


FRAN Quarterly Issue 2, April–June 2011

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union



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at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
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Executive summary

In Q2 2011, all Frontex irregular-migration indicators increased compared to the previous quarter. The most important indicator, detections of illegal border-crossing, increased to a level not seen since Q3 2008 and correspondingly asylum applications are now at nearly the highest level since data collection began. What's more, migration pressure at the border from migrants attempting to enter and stay in the EU increased even more than EU-level figures suggest, as they are offset against extensive reductions in Albanian circular migration.

In 2011 there were major and extensive developments in irregular-migration pressure at the external border of the EU, resulting from two simultaneous but independent hotspots of illegal border-crossings: the first was seasonally increased activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where a wide variety of migrants continued to be detected at very high levels. The second, and the undeniable hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the EU in Q2 2011, was in the Central Mediterranean, where vast numbers of sub-Saharan migrants landed in Italy and Malta mostly having been forcibly expelled from Libya.

At the Greek border with Turkey, detections increased seasonally to a very high level, exactly comparable to that of a year ago in Q2 2010. At this border section the most commonly detected migrants were Afghan refugees previously resident in Iran. Hence, in the short term, the measures taken by the Iranian authorities towards their resident population of ~3 million Afghans will be a key push factor for this particular flow of migrants. This border section also continued to attract migrants from an extremely wide geographical area; migrants from a variety of Asian (Pakistan), north African (Algeria, Morocco) and sub-Saharan African (Somalia, Congo) countries continue to typify the flow, as well as recent increases from countries as far afield as the Dominican Republic. Undeniably, this border section is a globally established illegal-entry point for would-be migrants and facilitation networks. Secondary movements from this hotspot of migration are readily detected at the land borders between the Western Balkans and both Slovenia and Hungary, at the blue border of Southern Italy and at a range of European airports, particularly in final destination countries such as the Netherlands and Germany.

In the previous quarter (Q1 2011) there was a surge of some 20 000 Tunisian irregular migrants on the Italian island of Lampedusa. This flow is still significant, but has reduced by 75% following an effective accelerated-return agreement between Italy and Tunisia. However, detections on this route still increased in Q2 2011 following an additional influx of mostly Central African, Nigerian and Ghanaian migrants to not only Lampedusa, but also increasingly to Malta and Sicily. Most of these migrants were previously resident in Libya, some were detained and then forcibly expelled to the EU. Indeed, in Q2 2011 Libya was confirmed by third-

country monitoring as the greatest source of irregular migration to the EU, but more recently the capacity of the Gaddafi regime to detain and expel its migrant populations has been compromised by the activities of the National Transitional Council (NTC). However, the situation remains unpredictable and very unstable. As a result of this flow, Malta has reported unprecedented numbers of asylum applications, and there were more detections of persons staying illegally in destination countries such as Germany and Switzerland.

Since being granted visa-free travel to the EU in late 2010, Albanians have been detected in much lower numbers illegally crossing the border into Greece and as persons staying illegally in Greece. However reports suggest that Albanians are still circular migrants to Greece, but this legal flow is now directed at land BCPs. In support of this, Albanians are now detected in large numbers as refusals of entry to Greece. In addition, other movements are now detectable as refusals of entry to Italy and Slovenia, and clandestine entry and the use of false documents while attempting entry to the UK.

Reports from Belarus and EU Member States suggest that there are increasing numbers of migrants from Georgia arriving in Belarus with the intention of illegally entering the EU; some 8 600 arrived during the first 6 months of 2011. Many arrived by air but others were detected transiting the Ukraine and Armenia. Evidence for this migration flow is supported by increased detections of Georgians in several Member States in terms of illegal border-crossing (Poland, Lithuania), secondary movements (Estonia) and applications for asylum (Latvia, Poland). Kaliningrad is increasingly a nexus point and Finland is among the final destinations.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of illegal migration at the EU external borders based on the illegal migration data provided by Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).

Frontex and the Member States are currently harmonising their irregular-migration data. It is clear that this harmonisation process is not yet finalised. Therefore more detailed data and trends in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities undertaken by Member State border-control authorities to secure different border sections and the data collection practices in place.

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide feedback to the FRAN system of information, to update the common situational picture regarding irregular migration and to serve as a basis for further discussion on related trends and patterns. FRAN Members and other risk analysis experts of Member State border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and encouraged to examine and comment on the data and the analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of RAU and Member State experts involved in the data collection and aggregation, it is impossible to avoid errors in compiling these reports due to the growing volume of data and other information exchanged via FRAN.

Following the closure of the CIREFI working group in April 2010, most of its mandates and, of particular relevance, the exchange of data were transferred to FRAN. Fortunately, most CIREFI indicators already overlap with the monthly data exchange of FRAN members.

Finally, RAU would like to express thanks to all FRAN Members, and in particular the Member State staff who collect, aggregate and upload the data on the data-sharing platform for their efforts as well as all other persons who are involved in the preparation of the FRAN Quarterlies.

2. Methodology

This, the 12th issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2011, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variation in six illegal-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Monthly data were collected on the following indicators:

- 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs;
- 1B – detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs;
- 2 – detections of suspected facilitators;
- 3 – detections of illegal stay;
- 4 – refusals of entry;
- 5 – asylum applications;
- 6 – detections of false documents.

A distinction was made between (i) EU external borders – borders between Member States with the rest of the world (including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), and (ii) Schengen land borders within the EU. The latter concerns only a small number of borders between Member States of which some are not part of the Schengen area. Such Schengen borders within the EU exist for example between Belgium/France and the UK (Eurostar train stations), as well as between Bulgaria/Romania and other Member States. This distinction is possible and necessary as data is in principle (only) collected at Schengen borders. However, the distinction was not possible for the air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but sum data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1 :
SUMMARY OF FRAN INDICATORS

As reported by Member States


	2010				2011	2011 Q2	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago prev. Qtr
1A Illegal border-crossing between BCPs	14 857	26 878	34 785	27 531	32 906	41 245	53 25
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	23	24	130	65	72	60	150 -17
2 Facilitators	2 470	2 282	2 159	1 718	1 860	1 950	-15 4.8
3 Illegal stay	86 357	87 939	88 079	86 291	82 257	86 686	-1.4 5.4
4 Refusals of entry	26 628	25 583	28 505	27 907	28 664	30 617	20 6.8
5 Applications for asylum	47 504	43 112	55 310	57 954	50 939	58 544	36 15
6 False travel-document users	2 117	2 312	2 374	2 636	2 171	2 234	-3.4 2.9

Source: FRAN data received as of 23 August 2011

Figure 1: Evolution of six FRAN indicators. Lines in red illustrate relationships between Q1 and Q2 in each year

Evolution of FRAN Indicators

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons



4. Main points Q2 2011


- All irregular migration indicators increased relative to the previous quarter
- Compared to a year ago, there were significant EU-level increases in several irregular migration indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries, and refusals of entry. There were also increased asylum applications
- Despite detections of Afghan migrants falling by a third compared to last year, they were still the most common nationality detected illegally crossing the EU external border. Most were previously resident as refugees in Iran
- In contrast, detections of all the other highly-ranked nationalities (Tunisians, Nigerians, Pakistanis, Ghanaians) increased massively relative to the same period last year
- In total there were over 40 000 detections of illegal border-crossings, a 50% increase compared to Q2 2010. These were the result of two simultaneous but independent routes of irregular migration: the Eastern Mediterranean and the Central Mediterranean routes:
 1. In the Eastern Mediterranean:
 - There were over 11 000 detections of illegal border-crossing, almost exclusively at the Greek land border with Turkey, which is comparable with the same period in 2010
 - This flow currently attracts migrants from north Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia
 - Groups of Dominicans were detected travelling to Turkey to enter the EU via the Greek land border
 - Secondary movements are assumed from detections of (i) illegal border-crossings in the Western Balkans, (ii) false documents on flights to major EU airports from Turkey as well as Greece, and (iii) landings in southern Italy from Greece, Turkey and Albania
 2. In the Central Mediterranean:
 - Following a bilateral return-agreement between Italy and Tunisia, the massive influx of Tunisians to Lampedusa reported in the previous quarter decreased, but remained significant
 - A very wide range of sub-Saharan Africans were detected on this route, some having been forcibly departed from Libya
 - Italy reported more detections of illegal border-crossing in Sicily than ever before, a three-fold increase compared to the previous quarter; the increased flow was composed of migrants from Côte d'Ivoire as well as Tunisia and a range of other nationalities
 - There were also increased detections of Egyptian migrants and facilitators landing in Sicily and Southern Italy from Egypt
 - Italy and Malta reported huge increases in the number of asylum applications submitted by sub-Saharan African migrants. In Italy increases were particularly marked for Nigerians and Ghanaians
- Following their new visa-free status, fewer Albanians were detected illegally crossing the EU border, and illegally staying within the EU (both mainly in Greece). Instead they were increasingly refused entry to Greece and they were also increasingly detected at the UK border, either as clandestine entry or using false documents
- There was an increased flow of Georgian migrants towards Belarus (air and land), with increased illegal entries and asylum applications in Poland and Lithuania
- In Q2, Libya was the most significant source of irregular migration to the EU. However, more recently the ability of the Gaddafi regime to forcibly expel its migrant population to the EU has become compromised; the situation remains dynamic and uncertain

4.1 Detections of illegal border-crossing

At the EU level, in Q2 2011 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing since Q3 2008. The total of 41 245 detections during this reporting period is a 25% increase compared the previous quarter and a 53% increase compared to the same period last year (Fig. 2). Without question there were major and extensive developments in illegal migration pressure at the external border of the EU, resulting from two simultaneous but independent hotspots of illegal border-crossings. The first was increased activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, where a range of Asian, north African and sub-Saharan African migrants were increasingly detected at very high levels. The second, and the undisputed hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the EU in Q2 2011, was at the Italian islands in the Central Mediterranean, where vast numbers of Tunisians, Nigerians and other sub-Saharan migrants landed in small sea vessels, the majority of which in Q2 had been forcibly departed from Libya.


Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. In Q2 2011 there were more detections of illegal border-crossing since the peak of Q3 2008 nearly three years ago. Compared to a year ago, detections at the EU land border decreased by 42% to 13 742 in Q2 2011, almost exclusively due to fewer detections of Albanian nationals following their new visa-free status; elsewhere at the land border (including Greece) trends were roughly stable. In contrast, at the sea border detections increased nine-fold to some 27 500 detections (Fig. 2), the vast majority of which (95%) were in the central Mediterranean, forming the major development in irregular migration to the EU in 2011.

Figure 2: Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, split between detections at the land (grey) and sea (blue) borders



For just the second time since data collection began, Greece was surpassed in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing by another Member State – Italy. This was despite a 66% increase in detections reported by Greece, from 7 226 in Q1 2011 to 12 021 in Q2 2011. However, detections in Italy remained at a consistently very high level at 25 457, a quarterly figure only ever surpassed by a single Member State (Greece) on two other occasions since data collection began in early 2008. The vast majority of detections reported by Greece were from the land border with Turkey, where more than half the detections were of Afghan and Pakistani migrants, whereas nearly all the detections reported by Italy were from the Pelagic Islands, most notably Lampedusa, where detections were almost exclusively of Tunisians and sub-Saharan Africans.

Figure 3: Differences in the number (bars, left axis) and percentage (open diamonds and labels, right axis) of detections of illegal border-crossing between Q2 2011 and Q2 2010 for nine Member States and the EU as a whole




At the EU level, detections of illegal border-crossing increased by 53% compared to a year ago (Fig. 3). However, this level masks a lot of variation among Member States. First, and most importantly to the current situation, was a 4 200% increase in detections of almost exclusively African migrants in Italy. Related to this central Mediterranean flow, was a concurrent and massive increase in detections reported from Malta (from 0 to 710), and also increases further west into Spain (+61%). As a result, all these countries have seen increases in other indicators such as asylum applications of the most common nationalities (see relevant sections). Secondly, in Greece overall detections of illegal border-crossing may have halved (-50%) compared to a year ago to 12 021, but it is important to consider that until very recently overall detections in Greece were the combined result of two separate and independent migratory flows. The first was circular migration of Albanian nationals who, each year, temporarily exploited seasonal employment opportunities in the Greek agricultural sector. Following visa liberalisation at the end of 2010, the number of Albanian circular migrants detected illegally crossing their border into Greece fell from 12 000 a year ago to just 1 000 in Q2 2011; it is this reduction that is largely responsible for the 50% decline at the national level (Fig. 3). In contrast, the second migratory flow into Greece, which is comprised of large numbers of

Asian and African migrants entering from Turkey, has remained broadly stable but still at a very high level, compared to a year ago. Hence, illegal migration in Greece is still apparent at the rates reported during the middle of 2010, prior to the deployment of the RABIT 2010. Figure 3 also shows large increases reported by Hungary (+18% to 657) and Romania (+117% to 165), which are mostly explained by the secondary movements of migrants that entered the EU through Greece.

Routes

As illustrated in Figure 4, for just the second time since records began in early 2008, in Q2 2011 detections of illegal border-crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, which comprises the blue borders of Italy and Malta, exceeded those reported from both the (i) Eastern Mediterranean route of the land and sea borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus, and (ii) circular migration from Albania to Greece.

Figure 4: Detections of illegal border-crossings between BCPs (indicator 1A), by major migration route



Without question, in Q2 2011 the single most important irregular-immigration route in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing was the Central Mediterranean route, where detections increased in the beginning of 2011 to previously unprecedented levels (Fig. 4). In the first quarter of 2011, and uniquely compared to previous surges of illegal immigration, this flow was restricted to a single nationality – Tunisian, most of whom were responding to civil unrest in their home country by leaving towards the Italian Island of Lampedusa. In response to this almost unmanageable influx of irregular migration at a single and isolated location, a bilateral return agreement was signed between Italy and Tunisia, which allowed for the accelerated repatriation of newly arrived individuals. Hence, during the current reporting period, the flow of Tunisian migrants fell from over 20 200 in the previous quarter to 4 300 in Q2 2011.


However, civil uprising commonly referred to as the Arab Spring, and its effects on migration in the area, was not limited to Tunisia. For example according to multiple sources, in next-door Libya, migrants from sub-Saharan countries were in Q2 2011 being coerced to move towards the EU by the Gaddafi regime in response to the NATO Operation Unified Protector which commenced on March 27 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Thus, in Q2 2011, besides some continued departures from Tunisia, the flow in the central Mediterranean was composed of a single flow of large numbers migrants from sub-Saharan countries departing Libya in small vessels.

Throughout 2010 the hotspot for illegal migration into the EU was the eastern Mediterranean route which, although exceeded so far in 2011 by detections on the central Mediterranean route, is still reporting detections of migrants illegally entering the EU at a similar level to that in 2010. For example, a year ago in Q2 2010 there were 11 772 detections of illegal border-crossings on this route. In the current reporting period there were a comparable 11 137 detections. Consistently through this period the most commonly detected migrants on this route have been from Afghanistan, detections of whom have fluctuated between 55% of all detections a year ago to 35% in Q2 2011. As well as Afghan migrants, and in contrast to the Eastern Mediterranean route, there are three independent waves of migrants entering the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route: (i) Asian migrants such as those from Pakistan and Bangladesh, (ii) sub-Saharan migrants such as those from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, and (iii) north African migrants from Algeria and Morocco.

4.1.1 Eastern Mediterranean route


Detections of illegal border-crossings on this route increased seasonally and in line with previous years, from 6 504 in Q1 2011 to 11 137 in Q2 2011, almost exclusively due to a massive increase in detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, where detections increased from 6 057 to 10 582. Figure 5 shows the changes in detections of illegal border-crossings at the Greek land and sea borders with Turkey. Based on detections in previous years, the increase in pressure on this route during Q2 2011 is not entirely unexpected and is at a level almost exactly comparable to that of a year ago.

Figure 5: Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land and sea borders with Turkey, by border type



The increase in detections at the Greek-Turkish land border was distributed among a wide range of nationalities. The countries with the most detections are shown in dark red, while those with fewer detections are shown in lighter shades. This map clearly shows the wide geographic range of third countries whose citizens were detected illegally crossing the EU border into Greece. The five most commonly detected nationalities in Greece were from Asia (Afghan, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) and north Africa (Algerian and Moroccan). Figure 6 shows detections of these top five nationalities over time at the land border between Greece and Turkey under JO Poseidon Land. This graph, in which weeks 14–26 correspond to the current reporting period, clearly illustrates increasing detections of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Figure 6: Detections of the top five nationalities detected illegally crossing the land border between Greece and Turkey during Operation Poseidon land 2011



The JO Poseidon 2011 Land started on 3 March 2011 as an immediate follow-up to the operation RABIT 2010. Since February 2011, the numbers of detections in JO Poseidon land have been steadily increasing. According to operational data, in the first seven months of 2011 a total of 22 096 migrants were apprehended at the Greek-Turkish land border across a wide range of nationalities. This is a 24% increase in the number of detections compared to the same period in 2010 and is consistent with seasonal increases reported in previous years.

On 30 March 2011, Bulgaria became a hosting country for JO Poseidon Land 2011. Small numbers of nationals claiming to be from of Iraq, Turkey, Palestine and Syria have attempted to enter Bulgaria illegally but no *displacement* in the irregular migratory flow towards the Bulgarian-Turkish land border has been observed.

Afghans in Iran

Information collected during interviews recently conducted during JO Poseidon Land 2011 suggests that more than 60% of Afghan migrants apprehended in Greece were actually resident (legally or illegally) as refugees in Iran prior to their attempt to enter the EU. This is confirmed by the fact that the majority of the newly arrived Afghan migrants, who were screened and debriefed in Greece, did not speak Dari or Pashto, the two official languages in Afghanistan; rather they spoke Persian (Farsi) which is the official language in Iran.

Hence, the main push factor for Afghan nationals to leave Iran is the increasingly difficult living conditions mostly caused by measures applied by Iranian authorities such as:

- Iranian authorities have started a concerted effort to return Afghan refugees;
- Iranian employers are now heavily penalised for illegally employing Afghan workers;
- new restrictions for Afghans: an obligation to reside in certain cities and regions, difficulties in obtaining bank loans, renting or owning property and opening bank accounts.

These measures taken by the Iranian government are therefore forcing Afghans to leave Iran and travel towards Europe, the majority moving into neighbouring Turkey and then onwards to Greece. However, Greece is not the final destination for Afghans, majority of them are claiming the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and the UK as their desired destinations within Europe.

The situation of Dominicans

According to a wide range of sources, since the beginning of 2011 groups of Dominicans have been travelling to Turkey to enter the EU via the Greek land border. They arrive in Istanbul via a number of EU airports.

After arriving in Istanbul these migrants either went to a predefined hotel, as instructed by a facilitator in the Dominican Republic, or they were met at the airport by a Dominican national and instructed to go to a certain hotel. After about a week they were picked up by Turkish facilitators and taken either directly towards the border or to a safe house where other migrants accumulated before crossing the border together. Individuals detected at the Greek land border claimed to originate from Somalia, Eritrea, Myanmar or even Palestine. Facilitation networks are operational in the Dominican Republic, Turkey and a number of other EU countries.

4.1.2 Central Mediterranean route

In Q2 2011 there were 26 167 detections of illegal border-crossings on the Central Mediterranean route, a 10% increase even compared to the 'peak' reported during the previous quarter, and evidently a massive increase compared to the negligible detections throughout all of 2010. The vast majority of detections on this route were reported from Italy (25 500) where detections increased by 13% even compared to the 'influx' of migrants reported during Q1 2011. In Italy, Central African, Tunisian, Nigerian and Ghanaian were the mostly commonly detected nationalities, 90% of which were detected in the Pelagic Islands (14 300), most notably Lampedusa (Fig. 7). However, in Q2 2011 there were also more detections of illegal border-crossing reported from Sicily (2 260) than ever before; this figure is nearly three times bigger than that reported in the previous quarter and more than twenty times higher than during the same period last year (100). Compared to the previous quarter, in Sicily there were more detections of migrants from a very

wide range of countries such as Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire and Tunisia. There were also over 710 detections reported from Malta, which is a sustained peak from the previous quarter (820) and extremely high compared to the negligible detections throughout 2010. In Malta there were much fewer detections of Somalis and Eritreans but there were increased detections of Nigerians and migrants from Côte d'Ivoire. However, migrants from Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt often claim to originate from sub-Saharan Africa in an attempt to appear as refugees, a fact which may render such comparisons of nationalities somewhat misleading.



Figure 7: African migrants continue to arrive in Lampedusa using wooden boats



Figure 8: Self-facilitated economic migrants from Tunisia

This group of migrants decided to leave their home country of Tunisia as most of them were unemployed graduates with family connections in France, Germany or Italy. Together they bought this 4m traditional fishing boat EUR 2 000 equipped with fuel, cigarettes, bread and water, and a 15hp outboard engine. They left Skhira at 17:00 hours paying a local skipper to tow them to open water. They were given a compass and a GPS and cut loose after 3 to 4 hours.

In the previous FRAN Quarterly (Q1 2011) it was reported a surge of irregular immigration (20 000 detections) on the Central Mediterranean route that was almost entirely restricted to a single nationality: Tunisian (Fig. 8). As a result of this influx, on 20 February the JO EPN-Hermes Extension 2011 commenced in the central Mediterranean, and a bilateral agreement was reached between Italy and Tunisia on 5 April 2011, which resulted in the strengthening of police surveillance along the Tunisian coast and regular repatriations of Tunisian nationals from Italy. For example, according to data collected under JO Hermes 2011, some 1 696 Tunisians were repatriated between 5 April and 23 August 2011. The repatriation agreement is probably an effective deterrent, combining as it does, returns and surveillance, however some migrants have reported their boats being spotted by military patrols that did not take any action. According to the FRAN data, in Q2 2011 some 4 286 Tunisian migrants were still detected illegally crossing the border into Italy. Although a massive reduction, this still represents a very large and significant flow of irregular migrants into the EU.

In comparison to the reduction in flow from Tunisia, in Q2 2011 there was a large increase in migrants who had departed from Libya (Fig. 9). The migrants departing from Libya were mostly nationals from countries in the Horn of Africa, the sub-Saharan and Central African regions and, to a lesser extent, Asia. According to intelligence collected during JO EPN-Hermes Extension 2011, most of these migrants had already been in Libya for over a year, originally heading to Tripoli via the traditional routes for sub-Saharan and Central African migrants. In Q2 2011, migrants tended to reach Italy on large fishing vessels that had departed directly from Tripoli or the nearby ports of Medina and Janzour. Most of these deported African nationals did not want to leave the country as their standard of living in Libya was high compared to their home countries. Several even stated that they would choose to return to Libya after the war. In Q2 2011 reports suggest that some migrants were instructed to reach embarkation areas on their own but had been caught by the military or police and then detained in camps or disused barracks until they were transported to embarkation areas and onto vessels bound for Italy. In each case the migrants were searched by the military before boarding and all their belongings were confiscated. According to reports, nationals of the sub-



Figure 9: Boat carrying long-term African residents of Libya forced to leave the country

In April 2011 this 22m vessel departed from Libya and was detected near Lampedusa containing some 760 nationals mostly from north and central Africa. Intelligence suggests that such migrants had generally been residents of Libya for up to a year before being forcibly expelled in this way. Many claim an intent to return at some point.

Saharan and Central African regions as well as from Horn of African countries have been recruited by the Libyan army/police to manage their compatriot migrants at gathering places or camps. In some cases the destination of vessels from Libya was Sicily, where the flow was characterised by waves of landings. For example there were around 11 landings on 13 May and 7 between 11 and 29 June, with the majority of boats arriving from Libya and Egypt.

According to the Italian authorities, there were also 4 landings on the Italian coast from Egypt involving around 300 migrants, of which around 100 were minors, having departed from the coastal area between Alexandria and Port Said or the region of Marsa Matruah near the Libyan border. The serious political and economic instability which remains after the early-2011 revolution means that Egypt continues to be a significant source of irregular migration to Italy. The situation is greatly exacerbated by the continued crisis within the Egyptian police, resulting in ineffective protection of territory and security in general. This is reflected in the poor control of the coastline and a lack of coastal surveillance resulting in smugglers easily departing from the west coast of Egypt.

4.1.3 Western Mediterranean route

In Q1 2011 there were 1 569 detections of illegal border-crossings on this route to Southern Spain, which is nearly double compared to the previous quarter (890), and more than a 50% increase compared to a year ago (973). Some of this increase is due to better weather conditions at this time of year, but irregular migration pressure on this route is clearly higher than it was at the same time last year. The most commonly detected nationality on this route was unknown (550) which more than doubled in number compared to the previous quarter and the same period last year. Of detections of known nationalities (1 022), the most common nationalities were Algerian (30%), followed by Côte d'Ivoire and Moroccan both at around 10% of the total (Fig. 10).



Figure 10: Boat with Algerian migrants on route to the Spanish coast

In the longer-term, irregular immigration to southern Spain has been consistently decreasing since the beginning of 2006. Commonly cited reasons are Frontex Joint Operations in the area, effective bilateral agreements and more recently rising unemployment in Spain, particularly in sectors typified by migrants.* Nationalities traditionally associated with this route were Algerian, Moroccan and Ghanaian.

* MPI Migration and Immigrants Two years after the collapse: Where do we stand? 2010

In one case on 17 June 2011, a small (5m) fibreglass boat was intercepted in the waters of the Balearic Islands with 11 Algerians on board, having departed from the village of Dellys (Algeria) near Algiers. This was the second boat containing migrants detected in 2011 in the waters of the isle of Mallorca (the first one was in January). However, reports from multiple sources suggest that migrants are increasingly using unseaworthy vessels to attempt the crossing between Morocco and both the Spanish mainland and the cities of Melilla and Ceuta.

Subsequent to the reporting period, in July 2011 there was a slight increase in the detection of African migrants illegally entering Ceuta and Melilla, both by land and by sea, which prompted The Director General of the Police and Civil Guard to visit his counterpart in Rabat. As a result Morocco promised to strengthen its controls in order to prevent sub-Saharan migrants gaining entry to Spain via Ceuta and Melilla.*

4.1.4 Western African route

The cooperation and bilateral agreements between Spain and the rest of the Western African countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali) are developing steadily. They are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals on this route over the last year, as are the presence of patrolling assets near the African coast. In Q4 2010 Frontex reported a slight increase in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the Canary Islands, from a maximum of 50 during each of the previous 4 quarters, to 113 in Q4 2010. This increased level of detections persisted into the first quarter of this year (154), exclusively due to Moroccan nationals (152) displaced after the dismantling of migrant camps near the dispute Western Saharan region. However, during the current reporting period detections on this route decreased massively to a negligible 24 detections.

4.1.5 Eastern land borders

In Q2 2011 there were 246 detections of illegal border-crossing at the Eastern land borders of the EU, which is a decrease of around a third compared the second quarters of both 2010 and 2009. The top five nationalities detected on this route were Moldovan, Somali, Georgian, Russian, Afghan and Ukrainian. At the level of the route, there has been little variation in the number of detections among these nationalities, with the exception of Moldovans, detections of whom have halved compared to the same period last year across a range of border sections. The border section detecting the most illegal border-crossings was the Slovakian – Ukrainian border, where Somalis were the most commonly detected nationality (Fig. 11 opposite).

* For further information, see: <http://www.diaariosur.es/v/20110720/melilla/rabat-reforzara-controles-para-20110720.html>

Also affecting the Baltic area in Q2 2011, particularly Latvia and Estonia, are increased reports of irregular migrants being detected from a range of sub-Saharan countries. For example, migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo are increasingly being detected having Latvia as an entry and transit country, having Finland as a destination country. Many of these migrants are using forged EU documents mostly obtained, together with other facilitation services, in Russia where migrants arrive at the air border. Latvian border guards report that near Moscow, there are special places where the citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo wait for the falsified, often Belgian travel documents. Network analysis of telephone numbers stored in the mobile phones of detected migrants confirms that individuals from many sub-Saharan countries are using the same facilitators in Russia.



Figure 11: The Slovakian-Ukrainian border was the section of the Eastern land borders with the most detections of illegal crossings

The number of detections also increased at the Romanian border with Moldova. In major cases of detections the migrants were Moldovans who crossed the border (the river Prut) swimming.

4.1.6 Western Balkans

The Western Balkan region continues to feature both as source and transit area for irregular migration that is directly impacting the EU. The two phenomena remained quite distinct during the second quarter of 2011, both in terms of numbers, *modus operandi* and trends.

Western Balkans as a source region

Western Balkans as a source region is typified by two flows. The first is Albanian circular migration to Greece and the second is false asylum claims submitted by local biometric passport-holders in several EU Member States. Albanian circular migration is detected as illegal border-crossings at the Greek-Albanian border, where detections of Albanians remained a significant but reduced problem compared with the same quarter last year. This decreasing trend is a direct consequence of visa liberalisation.

Importantly, compared to the first quarter of 2011, the decreasing trend largely stabilised during the current reporting period, with almost 1 500 illegal migrants detected by both Albanian and Greek authorities on both sides of the border. Predictably and somewhat linked, refusals of entry issued by Greek authorities to Albanian nationals remained at significantly increased levels compared to the

same period prior to visa liberalisation. However, the trend was by and large stable when compared to the first three months of 2011. The initial increase (after the introduction of visa liberalisation) and subsequent stabilisation of the trend (quarter to quarter) is very similar to the case of Serb nationals and therefore follows the same pattern.

With more than 4 500 largely unfounded asylum applications during the second quarter of 2011, the asylum abuse by the five visa-exempt nationalities of the Western Balkans continues to be a significant issue. Namely, the applications amounted to almost 8% of the EU total during the second quarter of 2011. Nevertheless, the numbers continue to decline since the 2010 fourth quarter peaks (52% in Q1 2011 and 16% in Q2 2011).

By comparing available figures for regular passenger flows, returns and detections of illegal stay, asylum claims from the Western Balkans continue to be linked with a tiny minority of travellers who willingly abuse the international protection system but do not generally engage in overstaying.

Western Balkans as a transit region

Travelling within the EU from Greece and further on to other destination Member States (secondary movements) is usually performed using the fastest possible route to re-enter the Schengen area (Hungary or Slovenia). Detections of illegal border-crossings at several border sections on route between Greece and Slovenia and/or Hungary indicate that secondary movements have continued to increase.

During June 2011, Slovenian authorities reported an increase in detection of Afghans and Pakistanis who, after claiming asylum in Croatia, tried to illegally enter the EU. The increase was significant enough for the Slovenian Ministry of Interior to issue a public warning calling upon citizens to report sightings of illegal migrants.

Interestingly, a small proportion of the transiting flow has been routing through Romania, where detections of mostly North African irregular migrants (at border with Serbia) have increased. The increase was initially attributed to errors in directions; however, given the steady increases in 2011 and the fact that almost all detected migrants are from North Africa, this assumption needs further investigation.

4.1.7 Clandestine entry

Restricting indicator 1B to the land and sea borders of the EU and also to those detections that are confirmed clandestine entry results in extremely low detections in Q2 2011. This figure is the highest number since the beginning of 2009. Most detections were at the UK external sea border, where a wide range of nationalities were detected at very low frequencies. Detections of clandestine entry at external EU border appear to be very low, but cases at borders within the EU suggest that numbers of clandestine entries at the external border may be much higher.

In Q2 2011 there was an increase in detections of stowaways in the Spanish Port of Malaga. In this port there is a significant flow of goods and passengers from North Africa.



Figure 12: Migrants have been detected trying to enter the UK hidden in transportation means in the Belgian port of Zeebrugge

4.2 Detections of facilitators

In Q2 2011 there were 1 950 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which is a stable trend compared to the previous quarter Q1 2010 (1 860) and but a reduction of 15% compared to a year ago in Q2 2010. In most Member States the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator was domestic. Hence there is considerable overlap between the Member States that detect the most facilitators and the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator at the EU level – Italy and France consistently detect the most facilitators, and the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator in the EU were Italian and French. The long-term stable trend at the EU level, masks changes at the level of individual Member States.

At the EU level, detections of Tunisian facilitators have increased three-fold since the same period last year. According to Italian reports, Tunisian criminal organisations appear to be moving their third-country areas of action towards the border with Libya because of the resumption of control by the authorities in Tunisia. In Libya, they collaborate with the army which is loyal to Gaddafi. Furthermore, criminal organisations use a *modus operandi* similar to that of the Libyan criminal organisation, using a support network to escape the controls of the Tunisian authorities, using people who collect illegal migrants, collecting the money, and contacting those who prepare boats for the crossing.

In Q2 2011 detections of facilitators in France remained on a high level including more than ever previously detected British facilitators. In France there are usually a lower percentage of domestic facilitators (20%), probably because the French language is spoken widely in Africa and so this reduces the dependency that migrants would otherwise have on French-national facilitators. There were detections of nationalities associated with the north Africa situation, for example Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian but these were all much reduced compared to the previous quarter.

Spain ranked third in terms of number of detected facilitators in Q2 2011, with 21% being of domestic nationality. According to the Spanish authorities, in the Canary Islands an international criminal network involved in arranging fake marriages to regularise Cuban irregular migrants in Spain was dismantled during Operation Celestina. A total of 14 people were arrested in this phase of the police operation, which accounted for all detections of Cuban facilitators reported by Spain in Q2 2011. The activities of this network coincided with increase in the number of Cuban asylum applications submitted in Spain, from just 10 a year ago in Q2 2010 to 300 in Q2 2011.

In Q2 2011 the Spanish National Police also dismantled a Chinese criminal network dedicated to providing fake study certificates. A total of 20 people were arrested, 19 Chinese and one Spanish national: the network was very well structured such that five facilitators were in charge of the falsifications of different official study academies, 14 were involved in recruiting Chinese would-be migrants in their country of origin (operating constantly in China and Spain) and one was the owner of a law firm (the Spanish citizen) who was managing all the procedure and applications to regularise or renew the status of the supposed foreigner students. Every Chinese illegal migrant was charged between EUR 800 and 1 000 for the falsification alone.

The number of Albanian facilitators was much reduced compared to a year ago, particularly in Greece, Italy and France, which is consistent with a decreased number of illegal border-crossings by Albanians at the Greek land border with Turkey following visa free travel of Albanian nationals instated at the end of 2010.

4.3 Detections of illegal stay

In Q2 2011 there were 86 686 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which reflects a stable, slightly declining trend over the last two years. There has been little variation in the ranking of Member States reporting illegal stay; invariably Spain, France, Italy and Germany detect the largest numbers of illegal stayers – together accounting for around half the total in each quarter. Each of these Member States tend to detect different nationalities; Moroccans, Bolivians and Paraguayans in Spain, Tunisian and Eritreans in France, Tunisians and Moroccans in Italy, and Afghans and Turks in Germany. Of these nationalities, the only one to have had variable detections over the last year is Tunisian, detections of whom have increased nearly three-fold since Q2 2010.

However, at the level of individual Member States, in Q2 2011 detections of illegal stayers in Germany and Austria both increased by at least 25% compared to the same period last year, due to increased detections of a range of nationalities but mostly Afghan and Tunisian nationals. Detections doubled in Switzerland, where the range of sub-Saharan nationals were also increasingly detected. This suggests that these Member States are increasingly final destinations for migrants that entered the EU via both the central and eastern Mediterranean routes. Elsewhere, detections in Poland more than doubled over the last year because of more detections of Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian nationals, most of which had probably entered via the Eastern land borders.

In Q2 2011 Greece reported roughly a 50% reduction in detected illegal stayers in relation to the number detected during the same period last year. In Greece the most commonly detected illegal stayers in Q2 were Afghans and Pakistanis, which corresponds to the nationalities most commonly detected illegally crossing the border from Turkey.

However, most of the decrease was due to far fewer detections of Albanians, reflecting widespread changes in their movements and status following visa free travel for Albanian nationals to the EU, granted late in 2010. Similarly fewer over-staying Albanians were detected in Sweden, Romania and Bulgaria, while at the EU level detections of over-staying Albanians fell to just 2 500 from previously recorded levels of nearly 7 000, despite detections increasing in France and the UK by at least three times over the last year. In Greece there were also fewer detections of illegally-staying nationals from a range of third countries such as Palestine and Somalia, Eritrea and more detections of over-staying Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians. For the most part, these changes reflect differences in patterns of illegal border-crossings between Greece and Turkey.

4.4 Refusals of entry

In Q2 2011 there were 30 617 refusals of entry from the external borders of the EU; this is the highest figure since the beginning of 2008 and an increase of 20% compared with Q2 2010. Consistent with previous reporting periods, in Q2 2011 detections were mostly at the land (50%) and air borders (41%), and refusals from the sea border continued to rise.

Much of the increase at the EU level was due a twenty-fold increase in refusals of Albanian nationals compared to a year ago, such that they now account for 16% of all refusals at the EU level. Most of the refusals were at the Greek land borders with Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as well as at very large range of Member States and border types across the EU, most notably the Italian blue and air borders the Belgian air border and the land borders of Slovenia.

Notwithstanding refusals of Albanian nationals, the most refused nationalities

were Ukrainian, Russian, Serbian and Belarusian. These refusals, which together accounted for nearly a third of all refusals, were mostly from the eastern land borders, and the British and Spanish air borders.

Poland refused more third-country nationals than any other Member State mostly nationals from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia or Georgia with little variation over the last year or so (Fig: 13). Due to increases in the number of refused Albanians, Greece ranked second

in terms of number of refusals. Refusals in Spain and Hungary increased by 22% and 25% compared to Q2 2010, respectively. These increases were due to Moroccan, and Ukrainian and Moldovan nationals, respectively.



Figure 13: Ukrainian nationals were those most often refused at the Polish border, the border section which had the largest number of refusals among all Member States


4.5 Asylum claims

In Q2 2011 there were 58 544 applications for asylum, which is a 36% increase compared the same quarter a year ago. Large increases compared to a year ago were reported by Malta, Italy, and Belgium and to a lesser extent by Germany, Austria and Norway. Nationalities that submitted increased numbers of asylum claims at the EU level include nationals from Afghanistan, Nigeria, Eritrea, Pakistan, and Côte d'Ivoire (Fig. 14).

In Q3 2010 a massive increase in asylum applications was reported in Germany. This peak has persisted in the beginning of 2011, representing around 20% all applications at the EU level. Most of the peak in the second half of 2010 was due to (eventually unsuccessful) applications submitted by nationals from the Western Balkan countries who had recently been granted visa-free travel to the EU. In 2011, however, there were nearly three times as many applications submitted by Tunisian nationals in Germany, compared to the previous quarter. In Q1 2011 more asylum applications were submitted in Germany by Afghan migrants than any other nationality, stable at around 2 500 applications per quarter.

Total applications in Italy rose sharply in Q2 2011 in relation to Q2 2010. In the previous quarter there was an influx of applications submitted by Tunisian migrants but this has now fallen. In contrast, applications by Nigerians and Ghanaians have risen sharply in 2011 Q2 compared with the previous quarter. In both cases applications continued to rise throughout the reporting period. Most of these applicants arrived in Italy from Libya (see section on Illegal border-crossing – Central Mediterranean). In general, irregular migrants landed in Lampedusa or Pantelleria are unable to remain in these places because it may be impossible to afford them appropriate care; hence they are transferred to dedicated facilities in other Italian regions where identification procedures are employed and the migrants apply for asylum. Also in Italy applications by nationals of Burkina Faso increased.

Figure 14: Asylum applications by third country



4.6 Forged documents

In Q2 2011 there were 2 300 detections of migrants using forged travel documents, which is a stable trend compared to a year ago and a small increase compared to the previous quarter, probably due to increased regular passenger flow.

Among Member States, Spain continued to report the most detections of forged documents, mostly of a range of nationalities at its air border, where detections increased by 20% compared to a year previously. Ranked second and third in terms of detections of forged documents were the UK and France, where air borders were also the most important and detections were similarly distributed among large numbers of nationalities. As well as at these Member States, large increases compared to a year ago were also reported from the air borders of Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium. At the land border there were increases in Latvia and Bulgaria. Not all Member States and border types reported increases in detections of forged documents. For example there were significant decreases at the Spanish and the Polish land border.

Apart from migrants of unknown nationality, the most commonly detected nationality using forged travel documents were Ukrainians, mostly detected at the land borders of Poland and Hungary as well as the UK air border. Also significant were increased detections of Albanian migrants using forged documents, mostly due to recent increases at the UK, Spanish and Irish air borders.

According to the German authorities and verified by UK and other Member-State officers, there were still large numbers of false EU documents detected on flights from Turkish airports – Istanbul, Antalya and Ankara. The main nationalities were Turkish, Afghan, Iranian and Moroccan. Most of the Afghans and Iranians immediately applied for asylum.

4.7 Other illegal activities at the border

Drugs

As established in the 2011 ARA, routes of drug trafficking vary depending on the type of drug, its origin and the specific criminal organisation involved. Weather conditions seem to also play a part in drug trafficking routes: during spring and summer the number of drug detections at the sea borders increases significantly.

The JO EPN Indalo 2011 is coordinated by Frontex and hosted by Spain. During May and June 2011, five incidents of drug trafficking were reported during JO EPN Indalo 2011 (Fig. 15), resulting in the apprehension of 3 847 kg of hashish,



Figure 15: Hashish detected during JO Indalo 2011

the arrest of nineteen individuals (mostly Moroccans) and the seizure of several vehicles including a fibreglass boat, a speed boat, a yacht and two small aircrafts.

The use of small aircrafts for drug trafficking to the Iberian Peninsula has been detected with some frequency in recent months. For example, on 16 June, as part of 'Operation Saffron,' the Spanish government detected two light aircrafts illicitly flying from

Morocco. The planes were searched, four men were arrested and 700 kg of hashish were seized. In the same month, a UNODC official stated that there is some evidence that drug cartels from West Africa are now making use of submarines to facilitate their trade. These 'narco-submarines' can carry relatively large quantities of drugs and are very hard to detect.

Multiple reports from open sources seem to indicate that the air and sea routes for cocaine trafficking described in the ARA 2011 – leading from South America and the Caribbean to the EU – remain highly active. Spain, Portugal and the UK seem to be the most common destinations for the cocaine trade, though a large seizure (2 500 kg) also took place in June at the Rotterdam Port in the Netherlands.

Cocaine has been found hidden within camping equipment in Munich airport *en route* to London from Lima via São Paulo. The cocaine was soaked within cotton camping mats and wrapped in carbon paper in an attempt to evade detection.

* The operation was led by Spain and involved seven other countries: four EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy) and three third-countries (Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia).

** <https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/press/nearly-one-tonne-cocaine-seized-international-police-operation-411>

At the end of May the Europol-coordinated 'Operation Salonica' took place* resulting in the apprehension of 160 kg of hashish and nearly one tonne of cocaine which had been diluted in palm oil. A total of 22 members of an international criminal drugs network composed of Spanish, Moroccan and Albanian citizens were arrested and the network itself, which dealt with the distribution of hashish, cannabis and Colombian cocaine, was dismantled. The operation was the culmination of eight months of investigations which had already resulted in a number of arrests and smaller seizures.**

Cruise ships have also been used by passengers attempting to smuggle cocaine into Europe. For example, seizures took place in Spain aboard a ship that had arrived from South America and onboard ships that had docked in Jamaica. In June the UK Border Agency apprehended 1.2 tonnes of cocaine originating from the Caribbean aboard a luxury yacht. The drugs, which had an unusually high level of purity, had an estimated market value of over EUR 340 000. Two months later the Dutch police arrested six men involved in the trafficking operation.

The UK also reported cases of cocaine and heroine smuggling in private cars via the Dover. Between January and May four cases of Albanian citizens attempting to smuggle drugs from the Netherlands, Kosovo and Albania were detected, resulting in the seizure of 24 360 kg of heroin and 10 000 kg of cocaine. UK reports also indicate the smuggling of heroin concealed in vegetable consignments, as well as concealed within wooden pallets travelling from Pakistan.

Recent cases show that, not only are the Iberian countries popular destination and transit countries for drugs entering the EU, but they are also being used as points of exit of drugs. In June, for instance, customs authorities at the Lisbon airport detected over 17 kg of cocaine originating from Brazil, while 2 460 kg of hashish and 4 560 kg of cannabis were apprehended in transit from Belgium to Brazil.

Narco-tourism from Brazil to the EU and back

Drug trafficking routes for cocaine coming from and through Brazil to the EU have long been identified. Yet the drug trade also occurs in the other direction, with drugs – particularly synthetic ones – leaving the EU towards Brazil.

A recently spotted trend is the 'narco-tourism' of Brazilians to Europe. Young, educated, middle-class Brazilians are contacted by drug traffickers who offer them trips to the EU with all the expenses paid. In return, the young people will carry drugs (mostly Ecstasy and LSD) back to Brazil, where they will be further compensated for the job (usually with payments ranging from EUR 8 500 to 13 000).

Belgium and the Netherlands are the most common destination countries in the EU as they are the biggest producers of synthetic drugs. When leaving Europe, the drug carriers may transit through different EU airports, with Lisbon being a major transit point. In Brazil, the target airports are not the ones in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the main international hubs in the country. Rather, because of the belief that the larger airports are more closely and thoroughly watched, traffickers prefer to use secondary hubs such as the airports in Belo Horizonte, Salvador and Recife, where direct flights to Portugal, Spain, France and Germany are available.

According to the Brazilian Federal Police, in the first semester of 2011 some 171 000 pills of Ecstasy and 44 000 doses of LSD were apprehended in Brazilian airports. More than half of them were found at the Tancredo Neves/Confins International airport in the Belo Horizonte metropolitan area.

Cigarette smuggling

Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations Focal Points (FP), Jupiter, Neptune, Poseidon, as well as bi-monthly reports from Member States and open source data indicate that cigarette smuggling remains a significant problem at land, sea and in lesser extent air borders of the EU.

Data from JO Focal Points Land shows that 22% more cigarettes were detected in Q2 2011 than in Q2 2010. Most cases of cigarette detections still take place at the Eastern border of the EU, but unlike in Q2 2010, when the majority of cigarettes detected were found at one BCP at the Polish border with Ukraine (Dorohusk), the hotspots for cigarette smuggling in Q2 2011 are more evenly distributed among BCPs, and the largest quantities were mainly found at the southern parts of the Eastern border (Bulgarian border with Turkey, Romanian border with Moldova, and Hungarian border with Ukraine). At the northern section of the border, two BCPs at the border with the Russian Federation have also presented significant quantities of smuggled cigarettes (Kybartai and Narva). This may suggest a geographical shift in cigarette smuggling and/or greater efficiency and expertise of border guards in the detection of smuggled cigarettes. Additional data on detection capabilities would be needed for a more in-depth analysis of these operational data.

It is unsurprising to note that cigarette smuggling was one of the forms of cross-border crime most commonly detected during JO Jupiter 2011. The biggest seizures of cigarettes were reported at the EU's external border with the Russian Federation and the Romanian border with Moldova. The smuggling of cigarettes at the border with Belarus was reported in smaller number. Overall, the majority of smugglers detected during JO Jupiter were EU nationals.

Sections of the Eastern border have been subjected a year-long investigation coordinated by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) which involved law enforcement authorities from Lithuania, Poland and Germany. As a result of the operation, nine people were arrested in Lithuania and approximately 350 000 cartons of cheap white cigarettes smuggled from Russia and Ukraine were apprehended, preventing a tax loss of six million EUR.

Smuggled cigarettes were also detected during the first operational phase of JO Neptune 2011.

Cheap whites

'Cheap whites' or illicit whites (also known as extremely low priced cigarettes – ELPC) are cigarettes produced by relatively small, unknown producers. As the name implies, these generic brands are sold at much lower prices than more popular tobacco products. Although legally manufactured, these cigarettes are produced specifically for the illegal market, where they are sold without being taxed and thus at much lower prices than those which are submitted to excise duty.

Most cheap white cigarettes are produced outside the EU (Eastern Europe, the United Arab Emirates and China being large producers), though some brands are produced in EU countries.



Source: EB Media Monitor, July 2010

Figure 16: Cartons of Regal cigarettes, a well-known brand of 'cheap whites' detected at the Moldovan border

Though they can be of reasonable and consistent quality (unlike counterfeits, which can be up to thirty times more harmful than genuine brands), 'cheap whites' are in most cases manufactured without following the stricter regulatory standards imposed by EU Member States, which means that they may be more detrimental to the consumer's health than traditional brands.

The cigarettes detected at BCPs were hidden in various places, such as special hiding compartments in vehicles and trains. At the green border and rivers the smuggling of cigarettes maintains the same *modus operandi* identified in previous quarters and is most likely aided by the favourable weather conditions of spring/summer. The main methods of trafficking cigarettes by rivers have been identified as the use of boats which are accompanied by facilitators and the use of boats carrying cigarettes which are abandoned at the EU bank of the river (e.g. on the river Nemunas or the river Bug). Green borders are crossed by smugglers with off-road vehicles, horse carts and agricultural vehicles (e.g. tractors) or on foot simply carrying bags containing the cigarettes. In Slovakia, police found unmarked cartons of cigarettes hidden in fields in the borderland region with Ukraine.

As was reported in FRAN Q1 2011, the smuggling of cigarettes by air borders is mainly reported from the UK. A number of tobacco seizures have involved groups of passengers on the same flights. Such flights come from multiple locations which include Doha, Brussels, Bombay and Dubai.

Smuggled cigarettes were also detected at the sea border. Though most detections of JO Poseidon Sea 2011 involve illegal migration, two large detections of cigarette smuggling took place during the second quarter of 2011. In April a Ukrainian vessel was intercepted in the sea area between Crete and Karpathos islands. The vessel was loaded with over 500 000 cartons of illegal cigarettes, representing an estimated tax loss of about EUR 8.5 million. Eight Ukrainian crew members were arrested and prosecuted. In May a ship sailing under the Bolivian flag was spotted close to Halastra, southwest of Thessaloniki bay. It was seized and the five Albanian nationals aboard it arrested. The ship carried over 270 000 cartons of cigarettes, which represented a potential tax loss of five million EUR. It had sailed from the areas of Cyprus where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control (port of Famagusta) and according to Greek intelligence its destination was Varna, Bulgaria.

Other detections at the sea border confirm that the UK is among the top destination countries for cigarettes smuggled through the Eastern land borders by Polish and Lithuanian smugglers. Seizures of cigarettes have been made involving Polish vehicles entering the UK at ports along the northeast coast of England, such as Newcastle and the small port of Killingholme.

Smuggling of petroleum products

The smuggling of fuel continues to be a localised problem that mainly affects the Eastern borders of the EU due to the price differentials that exist there. However, in Q2 2011 the price gap at the Eastern borders was reduced somewhat, with the exception of that which exists between Belarus and its neighbouring countries. In fact, this particular price gap became even larger by the end of the quarter due to the significant fuel price drop (in EUR) which took place in Belarus. The purchase of oil products and its transport by the border, however, has been limited by the Belarusian government.

Table 2 : PRICE DIFFERENCES OF EURO-SUPER 95 FUEL IN Q2 2011

Differences between EU countries and bordering third countries in EUR per litre

Border	Price in EU country	Price in third country	% price difference
Finland-Russia	1.57	0.70	55
Lithuania-Belarus	1.33	0.63	53
Poland-Belarus	1.26	0.63	50
Poland-Russia	1.26	0.70	44
Estonia-Russia	1.22	0.70	43
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.46	0.90	38
Hungary-Ukraine	1.40	0.90	36
Greece -Albania	1.67	1.18	29
Poland-Ukraine	1.26	0.90	29
Greece- FYROM	1.67	1.21	28
Romania-Ukraine	1.23	0.90	27
Romania- Moldova	1.23	1.00	19
Hungary-Croatia	1.40	1.31	6.4
Hungary- Serbia	1.40	1.37	2.1
Greece-Turkey	1.67	1.68	-0.6
Bulgaria- FYROM	1.14	1.21	-6.1
Slovenia- Croatia	1.23	1.31	-6.5
Romania- Serbia	1.23	1.37	-11
Bulgaria- Serbia	1.14	1.37	-20
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.14	1.68	-47

Source: ESRI Geodata, DG Energy and Open Source Data for June 2011

Stolen vehicles (on exit)

Data from JO Focal Points Land shows that about 50% more stolen vehicles were detected at the Eastern borders of the EU. Three BCPs remained in the top five in both years (Obrezje at the Slovenian-Croatian border, Dorohusk at the Polish-Ukrainian border and Kipi at the Greek-Turkish border), while BCPs at the Slovak-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Serbian borders (Vysne Nemecke and Röske respectively) were supplanted by BCPs at the Bulgarian-Turkish and Polish-Belarusian border (Kapitan Andreevo and Terespol respectively). Like with cigarette smuggling, this change may signify new routes and/or varied levels of expertise of border guards in the detection of stolen vehicles.

It is worth highlighting that in Q2 2011, the Kaptain Andreevo BCP was the only BCP which made to the top five in detections of both cigarettes and stolen vehicles, replacing BCP Dorohusk which previously held the position in Q2 2010.

In Q2 2011 the majority of stolen vehicles continued to have altered Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs) numbers, though the number of vehicle smugglers

using genuine identification numbers and documents is increasing. The *modus operandi* reported in previous FRAN Quarterlies remains unchanged. Cases of smuggling of stolen motorbikes in spare parts (Fig. 17) and the transportation of stolen vehicles on trailers, either in one piece or dismantled, have once more been reported. At the Polish-Belarusian border (BCP Terespol) the transport of stolen vehicles the transport of stolen vehicles in the car carriage of trains has been detected.



Source: Polish Border Guard Unit in Bieszczady 2011

Figure 17: In July 2011 Polish border guards detected four stolen motorbikes (Piaggio, Kawasaki and Yamaha) at the BCP Medyka (Polish-Ukrainian border). The motorbikes were hidden under old car tires and wheels in a Volkswagen Transport. The estimated value of the bikes is EUR 10 000

Trafficking in Human Beings (THB)

THB is rarely identified at the borders, but detections are occasionally achieved. In April 2011, two men (one German, one Swedish) were arrested at Munich airport attempting to enter the EU with a ten-year-old boy from Costa Rica who had been given false documents.* The men were identified as members of a paedophile ring which trafficked Latin-American children to the EU under the guise of a humanitarian organisation founded after the 2010 Haitian Earthquake.

* <http://www.thelocal.de/society/20110415-34415.html>

In the same month a Moldovan woman won a landmark case against the British government.** Initially trafficked at the age of 14, she was discovered by UK officers in 2003 (aged 18). She was immediately imprisoned for three months and then repatriated to Moldova, where just days later she was found by her traffickers and again forced into sexual exploitation. In 2004 she was re-trafficked to the UK, where she later managed to escape and successfully claimed asylum. She then went on to challenge the Home Office for failing to take the necessary precautions to ensure she would not be re-trafficked and has won a settlement of over EUR 147 000.

** <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13039290>

5. Statistical tables

Legend:	Symbols and abbreviations	n.a.	not applicable
		:	data not available
Source:	FRAN data as of 23 August 2011		
Note:	'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries		

Table A1 :

ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

Detections at the external borders by top ten nationalities

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
All Borders									
Not specified*	260	337	573	422	1 482	7 506	2 127	406	18
Afghanistan	1 686	7 061	10 916	6 255	1 762	4 606	-35	161	11
Tunisia	335	237	603	323	20 492	4 489	1 794	-78	11
Nigeria	34	54	251	220	282	3 214	5 852	1 040	7.8
Pakistan	272	345	840	2 421	1 054	2 821	718	168	6.8
Ghana	12	63	57	123	109	2 224	3 430	1 940	5.4
Mali	3	8	11	30	42	1 902	23 675	4 429	4.6
Bangladesh	142	209	593	703	562	1 799	761	220	4.4
Côte d'Ivoire	3	39	90	156	293	1 208	2 997	312	2.9
Albania	5 593	12 286	9 183	6 198	1 017	1 156	-91	14	2.8
Other	6 517	6 239	11 668	10 680	5 811	10 320	65	78	25
EU Total	14 857	26 878	34 785	27 531	32 906	41 245	53	25	100
Land Border									
Afghanistan	1 345	6 434	9 576	5 489	1 342	3 986	-38	197	29
Pakistan	224	288	779	2 384	945	2 136	642	126	16
Albania	5 390	11 995	9 074	6 133	1 014	1 144	-90	13	8.3
Bangladesh	116	133	563	694	556	763	474	37	5.6
Algeria	552	94	3 651	2 664	677	760	709	12	5.5
Not specified	156	189	545	414	299	580	207	94	4.2
Morocco	225	67	161	866	519	519	675	0	3.8
Congo	3	2	18	80	150	362	18 000	141	2.6
Somalia	585	1 598	1 160	759	151	279	-83	85	2.0
India	25	25	71	233	124	238	852	92	1.7
Other	2 869	2 988	4 125	5 049	2 741	2 975	-0.4	8.5	22
Total Land	11 490	23 813	29 723	24 765	8 518	13 742	-42	61	100
Sea Border									
Not specified	104	148	28	8	1 183	6 926	4 580	485	25
Tunisia	34	191	416	70	20 258	4 298	2 150	-79	16
Nigeria	9	17	111	59	57	3 105	18 165	5 347	11
Ghana	10	61	50	86	47	2 079	3 308	4 323	7.6
Mali	1	4	10	8	18	1 868	46 600	10 278	6.8
Côte d'Ivoire	3	19	83	37	76	1 086	5 616	1 329	3.9
Bangladesh	26	76	30	9	6	1 036	1 263	17 167	3.8
Somalia	380	61	62	14	420	756	1 139	80	2.7
Pakistan	48	57	61	37	109	685	1 102	528	2.5
Egypt	116	33	272	292	321	658	1 894	105	2.4
Other	2 636	2 398	3 939	2 146	1 893	5 006	109	164	18
Total Sea	3 367	3 065	5 062	2 766	24 388	27 503	797	13	100

* The "not specified" group includes those of unknown nationality, however it includes persons suspected to be from countries in the Horn of Africa (1172 in Q1 2011) and from countries in Central Africa (6922 in Q2 2011).

Table A2 :

CLANDESTINE ENTRIES AT BCPs

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Border Type									
Sea	7	20	15	32	47	31	55	-34	52
Land	16	4	115	33	25	29	625	16	48
Top Ten Nationalities									
Algeria	4	11	9	11	25	11	0	-56	18
Palestine	0	0	3	1	6	7	n.a.	17	12
Iraq	0	0	6	1	1	6	n.a.	500	10
Turkey	1	1	86	5	2	6	500	200	10
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	1	5	n.a.	400	8.3
Venezuela	0	0	0	0	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	6.7
Morocco	3	7	2	2	3	4	-43	33	6.7
Lybia	0	0	0	0	0	4	n.a.	n.a.	6.7
Afghanistan	0	2	0	6	7	3	50	-57	5.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	0	0	0	2	n.a.	n.a.	3.3
Other	15	3	24	39	27	8	167	-70	13
Total	23	24	130	65	72	60	150	-17	100

FACILITATORS

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 745	1 579	1 434	1 160	1 498	1 530	-3.1	2.1	78
Land	263	276	347	285	112	159	-42	42	8.2
Land Intra EU	173	191	137	115	83	89	-53	7.2	4.6
Air	51	70	116	63	91	80	14	-12	4.1
Sea	203	146	101	53	49	65	-55	33	3.3
Not specified	35	20	24	42	27	27	35	0	1.4
Top Ten Nationalities									
Italy	505	301	345	216	180	218	-28	21	11
France	92	127	66	80	131	129	1.6	-1.5	6.6
China	183	167	113	91	146	100	-40	-32	5.1
Not specified	58	45	51	107	56	87	93	55	4.5
Albania	135	139	87	69	47	80	-42	70	4.1
Romania	88	94	90	126	65	77	-18	18	3.9
Iraq	55	68	50	17	23	75	10	226	3.8
Tunisia	29	23	54	15	109	73	217	-33	3.7
Morocco	134	98	98	83	120	70	-29	-42	3.6
Egypt	30	38	48	44	39	68	79	74	3.5
Other	1161	1 182	1 157	870	944	973	-18	3.1	50
Total	2 470	2 282	2 159	1 718	1 860	1 950	-15	4.8	100

Table A3 :

ILLEGAL STAY

Detections reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	74 151	74 204	72 047	72 251	67 450	70 138	-5.5	4.0	81
Air	6 496	6 927	7 870	7 433	7 327	7 425	7.2	1.3	8.6
Land	1 267	1 499	2 278	1 965	2 805	4 352	190	55	5.0
Land Intra EU	2 821	3 629	3 555	2 991	2 796	2 772	-24	-0.9	3.2
Sea	1 603	1 666	2 318	1 637	1 766	1 981	19	12	2.3
Between BCP	19	13	5	12	113	18	38	-84	0
Not specified	0	1	6	2	0	0	-100	n.a.	0
Top Ten Nationalities									
Tunisia	2 365	2 103	1 853	2 026	3 459	7 562	260	119	8.7
Afghanistan	5 201	5 271	5 557	5 075	4 891	5 844	11	19	6.7
Morocco	5 828	5 855	4 924	5 524	5 806	5 464	-6.7	-5.9	6.3
Algeria	3 605	3 484	3 482	3 633	3 847	3 581	2.8	-6.9	4.1
Ukraine	1 852	2 112	2 331	2 311	2 409	2 902	37	20	3.3
Pakistan	2 416	2 719	2 862	2 472	2 470	2 830	4.1	15	3.3
Serbia	3 583	2 351	4 226	4 825	2 976	2 776	18	-6.7	3.2
Brazil	2 490	4 258	3 329	3 292	3 272	2 755	-35	-16	3.2
Albania	4 730	6 658	5 192	4 257	2 213	2 534	-62	15	2.9
Iraq	3 127	2 830	3 085	3 417	2 733	2 424	-14	-11	2.8
Other	51 160	50 298	51 238	49 459	48 181	48 014	-4.5	-0.3	55
Total	86 357	87 939	88 079	86 291	82 257	86 686	-1.4	5.4	100

APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	5 616	4 303	5 684	5 949	6 280	6 900	60	9.9	12
Somalia	3 791	3 377	4 615	3 565	2 514	3 692	9.3	47	6.3
Iraq	3 716	3 453	3 942	3 926	3 680	3 321	-3.8	-9.8	5.7
Nigeria	1 361	1 308	1 232	1 419	1 314	3 103	137	136	5.3
Eritrea	1 437	1 726	2 069	1 665	2 219	2 942	70	33	5.0
Russia	2 920	2 757	3 811	3 571	2 759	2 696	-2.2	-2.3	4.6
Serbia	4 100	2 726	5 509	8 396	4 102	2 552	-6.4	-38	4.4
Pakistan	1 258	1 600	2 226	2 045	2 109	2 511	57	19	4.3
Iran	2 152	1 876	2 726	2 937	2 560	2 352	25	-8	4.0
Côte d'Ivoire	236	255	245	300	725	1 548	507	114	2.6
Other	20 917	19 731	23 251	24 181	22 677	26 927	36	19	46
Total	47 504	43 112	55 310	57 954	50 939	58 544	36	15	100

Table A4 :

REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Refusals at the external borders by top ten nationalities

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
All Borders									
Albania	277	252	508	1 287	4 940	4 918	1852	-0.4	16
Ukraine	5 156	4 643	5 136	3 930	3 529	3 824	-18	8.4	12
Russia	1 570	1 732	3 166	2 698	1 833	2 469	43	35	8.1
Serbia	1 838	1 509	1 877	1 766	1 945	1 685	12	-13	5.5
Belarus	1 188	1 430	1 451	1 593	1 318	1 501	5.0	14	4.9
Brazil	1 863	1 628	1 313	1 374	1 373	1 238	-24	-10	4.0
Morocco	660	575	536	566	833	1 128	96	35	3.7
Croatia	1 151	1 163	1 055	936	1 051	1 072	-7.8	2.0	3.5
FYROM	1 249	1 021	984	819	947	826	-19	-13	2.7
Turkey	795	777	1 281	803	644	766	-1.4	19	2.5
Other	10 881	10 853	11 198	12 135	10 251	11 190	3.1	9.2	37
EU Total	26 628	25 583	28 505	27 907	28 664	30 617	20	6.8	100
Land Border									
Ukraine	4 945	4 391	4 796	3 648	3 336	3 520	-20	5.5	23
Albania	123	126	321	693	2 873	3 057	2 326	6.4	20
Belarus	1 166	1 405	1 418	1 566	1 300	1 462	4.1	12	9.4
Russia	1 157	1 377	2 110	1 745	1 178	1 431	3.9	21	9.2
Serbia	1 416	1 241	1 600	1 463	1 586	1 298	4.6	-18	8.4
Croatia	1 098	1 102	990	877	987	1 013	-8.1	2.6	6.5
Morocco	300	259	186	195	522	787	204	51	5.1
FYROM	1 035	808	848	616	783	667	-17	-15	4.3
Georgia	609	640	684	1 165	376	635	-0.8	69	4.1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	160	172	221	246	349	402	134	15	2.6
Other	1 040	1 151	1 706	1 222	1 125	1 251	8.7	11	8.1
Total Land	13 049	12 672	14 880	13 436	14 415	15 523	22	7.7	100
Air Border									
Brazil	1 842	1 607	1 276	1 347	1 358	1 212	-25	-11	10
Albania	109	77	126	312	827	863	1021	4.4	6.9
United States	600	548	666	524	495	563	2.7	14	4.5
Russia	333	280	421	329	267	388	39	45	3.1
Venezuela	271	309	272	331	226	379	23	68	3.0
Nigeria	390	362	439	526	406	361	-0.3	-11	2.9
Serbia	373	237	240	287	325	360	52	11	2.9
Not specified	428	334	382	290	273	352	5.4	29	2.8
Turkey	453	381	380	385	360	331	-13	-8.1	2.6
Paraguay	553	393	217	332	411	322	-18	-22	2.6
Other	7 440	7 288	7 462	8 062	7 044	7 421	1.8	5.4	59
Total Air	12 792	11 816	11 881	12 725	11 992	12 552	6.2	4.7	100
Sea Border									
Albania	45	49	61	282	1 240	998	1 937	-20	39
Russia	80	75	635	624	388	650	767	68	26
Morocco	77	60	116	76	65	96	60	48	3.8
Philippines	94	196	93	206	170	86	-56	-49	3.4
Turkey	49	50	143	61	30	61	22	103	2.4
Not specified	10	16	38	18	26	61	281	135	2.4
Ukraine	20	74	58	42	18	53	-28	194	2.1
Pakistan	18	13	12	11	15	40	208	167	1.6
India	64	63	77	23	11	39	-38	255	1.5
Syria	11	10	22	12	7	34	240	386	1.3
Other	319	489	489	391	287	424	-13	48	17
Total Sea	787	1 095	1 744	1 746	2 257	2 542	132	13	100

Table A5 :

REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Reasons for refusal of entry reported by top ten nationalities

	2011 Q2										Refused persons Total
	A No valid doc	B False doc	C No valid visa	D False visa	E No justification	F Over 3 mo. stay	G No subsistence	H Alert issued	I Threat	Not available	
Top Ten Nationalities											
Albania	40	6	74	2	677	28	835	3 177	36	101	4 918
Ukraine	29	32	1 109	19	1 798	196	277	289	15	66	3 824
Russia	463	5	1 436	69	169	21	217	92	51	32	2 469
Serbia	35	15	260	11	132	287	346	569	29	20	1 685
Belarus	49	0	615	2	115	7	582	68	62	3	1 501
Brazil	3	5	154	1	514	22	93	134	13	299	1 238
Morocco	505	31	94	26	100	4	39	274	60	10	1 128
Croatia	286	2	11	0	20	284	50	158	233	30	1 072
fYROM	8	2	45	4	195	155	124	281	19	7	826
Turkey	54	19	430	8	120	8	34	48	20	41	766
Others	716	577	2 958	267	2 878	245	612	531	171	2 687	11 190
Total	2 188	694	7 186	409	6 718	1 257	3 209	5 621	709	3 296	30 617

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry

- (A) has no valid travel document(s);
- (B) has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- (C) has no valid visa or residence permit;
- (D) has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- (E) has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- (F) has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- (G) does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- (H) is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- (I) is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

Table A6 :

REASONS FOR REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reason for refusal

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	per cent prev. Qtr	per cent of total
All Borders									
C) No valid visa	6 031	6 809	9 875	8 538	5 926	7 186	5.5	21	23
E) No justification	6 824	6 747	6 233	6 276	6 125	6 718	-0.4	10	21
H) Alert issued	3 524	2 804	2 816	3 490	6 456	5 621	100	-13	18
G) No subsistence	1 855	2 178	2 235	2 314	2 681	3 209	47	20	10
A) No valid doc	1 085	1 135	1 257	1 289	1 542	2 188	93	42	7.0
F) Over 3 mo. stay	2 012	1 035	1 295	1 247	1 568	1 257	21	-20	4.0
I) Threat	565	622	649	725	709	709	14	0.0	2.3
B) False doc	657	774	757	720	694	694	-10	0.0	2.2
D) False visa	398	463	395	459	490	409	-12	-17	1.3
Reason not available	3 997	3 594	3 708	3 499	3 183	3 296	-8.3	3.6	11
EU Total	26 948	26 161	29 220	28 557	29 374	31 287	20	6.5	100
Land Border									
C) No valid visa	3 596	4 349	6 405	5 333	3 443	4 390	0.9	28	28
E) No justification	3 071	3 167	2 912	2 468	2 327	2 439	-23	4.8	16
H) Alert issued	2 531	1 994	2 024	2 358	4 317	3 920	97	-9.2	25
G) No subsistence	1 153	1 299	1 474	1 378	1 752	2 093	61	19	13
A) No valid doc	440	439	476	392	688	1 039	137	51	6.6
F) Over 3 mo. stay	1 743	795	1 076	1 019	1 252	1 064	34	-15	6.8
I) Threat	435	466	422	429	521	540	16	3.6	3.5
B) False doc	90	146	125	59	104	60	-59	-42	0.4
D) False visa	112	93	102	103	104	81	-13	-22	0.5
Reason not available	2	1	0	0	1	0	n.a.	n.a.	0
Total Land	13 173	12 749	15 016	13 539	14 509	15 626	23	7.7	100
Air Border									
C) No valid visa	2 163	1 990	2 368	2 330	2 090	2 304	16	10	18
E) No justification	3 727	3 550	3 286	3 787	3 689	4 074	15	10	31
H) Alert issued	824	675	667	807	999	875	30	-12	6.7
G) No subsistence	688	870	745	887	814	981	13	21	7.5
A) No valid doc	506	514	571	584	498	536	4.3	7.6	4.1
F) Over 3 mo. stay	266	227	203	221	311	181	-20	-42	1.4
I) Threat	123	150	223	294	186	160	6.7	-14	1.2
B) False doc	553	603	593	624	573	589	-2.3	2.8	4.5
D) False visa	276	364	279	347	367	253	-30	-31	1.9
Reason not available	3 857	3 372	3 513	3 385	3 071	3 152	-6.5	2.6	24
Total Air	12 983	12 315	12 448	13 266	12 598	13 105	6.4	4.0	100
Sea Border									
H) Alert issued	169	135	125	325	1 140	826	512	-28	32
A) No valid doc	139	182	210	313	356	613	237	72	24
C) No valid visa	272	470	1 102	875	393	492	4.7	25	19
E) No justification	26	30	35	21	109	205	583	88	8.0
G) No subsistence	14	9	16	49	115	135	1 400	17	5.3
D) False visa	10	6	14	9	19	75	1 150	295	2.9
B) False doc	14	25	39	37	17	45	80	165	1.8
F) Over 3 mo. stay	3	13	16	7	5	12	-7.7	140	0.5
I) Threat	7	6	4	2	2	9	50	350	0.4
Reason not available	138	221	195	114	111	144	-35	30	5.6
Total Sea	792	1 097	1 756	1 752	2 267	2 556	133	13	100

Table A7 :

PERSONS USING FALSE TRAVEL-DOCUMENTS

Detections on entry at the external borders by border type, top ten nationalities of persons and country of issuance of documents

	2010				2011		2011 Q2		
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Border Type									
Air	1 549	1 731	1 699	2 067	1 714	1 732	0.1	1.1	78
Land	440	483	479	331	365	372	-23	1.9	17
Sea	128	98	196	238	92	130	33	41	5.8
Top Ten Nationalities of Persons									
Not specified	179	305	330	351	276	345	13	25	15
Ukraine	222	241	316	214	221	209	-13	-5.4	9.4
Albania	70	43	57	62	112	146	240	30	6.5
Morocco	126	99	169	225	110	121	22	10	5.4
Nigeria	130	102	113	127	109	90	-12	-17	4.0
Congo (DR)	31	49	38	38	47	71	45	51	3.2
China	81	117	54	69	57	65	-44	14	2.9
Iran	94	101	99	110	116	60	-41	-48	2.7
Afghanistan	27	58	65	61	48	55	-5.2	15	2.5
Serbia	49	17	39	47	62	53	212	-15	2.4
Other	1 108	1 180	1 094	1 332	1 013	1 019	-14	0.6	46
Top Ten Countries of Issuance of Documents									
Not specified	558	584	535	746	446	544	-6.8	22	24
Italy	99	110	109	157	170	186	69	9.4	8.3
Poland	158	184	179	165	147	156	-15	6.1	7.0
France	120	150	189	131	129	123	-18	-4.7	5.5
Greece	70	92	104	148	73	94	2.2	29	4.2
Spain	41	48	45	42	55	67	40	22	3.0
United Kingdom	38	50	40	48	51	65	30	27	2.9
Germany	70	75	81	124	76	61	-19	-20	2.7
Belgium	49	46	55	53	32	59	28	84	2.6
Bulgaria	33	17	22	34	35	46	171	31	2.1
Other	881	956	1 015	988	957	833	-13	-13	37
Total	2 117	2 312	2 374	2 636	2 171	2 234	-3.4	2.9	100

Notes on Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the Cypriot authorities. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the United Kingdom, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.





FRONTEX

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