

FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 3 • JULY–SEPTEMBER 2013

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





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List of abbreviations

BCP	border-crossing point
BCU	Border Control Unit
BSRBCC	Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation
CARA	<i>Centri di Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo</i> [Italian Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers]
CETI	<i>Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes</i> [Spanish Temporary Stay Centre for Immigrants]
CIRCA	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
CIREFI	Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration
CPB	Coastal Patrol Boat
EBGT	European Border Guard Teams
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EPN	European Patrols Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
EURODAC	European Dactyloscopy
Europol	European Police Office
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
fYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GPS	global positioning system
HNP	Hellenic National Police
IBSS	Integrated Border Surveillance System
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICONet	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
ID	identity document
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ITS	Italian Ship
JO	Joint Operation
JORA	Joint Operations Reporting Application
LBT	local border traffic
MS	Member State
n.a.	not applicable
nm	nautical mile
OCG	organised crime group
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SAR	search and rescue
SASEMAR	<i>Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima</i> [Spanish Maritime Security and Rescue Society]
SIS	Schengen Information System
THB	Trafficking in human beings
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollar
VIN	vehicle identification number
VIS	Visa Information System

Executive summary

In the third quarter of 2013 there was a massive influx of irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean. This, combined with sustained detections in the Ionian and Eastern Aegean Seas, meant that there were more detections of illegal border-crossing at the maritime borders of the EU than during any stage of the Arab Spring in 2011. Concurrent with this influx, there were more applications for international protection in the EU than in any other period since data collection began for this indicator in 2008.

In Q3 2013, Syrians were the most detected nationality at the EU level in terms of several different indicators of irregular migration, such as detections of illegal border-crossing (across several locations and border types), clandestine entries, illegal stay in several Member States, and document fraud at both the external border and on intra-Schengen flights. Syrians also submitted more applications for asylum than any other nationality. Hence, without doubt Syrians were the most common nationality reported for the FRAN indicators of irregular migration in Q3 2013 and there are few signs of this changing to any significant degree in the short or medium term.

Over the last few years there have been some extraordinary trends in the number of asylum applications submitted in the EU, in terms of: (a) the total volume of applications submitted; (b) the increasing concentration of applications submitted by the top nationalities; and (c) the increasing proportion of applications received by the top Member States. In 2011 there was an increase associated with the initial stages of the Arab Spring, as well as large numbers of applications submitted by nationals of the Western Balkan countries.

Over the last one and a half years there has also been a dramatic increase in the number of applications submitted by Syrians, and in Q2 2013 there were more applications submitted by a single nationality than ever before, i.e. Russian nationals of Chechen origin submitting applications in both Poland and Germany. Resulting from these effects, some of which are still detectable in the FRAN data, in Q3 2013 there were more asylum applications submitted in the EU than ever before, with an increasing concentration in the top three Member States: Germany, Sweden and the UK.

In Q3 2013, 42 618 detections of illegal border-crossing were reported at the EU level, which is very nearly double the number during the same period in 2012, and a fourfold increase compared to the beginning of the year. This dramatic rise was almost exclusively due to increased detections reported from the Italian blue border, specifically in Sicily and Lampedusa. The most commonly detected migrants were from Syria and Eritrea and, to a lesser extent, from Somalia and Egypt. In most cases, migrants arrived in boats from Libya but Egyptians departed from their own country. Across the region the use of large iron mother-ships, with smaller vessels for boarding and disembarking on tow, became more common. There were also increased detections of Syrians and Eritreans in Apulia and Calabria, and as a result, these nationalities ranked top at the EU level and detections of Eritreans increased more than any other nationality compared to a year previously.

Tragically, there were several major incidents of boats capsizing in the Central Mediterranean resulting in massive loss of life, including



women and children. Intelligence gathered during interviews suggests that migrants subject to frequent racial attacks are gathering in increasing numbers in Libya, and that the political stability and internal security in Egypt are both worsening. Hence, the migration pressure in the Central Mediterranean region is likely to remain at a high level.

After Sicily and Lampedusa, the next border section to be most affected by illegal border-crossings during the third quarter of 2013 was the Hungarian land border with Serbia, where detections have fluctuated dramatically throughout 2013 in response to a series of legislative changes aligning the treatment and detention of asylum seekers to EU standards; detections at this border section nearly doubled in relation to a year ago but were reduced by 50% compared to the previous quarter.

In Greece, where detections have tended to be concentrated in recent years, the overall number of detections of illegal border-crossing remained stable between the second and third quarters of 2013 but was still sufficiently high for Greece to be rank second among all Member States for this indicator. This is because Greece continues to be affected by two independent flows of irregular migration: at its borders with Turkey and Albania.

Until the launch of the Greek operation Aspidia in August 2012, the Greek land border with Turkey had for many years been the main entry point to illegally cross the border into the EU. Since then detections have dropped to negligible levels but have risen elsewhere, particularly at the Eastern Aegean Sea and on the Bulgarian land border with Turkey,

now ranking fourth and fifth among all border sections. In these locations detections increased going into the third quarter of this year, mostly of Syrians and, to a lesser extent, Afghans. In Bulgaria the 600% increase in detections of illegal border-crossing compared to a year previously was the largest increase at the EU level and was accompanied by an increase in asylum applications.

At the Greek land border with Albania, detections of illegal border-crossing remained stable compared to the previous year, almost exclusively involving Albanian circular migrants. Detections of Albanians using fraudulent documents to gain entry to Greece decreased in Q3 2013, but the number of Albanian refused entry and detected as illegal stayers increased to the highest level in Greece for several years. Given that Albanians were also widely detected in other Member States, particularly using fraudulent documents to enter the UK from the Schengen area, and as illegal stayers and subject to decisions to leave in France, the pressure of irregular migration from this nationality remains high.

Document fraud increased in the third quarter of 2013 both in terms of detections at the external border and also of migrants making secondary movements within the Schengen area, or attempting entry to the UK from the Schengen area. Spain, Italy, France and Greece reported the most detections on entry at the external border together accounting for more than half of all detections at the EU level. For the second quarter in a row Spain has reported more detections than ever before, the most common of which were Moroccans detected in either Melilla or Ceuta.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore some of the more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections, and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members and Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines, and the growing volume and complexity of data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.



2. Methodology

This, the 21st issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between July and September 2013, and exchanged between 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and so are not repeated here.

During the June 2010 FRAN Meeting, a proposal for a harmonised definition of the return indicator was outlined and several questions were presented in order to motivate discussion among FRAN members in view of establishing the regular collection of monthly return data by Frontex. Subsequently, an online survey of FRAN members was conducted to gather information and further motivate discussion to fine-tune the proposal for the indicator. The 11th FRAN report (Q1 2011) was the first to include analysis of Indicators 7A and 7B, and the definitions of these indicators are included in an annex to that report. Data collection commenced in January 2011.

The FRAN data-exchange has been in place since September 2007. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an in-

terest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a country template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 25th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end of year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 21st issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 25 October 2013. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with comprehensive analysis.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which was added as part of the regular data exchange within the FRAN at the beginning of 2011.

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud to illegally cross the external borders, and on all international flights.

The EDF-RAN data are checked for inconsistencies, and corrections are made to reported totals to bring them in line with reported breakdowns. Corrections are also made to any three-letter nationality codes not present in the reference ISO list of nationality codes.*

* <http://www.iso.org>

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active for at least a proportion of Q3 2013. Namely, for sea borders they

were JO Poseidon Sea 2013, Focal Points Sea 2013, JO EPN Hermes 2013, JO EPN Indalo 2013, JO EPN Aeneas 2013, JO EPN Minerva 2013 and JO EPN Hera 2013; for land borders – JO Poseidon Land 2013, JO Focal Points Land 2013, Project Coordination Points 2013, JO Jupiter 2013 and the Rabbit Exercise; for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2013, and JO Meteor 2013; and the return-related Project Attica 2013.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

Acknowledgements

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, and to the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

We are also grateful to Member State representatives who responded to requests for additional information on key topics and emerging trends.



3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1. **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2012			2013			2013 Q3	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on	
							prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	23 095	22 093	13 613	9 717	24 805	42 618	93	72
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	126	167	203	130	118	53	-68	-55
2 Facilitators	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	1 705	1 689	-1.3	-0.9
3 Illegal stay	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	80 125	85 608	-1.3	6.8
4 Refusals of entry	28 282	32 012	31 081	28 358	37 316	32 435	1.3	-13
5 Applications for asylum	59 576	73 769	86 109	72 850	85 362	97 207	32	14
7A Return decisions issued	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	53 586	57 583	-19	7.5
7B Effective returns	40 443	37 696	42 172	38 231	40 311	40 420	7.2	0.3

Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between second and third quarters



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013



4. Situational picture in Q3 2013

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Since the beginning of 2013 there has been a massive increase in detections of illegal border-crossing to a level even greater than that during the Arab Spring in 2011. Overall, there were 42 618 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is the highest number during any single quarter since 2008, very nearly double the number reported during the same quarter in 2012, and more than four times higher than at the beginning of the year. Most detections of illegal border-crossing were at the sea border of the EU, where irregular migration has not been at similarly high levels for five years. This level of illegal-border crossing represents a massive influx of irregular migration at the external border of the EU.

detections reported from the Italian blue border, specifically in the Central Mediterranean region. These detections were mostly of Syrians and Eritreans and, to a lesser extent, Egyptians and Somalis, arriving in boats to the Pelagic Islands (mainly Lampedusa) and Sicily. Tragically, in Q3 2013 there were several major incidents of boats capsizing in the region resulting in a massive loss of life including women and children. These events were widely reported in the media, and attracted a lot of political attention to the issue of irregular migration in the Mediterranean in general, including several statements released from EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, and her visit to Lampedusa with Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta* (see Section 4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route).


Elsewhere, in Greece detections remained stable between the second and third quarters of 2013 but remained at a sufficiently high level for Greece to rank second among all Member States in terms of illegal border-

* http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/news/archives/2013/10/20131008_en.htm

Similarly to the situation during the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011, this strong surge was almost exclusively due to increased

Figure 2. **Detections of illegal border-crossing increased dramatically in Q3 2013, almost exclusively because of boats arriving in the Central Mediterranean; detections of illegal border-crossing at the sea border of the EU were at the highest level for five years**

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013

crossings. The Greek land border with Turkey was for many years considered to be the main entry point for illegal border-crossing, until the launch of the Greek operation Aspida in August 2012. As a consequence of the operation Aspida, in nearby Bulgaria detections of illegal border-crossing have been steadily increasing. For example, between the second and third quarters of 2013 detections increased threefold mostly due to more Syrians and, to a lesser extent, Afghans and Algerians, detected at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey. This rise was associated with an increase in asylum applications in Bulgaria (see Section 4.2.4. Eastern Mediterranean route).


In Hungary detections of illegal border-crossing were more than three times higher than a year ago but down by a half compared to the previous quarter. This remarkable fluctuation in such a short space of time was due to a series of legislative changes affecting the treatment and detention of asylum seekers, which resulted in a brief but very significant and still apparent pull factor to the Hungarian land border with Serbia (see Section 4.2.1. Western Balkan route).

Figure 2 shows the evolution of FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections at the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. This figure clearly illustrates the huge increase going into the third quarter of 2013 and the fact that detections were mostly (69%) reported from the sea border, where detections have not been at a similarly high level since 2008.

As well as in the Central Mediterranean, there were also reports of increased pressure at other border sections. In Q3 2013, of the Member States that are subject to illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections compared to the same period in 2012. Figure 3 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing for ten

Figure 3. Of the Member States that are subject to illegal border-crossings, most reported increased detections, especially those in the Central Mediterranean (Italy and Malta) and those affected by flows of migrants entering the EU via Turkey (Bulgaria and Hungary)

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2012 and Q3 2013 for the top ten reporting Member States shown by size of circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods




Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013



Figure 4. **The massive influx of irregular migration at the European borders was mostly comprised of Syrians, Eritreans and, to a lesser extent, Somalis, Nigerians and Egyptians; the majority of each of these nationalities (59–97%) were detected at the blue borders of Italy**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2012 and Q3 2013 for the top ten nationalities shown by size of circle; gradient of the lines indicates the degree of change between the two reporting periods



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013


Member States during the third quarters of 2012 and 2013 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes). The biggest increase was reported by Bulgaria, where detections rose by over 600%, followed by Italy with an increase of more than 380%, and Hungary, where detections rose by more than 260%. Only in Greece were significant decreases reported compared to the same period in 2012. Each of these increases is dealt with in more detail in the relevant parts of Section 4.2. Routes.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these trends by nationality of the detected migrants at the EU level. Figure 4 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of the top ten nationalities during the third quarters of 2012 and 2013 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes). This clearly shows that detections of Eritreans increased the most in relative terms among all nationalities (tenfold) compared to the same period in 2012, but that Syrians were the most detected nationality. Also notable is the increased detections of migrants claiming to be from Mali; a sevenfold increase from below 150 in the third quarter of 2012 to over 1 000 during the current reporting period. Migrants claiming to be from Afghanistan have featured heavily across several indicators of irregular migration for the past few years, but in Q3 2013 they were less frequently detected illegally crossing the external border.

In the case of migrants claiming to be from either Syria or Mali there is some evidence to suggest that nationality swapping is becoming increasingly common, such that migrants from elsewhere are claiming to be from these two countries in order to increase their chances of being granted international protection, or at least to inhibit return procedures.

Figure 5. In Q3 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean rose to levels comparable with those last seen during the initial stages of the 2011 Arab Spring, while seasonal increases at other sea-border routes were much less apparent

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration route



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013

Sicily also saw a massive increase in the number of detected Eritreans particularly in Lampedusa. In fact, the total number of detected Eritreans on the main Central Mediterranean route (Sicily and Lampedusa) outnumbered the number of detected Syrians.

Elsewhere of the Central Mediterranean, detections of Syrians increased at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey probably in response to operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, and detections of Albanians increased at the Greek land border with Turkey. Nigerians were also detected in increasing numbers in Lampedusa and migrants from Kosovo* were still being detected at the Hungarian land border with Serbia.

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses, detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes, more accurately relating to regions of detection rather than linear routes taken. As illustrated in Figure 5, during the third quarter of 2013 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean ranked first among the main irregular migration routes, following a massive increase compared to the previous quarter and compared with every

other quarter over the past two years. There were also seasonally increased detections in the Eastern Mediterranean but to a much lesser degree compared to the same time in 2012, and compared to developments in the Central Mediterranean.

4.2.1. Western Balkan route

Western Balkan countries and their neighbouring EU Member States reported more than 9 000 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs. Importantly, the number

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Changes in data scope regarding the Western Balkans route after Croatia's entry to the EU

The scope of data for assessing the Western Balkans route changed after Croatia joined the EU in July 2013. First, Q3 data by Slovenia, which now has no external borders with third countries, is no longer included in the mentioned route. Furthermore, Slovenian historical data is also excluded in order to make the comparison with previous quarters analytically meaningful. Secondly, as Croatia-Hungary and Croatia-Slovenia border sections have now become internal EU-borders and are analysed as such.



Croatia less attractive transit country due to EUODAC?

As anticipated, after Croatia's accession to the EU the number of asylum applications in Croatia during the third quarter of 2013 dropped by 51% compared to the same period in 2012. This decline is most likely due to the fact that Croatia now records asylum seekers in EUODAC, which makes Croatia less attractive for the kind of misuse of asylum procedure as seen in before (asylum application followed by abscondment).

was 41% lower in relation to the previous quarter.

This sharp drop in detections was largely due to a 50% drop in detections made at the Hungarian-Serbian border compared with the previous quarter. The drop resulted from an amendment in Hungarian regulations considering the country's asylum procedure. The possibility for the detected person to move on further into the EU after applying for asylum in Hungary appears now to be more restricted than before the amendment. This led to a steep drop in the number of Kosovo* citizens detected by Hungary in 2013. As regards other nationalities detected by Hungary, the decreasing trend was less precipitous, but also significant.

Another factor contributing to the drop in detections against the previous quarter was the drop in detections reported by Greece at the Albanian border. However, this corresponds with the seasonal pattern of the second quarter usually seeing higher level of detections than the third.

Nevertheless, when the detections in the third quarter of 2013 are compared with the same period in 2012, the figures were still sharply up at the Hungarian border with Serbia (271%), which remained the busiest border section in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing. Similarly, despite a steep decline from the second quarter, there were still 13% more detections made in the region

as a whole as compared to the corresponding quarter of 2012.

As far as the situation in individual countries is concerned, sharply rising trends of detections in comparison with the previous quarter were reported by Albania (+163%), and Montenegro (+625%). The rise in detections in Albania was largely due to detections of Pakistani and Somali nationals in September. This may indicate a growing variety of routes of secondary movements from Greece to other EU Member States.

The rising trend in illegal border-crossings detected by Bulgaria at its border with Turkey also started to have an impact on detections at the Bulgarian borders with Serbia. Although the figures were still relatively low, there was a marked increase in detections at the Bulgarian-Serbian border between the first and the third quarter of 2013. The most commonly detected nationalities at this border section were nationals of Afghanistan, Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Syria and Ghana. Considering the continued increase in detections at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, the risk of secondary movements through Western Balkan countries, especially Serbia, is likely to grow.

As regards nationalities, over half of detections continued to be linked to migrants who had most probably entered the Western Balkans en route from Turkey and Greece (i.e. Afghans, Pakistanis, Syrians, Algerians, Somalis and Eritreans). However, there were clearly diverging trends considering different nationalities. The number of detections of Afghan nationals dropped to its low since 2010 (-36% when compared with the previous quarter and -75% compared with the corresponding period of 2012), which probably still indicates the difficulties in crossing the border from Turkey to Greece after the Aspida operation had been launched in August 2012. However, contrary to Afghans, the trend in detections of Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals was still rising when compared with the corresponding period of 2012.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

The number of detections of Syrian nationals was relatively stable compared to the previous quarter (+4.7%) but clearly higher when compared with the corresponding period of the previous year (+50%).

Even though the detections of West African nationalities showed a minor decrease after a steep rise during the second quarter of 2013, the detections of Nigerians clearly increased.

Among Western Balkan nationalities, Albanians were the most commonly detected with a 26% share of the total. The number of Kosovo* citizens – as already mentioned – dropped sharply (-79%) in comparison with the previous quarter in connection to developments in Hungary.

As regards the impact of Croatia's joining the EU, it does not increased the number of attempts of illegal entry from Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although there was an increase in detections (+25%) at the Croatian-Serbian border in comparison with the previous quarter, at the same time the figure was 80% lower than in the correspond-

ing quarter of 2012. Moreover, the detections were made mostly by Serbia. The rise in comparison with the previous quarter was due to a rising number of Syrian nationals detected by Serbia. Apparently, the route from Serbia to Hungary and the Schengen area is still preferred.


4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean increased staggeringly between the second and third quarters of 2013. Compared to detections during every other quarter in 2012 and 2013 the increase was both sudden and dramatic to a total of over 22 000 detected migrants (see Fig. 6). The main nationalities were Eritrean and Syrian, each with nearly 6 000 detections and together accounting for more than half of the flow. Also significant were detections of nearly 2 700 Somalis, around 1 800 Nigerians and 1 000 Egyptians. All of these nationalities were detected in much higher numbers than at any other time over the last two years, representing a massive surge of irregular migration at the EU level.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Figure 6. In Q3 2013 there was a massive influx of mostly Syrians and Eritreans in the Central Mediterranean area

Defections of illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean route (Pelagic Islands, Sicily) per quarter since the beginning of 2012 shown by bars (left axis). Also shows detections of the most common nationalities, Syrian and Eritrean (right axis)



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013



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Figure 8. **Iron boat from Egypt**

The Frontex JO Hermes 2013 began on 6 May and was extended till the end of April 2014. The aim of the joint operation is to implement coordinated operational activities for the purpose of controlling irregular migration flows and cross-border criminality from Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt towards the Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Sardinia. Compared to 2012, the operational area was enlarged to the southeast coast of Sicily. In order to receive operational intelligence, debriefing teams have been deployed in Trapani, in the

CARA centre of Mineo, in Syracuse and in Lampedusa.


During the last few weeks of Q3 2013, more than 2 000 migrants were detected per week, with the proportion of Syrians increasing to 60% by the end of the period (see Fig. 7). Most migrants departed from Libya, from the coastal area near Tripoli.

In October, for the first time two Syrian nationals arrived in Lampedusa after having departed from Tunisia. During their interview they stated that they had departed from Sidi Mansour, 141 nm southwest of Lampedusa, in a wooden boat together with 17 other migrants.

As well as migrants arriving from Libya, there were also significant numbers of Egyptians arriving in Italy in the Central Mediterranean region, but in this case departing from Egypt. Nearly 1 000 were detected arriving in Sicily during Q3 2013 (see Fig. 8).

Figure 7. **Detections of migrants illegally crossing the Central Mediterranean towards the EU during Joint Operation Hermes 2013 increased dramatically to a peak in late September when more than 2 500 migrants were detected in a single week**

Weekly detections of irregular migrants illegally crossing the border during Joint Operation Hermes 2013. Blue shaded frame indicates Q3 2013



Source: JO Hermes 2013

Since the removal of Egyptian President Morsi, Syrian nationals residing in Egypt started to leave the country in massive numbers. First they exclusively arrived in Italy from Egypt directly; then, from the end of September they were more frequently detected in boats that had departed from Libya. Other nationalities were also detected arriving from Libya, most notably Nigerians.

Operational activity in the area

Italy is strengthening its maritime presence in the southern Mediterranean. A specific operation, named *Mare Nostrum* ('Our Sea', i.e. the Latin name for the Mediterranean Sea used by ancient Romans) was launched on 18 October aiming at controlling irregular migration through increased surveillance and search-and-rescue (SAR) activities. Under *Mare Nostrum* the Italian Navy deployed a number of ships and other assets to the waters of the Sicily Channel between Italy and Libya (see Fig. 9).

4.2.3. Apulia and Calabria

In the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria, detections of illegal border-crossing tend to be associated with two different kinds of irregular migration. Most detections in the area of Apulia are of secondary movements to Italy of migrants who originally entered the Schengen area in Greece, while most detections in Calabria are of migrants who departed from Turkey or Egypt, sailed across the Aegean Sea, often near Crete, towards Italy to enter the Schengen area for the first time.

According to the FRAN data, in Q3 2013 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing in these regions than ever before. The sharpest increases were of Syrians and Eritreans, which, together with large numbers of arriving Egyptians, is consistent with the situation in the main Central Mediterranean

“ Italian police arrest Somali over Lampedusa boat tragedy

Italian police have arrested a 24-year-old Somali man in connection with last month's boat disaster off Lampedusa in which 366 African migrants died.

The man, believed to belong to an armed group, is accused of being one of the organisers of the people trafficking. He was arrested on Lampedusa.

The alleged captain of the Lampedusa boat, a Tunisian man named Khaled Bensalam, is being held in Sicily.

Most of the victims on 3 October were Eritreans and Somalis.

The overcrowded fishing boat caught fire, capsized and sank near the shore of the tiny rocky island off the North African coast. There were 155 survivors.

Italian media say the Somali man's arrest followed investigations by Sicilian police and anti-Mafia police based in Rome. He is now being questioned in Sicily.

The suspect had been pretending to be a migrant escaping the violence and poverty of his country, Italian media report. But survivors of the sinking identified him as one of the organisers of their disastrous journey.

Source: www.bbc.co.uk, 8 November 2013



Figure 9. The Italian Navy's Cassiopea-class offshore patrol vessel ITS **Libra** deployed in operation **Mare Nostrum**

© Italian Navy



“ Niger says 92 migrants found dead in Sahara after failed crossing

Rescuers have found the bodies of 92 migrants, most of them women and children, strewn across the Sahara desert in northern Niger after their vehicles broke down and they died of thirst, authorities said on Thursday.

Northern Niger lies on a major corridor for illegal migration and people-trafficking from sub-Saharan Africa into north Africa and across the Mediterranean into Europe. Most of those who make the perilous journey on ancient open-topped trucks are young African men in search of work. Two survived after walking dozens of kilometers across the burning desert back to Arlit.

The migrants had set off in two trucks from Arlit towards Tamanrasset in Algeria some time between late September and mid-October, officials and rescue workers said.

After one truck broke down, the second turned back to look for help but was stranded and the passengers tried to return by foot.

Many people flee poverty in Niger, ranked by the United Nations as the least developed country on earth. Some work in neighboring Libya and Algeria to save money before returning home.

The networks which send trucks across the desert also attract migrants from across West Africa who dream of a more prosperous life in Europe.

More than 32 000 people have arrived in southern Europe from Africa so far this year.

A crackdown by Spanish authorities has largely closed a route from the West African coast to the Canary Islands which drew tens of thousands of migrants in the mid-2000s.

Instead, most now try to make the Mediterranean crossing from north Africa to southern Europe, many losing their lives when their rickety boats are wrecked.

Source: www.reuters.com, 31 October 2013



route. Most of these migrants are thought to have departed from North Africa, specifically Egypt. In contrast to these increasing trends, numbers of Pakistanis and Afghans, who tend to be detected making secondary movements from Greece, declined compared with the previous quarter.

In this area, the JO EPN Aeneas 2013 started on 3 June and was scheduled to end on 31 December 2013. The Operational Plan defines two operational areas (Apulia and Calabria) covering the shore of the Ionian Sea and part of the Adriatic Sea. According to overall detections during the operation, there has been a stable trend compared to 2012, although there was a peak in Q3 2013 illustrated by that fact that more incidents were reported in September 2013 than during any other month since 2010. Around a third of migrants had departed from Egypt, a further third from Greece and just less than a fifth from Turkey. However, the departure points are becoming more complex as mother boats often collect migrants from several countries on route. For example some boats departed from Syria, collected migrants in Egypt and then Crete and then arrived in Italy.

Because of the increase in the number of fishing vessels in the Ionian Sea, and because of the mother-boat *modus operandi* used to smuggle migrants to Italy, the Italian Ministry of Interior decided to be pro-active in deterring the use of these large vessels and in arresting facilitators. The Italian government, in application of international law, strengthened cooperation between judicial and police authorities and carried out interceptions and inspections of iron fishing vessels in international waters. As a result, in September 2013, the Italian authorities detected and intercepted a big iron Egyptian fishing vessel towing a small wooden fishing vessel, which is typical of the mother-boat *modus operandi*. The Italian authorities

then escorted the vessels to Catania and to Syracuse, respectively, and apprehended 199 migrants, mostly Syrians, and arrested 20 Egyptian facilitators.

Syrian migrants are following family advice and refuse to be fingerprinted. They are also being told that it is easier to continue the trip to Sweden if they reach the east coast of Sicily (e.g. Catania) rather than Calabria. Many family members already established in Sweden are travelling by car to Catania, where they pick up the newly arriving migrants following their apprehension by the Italian authorities before they are fingerprinted. They then return to Sweden with the new migrants who apply for asylum.

4.2.4. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean route has been a major hotspot of irregular migration into the EU, mostly associated with illegal border-crossings from Turkey. However, since early August 2012 detections on this route have been at much lower levels following increased operational activity in the area; in Q3 2013 there were 8 138 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, which was a decrease of 27% compared to the same period in 2012 but a seasonal increase of 80% compared to the previous quarter.

The marked decrease in detections observed since August 2012 is due to a range of operational activities taking place at different border sections on the Eastern Mediterranean route:

1. In August 2012 the Greek operation Aspida deployed additional manpower, assets and equipment to the Evros region in order to curb the flow of irregular border-crossing. The enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities have resulted in a remarkable drop in the number of apprehended irregular migrants in both the

Police Directorates of Alexandropoulos and Orestiada and have led to a displacement of the migration flow towards the Bulgarian-Turkish border and the eastern Aegean Sea. In addition to the operation Aspida, the operation Xenios Zeus focused on detecting migrants in land in urban areas around Athens.

2. A Specialised Police Operation at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border and enhanced air surveillance has been ongoing since 1 October 2012. Since 1 July 2012, the Bulgarian authorities have implemented an Integrated Border Surveillance System (IBSS*) at the border section between the BCPs of Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo, covering 58 km. Regular bilateral joint meetings for preventing and resolving border incidents take place under an agreement signed between Bulgaria and Turkey, and there are now plans for the construction of a border fence.
3. JO Poseidon Land 2013 was also active during Q3 2013 at the land border with Turkey. From 1 January to 27 October 2013 some 9 300 irregular migrants were reported for crossing the border illegally (8 686 migrants in the Bulgarian operational area and 639 migrants in the Greek operational area). Regular meetings between the Greek and Turkish authorities take place on a monthly basis with the exchange of relevant data and information.
4. JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was also active during the reporting period in order to tackle the flow of irregular migrants penetrating the external EU sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean mainly from Turkey and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt.

This range of operational activities led to a rapid and sustained decrease in detections of illegal border-crossing in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Overall detections at the borders with Turkey have remained low since the activation of these operational measures

* The system consists of stationary posts with long-range 360-degree cameras triggered by movement-detection sensors. It is currently operative along a 58-kilometre stretch of the Bulgarian-Turkish border plus a short section of the Greek-Bulgarian border. It is planned to cover the whole Bulgarian-Turkish border by mid-2015.



Figure 10. In October 2013 Bulgarian Defence Minister ordered the army to begin construction of a fence along its border with Turkey to prevent the entry of irregular immigrants

despite increases at the Turkish sea border with Greece and the land border with Bulgaria. In the third quarter of 2013, detections in the Aegean Sea were the largest on this route, but overall detections were much lower than a year ago.

Syrians

As was the case in the previous quarter, in Q3 2013 Syrians constituted more than half of all detections on this route (4 535). However, in the current reporting period most were detected at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey (2 562) rather than in the Eastern Aegean Sea, where they were concentrated earlier in the year, probably when the weather was better. Most of them were travelling in family groups and were trying to avoid being registered in Turkey and sent to refugee camps. According to the information gathered from debriefing interviews, Syrian migrants believe that once registered in Turkey, no European country will accept them as refugees.

Bulgarian land border

In September 2013, at the level of Elhovo Directorate, a Command Centre for illegal bor-

der-crossing related issues was established. This includes representatives from different Bulgarian law-enforcement and government authorities such as the Bulgarian Border Police, Committee for State Security, Ministry of Defence, Migration Service and Yambol County Government.

In October 2013, a new Centre for migrants (Distributive Centre) became operational in Elhovo. Its capacity will be 240 places, but the building is still under renovation. According to the plans, migrants will be transferred from police stations to the new centre after finishing all the procedures. They will be kept at the centre for no longer than five days and then transferred to other detention centres, according to their status.

In the third quarter of 2013, the BCU Elhovo continued to be the area most affected by irregular migration, with nearly 80% of irregular migrants reported from this BCP. Generally, the area of the BCU Elhovo and the BCU Bolyarovo were targeted by migrants facilitated by criminal networks; local facilitators are aware of the location and the length of the IBSS and they try to avoid it. Elsewhere, the BCUs Svilengrad and Malko Tarnovo were targeted mainly by migrants attempting to cross the border on their own. They used maps, telephones with GPS application programs and guide themselves towards the BCPs of either Kapitan Andreevo or Malko Tarnovo.

According to several open sources, in October 2013 the Bulgarian authorities started the construction of a 30 km fence in the border area between the villages of Lesovo and Kraynovo. The fence is foreseen to be finalised in February 2014, but it will be probably delayed. It can be assumed that the construction of the fence will lead to a displacement of the migratory flow towards the areas not covered by either the fence or the surveillance system (see Fig. 10).

As well as the regular transportation to the Bulgarian-Turkish border (for EUR 100-500 per person), extended facilitation is also offered to migrants in Istanbul and Edirne for the whole journey to Sofia. This is more expensive, (EUR 2 500 per person), but, as the facilitation services are offered all the way to Sofia, migrants have a lower risk of being apprehended by the Bulgarian Border Police. In addition, the main advantage of this option is that migrants are not fingerprinted and their data are not introduced into Eurodac. Therefore in case they will seek asylum in another country, their return to Bulgaria will be inhibited.

4.2.5. Circular migration from Albania to Greece

Albanians are well known to travel illegally to Greece to exploit seasonal employment opportunities. Prior to being granted visa free access to the Schengen area in late 2010, Albanians were regularly detected in very high numbers illegally crossing their land border into Greece. Since visa liberalisation, Albanians are still detected illegally crossing the border into Greece but in much lower numbers. Concurrent to the decrease in this indicator, there were increased reports of refusals of entry (mostly for having an alert in the SIS) and also document fraud (counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay in the Schengen area).

In Q3 2013, Greece reported a large number of detections of illegal border-crossings at its land border with Albania and at its land border with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The vast majority of these cases (98%) were of Albanians but this figure is well within the range of variation previously seen for this phenomena over the last two years.

Over the same period refusals of entry of Albanians at these border sections have also remained stable (see Section 4.6. Refusals of entry) and there has been a decline in reports of document fraud (see Section 4.8. Document Fraud). Over the previous year the number of Albanians subject to decisions to leave Greece has steadily been increasing, as have the number of Albanians effectively returned (see Section 4.9. Returns).

According to a survey carried out by USAID, paid for by the United States Department of State and the Albanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about 200 000 people in the past five years have left Greece to return to Albania because of increasing economic hardships and lack of employment opportunities in Greece.

According to open sources, the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection Nikos Dendias stated that the adoption of measures to tackle irregular immigration will be a key priority of Greece's Presidency in the first half of 2014. However, such actions are likely to be concentrated at its Eastern Borders with Turkey rather than at the border with Albania.

4.2.6. Western Mediterranean route

In Q3 2013 there were more than 2 500 detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean region, which consists of several areas of the southern Spanish coast as well as the land borders of Ceuta and Melilla, where detections nearly doubled compared to the previous quarter to constitute nearly two-thirds of all detections in this region. Overall, on this route the figure of detections is the highest reported for two years. Other border sections where detections were significant included the Spanish blue border at Cadiz and at Granada.



© Frontex, 2013

Figure 11. **Migrants at the Port of Algeciras receiving assistance from the Red Cross (left) and the small toy boat being rescued near Morocco, with ten migrants on board (right)**

Since Q2 2012, detections on this route have remained fairly stable – between 1 500 and 2 000 detections per quarter. However, diverging trends are noticeable in detections at land and sea borders, probably associated with more prevention of departures at sea by the Moroccan authorities, as well as strengthened measures in the Mediterranean Sea, including through the JO EPN Indalo. The theory that sea crossings are being avoided, is supported by the fact that the improvement of weather conditions in June did not result in a significant increase in detections at the sea border in this region.

At the end of June, the Moroccan government representative in Melilla, Abdelmalik El Barkani, said at a press conference that the migrants had attacked the fence very aggressively and had thrown rocks at Moroccan security forces which, in addition to the Guardia Civil, have detained migrants who had not yet made it to the autonomous city. There have been many sightings of sub-Saharan Africans who had not yet reached the fence, according to the Spanish Authorities. For the last few months, the government has warned of the permanent threat of migration to Melilla. Once in Melilla, migrants are turned over to Police Headquarters for identification, and many are transferred to the Temporary Centre for Immigrants (CETI – *Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes*).

At the sea border, the JO EPN Indalo 2013 is coordinated by Frontex and hosted by Spain. The Joint Operation started on 16 May and ran until 31 October 2013. From 16 May to 13 October 2013, 1 306 irregular migrants were detected in 130 incidents in the operational areas. The total number of irregular migrants apprehended decreased by 18% compared to the same period in 2012. Together with interception by the Moroccan Police preventing departures, the JO EPN Indalo maintained a crucial surveillance function in preventing large scale irregular migration through the Western Mediterranean route.

According to data collected under the JO Indalo, most of the migrants detected at the blue border were either sub-Saharan or north Africans. The sub-Saharan tended to be young men with poor levels of English or French, travelling undocumented and claiming to be from Mali, Chad or Cameroon in order to avoid repatriation. The north Africans were also young men, Arabic speaking with some knowledge of English or French, and many reported that they attempted entry to the EU several times.

There is a reluctance by the vast majority of interviewed migrants to cooperate with the authorities which leads to many migrants refusing to be interviewed. These migrants were probably instructed by facilitators on how to behave during interviews and what to say once they arrive in Spain; they know

that Cameroonian, Sudanese, Chadian and Malian nationals are not being returned to their country of origin (at least easily) and for this reason migrants usually claim to have one of these nationalities.

In October 2013, a toy boat was spotted and intercepted by a Spanish SASEMAR CPB, 9 nm south of Tarifa Island and 1 nm north of Morocco. Incredibly, ten migrants were found onboard the small toy boat, all of them sub-Saharan and in good health (see Fig. 11). Five claimed to be from Cameroon, two from Gabon, one from Niger, one from Mali and one from the African Central Republic. In order to be rescued, the migrants decided to put their one and only life jacket on top of one of the oars, which they then waved around in the air so as to catch the attention of boats passing by.

4.2.7. Western African route

In the third quarter of 2013, there were more than a 100 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, which is the highest level for two years and a massive increase compared to previous quarters when detections tended to be less than 50 per quarter. This increase was mostly due to more detections of Moroccans and, to a lesser extent, Malians.

Despite this increase, irregular migration on the West African route was still at a much reduced rate compared the situation before 2010. Sustained high level of surveillance ensuring early detections and collaboration with third-country authorities are key for maintaining the low level of detections at the border.

The JO EPN Hera 2013 was launched on 1 August 2013 and finished on 31 October 2013. In 2013 the operational areas were established in the land area of the Canary Islands in Spain and on the territorial waters and the exclu-



© Frontex, 2013

Figure 12. **Two Moroccan males rescued after drifting at sea for a week**

sive economic zone of Senegal. The operation was organised to support the Spanish authorities in mitigating migration along the Western African migratory routes.

In October, two Moroccan migrants had departed from El Aaiún but due to the failure of the engine of their rubber boat they were drifting at sea for a week (see Fig. 12). They were spotted by SASEMAR about 60 nm from Gran Canaria island and were subsequently rescued and taken there by helicopter.

4.2.8. Eastern land borders route

The Eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported from the green borders of Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the great length of eastern borders, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and countries of origin, and often impassable terrain. Also according to several Member States, visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps tend to predominate on this route, as opposed to detections of illegal border-crossing (see Section 4.8. Document fraud).

In Q3 2013, there were just 469 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is slightly more than the previous quarter and the same period in

**14 October 2013: Over 1 600 migrants rounded up after ethnic riots in Moscow**

Russian police rounded up more than 1 600 migrants on Monday in Moscow after rioting swept through a southern neighbourhood over a fatal stabbing of a Russian that many residents blame on a man from the Caucasus region. Advocacy groups warned migrants from Russia's mainly Muslim Caucasus region and Central Asia of an increased risk of attacks in the worst ethnic disturbance in Moscow in three years. Authorities stepped up police patrols in the capital.

Migrant labor has played a significant role in Russia's transformation during an oil-fuelled economic boom that took off around the time President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000.

But many in Moscow are uneasy at the influx of migrants from Russia's heavily Muslim North Caucasus and ex-Soviet states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, although many do low-paying jobs, such as in construction, that few local residents want.

In an apparent attempt to appease residents, police said they rounded up some 1 200 people detained at a wholesale vegetable market that had been stormed on Sunday night.

Another 450 were detained in north-eastern Moscow, also near a vegetable market employing migrant workers.

Source: www.reuters.com, 14 October 2013



2012. Since 2009, detections of illegal border-crossing ranged between 100 and 600 per quarter. Typically, detections on the eastern land border are lowest during the winter months, when weather conditions prevent illegal border-crossing along the green border, and gradually increase to reach a peak during the summer.

In Q3 2013, about a quarter of the detections were reported from the land border

between Slovakia and Ukraine, and nearly as many from the land border between Lithuania and Belarus. As has often been the case since 2008, these two border sections reported the most detections.

For the first time in over a year the most commonly detected migrants on this route were from Afghanistan (81), mostly detected at the Slovakian land border with Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, at the Lithuanian land border with Belarus. Other nationalities detected in significant overall numbers on this route were Ukrainian and Georgian.

According to data collected under the framework of Focal Points 2013, the most common BCP for reported illegal border-crossings was Röszke, between Hungary and Serbia. This is consistent with FRAN data analysed in Section 4.2.1. Western Balkan route.

Migrants from North Africa and the Middle-East (particularly Syria) attempted to travel through the irregular migration channel via St Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast towards Estonia and Finland.

Russian Federation

According to open sources, different measures taken by the Russian authorities against irregular migration resulted in a large number of returnees and persons expelled from the Russian Federation. Moreover, irregular migrants and employees without work permits will receive an entry ban for the Russian Federation for at least three years. Mostly nationals from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were detained for illegal stay in the Russian Federation. Thus, it is likely that nationals of these countries will look for new opportunities and there is a risk that they might target the Baltic States, where they can communicate in Russian, and other EU/Schengen countries.

Local Border Traffic Permit (LBT) abuses


Poland has recently reported some increased abuse of local border traffic permits by nationals of the Russian Federation (Kaliningrad), and nationals of Ukraine, both at their respective land borders with Poland.

The multi-entry agreement with the Russian Federation (Kaliningrad) allows border residents to enter the Polish border area for 30 days, but not for the purpose of work or business. Nearly 2 million Polish nationals and nearly 1 million Russian nationals are eligible. Local border traffic in the region has recently increased dramatically from tens of thousands of individuals per month in 2012 to regularly more than 100 000 per month in 2013 but detections of abuse here are still relatively rare.

In contrast, abuse of local border traffic permits at the Polish land border with Ukraine has been increasing over the previous year. Holders of the multi-entry permits are allowed to enter the Polish border area for 60 days for non-economic activities. At this border section, local border traffic has remained stable at around half a million individuals per month, but refusals for LBT violations have steadily increased during 2013, although from a very low base. In fact in 2012 abuse was very rare indeed and in September there were nearly 200 refusals of local border traffic permit holders.

The reasons for refusals were:

1. the use of fraudulent local border traffic permits;
2. a record on the holder of the local border traffic permit existing in the SIS or in the national data base;
3. exceeding the time indicated in the local border traffic permit.



Press statements following Russian-Ukrainian talks in October 2012

© Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, 2012



Ukraine-Russia readmission agreement comes into force

A Ukrainian-Russian agreement on readmission, which was signed in October 2012, has come into force, the BBC Ukrainian has reported.

'Readmission foresees the return to Russia of illegal immigrants who entered Ukraine through Russia. On June 5, 2013, this agreement was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament, and in late June it was signed by the Ukrainian president,' reads the statement.

As reported, the agreement is a requirement for the liberalisation of the visa regime between Ukraine and the EU. A respective agreement between Ukraine and the EU entered into force on 1 January 2010.

Source: www.ukrinform.ua, 9 August 2013



Although the numbers are small in comparison to other trends at the EU, it is worth noting and monitoring this new *modus operandi* which was effectively unheard of in 2012.

4.2.9. Black Sea route

Detections of illegal border-crossing on the Black Sea have been extremely rare, but in



Q3 2013 Romania reported some detections of migrants illegally crossing its sea border. The detected migrants came from Syria and, to a lesser extent, from Afghanistan, suggesting that this route may be gaining some significance, especially since the nearby Greek land border with Turkey has been subject to so much increased operational activity.

According to the Romanian reports, these detections were mainly the result of two incidents, both in July 2013, involving Syrian irregular migrants accompanied by Turkish facilitators. Subsequent investigations revealed that the migrants travelled from Turkey aboard two Turkish fishing vessels.

There were more incidents in September 2013 involving a total of 10 Afghans and 21 Syrians, which may suggest that this is becoming a more established route. These incidents still constitute isolated cases, but they reveal possible increasing pressure of seasonal irregular migration from Turkey across the Black Sea. They are possibly linked to the increased surveillance on the Eastern Mediterranean route and the increasing number of migrants waiting in Turkey to reach the EU illegally.

4.3. Clandestine entry

Restricting the FRAN indicator on detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (1B) to the external land and sea borders of the EU and to detections confirmed to be clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport), results in extremely low numbers for the whole of the EU especially compared with other indicators of irregular migration. For example, in Q3 2013 only 53 detections were reported from the whole FRAN community, which is also the lowest number reported for several years.

Most detections were reported at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey and, to a

lesser extent, from the Hungarian land border with Serbia. In both cases Syrians were the most commonly detected migrants attempting to enter clandestinely.

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border, there were more detections within the EU/Schengen area (502), which is an increase of around a 20% compared to the previous quarter (415). Croatia joined the reporting for the first time but not with sufficient detections to inhibit long-term analyses. The geographical distribution of these 'internal' detections sheds important light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries selected by each nationality. For example, the UK and Italy reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine irregular migrants. In the case of the UK, most were at juxtaposed controls on the European mainland but in Italy detections were exclusively at the sea border, assumed to be predominantly related to ferries arriving from Greece.


The UK mostly detected Albanians followed by Iranians, both at the Eurotunnel border checks. Arriving hidden on vessels at the UK sea border were Eritreans. Italy mostly detected Afghans and Syrians at the sea border.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years, with a remarkably stable pattern over the last three quarters. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as illegal border-crossing.

Figure 13. **Detections of facilitators of irregular migration are clumped within a small number of Member States**

Detections of facilitators in the Schengen area in Q3 2013 by the proportions reported by the top three Member States, and all other countries combined



Source: FRAN data as 5 November 2013

Being consistent in the first half of 2013, in the third quarter of the year there were 1 689 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, just 1% lower than during the previous quarter. The same group of three Member States (Italy, France, Spain) continued to share the bulk; together they accounted for more than 60% of all detections of facilitators at the EU level (see Fig. 13). This clumped distribution among Mediterranean countries may be indicative of more difficult entry points that require assistance from facilitators, although in each case facilitators were reported as being detected inland.

There were no remarkable overall trends in any Member States, but in Italy there was a sixfold increase in detections of Egyptian facilitators since the beginning of the year. This was by far the highest number related to a specific nationality and reporting country.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other nationality; very often the top reporting countries for this indicator tend to report their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other

single nationality. Hence in most reporting periods the top nationalities of facilitators tend to be consistent with the top reporting countries for this indicator. However, in Q3 2013 the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator was Egyptian (142), indicative of the influx of irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean.

4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q3 2013, there were over 85 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is the highest level this year and since the end of 2011, which is somewhat in contrast to the longer-term slightly declining visible trend since 2008 (see Fig. 1). In fact there has not been a similar period of increase for this indicator since 2011. Croatia, for the first time shared data for this indicator, but not a level sufficient to interfere with long-term analyses, and September data were incomplete from Spain. In contrast, Germany, Sweden and France together detected 40% of all illegal stayers in the EU with continually high and increasing trends compared to the year before (see Fig. 14 overleaf).


Nearly 85% of illegal stayers were detected inland (71 818) and so are assumed to be long-term overstayers because they were not detected attempting to exit the EU and return home. In contrast the remaining 15% of illegal stayers were detected on exit at BCPs (12 690) and so are likely to include many short-term overstayers.

Syrians were detected as overstayers more frequently than any other nationality and at an extremely high level (8 195). They were mostly detected in Sweden, where many were applying for asylum at the time of detection, and also in Germany. Both countries have seen sharply increasing numbers of Syrians detected as illegal stayers throughout 2013.



Figure 14. **Detections of illegal stayers in Germany (Syrians, Eritreans, Russians) and France (Syrians, Albanians, Afghans) increased by around a quarter compared to the same period last year**

Detections of illegal stay in Q3 2013 per Member State (blue shades) and the percentage change from the same period a year before in Q3 2012. Data from Spain were incomplete for Q3 2013



Other nationalities that were detected in significant numbers included Moroccans (4 383), Afghans (4 113), Russians (4 076) and Albanians (4 029). Moroccans are usually detected in high numbers in Spain but in Q3 2013 Belgium detected more illegally stay-

ing Moroccans than Spain, not because of increased detections in Belgium but because of a marked decrease in Spain from more than 1 500 in the second quarter to less than 1 000 in the current reporting period.

4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q3 2013 there were 32 435 refusals of entry at the external border, a steady trend compared to a year ago. However, in this quarter Croatia joined the reporting of this indicator with more than 7% of the total number of refusals. With this share, Croatia ranked fourth among all Member States in terms of refusals issued in this quarter. Hence, in real terms there was a slight decrease compared to a year previously but levels remain exceptionally high in general, with one of the highest ever levels this quarter.

Consistent with recent trends, Poland continued to report the most refusals of entry (27% of the total) but at a much reduced rate compared to the previous quarter. The reason for this decrease was the peak of Russians of Chechen origin refused entry in Q2 2013 because of lack of visas at the train BCP on the Polish border with Belarus. Immediately after being refused entry, they applied for asylum in Poland, but then travelled to Germany, where they applied for asylum again. Despite this decrease Russians refused entry in Poland were still by far the most significant phenomena at the EU level.

Elsewhere, refusals of entry were relatively stable compared to previous quarters. Other top nationalities at the EU level were Ukrainian (3 375), Albanian (3 224) and Serbian (2 105) – all numbers within the range of variation seen over the previous year.

4.7. Asylum claims

The number of asylum claims submitted in the EU continues to increase at an alarming rate. During Q3 2013 the number of applications rose once more to a staggering 97 207* applications which for the second quarter in a row is the most applications ever submitted in the EU during a single quarter. Syrians were by far the most common nationality to

request international protection with 13 963 applications submitted at the EU level in Q3 2013. This is nearly double the already very high number of applications submitted by Syrians during the previous quarter and represents an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers to the EU. More than two-thirds of all Syrian applications were submitted in Sweden, Germany and Bulgaria.

The last year has seen some remarkable trends in asylum applications, in terms of both the total number of applications submitted in the EU and nationality totals in individual Member States (see Fig. 16 overleaf). Much of this was originally due to the initial stages of the Arab Spring in 2011, combined with large numbers of applications submitted by nationals of the Western Balkan countries following the granting of their visa-free status in the Schengen area, and more recently to the civil war in Syria.

During the previous reporting period Hungary reported a 20-fold rise in asylum applications, one of the most spectacular increases recorded in the FRAN to date. This increase was due to the January 2013 change in legislation in the Hungary asylum policy, which resulted in many migrants detected crossing the border illegally, immediately applying for asylum and rapidly absconding from the open centres. The news of this change quickly spread among migrants, creating a pull factor that resulted in massive increase in detections of illegal border-crossing at the land border between Hungary and Serbia, followed by concurrent asylum applications. In the current reporting period Hungary received almost 5 000 applications, which is much reduced compared to Q2 2013, but still renders Hungary fifth at the EU level.


In Bulgaria, the number of asylum applications also rose sharply, although from a lower base. Bulgaria reported more than 2 000 asylum applications in Q3 2013 which is a mas-

* The FRAN data do not include asylum applications submitted inland in France



Figure 15. Poland continued to refuse entry to more third-country nationals than any other Member State, mostly of Russians, Ukrainians and Georgians

Refusals of entry in Q3 2013 per Member States (blue shades) and percentage change since the same period a year previously in 2012



sive increase compared to a year previously and the previous reporting period. The increase was mostly due to Syrians whose applications accounted for nearly two-third of all applications in Bulgaria. According to in-

formal reports, they are mostly travelling in family units and intending to stay in Bulgaria until the end of the conflict. They first took refugee status in Turkey, but Bulgaria offers

Figure 16. **The number of applications for international protection has increased dramatically over the last two years, as has the proportion of applications submitted in the top three Member States**

Total number of asylum applications submitted in the EU by quarter since the beginning of 2009 (left axis). The line shows the percentage of applications submitted in the top three Member States (right axis)



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013

comparatively cheaper living conditions while being relatively close to Syria.

The staggered roll out of the Visa Information System (VIS) is having significant effects on the distribution of irregular migrants and the methods they use to attempt entry to the EU. One perhaps unforeseen benefit of the system is its use in ascertaining the proportion of asylum seekers that are also holders of current Schengen visas. This is achieved by performing searches of asylum seeker fingerprints in the VIS at the time of application.

4.8. Document fraud

In Q3 2013 there were just over 2 500 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries, which is an increase of a third compared to a year previously in Q3 2012. However, France exchanged usable data for the first time in 2013, which inevitably inflated the figures to a certain degree, particularly on entry from third countries; omitting the French data resulted

in a slightly smaller increase of 16% in detections at the external border compared to a year previously.

Spain, Italy, France and Greece reported the most detections on entry at the external border together accounting for more than half of all detections at the EU level. For the second quarter in a row Spain reported more detections than ever before, the most common of which were Moroccans detected at either Melilla or Ceuta, followed by unknown nationalities at Madrid airport.

To an approximation Italy also detected more cases than ever before of document fraud on entry from third countries, mostly of Syrians and Nigerians both at Fiumicino airport, but also of a very wide range of other nationalities. In France detections were also significant but the most commonly detected migrants were of unknown nationalities.

At the EU level, of the 105 nationalities detected using document fraud to illegally en-



ter the EU or Schengen area from a third country, the most commonly detected were from Syria, Albania and Morocco. Syrians were detected at a range of locations but Albanians were mostly detected on entry to Greece, and Moroccans were mostly detected on ferries heading to Algeciras from Ceuta and Melilla.

In addition to the 2 500 detections on entry there was also an increasing trend of 745 detections on exit, hence around a quarter of detections were on exit.

Between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States

As well as at the external border, also important at the EU level were the 716 detections of document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. As is normally the case, many of these were reported on entry to the UK, a common destination country for irregular migrants travelling from the Schengen area. In this case, by far the most commonly detected migrants were from Albania.

Intra-Schengen flights

The EDF-RAN data exchange also considers detections of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights, where no border checks are systematically performed. In Q3 2013 there was an increasing trend of 1 037 detections of document fraud on flights between Schengen airports which is the highest number since data collection began for this indicator. This increase was not because of France joining the data exchange, but was down to increased detections in Italy, mostly of Albanians arriving at a range of locations (see section on Migrants from Albania below) and a huge increase in the number of Syrians detected on exit from Greek airports.

Italy detected by far the most cases of document fraud on intra-Schengen flights followed by Greece and Germany. Syrians were the commonly detected nationality followed by Albanian and then Somalis and Eritreans.

Migrants from Albania

In Q3 2013 some 703 Albanians were detected using more than 900 fraudulent documents (including authentic passports containing fraudulent documents such as visas or stamps), which is a decrease compared to other reporting periods over the previous year. Nevertheless, Albanians still represent the biggest proportion of document fraud at the EU level.

Albanians were mostly detected on entry to the Schengen area from a third country mostly at their land border with Greece, but also travelling between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. The latter flow was almost exclusively between the Schengen area and the UK, sometimes via Ireland. In Greece the most commonly detected documents were counterfeit border crossing stamps.

In Q3 2013 there were increased detections of Albanians on intra-Schengen flights, mostly detected boarding flights in Italy, where Albanians were detected using counterfeit Greek ID cards or image substituted Italian ID cards.

Since the lifting of Schengen restrictions in late 2010, Albanian irregular migration to the UK has increased via clandestine activity and inadequately documented arrivals. A notable proportion of Albanians attempting to travel clandestinely from the Benelux region to the UK have travelled from Albanian port of Durrës to the Italian port of Bari. The majority of these Albanians attempted

to travel from Bari to the UK illegally within five days of arrival at the port.

Migrants from Syria

Overall, some 678 Syrians were detected using fraudulent documents in Q3 2013, which is the highest ever recorded number for this nationality and more than double the number reported a year ago in Q3 2012. Hence there has been a massive increase over the previous year in the extent to which Syrians have been detected with fraudulent documents. Syrians were mostly detected on intra-Schengen flights (266), followed by entry to the Schengen area from third countries (239), which suggests that many are illegally crossing the external border and then using fraudulent documents for secondary movements. Following continued increases over the previous year, in Q3 2013 their most common known embarkation point was Istanbul.

Syrians were most commonly detected using stolen blank Greek residence permits, counterfeit Romanian ID cards, counterfeit Greek ID cards, and stolen blank Italian ID cards.

4.9. Returns


4.9.1. Return decisions

In Q3 2013 there were 57 583 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which is the highest quarterly level so far during 2013, but within the range of the last few years. Greece reached more decisions to leave than any other Member State, followed by the UK, together representing over a third of the EU's total.

At the Member State level there is often a discrepancy between the number of return decisions reached and the number of effective returns carried out. Some of the differences may be due to time lags between judicial decisions and physical returns, while other dif-

Figure 17. In Q3 2013 the most commonly returned migrants were from Albania, Pakistan and the Russian Federation. Some nationalities were subject to a relatively high number of decisions to return, but were not effectively returned to the same extent (Syrians, Afghans, Somalis)

Return decisions issued and effective returns (voluntary or forced) to third countries of the top nationalities in Q3 2013



Source: FRAN data as of 5 November 2013



ferences may be due to the disappearance of migrants once a decision has been reached. The largest discrepancy was recorded in Italy, where less than a third of issued decisions led to effective returns, and in Greece, where half of return decisions were carried out. In contrast, the UK reported slightly more effective returns than decisions reached, which may have been caused by backlog issues.

More Albanians were subject to return decisions than any other nationality (4 528), followed by Pakistanis (3 973), both mostly in Greece. In total 3 555 Syrians were subject to decisions to leave, mostly in Greece and Bulgaria.

Note that the absolute total number of migrants subject to return decisions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

There was very little change in the number of decisions made by most Member States throughout 2013, with the notable exception of Malta, where the number of decisions reached increased more than tenfold from Q1 to Q3. This increase was due to more Somalis, Eritreans and Nigerians being subject to decisions to leave after arriving or being rescued in Maltese waters.

4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q3 2013, there continued to be a steady trend in the number of third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU compared to most previous quarters in 2012 and 2013. The total number of 40 420 was in the range that varied between 38 000 and 42 000 per quarter.

As has usually been the case for this indicator, the UK conducted the largest number

of returns in Q3 2013 with Indians, Pakistanis and Nigerians ranking top. Greece ranked second in terms of the number of active returns, with Albanians representing the majority.

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Information gathered through Frontex Joint Operations and Member State bi-monthly reports in Q3 2013 shows a continuously high level of criminal activities at the EU external borders. Criminal groups that are involved in smuggling drugs and excise goods, exporting stolen vehicles, or trafficking in human beings negatively affect the overall management of the external borders by engaging substantial personnel and financial resources of European border authorities. The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit works with Member States to gather information with the purpose to adapt operational activities to the actual cross-border crime situation.

4.10.1 Trafficking in human beings

On 25 July, the Organized Crime and Human Trafficking Unit of the Hellenic National Police (HNP) arrested 18 people in Athens as part of an operation to disband an internationally operating organised crime group that trafficked persons into the EU. The Greek authorities cooperated with Spanish Central Unit against Illegal Immigration Networks and Forgery, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Europol and INTERPOL to disrupt the criminal scheme.

The group was suspected to have trafficked women from the Dominican Republic to Spain, where they were forced into sexual exploitation. The criminals took advantage of the visa regulations in Turkey to gain entry to the country. Upon arrival, the OCG members took away the travel doc-

uments of the migrants. They were then smuggled into Greece and hidden in safe houses. Those migrants that were not able to pay for their facilitation were forced into prostitution and labour exploitation. Eventually, the criminal network facilitated the migrants' travel to Spain as the final destination country.

Greek police conducted the arrests in the towns of Kavala, Corinth, Volos and in Crete, as well as in Athens. Fifteen of the arrested traffickers were from the Dominican Republic and one each from Albania, Cuba and Greece. According to Europol, twelve house searches were performed during the operation. 77 mobile phones, 25 SIM cards, 12 computers, 2 hard disks, 11 forged travel documents and a large amount of electronic money transfer invoices and flight tickets were seized. 20 victims, men and women from the Dominican Republic, were found and set free.

In September 2013, in a good example of a national border authority disrupting a criminal scheme related to trafficking and forced prostitution, the Polish authorities arrested a Polish couple exploiting a Kenyan woman. During their stay in Africa, the two suspects had recruited a 26-year-old Kenyan woman to work as a masseuse in Poland. Upon completion of the necessary formalities, the woman travelled to Kraków, where the two traffickers, in abuse of her helpless situation, coerced her to provide sexual services in a massage parlour. Nevertheless, after some time of complying with her traffickers' demands, the victim reported the case to the Polish Border Guard, which initiated the proceedings against the alleged perpetrators and disrupted their illegal business.

In another law-enforcement operation of Q3 2013, the Spanish police dismantled a criminal network responsible for trafficking

in human beings for the purpose of sexual and labour exploitation. As a result, three Pakistani nationals were arrested in Tarragona (Spain) and around 50 victims, all Pakistanis, were identified. Once in Spain the perpetrators took advantage of the precarious economic situation of the victims and placed them in sub-standard accommodation near farms. The victims were forced to harvest fruit. If they expressed intention to leave the job, they were submitted to additional physical and psychological coercion. In addition, the victims were forced to pay a fee to cover the accommodation, meals, transportation, and other expenses.

4.10.2. Smuggling of excise goods

Eastern borders

In the third quarter of 2013, the number of tobacco smuggling incidents reported through Frontex Joint Operations decreased by one-third compared to the same period in 2012. Border guards reported 107 cases of cigarette contraband through the JO Focal Points 2013 Land and JO Jupiter 2013 Land, most of which were detected at the border to Moldova (39) as well as to Belarus (36) and, to a lesser extent, to Ukraine (19) and the Russian Federation (13).



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 18. **On 8 August, the Polish Border Guard seized 189 940 cigarettes, which were smuggled on an inflatable boat across the river Bug from Ukraine near the village of Ślipcze**



Moldova was the only country which did not see a decrease in the number of cases of illegal cigarette exports to the EU (Q3 2012: 38). Sculeni and Albita were the most used BCPs for contraband activities reported through JORA. In one example, on 21 September 2013 border guards detected 2 480 cartons of cigarettes at the green border between Moldova and Romania, which were smuggled by Romanian nationals. However, the bulk of seizures made at this border section involved smaller-scale smuggling. In most detected incidents, smugglers tried to take an average of around 30 cartons across the border. During these smaller-scale smuggling attempts, the excise goods were simply hidden behind dashboards, under seats, engines, or in trunks of private vehicles or below clothes.

The decline in the overall number of detections of cigarette smuggling at the border with Ukraine in Q3 2013 was matched with a decrease in the average number of pieces seized in a single incident. Border guards detected an average of 233 (Q2 2013: 387) cartons of cigarettes per incident, most of which were smuggled across the green border and especially through the river Bug.

On 27 August 2013, Polish border guards uncovered a particular *modus operandi* related to cigarette contraband at the border to Ukraine, when two persons picking up cigarettes from a field caught their attention. Investigation showed that the illicit goods had been previously dropped from an ultralight trike, which is a weight-shift-control aircraft propelled by a small engine. The plane crossed the Polish border in an area near the Carpathian Mountains around midnight and targeted a crop field near the Polish village of Bobrówka 26 km away from the Ukrainian border. Accomplices had marked the drop area with flashlights. When approaching the target area, the pilot declined to an altitude of around



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 19. **325 200 cigarettes of various brands were hidden on a freight train coming from Belarus, hidden under sawdust**

100 metres to discharge his freight of cigarettes worth more than EUR 40 000 before flying back to Ukraine. The Polish Air Force and the Ukrainian authorities were informed in order to assist in the search of the fugitive pilot.

The Polish Border Guard also fought successfully against the smuggling of excise goods along the border to Belarus. During Q3 2013, detections of a total number of 1 144 900 smuggled cigarettes were reported along this border section. Most smuggled cigarettes relate to small- and medium-scale contraband activities mostly involving residents of the border region rather than large criminal networks. 90% of all detections in Q3 2013 led to average seizures of around 75 cartons of cigarettes. These amounts were primarily detected in cavities of private vehicles, in hidden compartments on trains or in personal luggage.

One of the larger cases was reported on 29 August, when border guards discovered 325 200 cigarettes of various brands hidden under sawdust loaded on a freight train, which passed through the railway BCP of Terespol (see Fig 19). Two Polish citizens were caught while unloading the cigarettes at a cargo terminal near the village of Malaszewicze. The Polish Border Guard arrested the two persons, which appeared to be railway



© Polish Border Guard

Figure 20. Interior of a yacht loaded with 1.5 million illicit cigarettes destined for the black market in Sweden

employees and handed over the case to the customs authorities.

The Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) showed remarkable results by the end of August, when it helped to reveal the large-scale contraband of illicit cigarettes into the EU. A rather unusual course taken by the skipper of a private yacht from Russian via Lithuanian and Polish territorial waters towards Scandinavia raised the attention of the respective coastal authorities, which alerted a Swedish patrol boat from the port of Farosund on Gotland. The yacht appeared to be operated by a Polish and a Lithuanian national, who used it to transport 1.5 million illicit cigarettes destined for the Swedish market (see Fig. 20).

South Eastern Europe

The largest number of detections of cigarette smuggling reported in South Eastern Europe took place at the BCPs Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo at the border between Turkey and Bulgaria. In Q3 2013, border authorities were able to report the detection of 93 cases of tobacco product contraband and the seizure of 433 580 cigarettes. The second highest number of detections was reported from the border between Croatia and Serbia, where 25 detections led to the seizure of 101 480 cigarettes. The largest case at this

Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation



The BSRBCC, which is an integral part of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, was founded in 1996 by the heads of the border and coastal authorities in the region. The mandate of the BSRBCC covers security-related issues concerning border control in the Baltic Sea Region. Among the fields of activity are the improvement of practical cooperation, the establishment of communication routines, means of data exchange, joint operations and the cooperation with Frontex.

border section was revealed at the BCP of Bajakovo on 1 August 2013, when a Serbian national tried to conceal 2 250 boxes of cigarettes under a double floor of his car.

In one of the largest cases of cigarette smuggling cases reported in Q3 2013 the territory of the EU was only used for transit. On 27 September 2013, the Romanian authorities decided to unseal a lorry on the way to Serbia at the BCP Moravita and detected 11 million undeclared cigarettes. The cigarettes did not have excise stamps and were considered to be counterfeited. According to the transportation documents, the illicit freight of the lorry belonged to a Latvian company and the final destination of transport was a company in Serbia. However, first investigations showed that the private companies were non-existent. The Romanian Border Police officer opened proceedings against the Lithuanian driver of the lorry and confiscated the contraband.

Western Mediterranean Sea

As reported through Frontex JO, more than 751 600 cigarettes were seized during the



reporting period on the Western Mediterranean route. In Q3 2013, 10 incidents were reported in the scope of the JO EPN Indalo 2013, leading to the arrest of 14 suspects and the seizure of 436 820 cigarettes. During the JO EPN Minerva, 314 780 cigarettes were detected in a total of 87 incidents.

According to media reports, in August 2013 around 465 500 packs of allegedly falsified Marlboro cigarettes were seized in Murcia, Spain. The contraband was hidden in a container coming from Chiwan in China and showed to have a market value of more than EUR 2 200 000. The container docked at the Port of Valencia before heading to Murcia. The smugglers were caught by the Spanish authorities when moving the tobacco from the container to a lorry with a foreign license plate that would presumably transport the illegal products out of Spain. In the operation, ten persons were arrested, eight of whom were Polish nationals (two of them of Asian origin) and two were Spanish citizens.

Apart from cigarettes, a large amount of counterfeit goods was detected during the JO EPN Minerva. During the reporting period, authorities seized 22 700 counterfeit backpacks with an estimated market value of EUR 681 000 in a cargo container. Other seizures involved counterfeit football equipment with an estimated market value of EUR 681 000, to various clothes showing different false brands with a market value of EUR 298 160, and to 12 444 other counterfeit articles of different brands with a total estimated market value of EUR 2 503 310.

Eastern Mediterranean Sea

As reported by various newspapers, a terrorist attack committed by Al Qaeda this summer revealed a large cigarette smuggling operation from Asia to Europe. On 31 August, terrorists fired two rockets against an Asia Cosco cargo ship as it made its way

through Egypt's Suez Canal. When the container hit by the Islamists' rocket was inspected on board, it was reportedly found to be filled with 9 million cigarettes worth EUR 4.3 million, with the destination being a bogus furniture company in Ireland traced to an Irish business man. Investigations showed that the counterfeit cigarettes had been bought in Vietnam for around EUR 0.20 a packet to supply the black markets in Ireland and the UK.

4.10.3. Exit of stolen vehicles

Eastern borders

Compared to the same period in 2012, Frontex Joint Operations reported an increase in the number of stolen vehicles detected at the EU eastern external borders in Q3 2013. 114 stolen vehicles were prevented from crossing the border in Q3 2013, whereas 94 were detected during the same period of 2012 and 119 in the second quarter of 2013. As usual, the largest number of cars were prevented to cross the border from Poland to Ukraine. With 54 vehicles in Q3 2013, slightly more detections were made than in the second quarter of this year (52). At the border between Poland and Belarus, the level of detections remained on the same level with 19 detections. Along the EU borders to the Russian Federation, 26 stolen vehicles were detected, most of which (13) tried to exit at the Latvian section.

The most frequently detected car brands at the eastern border in Q2 2013 were Mercedes Benz and Volkswagen, with 18 detections each, followed by Renault cars that were prevented from leaving the EU in 9 cases. BMW and Peugeot were identified as stolen in six incidents, respectively. In Q3 2013, criminals had diverse preferences for different vehicle models of the above mentioned brands, but showed no single favourites, such as BMW X5 as was the case in previous quarters.

Figure 21. The distribution of detections of stolen vehicles on exit among border sections in Q3 2013, compared with Q3 2012 and Q2 2013



Source: JORA data

Western Mediterranean Sea

In Q3 2013, 37 detections of stolen vehicles were reported in the context of the Frontex JO EPN Minerva. As a result, 44 smugglers were arrested, whose average age was



Figure 22. The Tanzanian vessel Gold Star after being set on fire by its own crew. Although large amounts of the drug were destroyed by the fire, the Italian authorities could still seize 3.5 tonnes of cannabis resin

35 and the main nationalities were Moroccan, French and Spanish. Detections of stolen vehicles on exit to Morocco (26) were more common than those entering the EU via Spain (4). The majority of detected vehicles attempted to board a ferry to Morocco in Algeciras, Spain. Most of the cars detected were expensive compact cars, bearing fake plates and forged VIN numbers. In some cases the drivers claimed to have purchased the car in the EU without being aware that it had been stolen.

4.10.4. Drug trafficking

Eastern Mediterranean Sea

On 6 September, in an international operation involving maritime assets deployed through the JO Hermes, boats of the Italian Guardia di Finanza attempted to intercept the Gold Star, a vessel sailing under the Tanzanian flag (see Fig. 22). When the convoy approached the suspicious ship, its nine crew members, nationals of Syria and Egypt, set their ship on fire and escaped into water. The crew was rescued and arrested by the Italian authorities. After the fire was extinguished with the support of Maltese maritime fire-fighters, the Italian authorities discovered 3.4 tonnes of intact cannabis resin among large amounts of burned drugs on the vessel's cargo deck.

© Frontex, 2013



Figure 23. During the JO EPN Minerva, two Spanish males were detected in Tarifa hiding hashish inside their jackets and inside the tongues of their shoes. An x-ray also revealed several balls of hashish in their bodies

The detection, monitoring and pursuance of the Gold Star can serve as an example of successful cooperation between international naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Italian authorities initiated the operation after they received a tip-off on the drug contraband. In order to monitor the ship, they requested the assistance of an airplane of the Spanish Guardia Civil that was deployed through a Frontex JO, and followed the drug vessel until it reached the area between Sicily and Malta. As the unrest in North Africa and Syria increasingly fuels the smuggling of drugs and weapons across the Mediterranean Sea, an intensified international cooperation of that kind will be required to maintain security along the European sea borders.

Western Mediterranean Sea

The Western Mediterranean Sea is extensively used for the smuggling of hashish from Morocco to the Iberian Peninsula. Organised crime groups also smuggle cocaine from Latin America across the Spanish sea borders using boats and airplanes. In Q3 2013, the Western Mediterranean area was covered by the JO EPN Minerva 2013 and JO Indalo 2013, which regularly reported high numbers of drugs detections.

The JO EPN Minerva took place from August to September 2013 at Spanish maritime bor-



© Guardia Civil, 2013

Figure 24. Cocaine hidden inside cosmetic products and wrapped into fake candies

der-crossing points including the ferry ports of Algeciras, Tarifa and Ceuta. During the reporting period, the JO EPN Minerva reported a large number of detections, mainly of hashish carried by individual smugglers crossing from Morocco to the Spanish cities of Algeciras and Ceuta. In Q3 2013, the number of drug detections during this operation decreased by 34% to 138. Still, more than three tonnes of hashish and 670 kg of cocaine were confiscated. During this period, assets deployed as part of the JO EPN Minerva also arrested 187 suspected drug traffickers, 56% of Moroccan and 24% of Spanish nationality. In many cases, the smugglers attached the drugs to their bodies, swallowed them, hid them in their clothes or accessories, or concealed them in hollow cavities of their cars and lorries.

On 18 September, agents of the Spanish Guardia Civil and National Police disman-

tled a criminal organisation responsible for introducing hashish into Spain and Portugal coming from Morocco by sea. In this intervention 21 persons were arrested and more than 2.6 tonnes of hashish were seized. The drug was collected in Moroccan waters and hidden under double floors of the boat. The preparation of the vessels for the trafficking and the extraction the drug from the sealed compartments required a relatively high level of proficiency and organisation.

Between May and October, the JO Indalo 2013 took place in the Western Mediterranean Sea. During Q3 2013, as a result of this operation, 19 drug trafficking incidents were reported, 33 suspected drug traffickers were arrested and around 12 300 kg of hashish was seized. In the deployment area, the smuggling of Moroccan hashish from Morocco to Spain on speed boats with high-powered engines is the most common *modus operandi*. The sea routes taken were almost exclusively from Morocco to the regions of Algeciras, near the Strait of Gibraltar, and Malaga.

Spain also constituted a key entry point for drugs coming from South America to Europe. The traffickers mostly used boats to transport the drug for large distances. In September,

the Spanish authorities intercepted a sailing boat near the Azores with more than 800 kg of cocaine hidden in the boat hull. The crew, consisting of two Estonians, one Serbian and one Spanish national, was arrested. Following the detection, a large operation was performed in Malaga and Cadiz, leading to the arrest of eleven people allegedly connected to the trafficking network.

The Spanish airports are also considered as major entry points for cocaine that comes from South America. On 19 June 2013, the Guardia Civil seized 55 kg of cocaine at the Madrid-Barajas airport and arrested two persons of Spanish and Colombian citizenship. The first detection occurred on a flight coming from Bogotá, where the suspect was transporting the drugs hidden in about 20 bags of candies. The second apprehension occurred shortly after the arrival of a flight from Venezuela, where two suitcases were detected and not collected at the baggage claim area. Authorities then found 44 packages each containing one kilogram of cocaine. The detection resulted in the arrest of a Colombian citizen who moreover carried fourteen containers of cosmetic creams with 1 050 grammes of cocaine hidden under double bottoms.



5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 5 November 2013, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 28 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries

Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported by border type the external borders

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Syria	2 024	3 923	1 241	1 248	2 784	11 825	201	325	28
Eritrea	461	575	1 298	123	1 948	6 686	1063	243	16
Somalia	1 673	1 283	1 065	481	1 466	2 973	132	103	7.0
Afghanistan	4 529	4 518	1 969	1 082	1 892	2 674	-41	41	6.3
Nigeria	190	273	250	41	304	2 159	691	610	5.1
Albania	1 797	1 254	1 423	1 199	3 098	2 094	67	-32	4.9
Pakistan	1 650	1 491	691	755	1 990	1 665	12	-16	3.9
Egypt	626	458	152	243	818	1 374	200	68	3.2
Not specified	525	771	496	655	673	1 270	65	89	3.0
Algeria	2 000	1 494	710	622	998	1 038	-31	4.0	2.4
Others	7 620	6 053	4 318	3 268	8 834	8 860	46	0.3	21
Total All Borders									
Land Borders									
Syria	1 918	3 321	501	591	960	3 056	-8.0	218	23
Albania	1 736	1 214	1 334	1 158	3 042	2 052	69	-33	16
Not specified	463	554	493	643	664	1 270	129	91	9.7
Pakistan	1 189	1 006	234	403	1 512	1 044	3.8	-31	8.0
Kosovo*	199	272	316	588	4 449	920	238	-79	7.1
Algeria	1 481	878	495	505	794	801	-8.8	0.9	6.1
Afghanistan	3 963	3 584	516	473	498	707	-80	42	5.4
Nigeria	123	15	12	10	120	296	1873	147	2.3
Bangladesh	2 348	959	52	46	221	295	-69	33	2.3
Ghana	61	37	4	20	101	214	478	112	1.6
Others	4 324	2 721	1 657	1 579	2 221	2 376	-13	7.0	18
Total Land Border									
Sea Borders									
Syria	106	602	740	657	1 824	8 769	1357	381	30
Eritrea	223	434	1 246	10	1 891	6 619	1425	250	22
Somalia	1 106	862	959	364	1 336	2 807	226	110	9.5
Afghanistan	566	934	1 453	609	1 394	1 967	111	41	6.6
Nigeria	67	258	238	31	184	1 863	622	913	6.3
Egypt	533	422	142	226	775	1 329	215	71	4.5
Mali	22	100	296	150	471	881	781	87	3.0
Gambia	36	153	304	251	333	824	439	147	2.8
Pakistan	461	485	457	352	478	621	28	30	2.1
Senegal	10	61	71	43	158	522	756	230	1.8
Others	2 160	3 221	2 093	1 008	1 379	3 385	5.1	145	11
Total Sea Border	5 290	7 532	7 999	3 701	10 223	29 587	293	189	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Border Type									
Land	106	151	160	117	105	50	-67	-52	94
Sea	20	16	43	13	13	3	-81	-77	5.7
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	4	9	28	24	15	24	167	60	45
Afghanistan	52	47	41	33	29	11	-77	-62	21
Turkey	1	23	13	5	1	6	-74	500	11
Morocco	10	7	4	8	5	2	-71	-60	3.8
Iraq	3	5	2	2	8	2	-60	-75	3.8
Lebanon					1	2		100	3.8
Ghana	1		4	5	7	2		-71	3.8
Not specified	1	1	1	0	0	1	0		1.9
Algeria	10	15	28	12	13	1	-93	-92	1.9
India			1	1		1			1.9
Others	44	60	81	40	39	1	-98	-97	1.9
Total	126	167	203	130	118	53	-68	-55	100

* Greece does not distinguish between detections at BCPs and between BCPs. Total detections for Greece are shown in Annex Tables 1 and 2.

Annex Table 3. **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 254	1 019	1 424	1 142	1 199	1 090	7	-9.1	65
Land	177	272	223	186	168	191	-30	14	11
Land Intra-EU	122	96	142	93	104	158	65	52	9.4
Sea	116	117	109	98	105	115	-1.7	9.5	6.8
Not specified	46	111	110	23	64	81	-27	27	4.8
Air	70	97	110	80	65	54	-44	-17	3.2
Top Ten Nationalities									
Egypt	99	39	24	27	44	142	264	223	8.4
Italy	94	98	149	112	177	141	44.0	-20	8.3
Morocco	95	91	185	77	79	96	5.5	22	5.7
Albania	37	65	68	60	72	81	25	13	4.8
Syria	15	23	24	25	36	67	191	86	4.0
Turkey	50	69	36	32	34	63	-8.7	85	3.7
Romania	55	79	94	50	39	60	-24	54	3.6
France	99	70	88	81	61	58	-17	-4.9	3.4
Greece	26	40	30	47	36	44	10	22	2.6
Others	1 138	992	1 252	955	986	746	-25	-24	44
Total	1 785	1 712	2 118	1 622	1 705	1 689	-1.3	-0.9	100

Annex Table 4. **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of detection									
Inland	68 906	68 696	68 316	64 071	67 980	71 818	4.5	5.6	84
Air	8 493	9 752	8 472	7 779	7 200	8 296	-15	15	9.7
Land	4 766	5 632	4 754	4 117	3 716	4 158	-26	12	4.9
Land Intra EU	1 427	1 393	1 665	377	554	985	-29	78	1.2
Sea	1 084	1 090	1 371	380	461	236	-78	-49	0.3
Between BCPs	212	187	195	166	193	111	-41	-42	0.1
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	2 020	4 004	4 547	3 848	3 619	8 195	105	126	9.6
Not specified	1 253	2 653	4 142	3 985	4 149	6 566	147	58	7.7
Morocco	5 683	4 724	4 814	4 933	5 299	4 383	-7.2	-17	5.1
Afghanistan	6 179	6 252	5 619	4 077	4 058	4 113	-34	1.4	4.8
Russian Federation	2 419	3 531	3 173	3 189	4 150	4 076	15	-1.8	4.8
Albania	3 627	2 856	3 614	3 388	3 951	4 029	41	2.0	4.7
Ukraine	3 036	3 655	3 188	2 867	2 853	3 353	-8.3	18	3.9
Eritrea	1 062	1 390	1 309	967	872	3 288	137	277	3.8
Pakistan	5 088	4 989	4 505	3 779	4 092	3 201	-36	-22	3.7
Algeria	4 077	3 747	3 705	3 445	3 728	3 167	-15	-15	3.7
Others	50 447	48 958	46 201	42 649	43 354	41 237	-16	-4.9	48
Total	84 891	86 759	84 817	77 127	80 125	85 608	-1.3	6.8	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 5. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external border reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
All Borders									
Russian Federation	2 325	2 978	2 865	3 016	10 578	5 930	99	-44	18
Ukraine	3 994	5 840	4 486	3 638	4 206	3 375	-42	-20	10
Albania	3 754	2 837	3 207	2 789	2 695	3 224	14	20	9.9
Serbia	1 222	1 489	1 552	2 008	1 619	2 105	41	30	6.5
Georgia	1 692	3 282	3 304	1 714	2 937	1 777	-46	-39	5.5
Morocco	1 081	708	1 087	1 290	1 058	1 502	112	42	4.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	389	426	497	647	417	1 348	216	223	4.2
Turkey	637	1 132	739	580	546	1 142	0.9	109	3.5
Belarus	1 116	1 386	1 427	1 026	1 165	1 102	-20	-5.4	3.4
United States	509	569	509	503	611	710	25	16	2.2
Others	11 563	11 365	11 408	11 147	11 484	10 220	-10	-11	3.2
Total All Borders	28 282	32 012	31 081	28 358	37 316	32 435	1.3	-13	100
Land Borders									
Russian Federation	1 620	2 185	2 211	2 374	9 972	5 243	140	-47	26
Ukraine	3 723	5 500	4 281	3 429	3 952	3 111	-43	-21	16
Serbia	1 034	1 265	1 311	1 769	1 429	1 923	52	35	9.7
Albania	2 587	1 684	1 915	1 576	1 474	1 919	14	30	9.7
Georgia	1 620	3 214	3 208	1 634	2 844	1 701	-47	-40	8.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	346	385	454	615	373	1 304	239	250	6.6
Morocco	708	295	747	943	706	1 113	277	58	5.6
Belarus	1 086	1 350	1 396	1 001	1 144	1 042	-23	-8.9	5.3
Turkey	243	730	301	205	226	777	6.4	244	3.9
YROM	506	472	403	441	470	441	-6.6	-6.2	2.2
Others	1 780	2 219	1 934	2 035	1 904	1 262	-43	-34	6.4
Total Land Border	15 253	19 299	18 161	16 022	24 494	19 836	2.8	-19	100
Air Borders									
Albania	638	581	853	724	747	735	27	-1.6	6.7
United States	484	534	487	492	590	682	28	16	6.2
Russian Federation	389	510	378	401	393	572	12	46	5.2
Brazil	841	540	596	724	615	542	0.4	-12	5.0
Algeria	356	299	406	430	566	427	43	-25	3.9
Nigeria	435	477	423	340	380	413	-13	8.7	3.8
Not specified	458	453	612	511	470	404	-11	-14	3.7
China	258	345	287	268	382	304	-12	-20	2.8
Turkey	352	322	393	336	272	283	-12	4.0	2.6
Morocco	259	245	239	248	223	235	-4.1	5.4	2.1
Others	6 395	6 335	6 660	6 325	6 566	6 352	0.3	-3.3	5.8
Total Air Border	10 865	10 641	11 334	10 799	11 204	10 949	2.9	-2.3	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	529	572	439	489	474	570	-0.3	20	3.5
Morocco	114	168	101	99	129	154	-8.3	19	9.3
Philippines	372	241	252	246	275	121	-50	-56	7.3
Russian Federation	316	283	276	241	213	115	-59	-46	7.0
Turkey	42	80	45	39	48	82	2.5	71	5.0
Saint Lucia	1	1	0	0	0	66	6500		4.0
Syria	56	55	11	11	37	59	7.3	59	3.6
Not specified	117	43	51	29	47	58	35	23	3.5
Ukraine	42	69	13	4	21	37	-46	76	2.2
Tunisia	26	39	35	36	39	33	-15	-15	2.0
Others	549	521	363	343	335	355	-32	6.0	2.2
Total Sea Border	2 164	2 072	1 586	1 537	1 618	1 650	-20	2.0	100

Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2013 Q3 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Russian Federation	5 930	80	5	5 109	20	310	74	154	56	146	33	5 987
Ukraine	3 375	78	64	1 466	16	1 262	112	139	172	25	42	3 376
Albania	3 224	32	47	82	15	732	85	842	1 227	41	184	3 287
Serbia	2 105	60	20	115	2	512	305	619	436	17	60	2 146
Georgia	1 777	2	5	1 704	5	37	1	8	14	0	4	1 780
Morocco	1 502	694	40	275	35	134	1	38	187	103	8	1 515
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1 348	457	2	21	0	321	81	489	61	16	109	1 557
Turkey	1 142	131	20	673	9	74	112	28	50	36	22	1 155
Belarus	1 102	35	12	620	2	230	11	90	47	47	12	1 106
United States	710	25	0	17	1	11	22	7	15	4	611	713
Others	10 220	795	468	2 733	223	2 463	303	604	419	255	2 221	10 484
Total	32 435	2 389	683	12 815	328	6 086	1 107	3 018	2 684	690	3 306	33 106

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

A has no valid travel document(s);

B has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;

C has no valid visa or residence permit;

D has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;

E has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;

F has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;

G does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;

H is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;

I is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.



Annex Table 7. **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reasons for refusal

	2012			2013			2013 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
All Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	8 323	11 385	10 225	8 699	18 392	12 815	13	-30	39	Russian Federation (40%)
E) No justification	5 706	6 728	6 766	6 290	6 716	6 086	-9.5	-9.4	18	Ukraine (21%)
Reason not available	2 693	3 031	2 863	2 655	3 034	3 306	9.1	9.0	10	United States (18%)
G) No subsistence	3 406	2 651	2 465	2 607	2 332	3 018	14	29	9.1	Albania (28%)
H) Alert issued	3 289	5 102	3 967	3 158	2 739	2 684	-47	-2.0	8.1	Albania (46%)
A) No valid document	2 014	2 028	1 961	2 161	2 410	2 389	18	-0.9	7.2	Morocco (29%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 143	1 531	1 214	1 201	886	1 107	-28	25	3.3	Serbia (28%)
I) Threat	816	887	806	1 006	848	690	-22	-19	2.1	Russian Federation (21%)
B) False document	1 006	798	1 049	675	665	683	-14	2.7	2.1	Unknown (11%)
D) False visa	374	511	577	358	301	328	-36	9.0	1.0	Morocco (11%)
Total All Borders	28 770	34 652	31 893	28 810	38 323	33 106	-4.5	-14	100	
Land Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	5 521	8 389	7 498	6 366	15 735	10 157	21	-35	50	Russian Federation (47%)
E) No justification	2 259	3 875	3 530	2 734	3 198	2 939	-24	-8.1	15	Ukraine (40%)
G) No subsistence	2 484	1 750	1 527	1 733	1 425	2 228	27	56	11	Albania (32%)
H) Alert issued	2 183	3 996	2 912	2 186	1 858	1 807	-55	-2.7	9.0	Albania (41%)
A) No valid document	896	906	784	1 108	1 384	1 472	62	6.4	7.3	Morocco (46%)
F) Over 3 month stay	925	1 336	1 036	966	689	801	-40	16	4.0	Serbia (37%)
I) Threat	529	609	460	713	500	303	-50	-39	1.5	Russian Federation (35%)
Reason not available	0	0	0	101	0	243			1.2	Bosnia and Herzegovina (43%)
B) False document	464	328	305	99	117	159	-52	36	0.8	Ukraine (40%)
D) False visa	110	192	257	85	45	57	-70	27	0.3	Ukraine (25%)
Total Land Border	15 371	21 381	18 309	16 091	24 951	20 166	-5.7	-19	100	
Air Borders										Nationality
Reason not available	2 568	2 901	2 778	2 461	2 903	2 925	0.8	0.8	26	United States (20%)
E) No justification	3 317	2 590	3 085	3 355	3 256	2 851	10	-12	25	Albania (9.8%)
C) No valid visa	2 050	2 389	2 221	1 912	2 154	2 295	-3.9	6.5	20	Russian Federation (14%)
G) No subsistence	822	852	892	804	838	716	-16	-15	6.3	Albania (8.8%)
A) No valid document	589	629	794	709	656	579	-7.9	-12	5.1	Unknown (34%)
H) Alert issued	644	634	698	638	567	555	-12	-2.1	4.9	Albania (46%)
B) False document	518	441	712	563	464	492	12	6.0	4.4	Unknown (15%)
I) Threat	267	259	319	260	305	356	37	17	3.2	Suriname (13%)
F) Over 3 month stay	213	191	173	222	186	281	47	51	2.5	Russian Federation (11%)
D) False visa	246	295	308	257	240	238	-19	-0.8	2.1	Côte d'Ivoire (5.9%)
Total Air Border	11 234	11 181	11 980	11 181	11 569	11 288	1.0	-2.4	100	
Sea Borders										Nationality
C) No valid visa	752	607	506	421	487	363	-40	-25	22	Philippines (23%)
A) No valid document	529	493	383	344	366	338	-31	-7.7	20	Russian Federation (20%)
H) Alert issued	462	472	357	334	291	322	-32	11	19	Albania (75%)
E) No justification	130	263	151	201	198	296	13	49	18	Albania (75%)
Reason not available	125	130	85	93	128	138	6.2	7.8	8.4	United States (12%)
G) No subsistence	100	49	46	70	69	74	51	7.2	4.5	Albania (84%)
D) False visa	18	24	12	16	11	33	38	200	2.0	Morocco (70%)
B) False document	24	29	32	13	14	32	10	129	1.9	Morocco (44%)
I) Threat	20	19	27	33	43	31	63	-28	1.9	Albania (77%)
F) Over 3 month stay	5	4	5	13	11	25	525	127	1.5	Turkey (24%)
Total Sea Border	2 165	2 090	1 604	1 538	1 618	1 652	-21	2.1	100	

Annex Table 8. Applications for asylum

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3	2013 Q3		per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2		Q3	% change on year ago	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	3 591	7 592	9 109	8 366	7 917	13 963	84	76	14
Russian Federation	2 993	4 660	6 414	7 010	15 453	8 693	87	-44	8.9
Eritrea	2 338	2 973	3 064	2 437	2 065	6 631	123	221	6.8
Not specified	2 295	3 127	5 540	3 758	2 728	5 680	82	108	5.8
Afghanistan	6 881	7 343	7 652	5 791	5 458	5 679	-23	4.0	5.8
Somalia	4 073	3 742	4 150	3 459	4 046	5 127	37	27	5.3
Pakistan	3 539	3 965	4 783	3 422	4 840	4 551	15	-6.0	4.7
Serbia	1 691	4 576	6 321	2 465	2 258	4 509	-1.5	100	4.6
Kosovo***	1 045	1 027	1 642	1 912	6 487	3 548	245	-45	3.6
Iran	2 769	3 470	3 894	3 019	2 891	2 707	-22	-6.4	2.8
Others	28 361	31 294	33 540	31 211	31 219	36 119	15.0	16	37
Total	59 576	73 769	86 109	72 850	85 362	97 207	32	14	100

* For the Netherlands, due to modifications of the national information system, the breakdown by nationality of inland asylum applications is not available from the reporting period January 2012 to April 2012.

** For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications.

*** This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Annex Table 9. **Document fraud**

Fraudulent documents detected at BCP reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
Border Type										Nationality Claimed
Air	1 207	1 222	1 822	2 168	2 030	2 028	66	-0.1	70	Unknown (14%)
Land	1 060	819	654	574	464	559	-32	20	19	Albania (31%)
Sea	98	134	84	68	119	316	136	166	11	Morocco (53%)
Not specified	1	0	4	0	2	9	n.a.	350	0.3	Morocco (89%)
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed										Nationality of Document
Not specified	58	37	76	360	378	427	1054	13	15	France (20%)
Syria	60	92	412	406	378	322	250	-15	11	Sweden (12%)
Albania	909	498	391	325	263	260	-48	-1.1	8.9	Greece (67%)
Morocco	82	56	115	89	141	245	338	74	8.4	Spain (39%)
Ukraine	72	75	55	50	71	108	44	52	3.7	Poland (37%)
Afghanistan	51	67	95	51	60	101	51	68	3.5	UK (31%)
Nigeria	75	58	74	87	79	84	45	6.3	2.9	Nigeria (27%)
Iran	68	80	64	119	94	84	5	-11	2.9	France (19%)
Turkey	44	55	96	75	32	82	49	156	2.8	Turkey (41%)
Guinea	12	28	22	72	35	71	154	103	2.4	Guinea (42%)
Others	935	1 129	1 164	1 176	1 084	1 128	-0.1	4.1	39	France (15%)
Total	2 366	2 175	2 564	2 810	2 615	2 912	34	11	100	

Annex Table 10. Document fraud

False documents detected at BCP reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2012			2013		2013 Q3			per cent of total	Highest share	Nationality of Document
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr			
PASSPORTS	647	768	1 050	1 261	1 283	1 347	75	5	46	France (9.0%)	
Forged	288	327	456	447	521	527	61	1.2	39	Algeria (7.0%)	
Authentic	151	241	270	480	421	491	104	17	36	France (14%)	
Counterfeit	99	74	179	149	176	198	168	13	15	Turkey (29%)	
No more details	98	108	75	150	139	115	6.5	-17	8.5	Guinea (9.6%)	
Stolen blank	11	18	69	32	24	16	-11	-33	1.2	Germany (25%)	
Pseudo	0	0	1	3	2	0	n.a.	-100	0		
ID CARDS	247	217	242	290	275	376	73	37	13	Italy (23%)	
Counterfeit	112	102	134	148	139	153	50	10	41	Italy (22%)	
Authentic	47	52	47	67	73	122	135	67	32	Spain (35%)	
Forged	44	13	37	25	47	47	262	0	13	Italy (38%)	
No more details	25	42	11	22	6	33	-21	450	9	Unknown (48%)	
Stolen blank	18	7	13	25	10	21	200	110	6	Italy (86%)	
Pseudo	1	1	0	3	0	0	-100	n.a.	0		
VISA	170	167	242	318	259	336	101	30	12	France (29%)	
Counterfeit	95	83	111	189	144	212	155	47	63	France (30%)	
Forged	22	41	79	61	58	66	61	14	20	Italy (32%)	
No more details	27	23	17	27	30	31	35	3.3	9.2	France (52%)	
Authentic	10	13	13	25	21	16	23	-24	4.8	Spain (38%)	
Stolen blank	16	7	22	16	6	11	57	83	3.3	Greece (55%)	
RESIDENCE PERMITS	308	330	387	461	385	419	27	9	14	Greece (23%)	
Counterfeit	142	161	159	154	122	163	1.2	34	39	Italy (25%)	
Authentic	49	67	66	111	95	115	72	21	27	France (42%)	
Stolen blank	67	56	98	124	85	72	29	-15	17	Greece (72%)	
Forged	34	25	50	45	54	43	72	-20	10	Greece (49%)	
No more details	15	21	14	26	28	25	19	-11	6	Germany (28%)	
Pseudo	1	0	0	1	1	1	n.a.	0	0.2	Unknown (100%)	
STAMPS	959	630	509	409	350	377	-40	7.7	13	Greece (44%)	
Counterfeit	931	583	470	366	315	298	-49	-5.4	79	Greece (54%)	
Forged	27	42	35	34	32	69	64	116	18	Poland (19%)	
No more details	1	5	4	9	3	10	100	233	2.7	France (40%)	
OTHER	35	63	134	71	63	57	-9.5	-9.5	2.0	Italy (58%)	
Counterfeit	17	47	101	39	36	34	-28	-5.6	60	Italy (56%)	
Authentic	9	12	23	23	10	15	25	50	26	Italy (80%)	
Forged	5	3	7	4	8	4	33	-50	7	Sweden (25%)	
Stolen blank	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.5	France (50%)	
No more details	1	1	0	1	2	2	100	0	3.5	Moldova (50%)	
Pseudo	3	0	3	4	7	0	n.a.	-100	0		
Total	2 366	2 175	2 564	2 810	2 615	2 912	34	11			

In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.



Annex Table 11A. Document fraud

Top ten combinations Nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012			2013		2013 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
PASSPORTS	647	768	1 050	1 261	1 283	1 347	75	5.0	46	Syria (16%)
FRA-Authentic	13	27	33	55	68	68	152	0	5.0	Unknown (35%)
TUR-Counterfeit	9	14	56	38	42	57	307	36	4.2	Other (46%)
SWE-Authentic	10	16	44	78	55	43	169	-22	3.2	Syria (51%)
DZA-Forged	7	12	27	22	20	37	208	85	2.7	Syria (78%)
GBR-Forged	25	23	34	21	24	36	57	50	2.7	Afghanistan (75%)
TUR-Forged	8	8	16	16	34	35	338	2.9	2.6	Other (66%)
FRA-Forged	23	17	20	26	33	32	88	-3.0	2.4	Syria (16%)
MLI-Authentic	7	6	17	31	24	29	383	21	2.2	Unknown (76%)
SEN-Forged	4	0	10	15	27	27	n.a.	0	2.0	Other (44%)
SYR-Forged	6	6	18	16	22	26	333	18	1.9	Syria (100%)
Others	535	639	775	943	934	957	50	2.5	71	Unknown (14%)
ID CARDS	247	217	242	290	275	376	73	37	13	Morocco (20%)
ESP-Authentic	20	16	19	12	26	43	169	65	11	Morocco (91%)
ITA-Counterfeit	46	19	21	51	33	34	79	3.0	9.0	Syria (18%)
BGR-Counterfeit	7	8	11	12	19	27	238	42	7.2	Afghanistan (33%)
FRA-Authentic	4	10	6	19	15	26	160	73	6.9	Unknown (27%)
ITA-Forged	9	3	15	11	21	18	500	-14	4.8	Albania (50%)
ROU-Counterfeit	12	13	7	11	14	18	38	29	4.8	Syria (44%)
ITA-Stolen blank	15	3	10	8	7	18	500	157	4.8	Albania (50%)
FRA-Counterfeit	4	3	10	6	7	17	467	143	4.5	Algeria (18%)
BEL-Counterfeit	5	14	4	5	18	16	14	-11	4.3	Morocco (56%)
NO-No more details	0	17	0	0	0	14	-18	n.a.	3.7	Afghanistan (50%)
Others	125	111	139	155	115	145	31	26	39	Syria (16%)
VISA	170	167	242	318	259	336	101	30	12	Nigeria (8.3%)
FRA-Counterfeit	44	27	24	34	37	63	133	70	19	Iraq (11%)
DEU-Counterfeit	14	22	27	36	26	46	109	77	14	Afghanistan (17%)
ITA-Counterfeit	9	5	8	10	11	30	500	173	8.9	Sri Lanka (53%)
ITA-Forged	10	23	46	30	31	21	-8.7	-32	6.3	Bangladesh (52%)
ESP-Counterfeit	3	9	9	32	12	21	133	75	6.3	Tunisia (14%)
FRA-No more details	8	3	9	7	13	16	433	23	4.8	Ghana (31%)
FRA-Forged	5	3	7	16	8	14	367	75	4.2	Unknown (57%)
ESP-Forged	2	0	3	2	7	10	n.a.	43	3.0	Morocco (50%)
BEL-Counterfeit	0	1	12	21	14	10	900	-29	3.0	Turkey (40%)
PRT-Counterfeit	0	0	1	0	3	7	n.a.	133	2.1	Nigeria (57%)
Others	75	74	96	130	97	98	32	1.0	29	Nigeria (11%)

Total: see Table 11B

* In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

** Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

*** Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.

Annex Table 11B. Document fraud

Top ten combinations of nationality of document and document fraud by document type

Document Type	2012			2013		2013 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
RESIDENCE PERMITS	308	330	387	461	385	419	27	8.8	14	Morocco (16%)
GRC-Stolen blank	47	33	58	57	58	52	58	-10	1.2	Other (19%)
FRA-Authentic	9	20	22	34	35	48	140	37	1.1	Unknown (40%)
ESP-Authentic	21	20	18	28	23	41	105	78	9.8	Morocco (46%)
ITA-Counterfeit	63	46	29	37	38	40	-13	5.3	9.5	Morocco (30%)
BEL-Counterfeit	20	23	25	23	14	21	-8.7	50	5.0	Morocco (38%)
GRC-Forged	17	14	33	17	35	21	50	-40	5.0	Pakistan (38%)
GRC-Counterfeit	5	7	32	14	18	20	186	11	4.8	Syria (25%)
FRA-Counterfeit	15	37	7	10	5	19	-49	280	4.5	Guinea (37%)
PRT-Counterfeit	1	1	3	3	2	15	1400	650	3.6	Unknown (53%)
ESP-Counterfeit	14	9	14	16	28	14	56	-50	3.3	Morocco (57%)
Others	96	120	146	222	129	128	6.7	-0.8	3.1	Morocco (14%)
STAMPS	959	630	509	409	350	377	-40	7.7	13	Albania (42%)
GRC-Counterfeit	646	405	352	251	200	159	-61	-21	4.2	Albania (91%)
POL-Counterfeit	34	29	27	15	30	30	3.4	0	8.0	Ukraine (83%)
FRA-Counterfeit	2	8	13	9	14	21	163	50	5.6	Ukraine (19%)
ITA-Counterfeit	12	16	5	11	10	14	-13	40	3.7	Senegal (14%)
POL-Forged	4	8	2	0	5	13	63	160	3.4	Ukraine (100%)
HUN-Forged	2	9	3	7	8	13	44	63	3.4	Serbia (62%)
HUN-Counterfeit	5	12	5	10	9	11	-8.3	22	2.9	Serbia (64%)
ESP-Counterfeit	5	5	4	8	6	9	80	50	2.4	Russian Fed. (67%)
ITA-Forged	3	7	6	9	1	9	29	800	2.4	Ukraine (44%)
SVK-Counterfeit	7	7	9	1	3	8	14	167	2.1	Ukraine (100%)
Others	239	124	83	88	64	90	-27	41	2.4	Ukraine (20%)
OTHER	35	63	134	71	63	57	-9.5	-9.5	2.0	Sri Lanka (14%)
ITA-Counterfeit	7	12	78	16	13	19	58	46	3.3	Sri Lanka (32%)
ITA-Authentic	5	7	19	15	8	12	71	50	2.1	Bangladesh (58%)
ALB-Counterfeit	2	0	0	1	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	5.3	Albania (100%)
BGR-Counterfeit	0	0	3	7	7	3	n.a.	-57	5.3	Romania (100%)
FIN-Counterfeit	0	0	0	1	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.5	Syria (50%)
ESP-Counterfeit	0	0	1	1	2	2	n.a.	0	3.5	Ghana (50%)
LKA-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.5	Libya (50%)
NGA-Counterfeit	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	n.a.	1.8	Nigeria (100%)
MDA-No more details	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	1.8	Zimbabwe (100%)
DEU-Counterfeit	0	0	1	0	2	1	n.a.	-50	1.8	Jordan (100%)
Others	21	43	32	29	31	11	-74	-65	1.9	Turkey (9.1%)
Total	2 366	2 175	2 564	2 810	2 615	2 912	34	11		

* In Greece, the discontinuity between 2011 and 2012 is due to the introduction of reporting of counterfeit stamps used by Albanian nationals at the land border between Greece and Albania.

** Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

*** Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France have been excluded from this table in 2012.



Annex Table 12. **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by Member State and top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	4 149	3 615	4 024	3 838	4 588	4 528	25	-1.3	7.9
Pakistan	5 782	7 097	5 974	4 723	4 034	3 973	-44	-1.5	6.9
Syria	1 370	3 561	2 172	1 730	1 838	3 555	-0.2	93	6.2
Russian Federation	1 684	2 125	2 029	2 126	2 141	3 222	52	50	5.6
Morocco	4 022	3 744	3 456	3 439	3 242	2 802	-25	-14	4.9
Afghanistan	7 198	6 321	3 207	2 253	2 237	2 592	-59	16	4.5
Ukraine	2 160	2 445	2 487	2 203	2 072	2 572	5.2	24	4.5
India	2 467	2 360	2 713	2 901	2 624	2 181	-7.6	-17	3.8
Nigeria	2 251	2 327	2 312	2 320	2 252	2 032	-13	-9.8	3.5
Algeria	3 955	3 269	2 851	2 480	2 264	1 887	-42	-17	3.3
Others	32 853	34 265	29 800	27 272	26 294	28 239	-18	7.4	49
Total	67 891	71 129	61 025	55 285	53 586	57 583	-19	7.5	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 13. **Effective returns**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2012			2013		2013 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	3 071	2 884	4 166	3 478	5 889	4 845	68	-18	12
Pakistan	2 490	1 806	3 826	3 179	2 997	2 829	57	-5.6	7.0
India	2 204	1 962	2 392	2 508	2 141	2 223	13	3.8	5.5
Ukraine	1 906	2 103	2 163	1 702	1 763	2 110	0.3	20	5.2
Russian Federation	1 539	2 072	1 813	1 777	1 715	2 090	0.9	22	5.2
Kosovo*	976	776	1 173	730	805	1 733	123	115	4.3
Morocco	2 020	1 800	1 769	1 729	1 785	1 656	-8.0	-7.2	4.1
Serbia	1 882	1 978	1 977	1 645	1 751	1 642	-17	-6.2	4.1
Nigeria	1 259	1 145	1 160	1 293	1 355	1 290	13	-4.8	3.2
Bangladesh	1 090	795	1 674	1 285	1 186	1 104	39	-6.9	2.7
Others	22 006	20 375	20 059	18 905	18 924	18 898	-7.2	-0.1	47
Total	40 443	37 696	42 172	38 231	40 311	40 420	7.2	0.3	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Annex Table 14. **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by to type of return and top ten nationalities

Type of Return	2012			2013		2013 Q3		per cent of total	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Type of Return									
Forced	21 273	18 323	22 840	19 534	22 501	22 161	21	-1.5	55
Enforced by Member State	18 423	15 763	20 305	15 263	20 114	20 029	27	-0.4	90
Not specified	2 241	2 115	2 192	3 924	2 072	1 866	-12	-9.9	8.4
Enforced by Joint Operation	609	445	343	347	315	266	-40	-16	1.2
Voluntary	16 584	15 762	17 127	16 529	15 485	16 395	4.0	5.9	41
Others	9 589	8 476	9 782	9 431	8 447	8 378	-1.2	-0.8	38
IOM-assisted	3 984	3 418	3 761	3 697	4 020	4 903	43	22	22
Not specified	3 011	3 868	3 584	3 401	3 018	3 114	-19	3.2	14
Not specified	2 586	3 611	2 205	2 168	2 325	1 864	-48	-20	4.6
Total	40 443	37 696	42 172	38 231	40 311	40 420	7.2	0.3	100
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
Forced									
Albania	2 864	2 560	3 649	3 246	5 609	4 524	77	-19	20
Pakistan	1 759	972	2 873	2 298	2 075	1 763	81	-15	8.0
Egypt	499	425	337	378	678	958	125	41	4.3
Kosovo*	584	383	765	422	316	903	136	186	4.1
Tunisia	1 511	1 414	935	668	880	823	-42	-6.5	3.7
Serbia	785	647	770	846	863	815	26	-5.6	3.7
India	872	888	824	731	724	796	-10	9.9	3.6
Morocco	847	741	817	747	745	726	-2	-2.6	3.3
Algeria	615	565	717	575	657	696	23	5.9	3.1
Nigeria	774	694	660	641	710	652	-6.1	-8.2	2.9
Others	10 163	9 034	10 493	8 982	9 244	9 505	5.2	2.8	43
Total Forced Returns	21 273	18 323	22 840	19 534	22 501	22 161	21	-1.5	100
Voluntary									
Ukraine	1 483	1 707	1 765	1 377	1 418	1 691	-0.9	19	10
Russian Federation	1 171	1 741	1 488	1 483	1 341	1 677	-3.7	25	10
India	1 328	1 038	1 560	1 766	1 411	1 422	37	0.8	8.7
Pakistan	708	680	918	861	893	1 057	55	18	6.4
Kosovo*	392	393	408	308	489	830	111	70	5.1
Serbia	1 094	1 323	1 197	792	881	816	-38	-7.4	5.0
Nigeria	433	336	444	609	567	603	79	6.3	3.7
China	759	563	477	846	732	570	1.2	-22	3.5
Bangladesh	381	271	366	466	473	531	96	12	3.2
Iraq	569	467	378	447	362	381	-18	5.2	2.3
Others	8 266	7 243	8 126	7 574	6 918	6 817	-5.9	-1.5	42
Total Voluntary Returns	16 584	15 762	17 127	16 529	15 485	16 395	4.0	5.9	100

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include

land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, The Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM-assisted and others) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



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