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Executive summary

Notwithstanding some expected decreases associated with inclement weather conditions, at the EU level, illegal-migration pressure remained constant between the third and fourth quarters of 2010.

The peak in detections of illegal border-crossing reported throughout the second half of 2010 was almost exclusively due to increased pressure at the land border between Greece and Turkey.

Such a concentrated peak of illegal migration inevitably had measurable consequences elsewhere in the EU. For example, there was a continued peak in the number of asylum applications submitted by nationals of Serbia and the fYROM (and, to a lesser extent, also Montenegro) who had legitimately crossed the border into the EU following visa liberalisation for these nationals in early 2010.

Also, there was a large increase in the number of detections of false-document users. Although not formally captured quantitatively, there was also a clear trend towards the abuse of legal channels to enter the EU, such as bogus marriages and fraudulently obtained documents, particularly visas.

1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of illegal migration at the EU external borders based on the illegal migration data provided by Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).

This, the eleventh issue of the FRAN Quarterly, is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between July and September 2010, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variation in six illegal-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information.

The monthly data is collected for the following seven main indicators: (1A) detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs; (1B) detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs; (2) detections of suspected facilitators; (3) detections of illegal stay; (4) refusals of entry; (5) asylum applications, and (6) detections of false documents.

A distinction was made between (i) EU external borders – borders between Member States with the rest of the world (including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland), and (ii) Schengen land borders within the EU.

The latter concerns only a small number of borders between Member States of which some are not part of the Schengen area. Such Schengen borders within the EU exist for example between Belgium/France and the UK (Eurostar train stations), as well as between Bulgaria/Romania and other Member States. This distinction is possible and necessary as data is in principle (only) collected at Schengen borders. However, the distinction was not possible for the air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but sum data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established in time.

2. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1:
SUMMARY OF FRAN INDICATORS


As rep	orted by Member States										
		2	009		2	2010		2010 Q4			
FR	AN Indicator	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	% cha year ago	nge on prev. Qtr		
									p. 0 1 . q.		
1A	Illegal entries between BCPs	29 793	21 998	14 857	26 878	34 785	27 529	25	-21		
1B	Illegal entries at BCPs	71	53	23	24	130	65	23	-50		
2	Facilitators	2 362	2 177	2 470	2 282	2 159	1 718	-21	-20		
3	Illegal stay	104 511	93 969	86 357	87 939	88 079	86 291	-8.2	-2.0		
4	Refusals of entry	34 365	26 162	26 505	25 583	28 505	27 907	6.7	-2.1		
5	Applications for asylum	57 031	54 889	47 504	43 112	55 310	57 954	5.6	4.8		
6	False travel-document users	1 969	1 893	2 117	2 312	2 374	2 636	39	11		

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Figure 1: Evolution of six FRAN indicators. Lines in red illustrate relationships between Q3 and Q4 in each available year.

Evolution of FRAN Indicators

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons



Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

3. Main trends Q4 2010

Notwithstanding some expected seasonal reductions, the peak in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU external land border was sustained throughout Q4 2010.

The Greek land border with Turkey remains the hotspot for illegal border-crossing into the EU.

Afghans remained the nationality most commonly detected illegally crossing the external border of the EU.

To circumvent Frontex operational activities in Greece, more irregular migrants attempted entry to the EU from Turkey, either by air to western Europe or by boat to southern Italy.

The proportion of detected facilitators of unknown nationality increased in Q4 2010, which may indicate the presence of organised-crime groups unfamiliar to frontline staff.

The previously-reported surge in asylum applications submitted by nationals of Serbia, the fYROM and Kosovo mostly persisted in Q4 2010.

There were widespread increases in the number of detections of false-document users.

There is a noticeable trend towards the use of fraudulent means to enter the EU, such as bogus marriages and fraudulently obtained documents, particularly visas.

3.1 Detections of illegal border-crossing

At the EU level there were 27 500 detections of illegal border-crossing during Q4 2010, which is a reduction of around a fifth compared to the previous quarter (Figure 2). Most of this decrease is likely due to seasonal variation, associated with less favourable weather conditions at this time of year. Nevertheless, there were 5 000 more detections than during the same period in 2009 (an increase of 25%).

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossings between Border Crossing Points (BCPs), split between detections at the land and sea borders of the EU for each quarter since the beginning of 2008. The 20% decrease in the number of detections between the previous and the present quarters is comprised of a 45% decrease at the sea borders and a 17% decrease at the land borders. Nevertheless, in Q4 2010, there were nearly 25 000 detections of illegal border-crossing at the external land border of the EU, which constituted 90% of all the detections at the EU level, and the highest proportion of detections at the land border (compared to the sea border) since data collection began in early 2008.

60 000 Land Sea 50 000 Detections 40 000 30000 20000 10000 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 **Q4** Q1 Q2 Q3 **Q4** Q1 Q3 Ω2

2009

2010

Figure 2: Total quarterly detections between BCPs, split between detections at land (grey) and sea (blue) borders

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

2008

In Q4 2010, 90% detections of illegal border-crossing were made at the external land (as opposed to the sea) border of the EU, the highest percentage since FRAN data collection began. Of detections at the EU land border, 65% were detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, mostly at a single 12.5 km border section near the Greek city of Orestiada.

There were 5 000 more detections of illegal border-crossings in Q4 2010 than in Q4 2009, which represented an increase of around 25% (Figure 3). Data suggest that this rise was exclusively due to Greece, where there was a 35% increase in detections on a year earlier: in Q4 2010, 6 000 more detections were reported than in Q4 2009 (Figure 4).

6 000 50 42 Q4 2010 - Q4 2009 40 5 000 -% difference 30 4 000 20 Detections 10 3 000 0 2 000 -10 -20 1 000 -30 0 -40 GRC ΕU **BGR** ROU ESP ITA SVN SVK CYP HUN Level

Figure 3: Differences in the number (bars, left-hand axis) and percentage (dashed line and labels, right-hand axis) of detections of illegal border-crossing between Q4 2009 and Q4 2010 for nine Member States.

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

In total 97 different nationalities were detected illegally crossing the external border of the EU (88 at the land and 69 at sea border). However, citizens of Afghanistan and Albania were the most commonly detected nationalities, each with some 23% of the total. Following sharp increases in Q3 2010, which continued into Q4 2010, Algerians represented 10% of the total. Similarly, the proportion of Pakistanis rose markedly in Q4 2010 reaching 9% of the total. The vast majority of detections of these three nationalities were reported from the Greek land border, with some (10%) Algerians also being detected illegally crossing the Spanish blue border.

Routes

Consistent with seasonal variation in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing observed in previous years, all major irregular-immigration routes decreased in the number of detections between Q3 and Q4 2010. As illustrated in Figure 5, in that period the number of migrants illegally crossing the border between Greece and Albania followed a pattern roughly consistent with previous years, although detections in Q4 2010 actually declined by around a quarter compared to the same period in 2009. In Q4 2010 detections on both the central and western Mediterranean routes decreased compared to Q3 2010 and remain relatively low compared to other routes.

21 000 Eastern Mediteranean Route 18 000 Circular migration from Albania to Greece 15 000 12 000 9 000 6 0 0 0 Others 3 000 Central Mediteranean Route 0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 2008 2009 2010

Figure 4: The number of detections between BCPs, by major migration route

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Without question, in Q4 2010 the most important irregular-immigration route in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing was the eastern Mediterranean route, where detections increased in the end of 2010 far in excess of what might be explained by seasonal variation (Figure 4). Of these 16 700 detections, some were at the Bulgarian border with Turkey (188), and some were in Cyprus (332), but the overwhelming majority (16 000) were made along the Greek land border with Turkey, the unquestionable hot spot for illegal border-crossings into the EU, accounting for nearly 60% of all detections.

Eastern Mediterranean route

Of the 27 500 detected illegal border-crossings at the EU level in Q4 2010, Greece reported over 23 000, of which 6 000 were detections of circular migrants from Albania. These figures are indicative of a decrease of 20% compared to the previous quarter, but are roughly consistent with the seasonal variation regularly observed at this time of year (Figure 4).




Figure 5: Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land and sea borders

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Currently the most important single entry point to the EU is along the Greek border with Turkey. Here, detections of migrants, who invariably are intent on secondary movements to, and settlement in other Member States, fell by 10% to 16 000 between Q3 and Q4 2010, but still represent one of the largest single influxes of illegal immigration into the EU ever recorded.

Around three quarters of the detections along the Greek land border with Turkey were from a single 12.5 km stretch near the Greek city of Orestiada. Throughout 2010 there was both a demonstrable shift in illegal border-crossing to the land border with Turkey from the maritime border, where formerly most detections of illegal border-crossing had occurred (Figure 5), and an increase in the number of migrants of many different nationalities using Turkey as an entry point to illegally enter the EU.

At the Greek land border with Turkey, there was a 12% decline or 2 000 fewer detections of illegal border-crossing between Q3 and Q4 2010. Responsible for this decline was a massive 45% reduction in detections of Afghan nationals (4 200 fewer) and a 30% reduction in the number of detected Algerians (1 000) (Figure 6). However, these large declines were offset by at least three-fold increases in detections of nationals from Palestine and Morocco (Figure 6) and also Pakistan and Bangladesh, which together accounted for an extra 3 000 detections between Q3 and Q4 2010.

Pakistan 💳 Morocco — Palestine = • Afghanistan (right-hand axis) 4000 11 500 3 4 0 0 9 500 2800 7 500 2200 5 500 1600 3 500 1000 1 500 400 n Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Figure 6: Detections of illegal border-crossings for various nationalities at the Greek land border with Turkey during 2010

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Recent FRAN Quarterlies reported increases in the number of North African migrants detected illegally crossing the border between Greece and Turkey. For example, in the previous quarter we reported an eight-fold increase between Q2 and Q3 2010 in the number of nationals from Algeria between Greek land BCPs. Despite a 30% decrease in the number of detected Algerians between Q3 and Q4 2010 (Figure 6), these nationals were still the second most frequently detected nationality, and are now increasingly detected alongside nationals from Morocco. Migrants from these countries are thought to be using cheap flights from North Africa to Istanbul to then join flows of other migrants from Asia in crossing the land border into Greece. This route may be very indirect, yet it is thought to be the result of a displacement effect from the West African and western Mediterranean routes.

Central Mediterranean route

In Q4 2010, there were 1 534 detections of illegal border-crossing along the central Mediterranean route. This is a seasonal decrease of about 25% compared to the previous quarter, but is roughly consistent with same period last year. However, the number of irregular migrants from Turkey detected on the coasts of Calabria and Puglia remained constant, despite worsening travelling conditions. This may nevertheless be indicative of increasing pressure.

Despite the worse winter weather conditions, detections of Egyptians landing on the sea borders of southern Italy and Sicily actually increased from 40 to 160 between Q3 and Q4 2010 suggesting that the pressure from Egypt increased more than the figures would suggest.

Western Mediterranean route

In Q4 2010 there were 1 300 detections of illegal border-crossing on this route, which is a 40% decrease compared to the previous quarter, and a 17% decrease compared to Q4 2009. In the last FRAN Quarterly (Q3 2010) we reported some minor increases on this route. However, following recent decreases it is now apparent that this was probably associated with better weather conditions during the summer. The decrease was spread roughly evenly over a wide range of nationalities, with the exception of Ghanaians, who nearly doubled in number between quarters (from 48 to 86). Thus, Algerians still represented the largest share of detections (35%), now followed by Ghanaians with 6% of the share and another 30 mostly African nationalities detected in smaller numbers.

In the longer-term, irregular immigration to southern Spain has been consistently decreasing since the beginning of 2006. Commonly cited reasons are Frontex Joint Operations in the area, effective bilateral agreements and, more recently, rising unemployment in Spain, particularly in sectors typified by migrants.* Nationalities traditionally associated with this route were Algerian, Moroccan and Ghanaian.

Western African route

The cooperation and bilateral agreements between Spain and the rest of the West African countries (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali) are developing steadily, and are one of the main reasons for the decrease in arrivals, as is the presence of patrols near the African coast.

However, in Q4 2010 there was an increase in the number of detections of illegal border-crossing at the Canary Islands, from a maximum of 50 during the previous four quarters, to 113 in Q4 2010. This increase was exclusively due to Moroccan nationals (111).

^{*} MPI migration and immigrants two years after the collapse: Where do we stand? 2010

Eastern land borders

In Q4 2010 there were 215 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which represents a decrease on the previous quarter, yet remains consistent with a stable trend, with some seasonal declines at this time of year assumed to be associated with inclement weather conditions.

Western Balkans

On the Western Balkan route, the long-term decrease generally continued in Q4 2010. Specifically, there were 600 detections of illegal border-crossing from the

Western Balkan region. This figure is an increase of 20% compared to the previous quarter, but a decrease of a third compared to a year before, i.e. Q4 2009.

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greece -Albania border decreased by some 26% compared to Q4 2009. Nevertheless, this border section still amounts to 79% of total quarterly detections in the Western Balkans. Thus, circular illegal migration to Greece by Albanian nationals, regardless of a 30% decrease in detections, remained by and large the most detected nationality in the region. Importantly, illegal bordercrossings at the Greece-Albania border started a further period of decline after the introduction of visa-free travel for holders of Albanian biometric passports on 15 December 2010. Overall, detections of Western Balkan nationals (including those from the territory of Kosovo) have continued to decrease, a clear consequence of visa liberalisation.

Figure 7: New biometric passports of Albania



Specifically, in Q4 2010 detections of Afghans at the Hungary-Serbia border (both sides) declined by 76% compared to Q4 2009. Moreover, this border section no longer reported the highest number of detections of transiting Afghan irregular migrants in the Western Balkans; being surpassed by the Croatia-Serbia border, where detections increased from just 9 in Q4 2009 to 106 in Q4 2010. Very similar increases were also reported from Slovenia-Croatia border (Table 2). Despite this spatial variation, total detections of Afghans on the Western Balkan route remained very stable in 2010.

Table 2:
DETECTIONS OF AFGHAN NATIONALS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Quarterly detections by border sections (both sides of the border)

		2010						
Border Section	Q3	Q4	Q2	Q3				
Croatia - Serbia	0	35	90	106				
Hungary - Serbia	321	190	62	101				
Slovenia - Croatia	12	10	39	51				

Source: FRAN and WB-RAN, as of 7 February 2011

Clandestine entry (1B)

In Q4 2010 there were more detections of illegal entry attempted at BCPs than in any other quarter since data collection began (702). This figure represents a 20% increase since the previous quarter and is nearly double that of Q4 2009 and of most other quarters in 2009 and 2010.

Restricting indicator 1B to the external border of the EU, and also to those detections that are confirmed clandestine entry, results in extremely low detections in Q4 2010 (125). This figure has varied little over the past year, following some decline during the first half of 2009.

3.2 Detections of facilitators

In Q4 2010 there were 1 718 detections of facilitators – a 20% reduction compared to both Q3 2010 and a year before, i.e. Q4 2009. This represents the lowest number of detections since data collection began in Q1 2008. Most of the reduction, which amounts to around 500 detections, was due to fewer detections made in the Member States that traditionally report the highest numbers of facilitators.

It is typical for detections made at the external land border of the EU to involve predominantly domestic facilitators and those of neighbouring third countries, which reflects the fact that the local knowledge is typically required to provide facilitation services.

In the EU as a whole, there were fewer detections of facilitators across a wide range of nationalities. However, despite the overall decrease in detections, there was a 70% increase in detections of facilitators of unknown nationality compared to a year ago. This may be the effect of nationalities unfamiliar to front-line staff, which could be explained either by new organised crime groups appearing, or by established groups operating in new areas.

3.3 Detections of illegal stay

In Q4 2010 there were just over 85 000 detections of illegal stay in the EU. This figure remained fairly stable throughout 2010, but is about 10% lower than detections reported a year before, i.e. in Q4 2009. There was little change in the composition of Member States that reported the highest number of detections.

Increased detections of illegal stayers were also reported by Bulgaria (1 355), nearly doubling from a year ago in Q4 2009 (700 detections). Most of this increase was due to a seven-fold rise in the number of Iraqi nationals detected illegally staying in Bulgaria to 275 in Q4 2010, which was related to a concurrent increase in Iraqis detected crossing the land border from Turkey into Bulgaria.

3.4 Refusals of entry

In Q4 2010 there were 28 000 refusals of entry from the external borders of the EU, half of which were reported at the land border, mostly from Poland, which refused more third-country nationals than any other Member State (6 160 or 25% of the total). Most of the migrants refused entry at the Polish land border came from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia or Georgia.

The second greatest number of refusals of entry at the EU **external** land border in Q4 2010 were issued in Hungary (2 052), where nationals from Serbia, Croatia and the fYROM, were among the most commonly refused. Neighbouring Slovenia refused similar nationalities as Hungary but in smaller numbers (1 700), with the exception of nationals from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were refused in higher numbers by Slovenia (202) than Hungary (32).

At the EU level, refusals of Serbian nationals increased by 60% compared to a year before, but refusals of Albanians increased nearly six-fold compared the previous quarter, mostly due to higher refusals at the Greek land border with Albania, but also at the Italian sea and air borders.

Another massive increase in refusals occurred at the sea borders of Estonia, where the number of Russian nationals refused grew from being negligible in 2009 to 600 or so in both Q3 and Q4 2010. However, this phenomenon is related to Russian seamen being denied temporary shore access because of a lack of sufficient documentation.


The other half of refusals were issued at the air borders, where primarily the United Kingdom, France and Spain refused entry to the third-country nationals across a similar yet very wide range of nationalities, which has varied little over past quarters.

3.5 Asylum claims

In Q4 2010 there were 58 000 applications for asylum, which is a 5% increase compared to both the previous quarter and the same quarter of the previous year. Although this may suggest that the trend has been stable for the past year, there has been considerable variation in two specific ways:

- applications plummeted to around 43 000 in Q2 2010 (Figure 1), though this large drop was short-lived; and
- the composition of the top nationalities has changed considerably.

Figure 8: Asylum applications submitted among EU Member States and SAC in Q4 2010. Figures indicate changes compared to Q3 2010.



Compared to a year before, there was a substantial and sustained increase in the number of asylum applications submitted by nationals of Serbia and the fYROM. For example, in Q4 2010 there were 8 300 applications from Serbians, up 50% compared to Q3 2010, and a four-fold increase compared to a year earlier, while applications submitted by nationals of the fYROM increased 15-fold between Q4 2009 and Q4 2010. According to the Italian bi-monthly report, these migrants are predominately of Roma and Albanian ethnicity and originate from southern Serbia. As noted in the previous FRAN Quarterly, these increases are associated with visa liberalisation for travel to the EU which was granted for these nationalities early in 2010.

Of note, similar visa-free travel was granted to nationals from Albania and Bosnia in December 2010 and a similar surge of applications from these nationalities may be expected in early- to mid-2011.

According to the Lithuanian bi-monthly report and confirmed by the FRAN data, there was a three-fold increase in the number of Georgian migrants (150) entering Lithuania from Belarus and applying for asylum at land BCPs. In this case, Belarus is considered by local authorities to be the nexus point for Georgian nationals attempting to enter Lithuania in order to apply for asylum.

3.6 Forged documents

In Q4 2010 more migrants were detected using false documents (2 600) than at any time since data collection began in early 2009. Most detections were at the air border, but in comparison to Q3 2009, detections increased at land and sea borders as well. Of the countries that detect false-document users in significant numbers, the biggest increases were reported by Spain (up 400%), Portugal (up 170%) and Poland (up 83%). While the increase in detections is clearly widespread at this time, overall, the number of detections is still miniscule compared to the total flow of regular passengers, and taking into consideration the number of entry points to the EU.

According to the German bi-monthly report, there was a significant proportion of false document users among the passengers from several airports in Turkey to all of the major airports in Germany. The most commonly detected nationalities of false-document users were Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, Afghan and Syrian. Approximately one-third of these detections involved false EU travel documents or documents issued by the Turkish Republic. The remaining cases of document fraud were classified as follows:

- general visa abuse by African nationals (Nigerians, Somalis);
- business visas fraudulently obtained by Russian nationals;
- student visas fraudulently obtained by Chinese nationals;
- Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian nationals using swapped identity documents and boarding passes before departing on flights from Hatay airport (HAT) to Germany.

As reported in the section on secondary movements, document fraud is increasingly important for movement between discontinuous sections of the Schengen area. For example, in November 2010 14 irregular migrants were apprehended with counterfeit travel documents at Schiphol airport travelling on flights from Athens. Most were nationals of Afghanistan using false German or Bulgarian ID cards. Consistent with these detections, according to the Italian bimonthly report, boarding refusal in Athens by foreign nationals claiming to be Italian with clearly altered or counterfeit ID cards have become very frequent. This flow mainly involved flights to Rome, to Rome via Madrid and to Naples via various connections in Europe. On one occasion around 15 clearly falsified identity cards were detected on a single passenger refused boarding.

False-document detections Q4 2010 -67% % change Q4 2009 < 53 53 - 192 193 - 267 +100% 268 - 677 -41% +83% +26% -48% -100% +25% +9,5% -60% 44% -6% +37% -24% +390% +170% -62% FRONTEX Sources: FRAN data, Frontex Risk Analysis Unit

Figure 9: Detections of false-document users among EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries in Q4 2010 (red shade). Figures indicate changes compared to Q4 2009..

Legal channels

Increasingly legal channels are being abused to enter and remain in the EU.

For example, there was a large increase in the number of visa applications in Belgium made by Cameroon students. According to the Belgian bi-monthly report, a large number of them drop out of school within a year and apply for a regularisation for medical reasons, because they get a treatment for AIDS in Belgium. Also on the increase is the abuse of short-stay visas (family visit), whereby individuals, increasingly Moroccans, soon after arrival in Belgium, apply for a family reunification for relatives remaining in the country of origin.

According to the Czech bi-monthly reports, a group of six Moldovan migrants attempted to abuse short-term visas while presenting an invitation to compete in an orienteering championship in the Czech Republic in November 2010. The group presented all documents needed for the visa application including confirmation from a Moldovan company about sponsorship of the sportsmen. However, upon enquiry it was discovered that participation in the contest was a pretext for illegal migration to Italy or Portugal. Apparently facilitators charged a price of EUR 2 000 per person for arranging the Schengen visa.

In November 2010, the Czech Immigration Police Officer in Cairo, Egypt, conducted a survey to establish the extent to which applicants for short-term visas actually travelled to the Czech Republic according to the flights declared while applying for the visas. Results suggest that some 87% of persons did not use the declared flights, which provides some evidence of the scale of visa abuse in this context.

Increasingly authentic visas are being obtained fraudulently. For example, Germany reports this *modus operandi* being used extensively by nationals from Ukraine, Nigeria, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey and Libya. The perpetrators most commonly used visas issued by the German, French, Polish, Estonian, Greek and Hungarian embassies in their origin countries. However, according to the German bi-monthly report, the most common fraudulently obtained visas were applied for at the German embassy in Kiev (Ukraine) (which is consistent with detections of fraudulently obtained visas by the Polish authorities) followed by the German embassies in Lagos (Nigeria), Baghdad and Erbil (Iraq) as well as in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). Consistent with these reports from Germany, the Dutch authorities confirm that Ukrainian nationals applying for Schengen visas often submit false documentation to hide their real economic circumstances, and the UK authorities are still encountering Ukrainian nationals attempting to breach the juxtaposed controls using forged documentation.

Also in the period under review, cases concerning aiding and bettering illegal stayers in false paternity claims and bogus marriages were investigated in the Czech Republic, mainly involving nationals from Vietnam and Nigeria.

In October 2010, the French Border Police at Charles de Gaulle airport arrested a group of seven Angolan singers arriving from Luanda airport Angola, who claimed they had a live performance in Paris. Each member of the group possessed a genuine Schengen visa issued by the French Embassy in Luanda, but in actual fact the hotel booking had been cancelled and the migrants could neither produce return tickets or sufficient funds for their stay. There were similarities between this modus operandi and a band of 23 bogus musicians detected in May 2010, with a similar profile and booked by the same French producers.

In November 2010, Latvia detected an increased number of persons fraudulently obtaining Schengen (Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Polish) visas with false supporting documentation. By conducting interviews at BCPs, some 35 third-country nationals (17 Kazakhstanis, 6 Russians, 6 Uzbekistanis, 4 Iraqis, 1 Georgian and 1 Belarusian) were detected because their entry situation did not comply with the actual purpose of the visa; their Schengen visas were revoked. This represents the largest ever number of visas revoked in Latvia in a single month. Such reports go a long way to confirming that abuse of legal channels to enter the EU is probably on the increase. In Latvia this *modus operandi* for entry to the Schengen area was most often used by citizens of Central Asian States; nationals of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stated Sweden as their destination country.

Spain reported a growing number of nationals from Guinea and Senegal, entering the Schengen area with fraudulently obtained Schengen visas, allegedly issued by a French Consulate. They arrived at the Gran Canaria international airport on a Mauritanian Airlines flight from the airport of Nouakchott (Mauritania) but headed to France as their final destination.

Relevant to entering the EU via legal channels were detections made during the Spanish Operation Vilnius, which was operational between November and December 2010. According to the Spanish reports, a huge number of travel agencies were detected in Ukraine offering travel towards a range of countries within the Schengen area (mainly Italy, Spain and Portugal). Most of these companies have a legal basis, but are known to facilitate illegal immigration of Ukrainian nationals to the EU. For the most part, these agencies obtain Schengen visas for their clients from third-country consulates, such as the Polish Consulate in Lvov (Ukraine). The visas are usually issued for a short-term touristic stay, but are fraudulently obtained because the actual reason for travel is to reach other Member States and then to pose as EU citizens (Lithuanian nationals). Once in Spain the same criminal networks then offer to legalise illegal migrants with false Lithuanian documentation. The networks have personnel and equipment in Ukraine and Poland and, to a lesser extent, in Hungary (for harbouring and transportation within the EU) and also in the destination countries (for producing counterfeit identity documentation and accompanying clients to different institutions for legalising procedures).

The specific route and *modus operandi* can be summarised as follows:

- clients are first taken to Lvov (Ukraine) for visa application;
- from Lvov they take a train to Krakow (Poland);
- in Krakow migrants are picked up by van drivers for intra-EU travel;
- vans are swapped in Hungary for travel to Spain, Italy or Portugal.

By the end of the operation, some 12 members of one criminal group (all Ukrainians) were arrested in Spain (Andalucía region: Seville and Malaga), where four of them were involved in falsifying Lithuanian documentation.

4. Statistical annex

Legend: Symbols and abbreviations **n.a**. not applicable

data not available

Source: FRAN data received as of 25 February 2011

Table A1: ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

	20	009		20	010	2010 Q4			
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Total									
Afghanistan	4,875	2,542	1,686	7,061	10,916	6,255	146	-43	23
Albania	12,101	8,391	5,593	12,286	9,183	6,196	-26	-33	23
Algeria	1,228	1,521	805	489	4,419	3,050	101	-31	11
Pakistan	480	477	272	345	840	2,424	408	189	8.8
Palestine	2,412	3,068	1,485	892	581	1,318	-57	127	4.8
Morocco	332	241	291	155	434	1,079	348	149	3.9
Iraq	1,416	733	670	687	1,357	914	25	-33	3.3
Somalia	1,772	1,700	965	1,659	1,222	773	-55	-37	2.8
Bangladesh	104	62	142	209	593	703	1034	19	2.6
Egypt	68	113	136	43	300	437	287	46	1.6
Others	5,005	3,150	2,812	3,052	4,940	4,380	39	-11	16
Total	29,793	21,998	14,857	26,878	34,785	27,529	25	-21	100
Land Border									
Albania	11,859	8,225	5,390	11,995	9,074	6,133	-25	-32	25
Afghanistan	656	615	1,345	6,434	9,576	5,489	793	-43	22
Algeria	135	258	552	94	3,651	2,664	933	-27	11
Pakistan	421	447	224	288	779	2,384	433	206	9.6
Palestine	836	801	505	529	440	1,187	48	170	4.8
Morocco	23	12	225	67	161	866	7117	438	3.5
Iraq	1,166	658	640	636	1,167	802	22	-31	3.2
Somalia	59	86	585	1,598	1,160	759	783	-35	3.1
Bangladesh	92	38	116	133	563	694	1726	23	2.8
Not specified	104	194	156	189	545	414	113	-24	1.7
Others	2,112	1,367	1,752	1,850	2,607	3,373	147	29	14.0
Total Land	17,463	12,701	11,490	23,813	29,723	24,765	95	-17	100
Can Daviday	,	,	,	,	·				
Sea Border	4.040	4.007	0.44	007	4.040	=00	00	40	0.0
Afghanistan	4,219	1,927	341	627	1,340	766	-60	-43	28
Algeria	1,093	1,263	253	395	768	386	-69	-50	14
Egypt	65	110	116	33	272	292	165	7.4	11.0
Morocco	309	229	66	88	273	213	-7.0	-22	7.7
Palestine	1,576	2,267	980	363	141	131	-94	-7.1	4.7
Iraq	250	75	30	51	190	112	49	-41	4.1
Iran	82	87	40	60	110	112	29	1.8	4.1
Ghana	40	21	10	61	50	86	310	72	3.1
Tunisia	166	115	34	191	416	70	-39	-83	2.5
Albania	242	166	203	291	109	63	-62	-42	2.3
Others	4,288	3,037	1,294	905	1,393	533	-82	-62	19
Total Sea	12,330	9,297	3,367	3,065	5,062	2,764	-70	-45	100

Table A2 : CLANDESTINE ENTRIES AT BCPs

Others

Total

Grand Total

Detections by border type and top ten nationalities at the external borders 2010 Q4 % change on per cent Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 year ago prev. Qtr of total **Border Type** Land -71 Sea 6.7 **Top Ten Nationalities** Algeria Philippines n.a. n.a. 9.2 Afghanistan -50 n.a. 7.7 Turkey -38 -94 Albania 7.7 Russia 4.6 n.a. n.a. 3.1 Morocco -50 Viet Nam 3.1 n.a. n.a. Croatia 3.1

-63

-70

-50

-50

Table A3: FACILITATORS

Detections by top ten nationalities 2009 2010 2010 Q4 %change on per cent Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 of total year ago prev. Qtr **Top Ten Nationalities** 214 227 505 301 345 216 -4.8 -37 13 Italy Romania 75 88 90 126 68 40 7.3 68 94 Not specified 60 81 58 45 51 107 32 110 6.2 121 China 132 183 167 113 91 -31 -19 5.3 Morocco -4.6 -15 48 115 87 134 98 98 83 France 93 73 92 127 66 80 9.6 21 4.7 Albania 180 146 135 139 87 69 -53 -21 4.0 103 77 Spain 50 60 86 62 -40 -19 3.6 Slovenia 13 10 35 37 27 62 520 130 3.6 Pakistan 52 96 63 68 46 -52 -32 2.7 68 1,147 Others 1396 1,112 1,125 1,137 776 -32 -32 45 1,718 **Total** 2,362 2,177 2,470 2,282 2,159 -21 -20 100

ILLEGAL STAY

Detections by top ten nationalit	ies								
	20	009		20	010		2010	0 Q4	
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Morocco	5,439	6,010	5,828	5,855	4,924	5,524	-8.1	12	6.4
Afghanistan	10,472	7,100	5,201	5,271	5,557	5,075	-29	-8.7	5.9
Serbia	2,832	2,231	3,583	2,351	4,226	4,825	116	14	5.6
Albania	7,914	7,349	4,730	6,658	5,192	4,257	-42	-18	4.9
Algeria	2,199	3,375	3,605	3,484	3,482	3,633	7.6	4.3	4.2
Iraq	4,470	3,355	3,127	2,830	3,085	3,417	1.8	11	4.0
Brazil	5,283	4,939	2,490	4,258	3,329	3,292	-33	-1.1	3.8
China	2,936	2,680	3,015	2,871	2,461	2,619	-2.3	6.4	3
Pakistan	2,497	2,096	2,416	2,719	2,862	2,472	18	-14	2.9
Russia	3,069	2,629	2,147	2,056	2,859	2,370	-9.9	-17	2.7
Others	57,400	52,205	50,215	49,586	50,102	48,807	-6.5	-2.6	57
Total	104,511	93,969	86,357	87,939	88,079	86,291	-8.2	-2.0	100

APPLICATIONS FOR ASYLUM

Applications for international protection by top ten nationalities 2009 2010 2010 Q4 per cent % change on Q3 Q4 Q1 Q3 Q2 Q4 year ago prev. Qtr of total **Top Ten Nationalities** 8,396 Serbia 4,100 5,509 3,010 2,792 2,726 201 52 14 Afghanistan 7,153 6,790 5,616 4,303 5,684 5,949 -12 4.7 10 3,891 4,338 3,716 3,942 3,926 -9.5 -0.4 6.8 Iraq 3,453 2,757 3,571 Russia 4,354 4,519 2 920 3.811 -21 -6.3 62 Somalia 5,150 5,178 3,791 3,377 4,615 3,565 -31 -23 6.2 2,384 2,371 2,152 1,876 2,726 2,937 24 7.7 Iran 5.1 **FYROM** 1353 50 4.1 150 162 894 381 1,572 2,354 Pakistan 1,786 1,664 1,258 1,600 2,226 2,045 23 -8.1 3.5 2,446 2,228 1,437 1,726 2,069 1,665 -25 -20 2.9 Not specified 1,957 1,448 2,058 2.8 1.937 1.801 1.599 -18 -22 22,890 19,465 21,098 4.0 38 Others 24,770 19,819 21,947 -4.1 **Total** 57,031 43,112 54,889 47,504 55,310 57,954 5.6 4.8 100

Table A4:
REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Refusals at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities

	2	009		2	010		2010 Q4 %change on		nor cont
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		nge on prev. Qtr	per cen of total
Total									
Ukraine	5,578	4,662	5,034	4,643	5,136	3,930	-16	-23	14
Russia	2,480	2,073	1,569	1,732	3,166	2,698	30	-15	9.7
Serbia	1,144	1,089	1,838	1,509	1,877	1,766	62	-5.9	6.3
Belarus	1,112	1,287	1,188	1,430	1,451	1,593	24	9.8	5.7
Brazil	1,847	1,752	1,863	1,628	1,313	1,374	-22	4.6	4.9
Albania	598	275	277	252	508	1,287	368	153	4.6
Georgia	4,519	911	653	681	736	1,258	38	71	4.5
Croatia	1,183	1,134	1,151	1,163	1,055	936	-17	-11	3.4
FYROM	945	495	1,249	1,021	984	819	65	-17	2.9
Turkey	1,312	927	795	777	1,281	803	-13	-37	2.9
Others	13,647	11,557	10,888	10,747	10,998	11,443	-1.0	4.0	41
Total	34,365	26,162	26,505	25,583	28,505	27,907	6.7	-2.1	100
Land Border									
Ukraine	5,273	4,437	4,823	4,391	4,796	3,648	-18	-24	27
Russia	1,972	1,743	1,157	1,377	2,110	1,745	0.1	-17	13
Belarus	1,068	1,264	1,166	1,405	1,418	1,566	24	10	12
Serbia	1,019	888	1,416	1,241	1,600	1,463	65	-8.6	11
Georgia	4,463	866	609	640	684	1,165	35	70	8.7
Croatia	1,108	1,063	1,098	1,102	990	877	-17	-11	6.5
Albania	398	80	123	126	321	693	766	116	5.2
FYROM	895	438	1,035	808	848	616	41	-27	4.6
Turkey	739	392	293	346	758	357	-8.9	-53	2.7
Moldova	389	360	381	339	379	328	-8.9	-13	2.4
Others	1,165	831	826	897	976	978	18	0.2	7.3
Total Land	18,489	12,362	12,927	12,672	14,880	13,436	8.7	-10	100
Air Border									
Brazil	1,820	1,725	1,842	1,607	1,276	1,347	-22	5.6	11
Nigeria	543	527	390	362	439	526	-0.2	20	4.1
United States	800	586	600	548	666	524	-11	-21	4.1
India	371	361	463	284	348	397	10	14	3.1
China	591	409	345	432	446	387	-5.4	-13	3.0
Turkey	471	478	453	381	380	385	-19	1.3	3.0
Paraguay	396	331	553	393	217	332	0.3	53	2.6
Venezuela	643	392	271	309	272	331	-16	22	2.6
Russia	402	298	333	280	421	329	10	-22	2.6
Albania	137	151	109	77	126	312	107	148	2.5
Others	8,262	7,560	7,433	7,143	7,290	7,855	3.9	7.8	62
Total Air	14,436	12,818	12,792	11,816	11,881	12,725	-0.7	7.1	100
Sea Border									
Russia	106	32	79	75	635	624	1850	-1.7	36
Albania	63	44	45	49	61	282	541	362	16
Philippines	85	160	94	196	93	206	29	122	12
Morocco	399	251	77	60	116	76	-70	-34	4.4
Turkey	102	57	49	50	143	61	7	-57	3.5
Ukraine	37	11	20	74	58	42	282	-28	2.4
Myanmar	12	26	18	14	13	38	46	192	2.2
Cape Verde	4	1	3	12	21	27	2600	29	1.5
Tunisia	22	15	19	39	25	25	67	0	1.4
FYROM	13	0	28	34	6	23	n.a.	283	1.3
Others	597	385	354	492	573	342	-11	-40	20
Total Sea	1,440	982	786	1,095	1,744	1,746	78	0.1	100

Table A5:
REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Reasons for refusal of entry by top ten nationalities

		2010 Q2									
	Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	I		
	No valid doc	False doc	No valid visa	False visa	No justi- fication	Over 3 mo. stay	No subs- istence	Alert issued	Threat	Refused persons Total	
Top Ten Nationalities											
Ukraine	20	34	1,079	18	1,745	313	287	373	4	3,930	
Russia	180	11	1,932	27	242	25	164	85	72	2,698	
Serbia	18	7	323	17	72	274	268	732	39	1,766	
Belarus	2	1	761	0	264	16	494	35	26	1,593	
Brazil	5	4	120	0	540	39	76	145	20	1,374	
Albania	5	11	118	21	92	38	75	881	27	1,287	
Georgia	2	2	1,093	6	56	0	13	90	0	1,258	
Croatia	234	2	22	0	9	197	66	148	225	936	
FYROM	10	2	53	9	157	148	131	312	9	819	
Turkey	43	28	452	36	99	15	50	63	16	803	
Others	770	618	2,585	325	3,000	182	690	626	287	11,443	
Total	1,289	720	8,538	459	6,276	1,247	2,314	3,490	725	27,907	

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry

- (A) has no valid travel document(s);
- (B) has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- (C) has no valid visa or residence permit;
- (D) has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- (E) has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- (F) has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- (G) does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- (H) is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- (I) is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union;

Table A6:
REASONS FOR REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Refusals of entry at the external borders by reason for refusal

Relusais of entry at the external	_	009		2	010		201		
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		nge on	per cent
		<u> </u>		~_			year ago	prev. Qtr	of total
Total									
C) No valid visa	14,758	7,435	6,016	6,829	9,875	8,538	15	-14	30
E) No justification	7,665	6,975	6,729	6,747	6,233	6,276	-10	0.7	22
H) Alert issued	1,856	2,235	3,517	2,819	2,816	3,490	56	24	12
G) No subsistence	1,479	1,914	1,849	2,178	2,235	2,314	21	3.5	8.1
A) No valid doc	1,763	1,320	1,085	1,135	1,257	1,289	-2.3	2.5	4.5
F) Over 3 mo. stay	650	566	2,012	1,037	1,295	1,247	120	-3.7	4.4
I) Treath	591	684	565	622	649	725	6.0	12	2.5
B) False doc	848	717	657	781	757	720	0.4	-4.9	2.5
D) False visa	450	429	398	466	395	459	7.0	16	1.6
Reason not available	4,423	4,303	3,997	3,594	3,708	3,499	-19	-5.6	12
Total	34,483	26,578	26,825	26,208	29,220	28,557	7.4	-2.3	100
Land Border									
C) No valid visa	11,397	4,975	3,581	4,349	6,405	5,333	7.2	-17	39
E) No justification	3,249	3,220	2,976	3,167	2,912	2,468	-23	-17	18
H) Alert issued	1,222	1,521	2,525	1,994	2,024	2,358	55	17	17
G) No subsistence	975	1,325	1,147	1,299	1,474	1,378	4.0	-6.5	10
F) Over 3 mo. stay	366	403	1,743	795	1,076	1,019	153	-5.3	7.5
I) Treath	445	448	435	466	422	429	-4.2	1.7	3.2
A) No valid doc	657	371	440	439	476	392	5.7	-18	2.9
D) False visa	111	90	112	93	102	103	14	1.0	0.8
B) False doc	43	41	90	146	125	59	44	-53	0.4
Reason not available	24	0	2	1	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0
Total Land	18,489	12,394	13,051	12,749	15,016	13,539	9.2	-9.8	100
Air Border									
E) No justification	4,383	3,735	3,727	3,550	3,286	3,787	1.4	15	29
C) No valid visa	2,916	2,165	2,163	2,010	2,368	2,330	7.6	-1.6	18
G) No subsistence	495	576	688	870	745	887	54	19	6.7
H) Alert issued	539	626	824	690	667	807	29	21	6.1
B) False doc	727	646	553	610	593	624	-3.4	5.2	4.7
A) No valid doc	574	581	506	514	571	584	0.5	2.3	4.4
D) False visa	313	332	276	367	279	347	4.5	24	2.6
I) Treath	141	233	123	150	223	294	26	32	2.2
F) Over 3 mo. stay	260	162	266	229	203	221	36	8.9	1.7
Reason not available	4,207	4,130	3,857	3,372	3,513	3,385	-18	-3.6	26
Total Air	14,555	13,186	12,983	12,362	12,448	13,266	0.6	6.6	100
Sea Border									
C) No valid visa	445	295	272	470	1,102	875	197	-21	50
H) Alert issued	95	88	168	135	125	325	269	160	19
A) No valid doc	532	368	139	182	210	313	-15	49	18
G) No subsistence	9	13	14	9	16	49	277	206	2.8
B) False doc	78	30	14	25	39	37	23	-5.1	2.1
E) No justification	33	20	26	30	35	21	5.0	-40	1.2
D) False visa	26	7	10	6	14	9	29	-36	0.5
F) Over 3 mo. stay	24	1	3	13	16	7	600	-56	0.4
I) Treath	5	3	7	6	4	2	-33	-50	0.1
	192	173	138	221	195	114	-34	-42	6.5
Reason not available	102	110	100	221	195	117	-57	-72	0.0

Table A7:
PERSONS USING FALSE DOCUMENTS

Detections on entry at the external borders by border type and top ten nationalities of persons and documents

	2009			2010			2010 Q4			
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		nge on prev. Qtr	per cent of total	
							year ago	prev. qu	01 10101	
Border Type										
Air	1,524	1,542	1,549	1,731	1,699	2,067	34	22	n.a.	
Land	340	302	440	483	479	331	9.6	-31	n.a.	
Sea	105	49	128	98	196	238	386	21	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities of	f Person	S								
Not specified	134	117	179	305	330	351	200	6.4	13	
Morocco	41	45	126	99	169	225	400	33	8.5	
Ukraine	142	130	222	241	316	214	65	-32	8.1	
Nigeria	151	129	130	102	113	127	-1.6	12	4.8	
Turkey	92	97	70	108	112	126	30	13	4.8	
Iran, Islamic Republic of	95	75	94	101	99	110	47	11	4.2	
Sri Lanka	34	77	45	55	69	80	3.9	16	3.0	
China	78	74	81	117	54	69	-6.8	28	2.6	
Albania	73	63	70	43	57	62	-1.6	8.8	2.4	
Afghanistan	66	57	27	58	65	61	7.0	-6.2	2.3	
Others	1,063	1,029	1,073	1,083	990	1,211	18	22	46	
Top Ten Nationalities of	of Docum	ents								
Not specified	508	296	558	584	535	746	152	39	28	
Poland	84	102	158	184	179	165	62	-7.8	6.3	
Italy	98	124	99	110	109	157	27	44	6.0	
Greece	39	44	70	92	104	148	236	42	5.6	
France	108	141	120	150	189	131	-7.1	-31	5.0	
Germany	38	67	70	75	81	124	85	53	4.7	
Nigeria	60	49	69	48	49	63	29	29	2.4	
Turkey	61	41	38	45	61	54	32	-11	2.0	
Belgium	51	71	49	46	55	53	-25	-3.6	2.0	
Ukraine	48	37	61	43	118	50	35	-58	1.9	
Others	874	921	825	935	894	945	2.6	5.7	36	
Total	1,969	1,893	2,117	2,312	2,374	2,636	39	11	100	

Notes on FRAN data sources and methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the Cypriot authorities. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land Intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. For Greece, only detections of illegal-stayers with false documents are reported at the air border as detections of illegal stay on exit.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the United Kingdom, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

For Ireland, data on persons using false documents are not available (FRAN Indicator 6). In Sweden, the data on false document use are not presented since the reported detections do not distinguish between apprehensions of persons using false documents at the external border and those apprehended inland.



European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

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