# FRAN Quarterly Issue 1, January–March 2011

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union





Warsaw, July 2011 Risk Analysis Unit For Public Release Reference number: 12592

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# Executive summary

For the first time since data collection began in 2008, detections of illegal bordercrossings in the first quarter of the year exceeded those for the preceding quarter. This was almost exclusively due to a massive influx of illegal immigration at the Italian island of Lampedusa, where some 20 000 Tunisian nationals were detected during Q1 2011. As a result this was also the first quarter in which a Member State other than Greece (Italy) reported the highest number of illegal border-crossings into the EU. This represents a major shift in both the magnitude and distribution of pressure at the external border of the EU, with a wave of additional effects detectable across Member States, and significant developments subsequent to the current reporting period.

For linguistic reasons, and due to connections with established diaspora, many Tunisians arriving in Italy claimed France as their final destination. Therefore, in addition to detections of illegal border-crossings in Lampedusa, Tunisians were also increasingly detected as facilitators and illegal stayers in both Italy and France. There were also reports of organised crime groups facilitating sham marriages for Tunisian nationals. Since the reporting period, the flow of Tunisians has reduced somewhat, as a result of an accelerated repatriation agreement between Italy and Tunisia signed in April 2011 which applies to new arrivals.

Subsequent to the reporting period, Lampedusa came under severe immigration pressure from a second wave of migrants, this time departing from Libya (mainly migrants from Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan countries) following civil unrest and NATO Operation Unified Protector in the area.

In 2010 the unquestionable hotspot for illegal border-crossings was the Greek land border with Turkey, where mostly nationals of Afghanistan and Iraq were detected. In Q1 2011 detections of illegal border-crossing at this border section decreased 60% across a wide range of nationalities, particularly Afghans and Algerians. Nevertheless, in Q1 2011 the Greek land border with Turkey still constituted more than half of all illegal border-crossings at the EU level, excluding the arrivals in Lampedusa. The main hub for this migration route remains Turkey, which is also the main point of embarkation for attempts to illegally enter the EU via the air border. This border section has, to a large extent, not been affected by the civil unrest in North Africa. Much of the reduction of illegal migration pressure in Greece can be attributed to combined deterrent effects of increased operational activities in the area (RABIT 2010) and seasonal inclement weather, neither of which will be present in the next quarter. Hence, the pressure in this area is still assessed to be extremely high and increased detections are very likely to resume in the short term.

In late 2010 nationals of Albania were granted visa-free travel to the EU, which had significant and demonstrable consequences on their international travel and *modi operandi* for illegally entering the EU. For example, in Q1 2011 Albanians were detected in much lower numbers both illegally crossing the border into the EU and illegally staying within the EU, which reflects the new legality of short-term travel to the EU for Albanian nationals. In any case, more Albanians were refused entry into the EU than any other nationality, because of alerts in the Schengen Information System. Combined with the fact that fewer Albanian facilitators of illegal migration were detected than ever before, these figures clearly indicate that Albanians, who were previously illegal but circular migrants to the EU, are now less detectable in illegal migration statistics.

# 1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of illegal migration at the EU external borders based on the illegal migration data provided by Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).

Frontex and the Member States are currently harmonising their illegal-migration data. It is clear that this harmonisation process is not yet finalised. Therefore more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections and the data collection practices in place.

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide feedback to the FRAN system of information, to update the common situational picture regarding illegal migration and to serve as a basis for further discussion on related trends and patterns. FRAN Members and other risk analysis experts of Member State border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and encouraged to examine and comment on the data and the analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of RAU and Member State experts involved in the data collection and aggregation, it is impossible to avoid errors in compiling these reports due to the growing volume of data and other information exchanged via FRAN.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were subsequently transferred to the FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlapped with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members. The exception was the indicator on returns, which has been recently added as part of the regular data exchange within FRAN.

# 2. Methodology

This, the 11<sup>th</sup> issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between January and March 2011, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variation in six illegal-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

A distinction was made between (i) EU external borders – borders between Member States with the rest of the world (including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), and (ii) Schengen land borders within the EU. The latter concerns only a small number of borders between Member States of which some are not part of the Schengen area. Such Schengen borders within the EU exist for example between Belgium/ France and the UK (Eurostar train stations), as well as between Bulgaria/Romania and other Member States. This distinction is possible and necessary as data is in principle (only) collected at Schengen borders. However, the distinction was not possible for the air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but sum data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established in time.

#### Monthly data were collected on the following seven indicators:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 detections of false documents
- 7a return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7b returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

# 3. Summary of FRAN indicators


As rep	orted by Member States	2009		20	10			2011 Q1	
FR	AN Indicator	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr
1A	Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	21 998	14 857	26 878	34 785	27 531	32 906	121	20
1B	Clandestine entries at BCPs	53	23	24	130	65	72	213	11
2	Facilitators	2 177	2 470	2 282	2 159	1 718	1 860	-25	8.3
3	Illegal stay	93 969	86 357	87 939	88 079	86 291	82 257	-4.7	-4.7
4	Refusals of entry	26 162	26 505	25 583	28 505	27 907	28 664	8.1	2.7
5	Applications for asylum	54 889	47 504	43 112	55 310	57 954	50 939	7.2	-12
6	False travel-document users	1 893	2 117	2 312	2 374	2 636	2 171	2.6	-18

Source: FRAN data received as of 20 May 2011

Figure 1: Evolution of six FRAN indicators. Lines in red illustrate relationships between Q4 and Q1 in consecutive years.

#### **Evolution of FRAN Indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons



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
# 4. Main trends Q1 2011

- For the first time since data collection began, there were more detections of illegal border-crossings during the first quarter of the year than in the final quarter of the previous year
- In Q1 2011 there was a massive influx of irregular migration at the Italian island of Lampedusa, mostly Tunisian nationals
- For the first time since data collection began, a Member State other than Greece reported the highest number of illegal border-crossings into the EU
- As well as in illegal border-crossings, Tunisians were also increasingly detected as facilitators, illegal stayers and as asylum seekers, and in attempting sham marriages across the EU
- Immediately subsequent to the reporting period, the 5 April 2011 bilateral agreement between Tunisia and Italy significantly reduced the number of arrivals from Tunisia to Lampedusa
- At the Greek land border with Turkey, detections of illegal bordercrossings fell by 60% compared to the previous quarter across a range of nationalities, but still constituted more than half of illegal border-crossings elsewhere of Lampedusa
- Turkey is the most important transit country for irregular migration to the EU, related to both its land border with Greece and as an embarkation point for illegal entry at the EU air border
- Nationals of Somalia were detected in much fewer numbers at the Greek land border with Turkey, but increasingly in Malta, at the Slovakia-Ukraine land border and overstaying in Greece
- Circular Albanian migrants were previously detected in high numbers illegally crossing the external border of the EU, but in Q1 2011 they were increasingly refused entry at BCPs after the visa liberalisation for biometric passport holders started in December 2010
- For the first time more Albanians were refused than any other nationality, nearly all in connection to alerts in the Schengen Information System
- Possibly related to countermeasures taken by the Serbian authorities to address the abuse of visa liberalisation, between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011, the peak of Serbian asylum applications declined by 50% at the EU level

#### 4.1 Detections of illegal border-crossings

At the EU level there were 32 900 detections of illegal border-crossing during Q1 2011, which is a 20% increase compared to the previous quarter (Figure 2). This comparison is indicative of a major increase because, based on historical data, the first quarter of the year is normally expected to have lower detections than the final quarter of the preceding year. Indeed, in Q1 2011 there were more than twice the numbers of detections of illegal border-crossing than during the same period the year before, supporting the assertion of a massive increase in irregular migration pressure at the external border of the EU. Specifically, these figures relate to the well-publicised increased pressure at the Italian island of Lampedusa following civil unrest in North African countries, particularly Tunisia, and, subsequent to the reporting period, Libya.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN indicator 1A (detections of illegal bordercrossing) and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. In contrast to the unexpected overall increase at the EU external land border, detections of illegal border-crossing fell by two-thirds from 25 000 in the last quarter of 2010 to 8 500 in Q1 2011. This reduction is probably due to the combined effect of poorer weather conditions associated with the first quarter of the year and also increased operational activities at the Greek land border with Turkey, where most detections were occurring at the end of 2010. However, pressure at this border section is still high and likely to resume in subsequent quarters. Elsewhere, at the EU external sea border, detections increased ten-fold from just 2 800 in Q4 2010 to some 24 500 in Q1 2011. This increase was almost exclusively due to an influx of Tunisians at the Italian island of Lampedusa.





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There was a 20% increase in detections of illegal border-crossing between Q4 2010 (27 500) and Q1 2011 (32 900). This change was due to a dramatic increase in detections of Tunisians at the Italian sea border, the island of Lampedusa, and was apparent at the EU level despite a significant decline in detections of a wide range of nationalities at the Greek land border with Turkey during the same period.

For the first time since data collection began, Greece was surpassed in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing by another Member State – Italy. This was due to a simultaneous fall of detections in Greece and a massive rise of detections in Italy compared to the previous quarter. At the Greek border total detections of illegal border-crossings fell in Q1 2011 in relation to Q4 2011. This decrease was comprised of the lowest ever number of detections at the Greek land border with Albania, which is related to recent visa-free travel for Albanians to Europe, and a steep decline in detections of a range of nationalities at the Greek land border with Turkey. Concurrently, but resulting from very different processes, detections in Italy increased from Q4 2010 to Q1 2011. This increase represents one of the sharpest ever single peaks in illegal immigration pressure at the EU external border. This influx is almost exclusively due to Tunisians arriving in Lampedusa following civil unrests that spread across North Africa since the beginning of 2011.

Given the influx in Lampedusa, it is not surprising that Tunisians ranked first in Q1 2011 in terms of number of detections of illegal border-crossings, having increased massively from the previous quarter. This represents the biggest single-nationality influx of irregular migrants since records began in 2008 and is in stark contrast to declines in illegal border-crossings that were reported for most other 'important'



Picture 1: New wave of migrants arriving in Lampedusa from North Africa

nationalities of 2010. For example, detections of Afghan nationals, who ranked first throughout 2010, fell more than three-fold in Q1 2011, mostly at the Greek land border with Turkey. Similarly, detections of illegal border-crossings of nationals of Albania, Algeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Morocco and Iraq also declined by at least 50% during the same period. However, much of these declines are due to migrants responding to inclement weather rather than reduced migration


pressure *per se.* In support of this assessment, detections of nationals of Pakistan and Morocco, although reduced compared to the previous quarter, are actually much higher than the same period last year (+290%, and +160%, respectively). Other nationalities, although showing a declining trend in illegal border-crossings in Q1 2011, were correspondingly more apparent in other illegal-immigration indicators (refusals). Hence, a reduction of detections of illegal border-crossings is not always indicative of reduced pressure from the involved nationalities.

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#### Routes

For the first time since records began in early 2008, in Q1 2011 detections of illegal border-crossings on the Central Mediterranean route exceeded those reported from both the Eastern Mediterranean and Albania to Greece routes, both of which experienced decreases in excess of what might be expected from seasonal variation to reach the lowest levels for at least two years (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs (indicator 1A) by major migration route



Without question, in Q1 2011 the single most important irregular-migration route in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing was the Central Mediterranean route, where detections increased in the beginning of 2011 to previously unprecedented levels (Figure 3). Compared to previous surges of irregular immigration, this flow was unique in that, during the reporting period at least, it was restricted to a single nationality: Tunisian. Subsequently the nature of the flow and the departure points have developed significantly by the addition of large numbers of migrants from Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan countries being forced to depart from Libya due to civil unrest and the NATO Allies military action, which commenced on 27 March 2011 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

North African migrants have typically dominated the West African, Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean routes. In Q1 2011 there were very few detections in the Canary Islands, but some detections of Moroccans and Algerians on the Western Mediterranean route. The Eastern Mediterranean route featured detections of Algerians and Moroccans but somewhat reduced in numbers compared to the previous quarter before the outbreak of civil unrest across North Africa. Unquestionably, during Q1 2011 the most significant event was a surge of Tunisians illegally crossing the border into the Italian island of Lampedusa.

#### 4.1.1 Eastern Mediterranean route

Detections of illegal border-crossings fell between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011 on this route, almost exclusively due to a massive decline in detections at the Greek land border with Turkey.

The decrease in detections on this route was distributed among a wide range of nationalities. For example, in the previous quarter (Q4 2010) migrants detected in highest numbers at this border section claimed to be of Afghan, Algerian, Pakistani, Palestinian and Moroccan nationality. In Q1 2011 all these nationalities were detected in much lower numbers and detections of Afghan nationals are much higher than the other nationalities.

In contrast to the declines of most nationalities at the Eastern Mediterranean route, there were notable increases in detections of several sub-Saharan nationalities between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011. For example, nationals of Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo and Senegal were all detected on this route in low numbers. However, detections of all these nationalities have been increasing steadily, contrasting with a decreased number of Somalis detected at this border section.

Despite the overall decreases, the Eastern Mediterranean route still represents a major hotspot for illegal immigration into the EU. Not including the influx of Tunisian nationals in Lampedusa, this route still represented more than half the detections of illegal border -crossing into the EU. Given the seasonality of detections at this important border section in previous years, detections might be expected to rise in Q2 2011.

#### 4.1.2 Central Mediterranean route

In Q1 2011 there was a massive increase compared to the negligible detections during the previous quarter (Figure 3) and throughout the last two years.

Since 2008, Tunisians have been the most common nationality among irregular migrants arriving in Lampedusa accounting for around a quarter of all arrivals, most of whom had departed from Libya, often assisted by Tunisians facilitators. In February 2009, the detention centre in Lampedusa, with a capacity of 1 900 beds, was burned down by irregular migrants, mostly Tunisians, in protest against the suspension of transfers to the Italian mainland. At the time, the Tunisian authorities agreed to accept back 1 000 Tunisian irregular migrants via commercial flights. This readmission agreement was signed in January 2009 as part of a broader Police cooperation agreement (13/12/2003). In May 2009, joint patrols between the Italian and Libyan authorities were shown to be immediately effective as the number of detections on the Central Mediterranean route sharply decreased to a few sporadic arrivals throughout 2009 and 2010.

However, in early February 2011, following the political crises in Tunisia and elsewhere in the region, the migratory flow from Tunisia suddenly increased. The irregular migrants' figure reported in the FRAN data as detected on Lampedusa

Island during Q1 2011 is exceptionally high, especially in comparison with the arrivals during all of 2008, previously considered to be a peak year. Although arrivals in the area are clearly dominated by arrivals from Tunisia, arrivals from other locations have also been reported.

Frontex received a formal request for assistance on 15 February 2011 from the Italian Ministry of Interior regarding the extraordinary



Picture 2: North African migrants detected at sea during JO Hermes 2011

migratory situation in the Pelagic Islands. The request was specifically for assistance in strengthening the surveillance of the EU's external borders in the form of a Joint Operation. Subsequently, the JO EPN-Hermes Extension 2011 started on 20 February 2011.

#### 4.1.3 Western Mediterranean route

In Q1 2011 the detections of illegal border-crossings on this route showed a decrease of around a third compared to the previous quarter, but nearly double that of a year ago. The decrease is probably due to poorer weather conditions at this time of year, but pressure is clearly higher than it was at the same time last year. The most commonly detected nationality on this route was Algerian (52%), despite detections of this nationality decreasing by nearly a half from Q4 2010 to Q1 2011. Detections of Ghanaians and Moroccans also declined by around a half compared to the previous quarter but there was a stable trend of Nigerians and Guineans.

In the longer-term, irregular migration on this route has been consistently decreasing since the beginning of 2006. Commonly cited reasons are Frontex Joint Operations in the area, effective bilateral agreements and, more recently, rising unemployment in EU Member States, particularly in sectors typified by migrants.\*\* Nationalities traditionally associated with this route were Algerian, Moroccan and Ghanaian.

\*\* MPI Migration and Immigrants Two years after the collapse: Where do we stand? 2010

#### 4.1.4 Western African route

The cooperation and bilateral agreements between Spain and the rest of the Western African countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali) are developing steadily, and are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals, as is the presence of patrolling assets near the African coast.

However, in Q4 2010 Frontex reported an increase in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the Canary Islands. This increase continued further into Q1 2011 and was exclusively due to Moroccan nationals.

Although illegal border-crossings are still at a low level on this route there remains considerable illegal migration pressure in the Canary Islands.

In January 2011 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a report on the role of organised crime in facilitating illegal migration from West Africa to the EU.\* The report was generated by desk and field (interviews) research and concludes with four main findings, which are consistent with the findings of the FRAN community:

- 1. West Africans are facilitated by loose networks with no permanent structure
- Within West Africa, freedom of movement gives little incentive to engage in smuggling of migrants
- In West Africa, most smugglers are migrants themselves, passing on their own experiences
- 4. In some West African countries, important social value is attached to those who decide to leave as well as to those who have made it to Europe, be it legally or illegally, even though their situation in Europe is often worse than it was at home.

#### 4.1.5 Eastern land borders

In Q1 2011 the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the Eastern land borders of the EU showed a decrease compared to the previous quarter but was consistent with a stable trend with some seasonal declines at this time of year assumed to be associated with inclement weather conditions. Some increases, however, were detected at specific locations.

Detections of most nationalities, including Moldovans, declined in Q1 2011, with the exception of Somali nationals, whose detections increased from Q4 2010 to Q1 2011.

Belarus and Ukraine are still regarded as nexus points for irregular migrants intending to enter the EU green border. Several cases of detected facilitated irregular migration as well as a case of detection of three Georgian nationals entering the EU from Belarus across the green border on 26 January 2011 corroborate this presumption. Afghans constituted the largest number of third-country nationals illegally entering the EU across the green border from Belarus, but nationals of Vietnam were also important.

\* The role of organized crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York 2011

#### 4.1.6 Western Balkans

By and large, visa liberalisation for biometric passport holders from Albania was the single most important development related to Western Balkans route in the first quarter of 2011. This opening of legal travel channels has predictably led to significant decreases of illegal border-crossings of Albanian nationals, increases in regular passenger flows out of Albania and associated important increases of entry refusals for Albanian nationals at land, sea and air borders of the EU.

Reduction of illegal border-crossings has allowed Albanian Border Control Authorities to refocus some of their surveillance efforts on other cross-border criminal activities, resulting in significantly increased cannabis seizures.

Similarly to the case of Serbian nationals one year before, almost 80% of the refusals were linked to pre-existing entry bans, making Albanians the most refused nationality in the first quarter of 2011. Importantly, the broadening of legal travel options has reduced the number of detected Albanian illegal stayers.

Given the economic disparities between Albania and the EU, Albanian circular migration is likely to remain a sizable phenomenon. This is the case regardless of the fact that more Albanian economic migrants are likely to diversify their choice of destination Member States.

Apart from Albanian circular migration, the Western Balkans route remained largely a function of developments at the Eastern Mediterranean route. Namely, the so-called transiting flow of migrants that enter the EU at on this route and later continue towards western Member States through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia has remained stable or even increased. Consistent with a three/four-month detection lag (relative to detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route), the most detected nationalities were Afghan, Pakistani. Arabic-speaking migrants were also detected in large numbers.

Claiming asylum continued to be used by migrants as a method to avoid detention, largely reducing the deterrent effect of border surveillance at different border sections along the route.

#### Box 1: Post-visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism

Following the decision of the JHA Council of 8 November 2010 to extend visa-free travel to Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission took immediate steps for the establishment of the monitoring mechanism. A Steering Committee was established and its first meeting was convened on 12 January 2011. The Committee made a number of operational decisions at its January meeting and decided on the scope and structure of the mechanism. Importantly, the Commission has requested Frontex to act as a lead service in coordinating the input from all stakeholders involved and to assist the Commission services through the alert system.

#### 4.1.7 Clandestine entry (1b)

Restricting indicator 1b to the land and sea borders of the EU, and also to those detections that are confirmed clandestine entry, results in extremely low detections in Q1 2011. This is roughly consistent with the previous quarter but half that of Q3 2010. The most commonly detected nationality at the EU level was Algerian. Detections of clandestine entry at external EU border appear to be very low, but



Picture 3: Many migrants attempt to enter the EU in a clandestine manner by hiding in vehicles

cases at borders within the EU suggest that numbers of clandestine entries at the external border may be much higher.

For example, in February 2011 there were several cases of clandestine migrants discovered in trucks transporting goods from Turkey to EU countries.

Central Mediterranean Member States reported some detections of clandestine entry at the blue border.

Following the removal of the visa regime for short-term visitors there

has been an increase in the number of Albanians attempting to reach non-Schengen EU Member States, where Albanians were found in both freight and tourism vehicles.

#### 4.2 Detections of facilitators

In Q1 2011 the detections of facilitators of irregular migration remained stable compared to Q4 2010, but decreased 25% compared to a year ago in Q1 2010. This reasonably stable trend masks two important changes among Member States.

In some Member States there were increased detections of French (+71%), Tunisian (+1 360%), Vietnamese (+640%), Moroccan (+181%) and Turkish (+165%) facilitators. It is suspected that these increases are related to the North African situation.

The total of Tunisian facilitators detected in Q1 2011 represents a three-fold increase compared to a year ago in Q1 2010. Tunisian facilitators were detected in high and increasing numbers in some Member States, and were detected for almost the first time in other Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, which reflects the spread of facilitated migration of Tunisians throughout the EU. In contrast, no Tunisian facilitators were detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route, which, combined with few detections of Tunisians migrants, indicates avoidance or inability of Tunisians to approach the EU via this route.

In Q1 2011 the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator was Italian, followed by Chinese, French, Moroccan and Tunisian. The number of Albanian facilitators fell to the lowest number since data collection began, which is consistent with a decreased number of illegal border-crossings by Albanians, as legal entry is now possible following visa libaralisation.

#### 4.3 Detections of illegal stay

In Q1 2011 there were just over 82 200 detections of illegal stay in the EU. This indicator has been declining steadily for the last two years but there has been little variation in the Member States that report the highest number of detections.

At the EU level, the most commonly detected over-staying nationality was Moroccan, followed by Afghan, Algerian and Tunisian, the latter having doubled since Q1 2010. Other notable changes compared to a year ago include twice the number of over staying Iranians, and a quarter more Ukrainians in many member States, as well as half the number of detected Somalis, Albanians and Palestinians. Albanians were detected in fewer numbers in some Member States, but in higher numbers in others.

#### 4.4 Refusals of entry

The number of refusals of entry from the external borders of the EU has remained steady for the last year. Detections were mostly at the land (50%) and sea borders (42%), but refusals from the sea border increased three-fold compared to a year ago. This increase at the EU level was due to a six-fold increase in refusals of Albanian nationals.


In Q1 2011 for the first time since data collection began, more Albanians were refused than any other nationality, including Ukrainians, which ranked first in each preceding quarter. Indeed, refusals of Albanians increased four -fold from Q4 2011. Most Albanians were refused because an alert had been issued for the purpose of refusing entry.



Picture 4: Most refusals of entry take place at the land border

Map 1 overleaf is a world map illustrating variation among third countries in the extent to which their nationals were refused entry to the EU in Q1 2011. The darker the country in the map the more nationals were refused entry.

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#### 4.5 Asylum claims

In Q1 2010 the number of applications for asylum showed a 7% decrease compared the same quarter a year ago. This figure could suggest that the trend has been stable for the last year; however there has been considerable variation among the nationalities of asylum seekers and the Member States in which they are submitting applications.

In Q3 2010 Frontex reported a massive 50% increase in asylum applications in Germany. This peak has persisted to the present quarter when asylum applications submitted in Germany represented around a quarter of all applications at the EU level. Most of the peak in the second half of 2010 was due to (eventually unsuccessful) applications submitted by nationals of the Western Balkan countries who had recently been granted visa-free travel to the EU. However, in Q1 2011 the number of applications submitted by Serbian nationals in Germany more than halved compared to the previous quarter. This may be related at least in part to measures taken by the Serbian authorities to control abuse of the asylum system by Serbian nationals. Also in Germany applications submitted by nationals of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia fell in Q1 2011 from a peak in Q4 2010.

Also in Q3 2010 Frontex highlighted the possibility of increased asylum applications by nationals of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina following the introduction of visa-free travel for these nationalities in December 2010. However this is not currently detectable in the FRAN data. For example, applications submitted by nationals of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have remained stable in Q1 2011. However, applications submitted by Serbian nationals are still significant at the EU level. In Q1 2011 Serbian nationals still ranked second in terms of number of applications submitted in the EU. Applications by nationals of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also fell between Q4 2010 and Q1 2011.

More applications were submitted by Afghans nationals than any other nationality. As well as Afghans and Serbians, other nationalities with large numbers of applications were Iraqis, Russians and Iranians.

The largest increase or change of any kind in the number of applications were those submitted by Tunisians, which increased 20-fold from around a consistent 100 per quarter over the last 2 years to nearly 2 000 in Q1 2011. Hence, Tunisians now rank ninth at the EU level in terms of number of asylum applications submitted in Q1 2011, exceeding applications from nationals of Nigeria. As opposed to applications being spread across several member states, nearly all Tunisian applications were submitted in Italy, where consequently total applications have doubled compared to a year ago.

Following on from the political upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East, there has been an increase in the numbers Libyan nationals claiming asylum. Most of the claims were made by individuals already present on valid visas.

#### 4.6 Forged documents

In Q1 2011 there were 2 200 detections of migrants using forged or counterfeit travel documents, which is a stable trend compared to a year ago, but a reduction of 16% compared to a peak in the previous quarter. Spain continued to report the most detections despite a decrease compared to Q4 2010, followed by stable trends in the UK and France. The decrease in Spain was mostly at the sea border and so is probably due to seasonal changes in regular passenger flow. Apart from migrants of unknown nationality, which tend to compose around a sixth of the total in each quarter, the nationality most often detected using forged travel documents was Ukrainian, followed by Albanian, Iranian and Nigerian nationals. Detections, however, are extremely low compared to the regular flow of passengers and the number of entry points to the EU. The most significant change was a 60% increase in detections of Albanian nationals using forged documents.

There are increasing reports of the use of fraudulent EU documents, usually visas, by sub-Saharan nationals.

According to multiple sources, the trend regarding Somali nationals travelling with authentic look-alike passports continues; several Member States have reported detections of Somali nationals heading for northern Europe with authentic passports.

A new trend has been identified whereby Eritreans and Ethiopians present false EU residence permits, which so far have been discovered in Sweden, Djibouti and Sudan.

#### Legal channels

Increasingly legal channels are being abused to enter and remain in the EU. These *modi operandi* focus on fraudulently obtained visas, mostly student visas, and sham marriages.

There has also been an increase in the number of third-country male nationals attempting to obtain leave to remain by participating in sham marriages. Pakistani, Indian and Nigerians were the top nationalities encountered, with British, Polish and Lithuanian women acting as brides. A possible new trend has been seen involving Jamaicans attempting to take part in sham marriages. The Church of England has issued a new guidance to clergy in an attempt to reduce the number of sham marriages. According to open sources (12 April 2011):

In future, couples will have to apply for a licence if either the bride or groom is from a non-European country. Members of the clergy are also being urged to report any suspicions they have that the marriage is not genuine. Over the past nine months, 155 people have been arrested in the UK as a result of investigations into both church and civil ceremonies.

Member State authorities identified and arrested different members of an organised crime group committing the crime of arranging fake marriages between French citizens of Tunisian origin and Tunisian nationals in France. These Tunisian nationals holding identity documents as relatives of an EU citizen obtained in false grounds have been arrested in southern Europe after those fraudulent marriages too.

Educational establishments in Ukraine always receive attention from the main organisers of criminal groups and facilitators of irregular migrants from Somalia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries. In Ukraine, organised criminal groups call for cooperation of (the educational facilities) employers and private agencies from foreign countries when choosing foreigners to study in Ukraine. A significant proportion of the category of foreigners admitted to study in Ukraine did not enter the school.

#### 4.7 Returns

In Q1 2011 there were 46 100 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision. More than half of these decisions were made in just two Member States, although some Member States are yet to submit data.

At the EU level, some 155 nationalities were issued decisions for return in Q1 2011 (Figure 4). The most common nationalities were Afghan, Pakistani and Moroccan. Most Member States reported return decisions for a wide range of nationalities. In Member States with large numbers of detections of illegal border-crossings, nationalities under a decision to leave often corresponded with the nationalities illegally crossing the border.

In Q1 2011 a total of 34 400 third-country nationals were effectively returned to third countries. Of this total just over half (55%) were forced returns.




Figure 4: Number of return decisions (grey), forced returns (red) and voluntary returns (green) to third countries of the top twenty nationalities in Q1 2011

In Q1 2011 the most commonly returned nationality was Albanian (Figure 4). Nationals of India were also returned in high numbers from Member States with established diaspora. Chinese nationals were also returned in high numbers.

What is striking is that there is not a strong overlap between the nationalities for which most return decisions were made and the nationalities that were actually returned (Figure 4). For example, more decisions were made for Afghans than for any other nationality, but these nationals only ranked tenth in terms of actual returns. The same was applied to nationals of Pakistan and Algeria, who received very high numbers of decisions, but ranked much lower by actual returns.

#### 4.8 Cross-border crime

Although the identification of cross-border crimes at the border is not explicitly included in the Frontex mandate, this phenomenon is a crucial element of the integrated border management model\* and, as practice shows, it significantly affects the daily work of border guards. This section aims to provide for the first time an update of the situation of cross-border crimes detected at the borders in Q1 2011 using the information presented in the Annual Risk Analysis 2011 as a starting point. Changes include points of entry, routes of trafficking and *modus operandi* of cigarette smuggling, the smuggling of petroleum products and stolen vehicles exiting the EU. The following analysis was prepared on the basis of data provided by Frontex-coordinated JOs, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN), bi-monthly reports, WB-RAN and EB-RAN monthly reports and open source data.

#### 4.8.1 Cigarette smuggling

Consistent and effective monitoring of the situation at the borders suggests that the *modus operandi* of cigarette smugglers continues to be extremely diverse and dynamic, driven by that fact that trade in cigarettes is increasingly lucrative due to significant price differentials between EU and third countries. Cigarette smuggling is increasingly perceived by organised crime groups (OCGs) as a 'low risk – high profit' enterprise, especially if compared with drug trafficking which, is also highly lucrative but carries with it hefty penalties. The *modi operandi* of cigarette smugglers are diverse and range from 'ant' smuggling operations of isolated individuals to large-scale enterprises which involve the use of cars, buses, lorries, trains, boats, ferries and even planes. Most detections take place on land, but recently an increasing number of smuggled cigarettes have been seized at sea and even occasionally at air borders.

Countries at the Eastern border of the EU are destination and transit countries for smuggled cigarettes which are frequently transported through labour migrant networks internally across the EU to all other Member States , where the price differences are even more acute. In the case of cigarettes smuggled via the sea borders, the main destination countries are Cyprus, Greece, Italy and the UK.

\* 2768th Council Meeting of December 2006. The scale of the phenomenon is growing; in comparison with a year ago during the first quarter of 2010, there has been a significant increase in detections.

The *modus operandi* for smuggling cigarettes at land borders has not changed in the last quarter, with cigarettes being hidden in cars, buses and lorries compartments or transported by the natural border. Seasonal variation has been observed at northern Eastern part of the border where tobacco smugglers take advantage of harsh weather conditions to elude border guards and use snowmobiles to cross the border.

A modus operandi of tobacco smuggling that is being more frequently reported during Frontex coordinated operations is the trafficking of cigarettes from Ukraine and Moldova by ship through the Black Sea. Most One of the incidents reported during JO Poseidon 2011 (ongoing) was the apprehension of a Ukrainian cargo vessel that was almost fully loaded with smuggled cigarettes. The smuggled cargo was composed of boxes of cigarettes with the estimated market value of approximately 8.5 million Euros.

The UK represents an exceptional case among destination countries, as cigarettes destined for this Member State are smuggled in an organised way by small-scale carriers by air borders and in large quantities by sea borders from China, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Its attraction as a destination country comes from the fact that British tobacco prices are



Picture 5. The Ukrainian cargo vessel 'Snezhura' after being apprehended at the coast of the island of Crete

amongst the top three highest in Europe.

#### Box 2: Cigarette smuggling into the UK

Though most cigarette smuggling transactions in the EU take place through land borders, detections increasingly take place at air and sea borders. This is particularly true in the UK.

At the end of January 1 250 cartons were apprehended at Newcastle Airport having been smuggled in the luggage of several passengers in a seven-day period. (BBC News, 27 January, 2011)

In February the UK Border Agency seized 500 cartons cigarettes at the Peterhead port. The cigarettes, worth an estimated EUR 38 400, had been smuggled in a Russian ship. (*Evening Express*, 11 February 2011)

#### 4.8.2 Smuggling of petroleum products

There are increasing price differentials of oil products between the EU and bordering third countries (particularly those that share land borders in Eastern Europe). This causes a rise in the number of petrol smuggling cases, and necessitates increased security measures at BCPs and their surroundings and consequently impacts waiting times at the border.

#### Table 2 : PRICE DIFFERENCES OF EURO-SUPER 95 FUEL IN Q1 2011

Border	Price in EU country	Price in third country	% price difference
Finland-Russia	1.56	0.59	164
Poland-Russia	1.26	0.59	114
Estonia-Russia	1.23	0.59	108
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.44	0.75	92
Hungary-Ukraine	1.41	0.75	88
Lithuania-Belarus	1.30	0.74	76
Poland-Belarus	1.26	0.74	70
Poland-Ukraine	1.26	0.75	68
Romania-Ukraine	1.26	0.75	68
Greece-Albania	1.66	1.14	46
Romania-Moldova	1.26	0.87	45
Greece-fYROM	1.66	1.24	34
Hungary-Serbia	1.41	1.21	17
Hungary-Croatia	1.41	1.22	16
Slovenia-Croatia	1.28	1.22	4.9
Romania-Serbia	1.26	1.21	4.1
Bulgaria-Serbia	1.15	1.21	-5.0
Bulgaria-fYROM	1.15	1.24	-7.3
Greece-Turkey	1.66	1.80	-7.8
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.15	1.80	-36

Differences between EU countries and bordering third countries in EUR per litre

Source: Annual Risk Analysis 2011, DG Energy and Open Source Data for March 2011

A comparison between the last quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 shows that while prices in the vast majority of EU countries went up due to the political situation in North Africa, the cost of petrol in the Eastern European countries went down. This cost decrease (which was particularly sharp in Belarus) was mainly due to currency depreciation in Eastern European Third Countries. It is thus not surprising that the highest price gap has been registered between the borders of EU countries (Finland, Poland and Estonia) and Russia. Price differences almost on the same level are found in the borders between Ukraine and the EU (Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) and Belarus and the EU (Lithuania, Poland). In the same period, fuel prices at the Western Balkans have followed the overall rising trend consistent with the EU, making the region less attractive for fuel smugglers. In the case of Turkey, there is no incentive to smuggle into the EU because prices in Turkey are actually higher than in the neighbouring EU countries.

\* According to EU customs regulations people travelling by car can bring into the EU a full container of petrol and an additional 10 liters of fuel tank. As the greatest price differences are located at the Eastern Border, smugglers in the region have an incentive to illegally trade fuel.\* At the Lithuanian borders with Russia and Belarus, for instance, 1 632 cases of transportation of fuel in non-standard tanks were detected in the first quarter of 2011 (LETA/ELTA).

Although petrol smuggling is commonly believed to only have a limited and local impact on the EU economy, fuel smugglers present a challenge to the management of the movement at the borders. First, because the queues they create increase the waiting time at BCPs. Second, due to the security risk presented by extended fuel tanks and other modifications vehicles undertake to carry more fuel. Though not very common, incidents of exploding vehicles carrying smuggled fuel do occur and the threat is relatively high when the price differential creates a higher demand/smuggling pressure. To effectively manage this risk as much as possible, border guards should carefully conduct detailed technical checks of vehicles to ensure they have not undergone illegal reconstruction.

#### Box 3: Car explosion at Polish border with Russian Federation


A tourist car with Polish registration plates exploded in the Russian side of the Gołdap-Gusiev BCP located at the border with Poland. The explosion started a fire that reduced the car to its metal frame and spread to the nearby building of the duty -free shop, burning its roof. No people were harmed at the BCP. Illegal reconstruction of the car for the purpose of petrol smuggling was pointed out as the most probable cause of the incident. (Polish Radio Olsztyn News, 6 April 2011)

#### 4.8.3 Stolen vehicles (on exit)

Frontex coordinated Focal points operation for land borders reported a large rise in the number of detections of stolen vehicles in comparison with the first quarter 2010. The number of detections grew systematically in 2010. The increased number of detections is most likely related to the growing awareness of border guard officers and the specialisation of national teams of experts in the detection techniques of stolen vehicles.

As was the trend in 2010, vehicles were mainly stolen in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy and were trafficked from the EU through two main channels. The first one was the Eastern European route via Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey; the second one the Balkan route across Slovenia and Hungary respectively to Croatia and Serbia, as well as via Bulgaria and Greece to Turkey. Many of the European cars smuggled to Turkey were later smuggled to the Middle East.

Figure 5: Share of detected stolen vehicles in Q1 2011 among top five BCPs (FP Data)



Focal Points operation data indicate a considerable number of detections at the border between Poland and Belarus showing a marked increase from the previous year. Terespol BCP, for instance, did not register any detections in the



Picture 6: Smuggling of dismantled stolen motorbikes detected at the Hungarian border with Ukraine in the area of Zahony BCP

first quarter of 2010 but in Q1 2011 it reported the highest number of stolen vehicles among BCPs in the operation. Other important points of exit for stolen vehicles were the border between Slovenia and Croatia and the border between Turkey and Greece and Turkey and Bulgaria (Figure 5).

The recurring *modus operandi* of stolen vehicle transportation indicates that smuggling operations were related to the activities of organised crime

groups. In cases involving stolen motorbikes it can assumed that they will be reassembled, but it is unclear whether dismantled stolen cars are reassembled in all cases or whether they were sometimes to be used as spare parts.

# 5. Statistical tables

Legend:	Symbols and abbreviations n.a. not applicable : data not available	
Source:	FRAN data as of 20 May 2011	
Note:	'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member State including both 27 EU Member States and three Schenge Associated Countries	

#### Table A1 :

#### ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

	2009		2	010			2011	Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	%cha	nge on	per cent
			QL	40	4.7		year ago	prev. Qtr	of total
All Borders									
Tunisia	133	335	237	603	323	20 492	6017	6244	62
Afghanistan	2 542	1 686	7 061	10 916	6 255	1 762	4.5	-72	5.4
Not specified	210	260	337	573	422	1 482	470	251	4.5
Pakistan	477	272	345	840	2 421	1 054	288	-56	3.2
Albania	8 391	5 593	12 286	9 183	6 198	1 017	-82	-84	3.1
Algeria	1 521	805	489	4 4 1 9	3 050	907	13	-70	2.8
Morocco	241	291	155	434	1 079	749	157	-31	2.3
Eritrea	821	580	299	372	188	650	12	246	2.0
Somalia	1 700	965	1 659	1 222	773	571	-41	-26	1.7
Bangladesh	62	142	209	593	703	562	296	-20	1.7
Other	5 900	3 928	3 801	5 630	6 119	3 660	-6.8	-40	11
EU Total	21 998	14 857	26 878	34 785	27 531	32 906	121	20	100
Land Border									
Afghanistan	615	1 345	6 434	9 576	5 489	1 342	-0.2	-76	16
Albania	8 225	5 390	11 995	9 074	6 133	1 014	-81	-83	12
Pakistan	447	224	288	779	2 384	945	322	-60	11
Algeria	258	552	94	3 651	2 664	677	23	-75	7.9
Bangladesh	38	116	133	563	694	556	379	-20	6.5
Morocco	12	225	67	161	866	519	131	-40	6.1
Not specified	194	156	189	545	414	299	92	-28	3.5
Serbia	324	184	174	170	199	281	53	41	3.3
Tunisia	18	301	46	187	253	234	-22	-7.5	2.7
Nigeria	20	25	37	140	161	225	800	40	2.6
Other	2 550	2 972	4 356	4 877	5 508	2 426	-18	-56	28
Total Land	12 701	11 490	23 813	29 723	24 765	8 518	-26	-66	100
Sea Border									
Tunisia	115	34	191	416	70	20 258	59 482	28 840	83
Not specified	16	104	148	28	8	1 183	1 038	14 688	4.9
Eritrea	810	413	10	82	2	538	30	26 800	2.2
Somalia	1 614	380	61	62	14	420	11	2 900	1.7
Afghanistan	1 927	341	627	1 340	766	420	23	-45	1.7
Egypt	110	116	33	272	292	321	177	10	1.3
Morocco	229	66	88	273	213	230	248	8.0	0.9
Algeria	1 263	253	395	768	386	230	-9.1	-40	0.9
Pakistan	30	48	57	61	37	109	127	195	0.4
Ethiopia	10	2	0	2	0	88	4 300	n.a.	0.4
Other	3 173	1 610	1 455	1 758	978	591	-63	-40	2.4
Total Sea	9 297	3 367	3 065	5 062	2 766	24 388	624	782	100

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#### Table A2 :

#### **CLANDESTINE ENTRIES AT BCPs**

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2009		20	010			2011	Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Border Type									
Sea	30	7	20	15	32	47	571	47	65
Land	23	16	4	115	33	25	56	-24	35
Top Ten Nationalities									
Algeria	1	4	11	9	11	25	525	127	35
Afghanistan	12	0	2	0	6	7	n.a.	17	9.7
India	0	1	0	0	0	6	500	n.a.	8.3
Palestine	0	0	0	3	1	6	n.a.	500	8.3
Iran	4	0	0	6	0	6	n.a.	n.a.	8.3
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	2	3	n.a.	50	4.2
Morocco	4	3	7	2	2	3	0	50	4.2
Turkey	8	1	1	86	5	2	100	-60	2.8
Albania	2	0	0	2	5	2	n.a.	-60	2.8
Serbia	2	3	0	0	0	1	-67	n.a.	1.4
Other	20	11	3	22	33	11	0	-67	15
Total	53	23	24	130	65	72	213	11	100

#### FACILITATORS

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2009		20	10			2011	Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 383	1 745	1 579	1 434	1 160	1 498	-14	29	81
Land	268	263	276	347	285	112	-57	-61	6.0
Air	92	51	70	116	63	91	78	44	4.9
Land Intra EU	172	173	191	137	115	83	-52	-28	4.5
Sea	211	203	146	101	53	49	-76	-7.5	2.6
Not specified	51	35	20	24	42	27	-23	-36	1.5
Top Ten Nationalities									
Italy	227	505	301	345	216	180	-64	-17	9.7
China	132	183	167	113	91	146	-20	60	7.8
France	73	92	127	66	80	131	42	64	7.0
Morocco	87	134	98	98	83	120	-10	45	6.5
Tunisia	20	29	23	54	15	109	276	627	5.9
Pakistan	96	68	63	68	46	66	-2.9	43	3.5
Romania	75	88	94	90	126	65	-26	-48	3.5
India	19	99	32	20	11	58	-41	427	3.1
Not specified	81	58	45	51	107	56	-3.4	-48	3.0
Vietnam	8	8	33	22	13	56	600	331	3.0
Other	1359	1 206	1 299	1 232	930	873	-28	-6.1	47
Total	2 177	2 470	2 282	2 159	1 718	1 860	-25	8.3	100

#### Table A3 :

#### ILLEGAL STAY

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2009		20	010			2011	Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Border Type									
Inland	80 134	74 252	74 317	72 222	72 414	67 601	-9.0	-6.6	82
Air	6 704	6 395	6 814	7 695	7 270	7 176	12	-1.3	8.7
Land	1 426	1 267	1 499	2 278	1 965	2 805	121	43	3.4
Land Intra EU	3 189	2 821	3 629	3 555	2 991	2 796	-0.9	-6.5	3.4
Sea	2 486	1 603	1 666	2 3 1 8	1 637	1 766	10	7.9	2.1
Between BCP	26	19	13	5	12	113	495	842	0.1
Not specified	4	0	1	6	2	0	n.a.	-100	0
Top Ten Nationalities									
Morocco	6 0 1 0	5 828	5 855	4 924	5 524	5 806	-0.4	5.1	7.1
Afghanistan	7 100	5 201	5 271	5 557	5 075	4 891	-6.0	-3.6	5.9
Algeria	3 375	3 605	3 484	3 482	3 633	3 847	6.7	5.9	4.7
Tunisia	2 278	2 365	2 103	1 853	2 0 2 6	3 459	46	71	4.2
Brazil	4 939	2 490	4 258	3 329	3 292	3 272	31	-0.6	4.0
Serbia	2 231	3 583	2 351	4 226	4 825	2 978	-17	-38	3.6
Iraq	3 355	3 127	2 830	3 085	3 417	2 733	-13	-20	3.3
China	2 680	3 015	2 871	2 461	2 619	2 507	-17	-4.3	3.0
Pakistan	2 0 9 6	2 4 1 6	2719	2 862	2 472	2 470	2.2	-0.1	3.0
Russia	2 629	2 147	2 056	2 859	2 370	2 435	13	2.7	3.0
Other	57 276	52 580	54 141	53 441	51 038	47 859	-9.0	-6.2	58
Total	93 969	86 357	87 939	88 079	86 291	82 257	-4.7	-4.7	100

#### **APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM**

	2009		20	010			<b>201</b> <sup>2</sup>	1 Q1	
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	6 7 9 0	5 6 1 6	4 303	5 684	5 949	6 280	12	5.6	12
Serbia	2 792	4 100	2 726	5 509	8 396	4 102	0	-51	8.1
Iraq	4 338	3 7 1 6	3 453	3 942	3 926	3 680	-1.0	-6.3	7.2
Russia	4 519	2 920	2 757	3 811	3 571	2 759	-5.5	-23	5.4
Iran	2 371	2 152	1 876	2 7 2 6	2 937	2 560	19	-13	5.0
Somalia	5 178	3 791	3 377	4 615	3 565	2 514	-34	-29	4.9
Eritrea	2 228	1 437	1 726	2 069	1 665	2 219	54	33	4.4
Pakistan	1 664	1 258	1 600	2 226	2 045	2 109	68	3.1	4.1
Tunisia	89	131	101	123	120	1 971	1 405	1 543	3.9
Not specified	1 957	1 801	1 448	2 058	1 599	1 702	-5.5	6.4	3.3
Other	22 963	20 582	19 745	22 547	24 181	21 043	2.2	-13	41
Total	54 889	47 504	43 112	55 310	57 954	50 939	7.2	-12	100

#### Table A4 : **REFUSALS OF ENTRY**

Refusals at the external bor	2009			010			2011	01	
	2009		2	010					
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
All Borders									
Albania	275	277	252	508	1 287	4 940	1683	284	17
Ukraine	4 662	5 0 3 4	4 643	5 136	3 930	3 529	-30	-10	12
Serbia	1 089	1 838	1 509	1 877	1 766	1 945	5.8	10	6.8
Russia	2 073	1 569	1 732	3 166	2 698	1 833	17	-32	6.4
Brazil	1 752	1 863	1 628	1 313	1 374	1 373	-26	-0.1	4.8
Belarus	1 287	1 188	1 430	1 451	1 593	1 318	11	-17	4.6
Croatia	1 134	1 151	1 163	1 055	936	1 051	-8.7	12	3.7
fYROM	495	1 249	1 021	984	819	947	-24	16	3.3
Morocco	729	660	575	536	566	833	26	47	2.9
Turkey	927	795	777	1 281	803	644	-19	-20	2.2
Other	11 739	10 881	10 853	11 198	12 135	10 251	-5.8	-16	36
EU Total	26 162	26 505	25 583	28 505	27 907	28 664	8.1	2.7	100
Land Border									
Ukraine	4 4 37	4 823	4 391	4 796	3 648	3 3 3 6	-31	-8.6	23
Albania	80	123	126	321	693	2 873	2 2 3 6	315	20
Serbia	888	1 4 1 6	1 241	1 600	1 463	1 586	12	8.4	11
Belarus	1 264	1 166	1 405	1 418	1 566	1 300	11	-17	9.0
Russia	1 743	1 157	1 377	2 110	1 745	1 178	1.8	-32	8.2
Croatia	1 063	1 098	1 102	990	877	987	-10	13	6.8
fYROM	438	1 0 3 5	808	848	616	783	-24	27	5.4
Morocco	205	300	259	186	195	522	74	168	3.6
Moldova	360	381	339	379	328	423	11	29	2.9
Georgia	866	609	640	684	1 165	376	-38	-68	2.6
Other	1 018	819	984	1 548	1 140	1 051	28	-7.8	7.3
Total Land	12 362	12 927	12 672	14 880	13 436	14 415	12	7.3	100
Air Border									
Brazil	1 725	1 842	1 607	1 276	1 347	1 358	-26	0.8	11
Albania	151	109	77	126	312	827	659	165	6.9
United States	586	600	548	666	524	495	-18	-5.5	4.1
Paraguay	331	553	393	217	332	411	-26	24	3.4
Nigeria	527	390	362	439	526	406	4.1	-23	3.4
Turkey	478	453	381	380	385	360	-21	-6.5	3.0
Serbia	190	373	237	240	287	325	-13	13	2.7
Pakistan	179	222	192	222	226	323	45	43	2.7
India	361	463	284	348	397	319	-31	-20	2.7
China	409	345	432	446	387	282	-18	-27	2.4
Other	7 881	7 442	7 303	7 521	8 002	6 886	-7.5	-14	57
Total Air	12 818	12 792	11 816	11 881	12 725	11 992	-6.3	-5.8	100
Sea Border									
Albania	44	45	49	61	282	1 240	2 656	340	55
Russia	32	79	75	635	624	388	391	-38	17
Philippines	160	94	196	93	206	170	81	-17	7.5
Morocco	251	77	60	116	76	65	-16	-14	2.9
Tunisia	15	19	39	25	25	43	126	72	1.9
Serbia	11	49	31	37	16	34	-31	113	1.5
Turkey	57	49	50	143	61	30	-39	-51	1.3
Not specified	24	10	16	38	18	26	160	44	1.2
Myanmar	26	18	14	13	38	25	39	-34	1.1
fYROM	0	28	34	6	23	22	-21	-4.3	1.0
Other	362	318	531	577	377	214	-33	-43	9.5
Total Sea	982	786	1 095	1 744	1 746	2 257	187	29	100

#### Table A5 : REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Reasons for refusal of entry reported by top ten nationalities

						2011 Q1					
	A No valid doc	B False doc	C No valid visa	D False visa	E No justi- fication	F Over 3 mo. stay	G No subs- istence	H Alert issued	l Threat	Not available	Refused persons Total
Top Ten Nationalities											
Albania	12	11	73	26	444	28	403	3 844	41	74	4 940
Ukraine	28	51	901	20	1 681	220	274	302	9	44	3 529
Serbia	27	20	271	12	106	433	332	681	39	44	1 945
Russia	292	3	1 076	31	154	12	164	85	77	29	1 833
Brazil	4	8	140	50	531	80	77	145	6	332	1 373
Belarus	26	0	530	0	85	9	571	50	48	7	1 318
Croatia	247	2	18	0	27	289	70	150	218	30	1 051
fYROM	11	1	55	25	106	268	141	335	14	1	947
Morocco	260	34	102	17	95	5	42	241	48	5	833
Turkey	46	31	315	20	116	10	50	51	23	17	644
Others	589	533	2 445	289	2 780	214	557	572	186	2 600	10 251
Total	1 542	694	5 926	490	6 125	1 568	2 681	6 456	709	3 183	28 664

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry

(A) has no valid travel document(s);

(B) has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;

(C) has no valid visa or residence permit;

(D) has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;

(E) has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;

(F) has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;

(G) does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
(H) is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;

 (I) is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

### Table A6 :

#### REASONS FOR REFUSALS OF ENTRY

	2009		2	010			2011	01	
	2009		2	010					
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1		nge on prev. Qtr	per cen of total
All Borders									
H) Alert issued	2 235	3 517	2 804	2 816	3 4 9 0	6 456	84	85	22
E) No justification	6 975	6 7 2 9	6 7 4 7	6 233	6 276	6 125	-9.0	-2.4	21
C) No valid visa	7 435	6 0 1 6	6 809	9 875	8 538	5 926	-1.5	-31	20
Reason not available	4 303	3 997	3 594	3 708	3 4 9 9	3 183	-20	-9.0	11
G) No subsistence	1 914	1 849	2 178	2 235	2 314	2 681	45	16	9.1
F) Over 3 mo. stay	566	2 0 1 2	1 0 3 5	1 295	1 247	1 568	-22	26	5.3
A) No valid doc	1 320	1 085	1 1 3 5	1 257	1 289	1 542	42	20	5.2
I) Threat	684	565	622	649	725	709	25	-2.2	2.4
B) False doc	717	657	774	757	720	694	5.6	-3.6	2.4
D) False visa	429	398	463	395	459	490	23	6.8	1.7
EU Total	26 578	26 825	26 161	<b>29 220</b>	28 557	29 374	9.5	2.9	100
Land Darder									
Land Border		0 -0-	4.004	0.001	0.070	4			
H) Alert issued	1 521	2 525	1 994	2 0 2 4	2 358	4 317	71	83	30
C) No valid visa	4 975	3 581	4 349	6 405	5 333	3 443	-3.9	-35	24
E) No justification	3 220	2 976	3 167	2 912	2 468	2 327	-22	-5.7	16
G) No subsistence	1 325	1 147	1 299	1 474	1 378	1 752	53	27	12
F) Over 3 mo. stay	403	1 743	795	1 076	1 0 1 9	1 252	-28	23	8.6
A) No valid doc	371	440	439	476	392	688	56	76	4.7
I) Threat	448	435	466	422	429	521	20	21	3.6
B) False doc	41	90	146	125	59	104	16	76	0.7
D) False visa	90	112	93	102	103	104	-7.1	1.0	0.7
Reason not available	0	2	1	0	0	1	-50	n.a.	0
Total Land	12 394	13 051	12 749	15 016	13 539	14 509	11	7.2	100
Air Border									
E) No justification	3 7 3 5	3 7 2 7	3 550	3 286	3 787	3 689	-1.0	-2.6	29
Reason not available	4 130	3 857	3 372	3 513	3 385	3 071	-20	-9.3	24
C) No valid visa	2 165	2 163	1 990	2 368	2 3 3 0	2 090	-3.4	-10	17
H) Alert issued	626	824	675	667	807	999	21	24	7.9
G) No subsistence	576	688	870	745	887	814	18	-8.2	6.5
B) False doc	646	553	603	593	624	573	3.6	-8.2	4.5
A) No valid doc	581	506	514	571	584	498	-1.6	-15	4.0
D) False visa	332	276	364	279	347	367	33	5.8	2.9
F) Over 3 mo. stay	162	266	227	203	221	311	17	41	2.5
l) Threat	233	123	150	223	294	186	51	-37	1.5
Total Air	13 186	12 983	12 315	12 448	13 266	12 598	-3.0	-5.0	100
Sea Border									
H) Alert issued	88	168	135	125	325	1 140	579	251	50
C) No valid visa	295	272	470	1 102	875	393	44	-55	17
A) No valid doc	368	139	182	210	313	356	156	14	16
G) No subsistence	13	14	9	16	49	115	721	135	5.1
Reason not available	173	138	221	195	114	111	-20	-2.6	4.9
E) No justification	20	26	30	35	21	109	319	419	4.8
D) False visa	7	10	6	14	9	19	90	111	0.8
B) False doc	30	14	25	39	37	17	21	-54	0.7
F) Over 3 mo. stay	1	3	13	16	7	5	67	-29	0.2
I) Threat	3	7	6	4	2	2	-71	0	0.1
Total Sea	998	791	1 097	1 756	1 752	2 267	187	29	100

#### Table A7 :

#### PERSONS USING FALSE TRAVEL-DOCUMENTS

Detections on entry at the external borders by top ten nationalities of persons and country of issuance of documents

	2009	2010				2011 Q1			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	% cha year ago	nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
op Ten Nationalitie	es of Person	s							
Not specified	117	179	305	330	351	276	54	-21	13
Ukraine	130	222	241	316	214	221	-0.5	3.3	10
Iran	75	94	101	99	110	116	23	5.5	5.3
Albania	63	70	43	57	62	112	60	81	5.2
Morocco	45	126	99	169	225	110	-13	-51	5.1
Nigeria	129	130	102	113	127	109	-16	-14	5.0
Turkey	97	70	108	112	126	76	8.6	-40	3.5
Serbia	71	49	17	39	47	62	27	32	2.9
China	74	81	117	54	69	57	-30	-17	2.6
Pakistan	25	55	35	48	58	54	-1.8	-6.9	2.5
Other	1 067	1 0 4 1	1 144	1 037	1 247	978	-6.1	-22	45
op Ten Countries									
									01
Not specified	296	558	584	535	746	446	-20	-40	21
Italy	124	99	110	109	157	170	72	8.3	7.8
Italy Poland	124 102	99 158	110 184	109 179	157 165	170 147	72 -7.0	8.3 -11	7.8 6.8
Italy Poland France	124 102 141	99 158 120	110 184 150	109 179 189	157 165 131	170 147 129	72 -7.0 7.5	8.3 -11 -1.5	7.8 6.8 5.9
Italy Poland France Ukraine	124 102 141 37	99 158 120 61	110 184 150 43	109 179 189 118	157 165 131 50	170 147 129 76	72 -7.0 7.5 25	8.3 -11 -1.5 52	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany	124 102 141 37 67	99 158 120 61 70	110 184 150 43 75	109 179 189 118 81	157 165 131 50 124	170 147 129 76 76	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany Greece	124 102 141 37 67 44	99 158 120 61 70 70	110 184 150 43 75 92	109 179 189 118 81 104	157 165 131 50 124 148	170 147 129 76 76 73	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6 4.3	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39 -51	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.4
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany Greece Portugal	124 102 141 37 67 44 37	99 158 120 61 70 70 42	110 184 150 43 75 92 44	109 179 189 118 81 104 26	157 165 131 50 124 148 39	170 147 129 76 76 73 66	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6 4.3 57	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39 -51 69	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany Greece	124 102 141 37 67 44 37 78	99 158 120 61 70 70 42 41	110 184 150 43 75 92 44 48	109 179 189 118 81 104 26 45	157 165 131 50 124 148 39 42	170 147 129 76 76 73	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6 4.3 57 34	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39 -51 69 31	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.5
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany Greece Portugal	124 102 141 37 67 44 37	99 158 120 61 70 70 42	110 184 150 43 75 92 44	109 179 189 118 81 104 26	157 165 131 50 124 148 39	170 147 129 76 76 73 66	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6 4.3 57	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39 -51 69	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0
Italy Poland France Ukraine Germany Greece Portugal Spain	124 102 141 37 67 44 37 78	99 158 120 61 70 70 42 41	110 184 150 43 75 92 44 48	109 179 189 118 81 104 26 45	157 165 131 50 124 148 39 42	170 147 129 76 76 73 66 55	72 -7.0 7.5 25 8.6 4.3 57 34	8.3 -11 -1.5 52 -39 -51 69 31	7.8 6.8 5.9 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.5

#### Table A8 :

#### RETURN DECISIONS ISSUED IN Q1 2011

Decisions issued at the EU level

### **Top Ten Nationalities**

Total EU	46 108
Other	22 665
Ukraine	1 751
Brazil	1 808
Serbia	1 890
Nigeria	1 933
India	2 091
Albania	2 133
Algeria	2 145
Morocco	2 349
Pakistan	3 494
Afghanistan	3 849

#### **EFFECTIVE RETURNS IN Q1 2011**

People effectively returned at the EU level

### **Top Ten Nationalities**

Albania	2 769
Morocco	1 873
Serbia	1 869
India	1 859
Brazil	1 696
China	1 536
Nigeria	1 466
Russia	1 339
Ukraine	1 254
Pakistan	1 214
Other	17 528
Total EU	34 403

# Table A9 : EFFECTIVE RETURNS IN Q1 2011

People effectively returned according to type of return by top ten nationalities at the EU level

Top Ten Nationalities	Total Voluntary	Top Ten Nationalities	Total Enforced
India	1 208	Albania	2 680
Russia	1 053	Serbia	972
China	917	Morocco	789
Brazil	906	Afghanistan	775
Serbia	891	Nigeria	772
Ukraine	803	India	642
Pakistan	625	China	586
Nigeria	609	Pakistan	574
Turkey	456	Turkey	566
Iraq	455	Brazil	551
Other	5 976	Other	8 627
Total EU	13 899		17 534

#### **Notes on Sources and Methods**

For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the Cypriot authorities. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece. These detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal bordercrossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the United Kingdom, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

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