-25	-66	2.4	Dominican Republic (25%)
ESP-Forged	2	5	1	5	4	9	80	125	1.8	Dominican Republic (44%)
ITA-Forged	6	18	11	15	15	8	-56	-47	1.6	Iran (38%)
LVA-Authentic	0	0	0	11	2	7	n.a.	250	1.4	Armenia (29%)
TUR-Counterfeit	0	0	2	0	1	6	n.a.	500	1.2	Not specified (50%)
Others	122	103	98	123	182	98	-4.9	-46	20	Ukraine (9.2%)

Total: see Table 11B

## Annex Table 11B. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr		
<b>Residence permits</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>380</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Not specified (20%)</b>
FRA-Authentic	40	38	34	23	23	42	11	83	14	Not specified (79%)
ESP-Authentic	28	19	33	30	29	29	53	0	9.8	Not specified (38%)
ITA-Counterfeit	29	40	20	24	32	24	-40	-25	8.1	Morocco (46%)
ESP-Counterfeit	39	35	45	29	28	21	-40	-25	7.1	Morocco (38%)
DEU-Stolen blank	10	12	8	7	16	14	17	-13	4.7	Syria (29%)
ITA-Authentic	17	13	10	9	15	13	0	-13	4.4	Not specified (38%)
DEU-Counterfeit	11	5	4	3	11	13	160	18	4.4	Iraq (46%)
BEL-Counterfeit	22	10	20	25	29	12	20	-59	4.1	Morocco (25%)
FRA-Counterfeit	5	18	21	12	8	10	-44	25	3.4	Tunisia (20%)
DEU-Forged	2	0	2	0	0	10	n.a.	n.a.	3.4	Iraq (70%)
Others	181	175	183	215	141	107	-39	-24	36	Philippines (10%)
<b>Stamps</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>-27</b>	<b>-16</b>	<b>9.2</b>	<b>Ukraine (34%)</b>
POL-Counterfeit	16	18	18	16	15	23	28	53	11	Ukraine (91%)
GRC-Counterfeit	106	92	60	64	57	22	-76	-61	10	Albania (68%)
SVK-Counterfeit	14	6	14	5	15	18	200	20	8.5	Ukraine (100%)
FRA-Counterfeit	9	12	12	11	7	13	8.3	86	6.1	India (23%)
HUN-Counterfeit	10	8	12	5	4	12	50	200	5.7	Ukraine (50%)
ITA-Forged	5	5	6	5	11	12	140	9.1	5.7	Albania (33%)
TUR-Counterfeit	14	5	7	1	9	11	120	22	5.2	Iran (36%)
POL-Forged	5	4	8	8	4	8	100	100	3.8	Ukraine (75%)
NLD-Counterfeit	3	1	0	1	6	8	700	33	3.8	Not specified (38%)
ESP-Counterfeit	7	8	5	14	6	7	-13	17	3.3	Morocco (43%)
Others	92	130	113	92	117	78	-40	-33	37	Ukraine (21%)
<b>Other</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>-31</b>	<b>-30</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>Ukraine (17%)</b>
ITA-Counterfeit	10	9	25	14	13	9	0	-31	21	Albania (44%)
CRI-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	Iraq (100%)
UKR-Counterfeit	4	3	1	0	2	2	-33	0	4.8	Ukraine (100%)
DEU-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	Syria (50%)
GTM-Counterfeit	0	0	0	2	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	Benin (50%)
SYR-Counterfeit	2	0	0	0	2	2	n.a.	0	4.8	Syria (100%)
AUT-Counterfeit	0	0	1	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	Serbia (100%)
DEU-Counterfeit	2	0	0	1	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	4.8	Syria (50%)
UKR-Pseudo	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	2.4	Ukraine (100%)
USA-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	2.4	Iraq (100%)
Others	32	49	36	42	43	17	-65	-60	40	Ukraine (24%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 474</b>	<b>2 718</b>	<b>2 711</b>	<b>2 868</b>	<b>2 538</b>	<b>2 312</b>	<b>-15</b>	<b>-8.9</b>		

## Annex Table 12. Return decisions issued

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Syria	6 118	5 312	8 400	6 659	4 249	<b>9 807</b>	85	131	14
Albania	4 574	5 086	5 228	6 399	6 040	<b>6 540</b>	29	8.3	9.1
Morocco	4 621	5 184	5 414	4 570	5 442	<b>5 297</b>	2.2	-2.7	7.3
Afghanistan	2 585	1 883	3 553	3 840	2 447	<b>4 306</b>	129	76	6
Ukraine	1 817	2 164	3 180	3 865	3 260	<b>4 150</b>	92	27	5.8
Pakistan	3 919	3 448	3 238	3 112	3 374	<b>3 378</b>	-2	0.1	4.7
Iraq	786	618	727	1 161	1 340	<b>2 863</b>	363	114	4
India	2 581	2 593	1 822	1 864	2 227	<b>1 955</b>	-25	-12	2.7
Nigeria	2 042	1 820	1 658	1 615	1 741	<b>1 728</b>	-5.1	-0.7	2.4
Algeria	2 342	1 836	1 879	1 733	1 632	<b>1 585</b>	-14	-2.9	2.2
Others	33 201	30 375	30 117	27 051	32 091	<b>30 559</b>	0.6	-4.8	42
<b>Total</b>	<b>64 586</b>	<b>60 319</b>	<b>65 216</b>	<b>61 869</b>	<b>63 843</b>	<b>72 168</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>

## Annex Table 13. Effective returns

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Albania	4 514	6 225	6 639	9 064	5 733	<b>7 342</b>	18	28	17
Kosovo*	1 147	1 129	1 126	1 342	1 782	<b>3 396</b>	201	91	7.9
Ukraine	1 419	1 929	2 814	3 420	2 480	<b>3 297</b>	71	33	7.7
Morocco	1 822	2 228	2 281	2 264	2 288	<b>2 217</b>	-0.5	-3.1	5.2
India	2 140	2 211	1 601	1 657	1 995	<b>1 912</b>	-14	-4.2	4.5
Pakistan	2 798	2 427	2 132	2 252	2 167	<b>1 878</b>	-23	-13	4.4
Serbia	1 636	1 701	1 442	1 464	1 722	<b>1 751</b>	2.9	1.7	4.1
Syria	474	436	632	953	644	<b>1 738</b>	299	170	4.1
Russian Federation	1 838	1 692	1 775	1 347	1 166	<b>1 076</b>	-36	-7.7	2.5
Nigeria	1 168	1 085	1 042	1 054	987	<b>983</b>	-9.4	-0.4	2.3
Others	18 788	20 228	18 088	17 885	16 800	<b>17 151</b>	-15	2.1	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 744</b>	<b>41 291</b>	<b>39 572</b>	<b>42 702</b>	<b>37 764</b>	<b>42 741</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence



Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by to type of return and top ten nationalities

TYPE OF RETURN	2014				2015		2015 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
Forced	15 139	18 616	17 860	17 785	16 438	<b>18 993</b>	2	16	44
Enforced by Member State	12 055	13 156	12 823	12 384	11 039	<b>14 368</b>	9.2	30	34
Not specified	2 802	4 698	4 667	4 847	4 861	<b>4 090</b>	-13	-16	9.6
Enforced by Joint Operation	282	762	370	554	538	<b>535</b>	-30	-0.6	1.3
Voluntary	16 333	16 375	15 243	15 945	16 208	<b>17 553</b>	7.2	8.3	41
Others	9 629	10 046	8 778	9 035	9 629	<b>11 063</b>	10	15	26
Not specified	3 436	3 703	3 836	4 108	3 393	<b>3 407</b>	-8	0.4	8
IOM-assisted	3 268	2 626	2 629	2 802	3 186	<b>3 083</b>	17	-3.2	7.2
Not specified	6 272	6 300	6 469	8 972	5 118	<b>6 195</b>	-1.7	21	14
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 744</b>	<b>41 291</b>	<b>39 572</b>	<b>42 702</b>	<b>37 764</b>	<b>42 741</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>TOP TEN NATIONALITIES</b>									
<b>Forced</b>									
Morocco	994	2 021	2 070	2 073	2 104	<b>2 045</b>	1.2	-2.8	4.8
Albania	1 410	1 559	1 514	1 823	1 829	<b>1 936</b>	24	5.9	4.5
Syria	305	277	388	534	374	<b>1 595</b>	476	326	3.7
Kosovo*	577	699	683	749	731	<b>1 465</b>	110	100	3.4
Serbia	635	1 051	697	781	741	<b>930</b>	-12	26	2.2
Tunisia	680	802	873	693	579	<b>659</b>	-18	14	1.5
Algeria	699	829	565	718	627	<b>609</b>	-27	-2.9	1.4
Nigeria	627	594	647	620	602	<b>565</b>	-4.9	-6.1	1.3
Pakistan	689	801	711	741	636	<b>551</b>	-31	-13	1.3
Ukraine	242	363	346	394	348	<b>476</b>	31	37	1.1
Others	8 281	9 620	9 366	8 659	7 867	<b>8 162</b>	-15	3.7	19
<b>Voluntary</b>									
Ukraine	1 130	1 541	2 453	2 998	2 108	<b>2 798</b>	82	33	6.5
Kosovo*	569	430	443	593	1 051	<b>1 931</b>	349	84	4.5
India	1 554	1 517	999	1 041	1 367	<b>1 447</b>	-4.6	5.9	3.4
Pakistan	1 145	890	788	684	819	<b>905</b>	1.7	11	2.1
Serbia	987	637	731	665	979	<b>813</b>	28	-17	1.9
Russian Federation	1 367	1 223	1 356	1 072	905	<b>775</b>	-37	-14	1.8
Albania	430	439	521	623	651	<b>635</b>	45	-2.5	1.5
FYR Macedonia	269	287	263	229	339	<b>470</b>	64	39	1.1
China	811	783	443	354	494	<b>440</b>	-44	-11	1
Nigeria	489	478	383	417	358	<b>406</b>	-15	13	0.9
Others	7 582	8 150	6 863	7 269	7 137	<b>6 933</b>	-15	-2.9	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 744</b>	<b>41 291</b>	<b>39 572</b>	<b>42 702</b>	<b>37 764</b>	<b>42 741</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

## Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type

of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM-assisted and others) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.





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