

# FRAN Quarterly

QUARTER 2 • APRIL–JUNE 2017

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.



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Warsaw, December 2017  
Risk Analysis Unit  
Frontex reference number: 24200/2017

OPOCE Catalogue number: TT-AF-17-002-EN-N  
ISSN 2363-0566

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Throughout the report, references to Kosovo\* are marked with an asterisk to indicate that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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## List of abbreviations used

<b>BCP</b>	border-crossing point
<b>BDT</b>	Bangladeshi taka
<b>BMET</b>	Bangladesh's Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training
<b>CIRCA</b>	Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
<b>EDF-RAN</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>Frontex</b>	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ICONet</b>	Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services
<b>ID</b>	identification document
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>JO</b>	Joint Operation
<b>LYD</b>	Libyan dinar
<b>MAD</b>	Moroccan dirham
<b>n.a.</b>	not available
<b>Q/Qtr</b>	quarter of the year
<b>SAC</b>	Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland)
<b>SAR</b>	search and rescue
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>UNSCR</b>	United Nations Security Council Resolution

# Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU's external borders, based on the irregular migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterly is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update of irregular migration situation at EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

This report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses.

Harmonising complex, multi-source migration data among Frontex and Member States is an ongoing process. Therefore, some of the more detailed data and trends

in this report should be interpreted with caution and, where possible, cross-referenced with information from other sources. The statistics should be understood in the context of the different levels of passenger flows passing through different border sections, the activities of Member State border-control authorities undertaken to secure different border sections and widespread variation in reporting and data-collection practices.

FRAN members, Member State risk analysis experts and border-control authorities are considered the primary customers of these reports. In addition to the discussions taking place during FRAN meetings, Member State experts are invited and actively encouraged to examine and comment upon the data and analyses presented here. Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State experts involved in data exchange and analyses, some minor errors may occur in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community.

Starting with the 2015 Q1 issue, the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit has implemented a number of changes to present the analy-

sis of migration-related indicators in the FRAN Quarterly in a more concise and focused way.

The first part provides a **situational overview**, broken down by main areas of work of border-control authorities and police activities related to irregular migration.

■ **Surveillance**, describing and analysing trends in detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs;

■ **Border checks**, describing detections reported during checks at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles or refused entry);

■ **Fraudulent documents**, describing trends and patterns related to document fraud both at the border and within the EU;

■ **Situation in the EU**, examining developments related to: persons applying for asylum and those detected staying illegally, detected facilitators, return decisions issued and effective returns.

The second thematic part of the report consists of several **featured risk analyses**, examining trends and patterns of irregular migration in a more comprehensive manner. Eventually, it is expected that some of the featured analysis topics would be developed by external contributors (FRAN members, EU agencies and international institutions).

# Methodology

The current 36<sup>th</sup> issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2017 and exchanged among 31 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network. The report presents the results of statistical analysis of quarterly changes of eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports exchanged by Member States were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information, such as Frontex Joint Operations.

Precise definitions of Indicators 1 to 6, aimed at harmonising the data exchanged at EU level, were presented in the annexes of the Q1 and Q2 reports in 2009 and therefore are not repeated here.

The FRAN data exchange has been in place since September 2008. Data are exchanged through the ICONet Internet platform, an interest group of the European Commission's CIRCA server. Member State monthly data are based on a coun-

try template prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. The deadline for submitting data for each month is the 20th day of the subsequent month, with the exception of the end-of-year data, which are requested by 15 January each year. For this 36<sup>th</sup> issue of the FRAN Quarterly, the target for Member States to upload the monthly data was thus 20 July 2017. In principle, data submitted subsequent to this date will be reflected in the next FRAN Quarterly, except in cases where clarification is needed in order to proceed with a comprehensive analysis.

In January 2012, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDFRAN) was formed as a specialist forum to oversee the exchange and analyses of detections of document fraud at the external borders and on all international flights. The data were backdated and merged with those exchanged under a pilot Tailored Risk Analysis released in 2011.

At the beginning of 2014, Member States started to regularly collect quantitative information on indicators related to secondary movements. In addition, in July

2014, Frontex organised workshops for Member State experts to gather their expertise and analyse available data. Their input was essential for the analysis of intra-EU/Schengen secondary movements of undocumented migrants.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between Schengen Associated Countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the United Kingdom and Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries (SAC) as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate be-

tween extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the categories of 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices: nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (biweekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation) were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open-source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.

## **Acknowledgements**

The Frontex Risk Analysis Unit would like to express its gratitude to all FRAN and EDF-RAN members and their associates in Member State statistical, migration and document-fraud units who collect, aggregate and exchange monthly data, also to the analysts who compile the bi-monthly analytical reports, on which much of the detailed analyses presented here are based.

# I. SITUATIONAL OVERVIEW


Table 1. **Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs**  
Detections reported at the external borders, by route and top three nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Central Mediterranean route</b>	<b>18 776</b>	<b>51 450</b>	<b>61 825</b>	<b>49 408</b>	<b>24 296</b>	<b>59 475</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>78</b>
Nigeria	3 433	8 458	15 280	10 383	3 160	<b>10 963</b>	30	247	17
Bangladesh	1	584	5 233	2 313	2 831	<b>5 410</b>	826	91	8.5
Côte d'Ivoire	1 547	3 819	3 350	3 683	2 529	<b>4 827</b>	26	91	7.6
Other	13 795	38 589	37 962	33 029	15 776	<b>38 275</b>	-0.8	143	60
<b>Eastern Mediterranean route (GRC,BGR,CYP-land and sea)</b>	<b>153 967</b>	<b>8 804</b>	<b>10 500</b>	<b>9 006</b>	<b>6 058</b>	<b>7 408</b>	<b>-16</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9.8</b>
<b>Sea</b>	<b>151 490</b>	<b>7 067</b>	<b>8 764</b>	<b>7 284</b>	<b>4 928</b>	<b>5 897</b>	<b>-17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>48</b>
Syria	74 397	2 345	2 616	2 212	1 770	<b>2 015</b>	-14	14	16
Iraq	23 850	751	965	1 007	427	<b>857</b>	14	101	6.9
Pakistan	5 446	1 011	1 635	590	525	<b>398</b>	-61	-24	3.2
Other	47 797	2 960	3 548	3 475	2 206	<b>2 627</b>	-11	19	21
<b>Land</b>	<b>2 477</b>	<b>1 737</b>	<b>1 736</b>	<b>1 722</b>	<b>1 130</b>	<b>1 511</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>12</b>
Syria	1 212	462	569	772	473	<b>467</b>	1.1	-1.3	3.8
Pakistan	87	317	268	221	149	<b>432</b>	36	190	3.5
Turkey	22	20	47	101	109	<b>183</b>	815	68	1.5
Other	1 156	938	852	628	399	<b>429</b>	-54	7.5	3.5
<b>Western Mediterranean route (ESP-land and sea)</b>	<b>1 408</b>	<b>1 994</b>	<b>2 987</b>	<b>3 842</b>	<b>4 096</b>	<b>4 970</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>6.5</b>
<b>Sea</b>	<b>1 307</b>	<b>1 878</b>	<b>2 757</b>	<b>2 699</b>	<b>2 352</b>	<b>4 035</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>33</b>
Côte d'Ivoire	147	485	455	460	680	<b>918</b>	89	35	7.4
Morocco	59	92	265	306	127	<b>782</b>	750	516	6.3
Guinea	564	611	171	234	242	<b>635</b>	3.9	162	5.1
Other	537	690	1 866	1 699	1 303	<b>1 700</b>	146	30	14
<b>Land</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>1 143</b>	<b>1 744</b>	<b>935</b>	<b>706</b>	<b>-46</b>	<b>7.6</b>
Syria	.	.	.	<b>143</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>429</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	<b>13</b>	<b>3.5</b>
Algeria	3	.	.	64	163	<b>130</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	-20	1.1
Guinea	29	44	81	450	501	<b>105</b>	139	-79	0.8
Other	69	72	149	486	699	<b>271</b>	276	-61	2.2
<b>Western Balkan route</b>	<b>108 649</b>	<b>11 102</b>	<b>5 889</b>	<b>4 621</b>	<b>3 507</b>	<b>2 224</b>	<b>-80</b>	<b>-37</b>	<b>2.9</b>
Pakistan	1 346	1 796	1 233	1 208	915	<b>767</b>	-57	-16	1.2
Iraq	772	947	560	328	322	<b>434</b>	-54	35	0.7
Afghanistan	1 093	5 386	2 245	1 896	1 211	<b>319</b>	-94	-74	0.5
Other	105 438	2 973	1 851	1 189	1 059	<b>704</b>	-76	-34	1.1
<b>Circular route from Albania to Greece</b>	<b>1 350</b>	<b>1 402</b>	<b>1 111</b>	<b>1 258</b>	<b>1 539</b>	<b>1 657</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Albania	1 344	1 389	1 044	1 219	1 493	<b>1 610</b>	16	7.8	2.5
Afghanistan	.	1	34	10	1	<b>12</b>	1 100	1 100	0
Bangladesh	0	0	1	.	.	<b>8</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0
Other	6	12	32	29	45	<b>27</b>	125	-40	0
<b>Eastern borders route</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>317</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>-52</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>0.2</b>
Vietnam	36	137	142	84	27	<b>53</b>	-61	96	0.1
Ukraine	28	32	54	24	19	<b>29</b>	-9.4	53	0
Russia	23	34	36	26	21	<b>12</b>	-65	-43	0
Other	126	167	217	183	76	<b>85</b>	-49	12	0.1
<b>Western African route</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-77</b>	<b>-47</b>	<b>0.1</b>
Algeria	.	1	.	.	5	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Burkina Faso	3	10	.	2	.	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Morocco	.	7	14	73	7	<b>39</b>	457	457	0.1
Other	159	150	130	122	62	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
<b>Other</b>	.	.	.	<b>1</b>	.	<b>1</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<b>0</b>
Russia	.	.	.	1	.	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Ukraine	.	.	.	.	.	<b>1</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0
<b>Black Sea route</b>	.	.	<b>1</b>	.	.	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Belarus	.	.	1	.	.	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>284 525</b>	<b>75 290</b>	<b>82 906</b>	<b>68 650</b>	<b>39 713</b>	<b>75 953</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: FRAN data as of 4 August 2017



# FRAN indicators



In the second quarter of 2017, the overall number of detected illegal border-crossings at the EU's external borders was approximately on a par with the corresponding quarter of 2016, i.e. just after the EU-Turkey statement was signed and the Western Balkan route effectively closed. As the statement still holds and the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes are ever more difficult to traverse successfully, the reduction on these two routes is made up for by increases in the Central Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean.

Diverging trends have been observed along the different migratory routes. At almost 60 000 irregular migrants, the Central Mediterranean route recorded almost as many irregular migrants as during all-time highs of migratory pressure in the summer of 2015 (Q2, Q3) and 2016 (Q3). Given the relative decrease reported on other routes, the detections made on the Central Mediterranean route now account for 78% of the overall number of detected irregular migrants. The number of East Africans travelling along this route is decreasing (for example, the number of Eritreans almost halved compared with one year ago). This decline, however, is more than made up for by migrants from West and North Africa but also from Asia, in particular Bangladesh.

The Eastern Mediterranean route continued to register the second highest number of irregular migrants in Q2, albeit with a decrease of 16% compared with the previous year. The decrease was mainly the result of a decreased number of migrants from South Asia. In turn Syrians – accounting for roughly one-third of the migrants –


remained the main nationality detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route.

The number of detections of illegal border-crossing on the Western Balkan route dropped for the sixth consecutive quarter. The decrease of 80% in comparison with the second quarter of 2016 reflects the ongoing efforts to curb this flow by countries located along the route. Compared with the previous year, the 2 224 detected migrants, most of whom crossed the EU's external borders for the second time and having transited Serbia, were comparatively less frequently detected at the Hungarian border, but more often at the Romanian border.


On the Western Mediterranean route, a roughly 150% rise in the number of migrants compared with Q2 2016 was observed, which means that it increased for the fifth consecutive quarter. Unrest in Morocco's Rif region has created an opening for more departures from this country in general and contributed to the increased number of departures from the western coast in particular, which in Q2 saw the use of high-capacity boats capable of transporting large numbers of migrants. These departures of migrants sailing along the Atlantic coast are largely responsible for the surge in the number of arrivals of Moroccan migrants to 809 in Q2 2017 from a mere 92 detected in Q2 2016.

A comprehensive look at the FRAN indicators reveals that they have all either declined or stayed roughly unchanged, with the notable exception of detected clandestine entries, which increased by 31% in relation to Q2 2016.

# Situation Q2 2017



# Trend




# Surveillance

## Routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's external borders, Q2 2017

**75 953** →  
(75 290) →

Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2016



The FRAN data for the period between April to June 2017 show an expected seasonal increase compared with the first quarter of the year and an almost unchanged level (a mere 1% increase) in relation to the same period in 2016. While the total of 75 953 detections seems low compared with peaks recorded at the height of the migration crisis, it is higher than in any quarter before Q3 2014. In fact, this number of detections stands as the second highest number ever recorded in the second quarter since the collection of FRAN data began. While, due to the dominance of the Central Mediterranean route, the detections at the sea border increased by 15% in comparison with the same period in 2016, the decreases observed on the Western Balkan route in particular mean that detections at land borders declined by 56%. Likewise, the already observed reversal of the regions of origin of migrants became even more pronounced: in Q2 2017, almost 73% of detected irregular migrants came from Africa, whereas 24% hailed from Asia.

### Migratory pressure in the Central Mediterranean persists

The share of irregular migrants entering the EU on the Central Mediterranean route

continued to increase, reaching 78% (59 475 detections) in Q2 2017. Far more affected by seasonal changes in weather conditions than the other major routes, the 145% increase compared with Q1 2017 is hardly surprising and is consistent with previous years. Q2 2017 fell just 2 271 migrants short of the record quarter for this route (Q3 2015). However, noticeable changes can be seen in the nationality composition of the flow. In particular, the share of East African migrants shrank, as they face increasing obstacles to reach areas of departure in Libya (the closest point of departure now that embarkations in Egypt have been stopped). The number of Eritrean migrants represents 47% of the level in Q2 2016, that of Sudan 82%, Somalia 55%, and Ethiopia 33%.

It is hardly surprising that 83.5% of migrants detected on the Central Mediterranean route are of African origin – almost unchanged since Q2 2016 – while the overall number on this route increased by 16%. The decline in the number of East Africans was thus more than made up for by the increasing number of migrants originating from other parts of the continent. Of the major West African countries of origin, lower number of detections were only registered for nationals of the Gambia (-22%) and Guinea (-39%). The

detections of the nationals of Nigeria, the most important country of origin, increased by 30% in relation to Q2 2016 (to 10 963 in Q2 2017). Significant hikes were also recorded for most North African littoral counties except for Egypt. The number of Moroccans (2 344) more than tripled, there was a sevenfold increase in the number of Algerians (425), twofold in Tunisians (424), and almost sixfold in Libyans. Of the 9 682 Asian nationals detected, 5 410 were Bangladeshis, which represents a more than ninefold surge in relation to Q2 2016. Sizable increases were also observed for Pakistanis (sevenfold), Syrians (also sevenfold), and Iraqis (almost sixfold).


### More Middle Eastern migrants on the Central Mediterranean route

As the EU-Turkey statement has made the journey on the Eastern Mediterranean route more difficult, the increased number of detections of Middle Eastern and South Asian migrants on other routes continued. Compared with Q2 2016, the number of Syrians detected in the Eastern Mediterranean decreased by 12%, Pakistanis – by 38%, Afghans – by 74% and Iranians – by 16%. One exception to this trend was the number of Iraqis, which showed a 12% increase, making them the second-ranking nationality. Overall on the Eastern Medi-

# Trend


## Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, 2015–2017

Number



# Nationalities

## Main nationalities of illegal border-crossers Q2 2017



terreanean route, the number of detections decreased by 16% compared with Q2 2016 and by rose by 22% in relation to Q1 2017. This is put into perspective by an almost 18% decrease in comparison to Q4 2016, despite more favourable weather conditions in Q2 2017. Moreover, this route's total for Q2 2017 only accounts for 1.5% of the flow in the record quarter of Q4 2015. The share of illegal border-crossings reported at land borders further increased compared to the number of detections made at sea borders. It was mostly associated with the almost 36% increase in the number of detections recorded at the Greek-Turkish border over Q1 2017. With a tenfold increase in relation to Q2 2016, Congolese (COG; with 361 detections) joined the top five nationalities detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route after Syrians (2 482), Iraqis (1 008), Pakistanis (830) and Afghans (455).

### Continued downward trend in secondary movements of migrants arriving on the Eastern Mediterranean route

The declining trend observed on the Western Balkan route since Q1 2016 continued into Q2 2017. The number of reported il-

legal border-crossings (2 224 detections) dropped by 37% compared with Q1 2017 and by as much as 80% in relation to the corresponding period last year. Significant decreases registered at the Hungarian land border with Serbia led to increased pressure, for instance on the Romanian-Serbian land border. As regards the top detected nationalities, the most marked decline compared with Q1 2017 (74%) was observed with regard to Afghans (319), who ranked third after Pakistanis (767) and Iraqis (434).

### Fifth consecutive quarter to register an increase in the number of irregular migrants detected on the Western Mediterranean route

The Western Mediterranean route registered an increase of 21% in the number of detections compared with Q1 2017 and an increase of 149% in relation to Q2 2016, which is associated with detections at sea. Specifically, the increase is connected to detections of migrants who departed from Morocco's western coast and sailed alongside the Atlantic coast towards Spain. In fact, the number of migrants (mostly Moroccans) who disembarked in Cadiz rose

significantly in Q2 2017. While the number of almost all West African nationals increased compared with Q2 2016, the rise in the number of Moroccans (eightfold) and Algerians (threefold) is particularly noticeable. By comparison, the migratory pressure on the exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla decreased in relation to Q4 2016 and Q1 2017.


### Developments on other migratory routes

In Q2 2017, 1 657 detections were registered on the circular route between Albania and Greece, which represents a roughly 8% increase in relation to Q1 2017; it is not surprising considering that the route is heavily used by seasonal labour migrants. Albanians continued to account for 97% of detections reported on this route. The migratory pressure on the Western African route started easing in Q3 2016, which continued into Q2 2017 (39 detections). On the Eastern borders route, the 25% increase over Q1 2017 observed in Q2 2017 is put into perspective by the fact that the absolute number of detected migrants (179) is actually lower than in any quarter between 2014 and 2016.


# Border checks

## Refusals of entry

**Number per border type, Q2 2017**  
(only values higher than 1000 are stipulated)



**Total: 47 203** (51 687)  
Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2016



### Trend of the total



### Member States report a 5% increase in the number of refusals of entry compared with Q1 2017

The overall number of refusals of entry increased slightly, to 47 203. It reflects a continuously increasing trend in refusals of entry in Member States once the phenomenon of record numbers of Russian citizens being refused entry at the Polish border is disregarded. During the reference period, the proportion of refusals of entry per border type was as follows: 30 350 (64%) land borders; 14 217 (30%) air borders; and 2 636 (5.6%) sea borders. Poland reported by far the biggest share of refusals (36%), which is due to its location at the EU's eastern land border.

At land borders, the refusals issued in Q2 2017 represent a decrease of 21% compared with Q2 2016 – which is closely linked to the record number of refusals issued to Russian citizens – and an increase of 6.8% compared with Q1 2017.

They were issued to Ukrainians (28%), mostly at the Polish border (84% of the overall share of refusals to Ukrainians), Russians (28%), also mostly at the Polish border (86% of refusals to Russians) and Albanians (18%), who were mostly refused at the Greek border (84%). The increase in the number of refusals issued to Albanians mostly contributed to the overall increase in the number of refusals issued by EU Member States/Schengen Associated Countries at all border types. Consequently, Albanian nationals ranked second in regard to the overall number of refusals issued (following Ukrainians and ahead of Russians) and were the most refused nationality both at air and sea borders.

At air borders, the number of refusals issued in Q2 increased by 3.2% and 22% compared with Q1 2017 and Q2 2016, respectively. The five countries (all recording increases compared with Q2 2016) which issued the most refusals at air borders


# Clandestine entries

Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs (people hiding in vehicles)

**Number, Q2 2017**

**Total: 528** (403)

Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2016



were France followed by Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and Germany. As regards refused nationalities, a significant number of refusals was issued to Albanians by Italy (826), Brazilians by Portugal (312), and Colombians by Spain (347).

The number of refusals issued at sea borders slightly decreased compared with the previous quarter (-2.8%). However, it increased significantly (+69%) in relation to Q2 2016. The top three nationalities refused at sea borders were Albanians (1 520), mostly arriving at Italian ports (97%), Moroccans (440), mainly at Spanish ports (95%), and Turks (93), arriving in Greece (74%).

### Increase in clandestine entries compared to last quarter

In Q2 2017, the number of clandestine entry attempts by migrants hiding in lorries, trains, ships and other means of transport increased to 528 (from 455 in Q1 2017). This



# Illegal stayers on exit

**Total: 18 322** (19 572)


Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2016

## Number of detections, Q2 2017

○ 500 ○ 10-100 ○ 1-10

Type of border section:

● Land ● Sea ● Air ■ no data



rise is associated with the increase in the number of Afghan clandestine entrants, whose share amounted to 50% of all clandestine entry attempts made in Q2 2017.

The number of clandestine entry attempts at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla also increased in relation to the corresponding quarter of 2016. This rise is consistent with the overall increase in the migratory pressure. Belgium detected 41 attempts of clandestine entry, 21 of which involved Eritrean nationals. The second quarter of 2017 saw the continuation of the previously reported phenomenon whereby specific nationalities tend to attempt clandestine entry at specific border sections in high numbers. This suggests the involvement of ethnicity-based organised facilitation networks.

## Increase in illegal stay on exit compared with Q1 2017

The number of persons without a valid permission to stay detected on exit at BCPS at the EU's external borders increased from 17 542 in Q1 2017 to 18 322 in Q2 2017, which is still 30% lower than that reported in Q4 2016.

This increase was mostly the result of two phenomena. Firstly, Hungary reported an increase in the number of illegal stayers detected on exit at land borders from 1 104 in Q1 2017 to 2 214 in Q2 2017.

In the reference period, most detections of illegal stay on exit were reported by Germany (5 686), followed by Poland (3 774), Hungary (2 955), France (1 817) and Greece

(539). In Germany, all detections were made at its air border and their number decreased slightly (from 6 151 detections) over the first quarter 2017. While the number of Albanians detected on exit dropped from 1 321 to 894, they remained the top ranking nationality of illegal stayers. By contrast, the number of illegally staying Chinese and Indians increased, while the number of citizens of Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia almost doubled.

The share of illegally staying Ukrainian nationals increased from 21% in Q1 2017 to 23% in Q2 2017 (4 244 detections). Serbian nationals, whose number almost doubled compared with the previous quarter, ranked second (1 359) and were followed by Albanians (1 291) and Moldovans (1 103).

# Fraudulent documents

## Detections


(at external borders)

### Number of detected fraudulent documents per Member State, Q2 2017

Direction:



Number:  
(only highest values are stipulated)



### Stable trend in document fraud detections in Q2 2017

In Q2 2017, the overall level of document fraud reported within the EDF-RAN was almost equal to that of the previous quarter, with 4 941 reported cases and 5 860 detected fraudulent documents. A small increase was observed compared with Q2 2016; however, the current figures have not reached the levels recorded before the migration crisis reached a peak in Q3 2015.

As regards the trends in fraudulent document use, they vary according to nationality. The number of Albanian nationals, which decreased by 18% compared with Q1 2017, was still higher in Q2 2017 than in any other second quarter in the past four years. Thus, the decrease in relation to Q1 2017 mostly results from the unusually high number of Albanians detected in that quarter. While some percentage decrease was observed in the subsequent quarter, the absolute number remained high. The number of Ukrainian nationals slightly increased between Q1 and Q2 2017; however, an overall decreasing trend has

been observed over the last two years. The visa-free regime for Ukrainian nationals travelling on Ukrainian biometric passports, which entered into force on 11 June 2017, will most likely bring about an even more significant decrease in the number of Ukrainians abusing travel documents. However, as regards the total number of Ukrainian document fraudsters, the decrease in those entering the Schengen area with fraudulent documents will probably be counterbalanced by a higher number of those detected on exit from the Schengen area towards the United Kingdom and Ireland, where the visa policy remains unchanged. The number of Syrians, the third most reported nationality in Q2 2017, rose by 12% compared with the previous quarter, following an increasing trend that has been observed since the beginning of 2016. However, the overall number of Syrians travelling on fraudulent documents remains far below the levels usually detected before the migration crisis hit its peak in Q3 2015. Apart from the abovementioned nationalities, considerable increases were also registered in Q2 2017 in the number of Turkish and Pakistani nationals.


### Significant increase in the number of document fraud detections among persons departing from Greece by air

Compared with the previous quarter, the overall number of detections on secondary movements within the EU/Schengen area decreased by 3.5% (from 2 757 in Q1 2017 to 2 660 in Q2 2017). Over a quarter of detections made in Q2 2017 were associated with Albanians detected on the routes leading towards the United Kingdom and Ireland.

By contrast, the number of migrants stranded in Greece who were detected using fraudulent documents and whose options of reaching their intended final destinations by land or sea have been limited, started to rise again on air routes. The top nationalities of document fraudsters departing from Greece include Syrians, Afghans, Iranians, Turks, Albanians and lately also Eritreans. Germany remains the most favoured destination country of fraudulent document users, followed by Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. Despite the fact that Syrians


## Type

**Type of fraudulent document detected, by main countries of issuance, Q2 2017**



## Nationality of users

**Claimed nationality of persons detected with fraudulent documents on entry from third countries, Q2 2017**



continued to rank first among the most detected nationalities of fraudulent document users detected between Greece and Germany, their number decreased in Q2 2017 by one-fourth in relation to the previous quarter. However, more Syrians were detected on air routes between Greece and Switzerland, Italy and Belgium.

The United Kingdom remained the most frequently reported final destination as regards secondary movements within the EU/Schengen area. In Q2 2017, almost 1 000 persons with fraudulent documents were detected on the routes leading towards the United Kingdom. This number is 25% lower than that recorded in the first quarter of 2017; however, it is comparable to the figures reported in the second quarters over the past few years. Document fraudsters,

often Albanian and Ukrainian nationals, used the sea and land routes between France and the United Kingdom most frequently. On the air routes leading from Italy, Germany and Spain to the United Kingdom, the most reported nationalities were Albanians, Iranians and Chinese.

### **On entry from third countries, the number of fraudulent Ukrainian and Georgian passports remains low**

In Q2 2017, 1 682 persons with fraudulent documents entered the EU/Schengen area from third countries. Compared with the situation on the intra-EU/Schengen movements, the number of detections on routes from third countries slightly increased (+4%) in relation to Q1 2017.

At EU level, of the 101 nationalities detected using fraudulent documents to illegally enter the EU/Schengen area from a third country, Ukrainians (252), Moroccans (147), Iranians (88), Albanians (81) and Turks (65) were the most commonly detected nationalities. The number of Iranian and Turkish nationals increased by almost 50%.

As in the previous quarters, most detections were reported on air routes. The number of document fraud cases reported on arrival from Istanbul Atatürk increased by 20% compared with the previous quarter. Thus, Istanbul Atatürk is still one of the most frequently reported last departure airports outside the EU/Schengen area.

# Situation in the EU


## Illegal stayers

### Number of detected cases, Q2 2017

(only highest values are stipulated)




Number in parenthesis is for Q2 2016



## Facilitators

### Number of detected persons, Q2 2017

Lower bars represent the level for Q2 2016



### Illegal stay detections in the EU remain mostly associated with secondary movements of migrants who reached Europe via the Central Mediterranean

Member States reported a total of 87 140 detections of illegal stay in Q2 2017, a figure that excludes the 18 322 detections made on exit at BCPs (see Border checks on p. 10).<sup>1</sup> Even though this is the consecutive third quarter of gradual decline in the overall figure (Q3 2016 with 106 896 detections marks the beginning of the reversal), the high absolute numbers indicate that the problem persists.

Most detections of illegal stay continue to be reported from a few countries. Germany, Italy and Switzerland together accounted for 62% of the total number of detections reported in Q2 2017. Considering their location, among other factors, the high share of detections in these countries seems to be associated with the spillover effect of secondary movements

of migrants who entered the EU/Schengen area on the Central Mediterranean route. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the breakdown of nationalities of illegal stayers reported by the abovementioned countries matches the relative shares of nationalities reported on this route. For example, 40 266 migrants detected for illegal stay in Q2 2017 (which constituted 46% of the overall number of detections) were nationals of African countries. They, in turn, accounted for over 57% of all migrants detected for illegal stay in France. A even higher share of African illegal stayers (74%) was reported in Italy, which remains the primary country of disembarkation, and in Switzerland (77%), which now seems to have become the primary transit country to Germany. As regards Germany, 38% of the total number of illegal stayers originated from Africa.

### Detections of Asian nationals on the decline for the sixth consecutive quarter

Asian migrants had been the largest group detected for illegal stay until Q2 2016, when they were outnumbered by migrants from Africa, who have ranked first ever since. In Q2 2017, the number of detections of ille-

gal stayers from Asian countries decreased for the sixth quarter in a row. Their number dropped from 28 455 in Q1 2017 to 27 716 in Q2 2017, which mostly resulted from the decrease in the number of detections reported in Germany and Austria. The increase in the number of Asian migrants (more specifically Pakistanis) detected in Greece was slight in comparison with the decreasing numbers reported in the abovementioned countries. Of the Member States reporting the largest increase in the number of detected illegal stayers over Q1 2017, Greece ranked first with a 44% rise. Two nationalities experienced the largest percentage increases: Pakistanis with a 63% increase (1 782 detections) and Albanians with a 44% rise (1 623).


### Further decrease in the number of detections in Scandinavia, detections in the Balkans on the increase again

The decreasing trend observed in Scandinavian Member States continued into the reporting period. Denmark recorded the lowest number of detections since Q1 2014, Norway – since Q3 2014 and Sweden – since Q4 2015. The number of persons detected for illegal stay in Finland followed an opposite (increasing) trend.


<sup>1</sup> All data on detections of illegal stay in this chapter will consist only of those detections that were not made at BCPs on exit from the EU, because these cases are analysed in Chapter 'Border checks'.




# Returns



## Nationality of returned people, Q2 2017



## Decisions vs. Effective returns



The increase in the number of detections reported by Member States located along the Western Balkan route was probably linked to the closure of the Balkan corridor. In addition to the abovementioned rise in Greece, Bulgaria saw an increase of 27%, Croatia of 22%, Slovenia of 48% and Romania of 90%. A significant increase in the number of detected illegal stayers reported in Q2 2017 was associated with Pakistani nationals (mentioned above), as well as Albanians, Afghans and Iraqis.

### Fewer detections of Moroccan facilitators led to a 50% decrease in the overall number of facilitators detected in Q2 2017 over Q1 2017

In Q2 2017, Member States reported the arrest of 2 576 facilitators, which represents a decrease compared with both the previous quarter (9.7%) and Q2 2016 (28%). Notably, the decrease over Q1 2017 was observed at all border types, whereas the number of facilitators arrested inland remained virtually

unchanged (1 233) and accounts for almost half the overall number recorded in Q2. The number of Moroccan facilitators decreased most markedly, from 330 in Q1 2017 to 176 in Q2 2017, yet they remained the most frequently arrested facilitators.

The top four countries reporting most arrested facilitators in Q2 2017 were the same as in Q1 2017 and also Q2 2016: Spain, Italy, France and Greece. Together, these four countries account for 84% of the total, which is hardly surprising considering that they are frontline states most exposed to the strong migratory pressure in the Mediterranean.

### A significant fall in effective returns amid a stable trend of return decisions

In the second quarter of 2017, the authorities of Member States issued 69 674 return decisions to third-country nationals following an administrative or judicial decision. This number, despite a small increase in relation

to Q1 2017, is lower than that reported in the last three quarters of 2016. The changes in the composition of nationalities receiving return decisions reflect the changing composition of the incoming migratory flow, with different time lags resulting from differences in national procedures. Thus, the number of return decisions issued to citizens of Ukraine, Morocco and Albania increased in Q2 2017, whereas a marked decrease was recorded with regard to citizens of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The ratio of effective returns to return decisions decreased compared with Q1 2017. The number of persons effectively returned in Q2 2017 represented less than 50% of those issued with a return decision. By contrast, the ratio in Q2 2016 was 63%, which shows that it has been increasingly difficult to enforce return decisions. The decrease over Q1 2017 was mostly associated with the nationals of Asian countries, especially Pakistanis (a 33% fall to 1 389) and Iraqis (a 40% fall to 1 167).

## II. FEATURED RISK ANALYSES


# Turnaround in trend of detections of Bangladeshi nationals on the Central Mediterranean route

The increasing trend of Bangladeshi nationals, who became the third most detected nationality on the Central Mediterranean route, was discussed in some detail in the first issue of the FRAN Quarterly of 2017. While this trend continued into the second quarter, catapulting this group into the second position among most detected nationalities in the Central Mediterranean in Q2 2017, a turnaround was observed in May. Namely, the overall number of Bangladeshi nationals on the Central Mediterranean route (which accounted for 98% of their detections in Q2 2017 with the remainder detected exclusively in the Eastern Mediterranean) dropped from 2 492 to 1 174 detections in June. Thus, the number of Bangladeshis more than halved over the

period of just one month. Importantly, this reversal, which continued into July, was in sharp contrast to the overall trend of detections in the Central Mediterranean, which, as illustrated in Figure 1, was still increasing in June.

As discussed in detail in the previous FRAN Quarterly, the huge wealth gap between Bangladesh and Europe is the main motivation for the vast majority of Bangladeshi migrants – mostly young, unmarried males – to try to reach Europe in search of a better life, which is also confirmed by Frontex debriefing interviews. What was puzzling about the migration of this nationality was how Bangladeshis, unlike nationals of other Asian countries with similar push factors in place, were able to make this journey in such large numbers and why they almost exclusively arrived along the Central Mediterranean route. This seems to be largely explained by the fact that it was easy for workers recruited by legal recruiting agencies to obtain a certificate of Bangladesh's Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) enabling them to work abroad. Moreover, Bangladeshis holding a work visa could easily enter Libya (mostly via Istanbul Airport with a stopover in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar). With the BMET certificate, generally obtained through recruiting agencies, migrants were able to legally exit Bangladesh, but ran a serious risk of being later victimised by smugglers along the route. Many recruiting agencies are suspected of being directly involved in making arrangements with smugglers. Open sources indicate that some Bangladeshis who recently arrived in Italy had paid agencies up to EUR 7 000 for legal travel to Libya, and had been taken by local smugglers to safe houses upon arrival. The smuggler would then arrange for them

Figure 1. **Bangladeshi nationals detected on the Central Mediterranean route**




Source: FRAN data

to be further transferred to Europe by sea. Operational information also indicates that after picking up Bangladeshis from the airport, Libyan smugglers often provided them with temporary employment while the preparations for the onward journey were being made, often confiscating the migrants' passports.

The recent plunge in the number of Bangladeshis can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, Bangladeshi officials stated in May that the government would no longer allow travelling to Libya for work purposes and the persons who continue going there are assumed to be doing so illegally. Indeed, law-enforcement agencies seemed to have stepped up their efforts to stop human trafficking, even organising awareness campaigns. The level of effort taken by the Bangladeshi authorities to prevent legal recruiting agencies from obtaining BMET certificates for workers to be sent abroad might have played an important role in reducing the number of people travelling to Libya legally and subsequently crossing to Europe via the Central Mediterranean. Secondly, on 8 May 2017, the Libyan Passport Control Office banned the issuing of visas-on-arrival to the nationals of five countries (Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Syria and Bangladesh) at Tripoli Mitiga International Airport (MJI), the main airport used by migrants who arrive in Libya by air. The fact that Bangladeshi nationals have been included in the list could have some, if limited, impact, as many of them are known to arrive at Mitiga airport already holding a visa. However, the exact numbers of migrants who arrive with and without a visa are unknown.

Figure 2. **Detections of illegal border-crossing versus returns of Bangladeshis in EU/SAC**



Source: FRAN data

### Failure to effectively return Bangladeshi nationals remains a pull factor

While the number of detections of Bangladeshis illegally crossing the EU's external borders was high during the summer seasons of 2014–2016 and again in the spring and summer of 2017, return figures related to this nationality show a slowly declining trend.

In the first half of 2017, the number of return decisions issued by Member States was a quarter lower than in the same period of 2016. At the same time, the number of effective returns was less than half that of 2016. While Member States returned almost 1 699 Bangladeshi nationals in the first six months of 2016, this number decreased to 827 in the first half of 2017. Moreover, Q2 2017 registered the lowest level of returned Bangladeshis since FRAN data collection on effective returns commenced in 2011. In spite of the high asylum rejection rate of Bangladeshi nationals, Member States could not prevent the widening of the gap between Bangladeshis crossing the border illegally and those effectively returned.

### A typical case

A 19-year-old man told a Frontex debriefing team that he had left Bangladesh because of the poor economic situation of the country. He used the services of a facilitator, to whom he paid about BDT 500 000 (about EUR 5 230). The fee covered the entire journey to Libya, where he was instructed to contact another facilitator. Once he arrived in Libya, the other facilitator took him to a camp in Misratha, where he stayed for about seven months. He was allowed to leave the compound every day because he was working as an electrician. After he raised enough money to pay for the last leg of the journey (LYD 4 000, i.e. about EUR 2 500), he arranged with other facilitators to be taken to Tripoli. He stayed in a compound with a group of other migrants for about a month and at the end of May they were taken to a beach put on a boat to Catania (Italy), where they were disembarked.

Source: Frontex debriefing interview within the JO Triton 2017

# Latest developments on the Western Mediterranean migratory route

In the second quarter of 2017, 4 970 irregular migrants were reported on the Western Mediterranean route (land and sea detections), which represents a sharp increase (of almost 150%) compared with the same period in 2016 and a 21% increase in relation to the first quarter of 2017, when 4 096 irregular migrants were apprehended.


The number of migrants apprehended on the sea route leading from the northern coast of Morocco and Algeria towards Spain increased by 115%, from 1 878 in April-June 2016 to 4 035 in the same period of 2017. The number of attempts to storm the fence in the area of the two Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla increased by 706% in relation to one year before. The apprehensions at the sea borders of Ceuta and Melilla dropped by 84%.

One of the main reasons for the increase (from Q1 to Q2 2017) in sea and land crossings on the Western Mediterranean route is the persisting instability in the countries of origin and transit. In addition, the dismantling of makeshift camps in Morocco and Algeria acted as a push factor for many migrants to leave for Europe. The sharp increase in the number of migrants observed in June 2017 mainly re-

sulted from the arrival of large groups of Moroccan migrants sailing along the Atlantic coast aboard high-capacity boats, capable of carrying up to 70 persons. It turned out that they departed from the western coast of Morocco between Kenitra and Larache. In the Strait of Gibraltar, migrants were transported aboard the so-called 'mother boats', i.e. small fishing vessels carrying migrants from the area of Tangier to Spanish territorial waters. Once there, migrants were transferred into small rubber or toy dinghies and continued travelling towards the Spanish coast. In the Alboran Sea, a new type of vessel was reported as a 'mother boat', namely powerful speedboats that were used to transport migrants from Morocco to the Spanish SAR area, where they were transferred into smaller rubber boats and continued their journey towards Spain.

Unlike other routes (Central and Eastern Mediterranean), the Western Mediterranean route is used by less affluent migrants and remains an attractive option, despite a low rate of successful sea crossings. However, an increase in fees for crossing the Alboran Sea has been observed in 2017. While a few years ago, the average price was EUR 200–300, in 2017 it

Figure 3. **Detections on the Western Mediterranean sea route in 2016–2017**



Source: FRAN data

has increased to approximately EUR 500. This rise in fees on the Western Mediterranean route might have resulted from a growing number of sub-Saharan migrants stranded in the northern part of Morocco (Tanger, Nador) and, consequently, a higher demand for smuggling services.

It has to be mentioned that the migratory pressure on this route is even higher than the statistics indicate, considering the high number of migrants prevented by the Moroccan authorities from crossing the sea toward the southern coast of Spain. It is estimated that for each migrant who managed to reach the Spanish coast, two others were intercepted by the Moroccan authorities.

As regards the attempts to storm the fence in the area of Ceuta and Melilla, record figures were reported in Q1 2017, after a period when a decreasing number of apprehensions in the area of these two Spanish exclaves had been reported.

Moreover, many migrants continue their attempts to cross using ferry connections between Morocco and Spain with false documents or hiding in means of transport. The Spanish authorities regularly detect irregular migrants, in particular in the months of August and September, when cross-border traffic increases significantly.

In the second quarter of 2017, the most common nationalities detected for illegal border-crossing on the Western Mediterranean route were: Ivorian (970), Moroccan (809), Guinean (740), Gambian (619)

and Algerian (459). The most significant increase in the number of migrants compared with last year was reported with regard to Gambians, Ivorians and Moroccans, who are largely economic migrants.

In this context, it is worth highlighting the phenomenon of 'nationality swapping', i.e. migrants claiming to be of other nationality in order to avoid repatriation. On the Western Mediterranean route, it is mostly associated with Senegalese migrants, due to the fact that Spain has a readmission agreement with Senegal. Most of the Senegalese migrants claim to be from the Gambia, but they have no knowledge about this country. They claim that they are from Banjul, the capital of the country, or from Serekunda, its largest urban centre, but are unable to answer any questions about their supposed country of origin. This phenomenon could explain the sharp increase in the number of Gambians and the low number of Senegalese migrants. It is worth pointing out that the Senegalese diaspora is one of the largest migrant communities in Morocco. Hence, logically, the number of Senegalese migrants trying to reach Spain from Morocco should be much higher than it actually is.

Apprehensions were reported along the whole coast of Spain, with migrants departing from both Morocco and Algeria. As much as 91% of the total number of irregular migrants intercepted while trying to reach Spain departed from Morocco (both Moroccans and sub-Saharan), while the flow from Algeria (Algerians) accounted for the remaining 9%.

### A typical case

A 39-year-old Moroccan woman told a Frontex debriefing team that she hailed from the city of Larache on Morocco's western coastline, where she lived alone working in a shoe factory. About a month before the interview, while shopping, the interviewee met a woman in the streets of Larache, who told her that she knew a facilitator who could organise her crossing to Spain. The interviewee was told to prepare MAD 1 000 000 (about EUR 925) that she would have to pay to the facilitator before the departure. At the beginning of May, she took a taxi from Larache to Kenitra, a city also located on the Moroccan coastline. Once in Kenitra, she met the facilitator to whom she paid the agreed amount. At the meeting point, she was joined by another eight migrants. As soon as the sun set, the facilitator guided the group towards the beach. They departed aboard a blue wooden vessel, which was about five metres long and was equipped with an engine (see picture below). The interviewee was apprehended by the Guardia Civil on a beach near the Spanish village of Bolonia.

Source: Frontex debriefing interview within the JO Indalo 2017





# Minors at the EU's external borders

Minors are often overlooked when analysing the vast amount of FRAN data. Nevertheless, they account for a significant share of migratory flows heading towards the EU's external borders. In the first half of the year, 28.7% of the flow of irregular migrants to Greece from Turkey by sea were reportedly minors, 21.5% of the flow from Turkey to the EU overland and 14.5% of the flow to Italy. It should be noted that these figures include an unknown number of adults claiming to be minors in the hope of receiving special status. However, rather than concentrating on statistics in terms of absolute numbers, policy-makers should focus on the impact of this phenomenon.

In order to be able to assess the impact of the share of underage migrants reported at particular external borders of the EU, it is essential to analyse some crucial factors, such as push/pull factors, preferred routes, nationality profiles and *modi operandi*.

In the case of minors, the decision to leave the country tends to result from push factors such as conflict, rather than from pull factors such as better economic opportunities in the destination country. It has been observed that the share of minors coming from crisis-stricken areas is about one-third (similar to those of adult males and females). For instance, in the first half of 2017 minors accounted for 38% of irregular Syrian migrants arriving at the Greek-Turkish maritime borders, for 30% at the Greek and Bulgarian land border with Turkey, for 39% of Syrians arriving in Italy from Libya as well as 27% of those arriving in Italy from Turkey. On the same routes, the share of minors amongst Iraqi migrants ranged from 35% to 47%, and amongst Afghans – from 27% to 35%. On the other hand, the share of minors among irregular migrants is conspicuously low for nationals who are typically travelling to Europe for economic reasons. For instance, in the first half of 2017, the share of Pakistani minors was 15% at the Greek-Turkish mar-



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Figure 4. An adult migrant with a minor stranded on the island of Kos

itime borders and 7% at the Turkish land borders with the EU. Minors accounted for 13% of the Pakistani migrants who arrived in Italy from Turkey, while only 3% of Pakistanis arriving in Italy from Libya were minors. Similarly, the shares of minors among irregular migrants originating from West, Central and the Horn of Africa ranged from 8% to 18%.

The share of minors of a specific nationality may vary depending on the arduousness of the route on which they are detected. For example, Syrian nationals travelling with minors are known to prefer routes which are less perilous, especially in winter; therefore, they are more inclined to travel overland or, if they cross the sea, to minimise the risk. To give another example, in the first six months of 2017, no Algerian minors arrived from Turkey overland, and their share was very low among migrants arriving in Italy from Libya (1.3%) and Algeria (1.4%). However, almost 12% of the Algerians who landed on the Eastern Aegean Greek islands from Turkey were minors, which reflects the relative safety of this route.

The *modus operandi* used by minors (either travelling unaccompanied or with their families) is also distinctive. For instance, the number of ethnic Bedoons, i.e. stateless Kuwaiti nationals, arriving in Greece – the majority (62.1%) of whom were minors – increased significantly in the first six months of 2017: after February their total number per month exceeded 100 migrants. Typically, they entered Turkey and travelled to the Greek Eastern Aegean islands using forged documents (they claim

Table 2. **The percentage of minor migrants in the overall migratory flow, by nationality and route, January–June 2017**

	Migratory route						
	From Turkey to Greece by sea	From Turkey to Greece/Bulgaria by land	From Libya to Italy	From Turkey to Italy	From Algeria to Italy	From Tunisia to Italy	From Egypt to Italy (2016)
Syrian	38%	30%	39%	27%	-	-	25%
Iraqi	37%	47%	-	35%	-	-	44%
Pakistani	15%	7%	3%	13%	-	-	-
Afghan	35%	27%	-	35%	-	-	-
Algerian	12%	0%	1%	-	1%	0%	-
Egyptian	7%	0%	8%	-	-	-	69%
Stateless/ Kuwaiti	62%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malian	5%	-	14%	-	-	-	-
Ethiopian	2%	-	12%	0%	-	-	15%
Cameroonian	2%	0%	7%	-	-	0%	9%

- no arrivals of migrants of that nationality

Source: Frontex data as of 1 August 2017

that the Kuwaiti government refuses to provide them with official IDs or travel documents). Upon arrival in Greece, they applied for family reunification, as the vast majority of them have relatives who are legally staying in the EU (mainly in the United Kingdom). The large share of Egyptian minors who arrived in Italy from Egypt in 2016 (69% of the total), serves as another example. Even though Italy has a well-established readmission agreement with Egypt, special measures apply to Egyptian minors (many of whom arrive unaccompanied) who often abscond from reception centres and try to get a job.

The fact that minors arrive in the EU in high numbers has a wide range of consequences. Firstly, minors obviously need

special care. Secondly, if they come unaccompanied, they require further attention. The travel patterns of unaccompanied minors are different from those who travel with their families. Notably, unaccompanied minors are highly exposed to criminality, including trafficking in human beings (e.g. in connection with child prostitution, begging, etc.).

In conclusion, examining shares of minors is a useful tool for monitoring migration patterns, migrant profiles, routes and *modus operandi*. Beyond this, the awareness of the impact of migration flows of minors is the basis for authorities to take proper mitigation measures.

## III. STATISTICAL ANNEX

### LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 4 August 2017,  
unless otherwise indicated



Annex Table 1. **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>All Borders</b>									
Nigeria	3 501	8 527	15 339	10 444	3 192	<b>11 002</b>	29	245	14
Côte d'Ivoire	1 758	4 387	3 868	4 287	3 306	<b>5 810</b>	32	76	7.6
Bangladesh	624	776	5 508	2 537	2 905	<b>5 515</b>	611	90	7.3
Guinea	2 434	4 385	3 741	5 425	3 990	<b>5 362</b>	22	34	7.1
Syria	76 048	4 241	4 481	3 927	3 301	<b>4 377</b>	3.2	33	5.8
Eritrea	807	8 575	6 777	5 190	657	<b>3 998</b>	-53	509	5.3
Mali	1 523	2 636	3 086	3 025	1 163	<b>3 691</b>	40	217	4.9
Sudan	802	4 311	3 598	804	482	<b>3 539</b>	-18	634	4.7
Gambia	2 487	3 585	3 312	3 543	2 637	<b>3 315</b>	-7.5	26	4.4
Pakistan	6 956	3 361	4 308	3 348	2 144	<b>3 304</b>	-1.7	54	4.4
Other	187 585	30 506	28 888	26 120	15 936	<b>26 040</b>	-15	63	34
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>284 525</b>	<b>75 290</b>	<b>82 906</b>	<b>68 650</b>	<b>39 713</b>	<b>75 953</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Albania	1 436	1 443	1 124	1 313	1 553	<b>1 659</b>	15	6.8	26
Pakistan	1 438	2 119	1 518	1 444	1 070	<b>1 213</b>	-43	13	19
Syria	1 630	1 717	1 274	1 299	1 223	<b>1 055</b>	-39	-14	16
Iraq	1 553	1 103	852	533	408	<b>592</b>	-46	45	9.1
Afghanistan	1 289	6 061	2 677	2 144	1 295	<b>392</b>	-94	-70	6
Turkey	209	350	186	176	166	<b>265</b>	-24	60	4.1
Kosovo*	336	163	265	163	239	<b>165</b>	1.2	-31	2.5
Algeria	243	108	101	175	316	<b>152</b>	41	-52	2.3
Guinea	31	48	87	456	502	<b>108</b>	125	-78	1.7
Bangladesh	137	110	99	147	61	<b>78</b>	-29	28	1.2
Other	104 488	1 505	1 232	1 211	1 230	<b>825</b>	-45	-33	13
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>112 790</b>	<b>14 727</b>	<b>9 415</b>	<b>9 061</b>	<b>8 063</b>	<b>6 504</b>	<b>-56</b>	<b>-19</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Nigeria	3 481	8 509	15 332	10 437	3 179	<b>10 988</b>	29	246	16
Côte d'Ivoire	1 754	4 367	3 847	4 221	3 232	<b>5 754</b>	32	78	8.3
Bangladesh	487	666	5 409	2 390	2 844	<b>5 437</b>	716	91	7.8
Guinea	2 403	4 337	3 654	4 969	3 488	<b>5 254</b>	21	51	7.6
Eritrea	775	8 565	6 760	5 184	645	<b>3 994</b>	-53	519	5.8
Mali	1 520	2 624	3 065	3 017	1 160	<b>3 688</b>	41	218	5.3
Sudan	794	4 304	3 596	795	480	<b>3 538</b>	-18	637	5.1
Syria	74 418	2 524	3 207	2 628	2 078	<b>3 322</b>	32	60	4.8
Gambia	2 485	3 572	3 298	3 499	2 573	<b>3 298</b>	-7.7	28	4.7
Morocco	1 137	856	1 246	2 773	1 945	<b>3 261</b>	281	68	4.7
Other	82 481	20 239	24 077	19 676	10 026	<b>20 915</b>	3.3	109	30
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>171 735</b>	<b>60 563</b>	<b>73 491</b>	<b>59 589</b>	<b>31 650</b>	<b>69 449</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

## Annex Table 2. **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	571	372	584	369	438	<b>485</b>	30	11	92
Sea	19	31	62	20	17	<b>43</b>	39	153	8.1
Air	.	.	0	.	.	.	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	40	32	102	58	193	<b>269</b>	741	39	51
Guinea	72	112	86	90	94	<b>109</b>	-2.7	16	21
Eritrea	.	.	1	.	4	<b>21</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	425	4
Yemen	.	.	.	.	.	<b>17</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	3.2
Algeria	68	10	26	22	24	<b>16</b>	60	-33	3
Sudan	.	0	2	.	2	<b>12</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	500	2.3
Pakistan	7	10	15	24	35	<b>11</b>	10	-69	2.1
Congo (D.R.)	.	2	10	14	7	<b>11</b>	450	57	2.1
Gambia	.	.	5	3	5	<b>11</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	120	2.1
Côte d'Ivoire	1	.	4	.	4	<b>6</b>	<i>n.a.</i>	50	1.1
Other	402	237	395	178	87	<b>45</b>	-81	-48	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 3. Facilitators

Detections reported at the external borders, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Place of Detection	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
Inland	1 012	1 744	1 129	1 314	1 235	<b>1 233</b>	-29	-0.2	48
Land	412	210	532	817	956	<b>853</b>	306	-11	33
Land Intra EU	144	159	179	397	208	<b>198</b>	25	-4.8	7.7
Sea	350	214	227	171	312	<b>186</b>	-13	-40	7.2
Air	51	53	58	83	66	<b>59</b>	11	-11	2.3
Not specified	1 003	1 195	597	517	76	<b>47</b>	-96	-38	1.8
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Morocco	323	313	255	341	330	<b>176</b>	-44	-47	6.8
Spain	205	170	141	122	129	<b>170</b>	0	32	6.6
Italy	129	203	65	106	141	<b>164</b>	-19	16	6.4
Albania	116	148	164	258	192	<b>162</b>	9.5	-16	6.3
France	126	175	97	92	116	<b>129</b>	-26	11	5
Not specified	290	644	506	529	298	<b>119</b>	-82	-60	4.6
Pakistan	102	112	75	75	75	<b>102</b>	-8.9	36	4
Ukraine	18	53	32	35	41	<b>86</b>	62	110	3.3
Dominican Republic	11	25	15	12	12	<b>83</b>	232	592	3.2
Nigeria	45	59	33	72	65	<b>82</b>	39	26	3.2
Other	1 607	1 673	1 339	1 657	1 454	<b>1 303</b>	-22	-10	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 972</b>	<b>3 575</b>	<b>2 722</b>	<b>3 299</b>	<b>2 853</b>	<b>2 576</b>	<b>-28</b>	<b>-9.7</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 4. Illegal stay

Detections reported at the external borders and inland, by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Place of Detection	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
Inland	108 498	95 885	106 896	92 593	89 036	<b>87 140</b>	-9.1	-2.1	83
Air	12 030	12 281	13 391	12 645	10 979	<b>10 595</b>	-14	-3.5	10
Land	4 499	5 054	6 680	12 108	5 292	<b>6 581</b>	30	24	6.2
Land Intra EU	1 132	1 478	1 602	1 726	1 118	<b>977</b>	-34	-13	0.9
Sea	88	161	171	158	151	<b>169</b>	5	12	0.2
Not specified	.	1 162	0	.	.	.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Between BCPs*	1 082	598	.	.	.	.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Morocco	9 055	6 732	6 938	7 317	8 395	<b>8 019</b>	19	-4.5	7.6
Ukraine	5 195	6 642	8 068	9 091	7 275	<b>8 002</b>	20	10	7.6
Albania	4 951	4 771	6 430	7 975	6 417	<b>6 125</b>	28	-4.6	5.8
Afghanistan	16 135	14 306	11 946	8 359	5 447	<b>5 507</b>	-62	1.1	5.2
Pakistan	4 708	5 201	4 895	4 769	4 637	<b>5 096</b>	-2	9.9	4.8
Algeria	4 638	3 849	4 255	4 532	4 811	<b>4 302</b>	12	-11	4.1
Iraq	13 054	6 671	5 850	6 308	5 191	<b>3 947</b>	-41	-24	3.7
Sudan	532	1 997	2 935	1 691	1 607	<b>3 783</b>	89	135	3.6
Nigeria	3 271	3 408	4 222	3 937	3 826	<b>3 612</b>	6	-5.6	3.4
Syria	14 009	7 129	5 999	4 496	3 087	<b>3 293</b>	-54	6.7	3.1
Other	51 781	55 913	67 202	60 755	55 883	<b>53 776</b>	-3.8	-3.8	51
<b>Total</b>	<b>127 329</b>	<b>116 619</b>	<b>128 740</b>	<b>119 230</b>	<b>106 576</b>	<b>105 462</b>	<b>-9.6</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Since July 2016 detections 'between BCPs' are no longer available accordance with new template for Illegal stay indicator.

Annex Table 5. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>All Borders</b>									
Ukraine	6 185	6 733	7 940	6 952	8 511	<b>9 052</b>	34	6.4	19
Albania	3 585	4 715	4 841	6 410	7 899	<b>9 007</b>	91	14	19
Russia	5 380	18 591	41 536	14 747	7 716	<b>8 795</b>	-53	14	19
Belarus	1 368	1 222	1 524	1 868	1 609	<b>1 849</b>	51	15	3.9
Serbia	1 919	1 634	1 759	1 566	1 816	<b>1 767</b>	8.1	-2.7	3.7
Moldova	744	1 000	932	1 193	1 298	<b>1 306</b>	31	0.6	2.8
Turkey	540	641	1 227	870	1 007	<b>1 207</b>	88	20	2.6
Morocco	1 708	1 208	912	855	1 128	<b>947</b>	-22	-16	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	987	1 387	804	929	966	<b>900</b>	-35	-6.8	1.9
Brazil	848	941	841	1 104	933	<b>865</b>	-8.1	-7.3	1.8
Other	12 185	13 615	14 385	17 473	12 021	<b>11 508</b>	-15	-4.3	24
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>35 449</b>	<b>51 687</b>	<b>76 701</b>	<b>53 967</b>	<b>44 904</b>	<b>47 203</b>	<b>-8.7</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Ukraine	5 916	6 372	7 566	6 558	8 132	<b>8 589</b>	35	5.6	28
Russia	5 117	18 291	41 165	14 393	7 439	<b>8 363</b>	-54	12	28
Albania	1 701	2 871	3 078	2 879	3 999	<b>5 400</b>	88	35	18
Belarus	1 347	1 187	1 472	1 819	1 565	<b>1 794</b>	51	15	5.9
Serbia	1 679	1 409	1 567	1 341	1 518	<b>1 471</b>	4.4	-3.1	4.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	942	1 315	754	867	907	<b>838</b>	-36	-7.6	2.8
Turkey	284	345	774	533	690	<b>774</b>	124	12	2.6
Moldova	419	638	606	829	802	<b>741</b>	16	-7.6	2.4
Tajikistan	1 649	2 512	2 549	1 471	671	<b>491</b>	-80	-27	1.6
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	417	293	451	324	451	<b>384</b>	31	-15	1.3
Other	3 447	3 260	2 820	7 075	2 241	<b>1 505</b>	-54	-33	5
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>22 918</b>	<b>38 493</b>	<b>62 802</b>	<b>38 089</b>	<b>28 415</b>	<b>30 350</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Air Borders</b>									
Albania	1 152	1 050	937	2 126	2 195	<b>2 087</b>	99	-4.9	15
Brazil	843	927	832	1 092	924	<b>854</b>	-7.9	-7.6	6
Moldova	321	359	324	363	494	<b>565</b>	57	14	4
Colombia	248	393	408	491	623	<b>467</b>	19	-25	3.3
India	328	341	370	275	285	<b>447</b>	31	57	3.1
Ukraine	262	333	348	382	374	<b>427</b>	28	14	3
Russia	249	289	349	315	255	<b>415</b>	44	63	2.9
Georgia	89	80	110	105	116	<b>389</b>	386	235	2.7
United States	327	398	424	336	396	<b>377</b>	-5.3	-4.8	2.7
Algeria	468	326	433	436	424	<b>350</b>	7.4	-17	2.5
Other	6 858	7 141	7 288	7 755	7 692	<b>7 839</b>	9.8	1.9	55
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>11 145</b>	<b>11 637</b>	<b>11 823</b>	<b>13 676</b>	<b>13 778</b>	<b>14 217</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Albania	732	794	826	1 405	1 705	<b>1 520</b>	91	-11	58
Morocco	246	246	278	228	482	<b>440</b>	79	-8.7	17
Turkey	22	70	171	49	45	<b>93</b>	33	107	3.5
Afghanistan	46	32	42	42	46	<b>66</b>	106	43	2.5
Algeria	32	26	29	14	34	<b>55</b>	112	62	2.1
Iraq	31	17	62	66	27	<b>40</b>	135	48	1.5
Ukraine	7	28	26	12	5	<b>36</b>	29	620	1.4
Tunisia	33	49	53	31	26	<b>35</b>	-29	35	1.3
Syria	31	30	87	25	31	<b>34</b>	13	9.7	1.3
Iran	25	17	30	18	10	<b>28</b>	65	180	1.1
Other	181	248	472	312	300	<b>289</b>	17	-3.7	11
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 386</b>	<b>1 557</b>	<b>2 076</b>	<b>2 202</b>	<b>2 711</b>	<b>2 636</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>-2.8</b>	<b>100</b>

## Annex Table 6. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders, by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2017 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>												
Ukraine	9 052	17	31	2 260	1	4 334	339	680	440	36	977	9 115
Albania	9 007	28	43	79	4	3 387	413	2 467	2 425	67	197	9 110
Russia	8 795	15	8	7 608	7	399	78	229	70	320	96	8 830
Belarus	1 849	21	3	533	2	256	99	415	74	295	168	1 866
Serbia	1 767	39	9	86	2	243	790	219	381	5	6	1 780
Moldova	1 306	1	5	175	0	703	85	258	116	6	20	1 369
Turkey	1 207	124	17	507	7	146	339	44	34	7	9	1 234
Morocco	947	57	12	122	21	483	59	79	77	59	9	978
Bosnia and Herzegovina	900	178	0	14	0	360	55	234	52	5	2	900
Brazil	865	2	2	140	0	289	30	37	80	8	291	879
Other	11 508	1 035	343	2 806	183	3 510	392	832	695	155	1 984	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47 203</b>	<b>1 517</b>	<b>473</b>	<b>14 330</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>14 110</b>	<b>2 679</b>	<b>5 494</b>	<b>4 444</b>	<b>963</b>	<b>3 759</b>	<b>47 996</b>

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the EU;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the EU.

## Annex Table 7. Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry reported at the external borders, by reason for refusal and border type

	2016				2017		2017 Q2			Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		per cent of total	
							year ago	prev. Qtr		
<b>All Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	11 358	25 323	52 177	22 874	14 006	<b>14 330</b>	-43	2.3	30	Russia (53%)
E) No justification	9 522	9 973	9 194	12 618	14 074	<b>14 110</b>	41	0.3	29	Ukraine (31%)
G) No subsistence	3 170	3 427	3 730	6 592	4 360	<b>5 494</b>	60	26	11	Albania (45%)
H) Alert issued	2 530	2 680	3 111	3 734	3 913	<b>4 444</b>	66	14	9.3	Albania (55%)
Reason not available	4 209	5 917	3 582	3 818	3 439	<b>3 759</b>	-36	9.3	7.8	Ukraine (26%)
F) Over 3 month stay	2 261	1 719	2 326	2 336	2 977	<b>2 679</b>	56	-10	5.6	Serbia (29%)
A) No valid document	1 317	1 487	1 590	1 156	1 319	<b>1 517</b>	2	15	3.2	Not specified (13%)
I) Threat	728	791	829	874	886	<b>963</b>	22	8.7	2	Russia (33%)
B) False document	370	281	364	506	401	<b>473</b>	68	18	1	Albania (9%)
D) False visa	170	187	221	242	232	<b>227</b>	21	-2.2	0.5	Morocco (9%)
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>35 635</b>	<b>51 785</b>	<b>77 124</b>	<b>54 750</b>	<b>45 607</b>	<b>47 996</b>	<b>-7.3</b>	<b>5.2</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Land Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	9 299	23 012	49 286	20 364	11 574	<b>11 713</b>	-49	1.2	38	Russia (63%)
E) No justification	5 172	5 276	4 779	6 761	7 503	<b>7 795</b>	48	3.9	26	Ukraine (53%)
G) No subsistence	1 920	2 305	2 536	4 954	2 722	<b>4 067</b>	76	49	13	Albania (54%)
H) Alert issued	1 616	1 668	1 979	1 945	1 866	<b>2 270</b>	36	22	7.5	Albania (45%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 731	1 254	1 768	1 732	2 294	<b>2 019</b>	61	-1.2	6.6	Serbia (37%)
Reason not available	1 901	3 449	1 051	1 085	1 146	<b>1 183</b>	-66	3.2	3.9	Ukraine (78%)
I) Threat	476	571	644	651	656	<b>732</b>	28	1.2	2.4	Russia (42%)
A) No valid document	711	902	684	438	563	<b>558</b>	-38	-0.9	1.8	Bosnia and Herzegovina (31%)
B) False document	85	54	74	144	84	<b>92</b>	70	9.5	0.3	Ukraine (27%)
D) False visa	33	42	33	65	64	<b>28</b>	-33	-56	0.1	Thailand (18%)
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>22 944</b>	<b>38 533</b>	<b>62 834</b>	<b>38 139</b>	<b>28 472</b>	<b>30 457</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Air Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	3 962	4 301	3 990	5 353	5 781	<b>5 470</b>	27	-5.4	37	Albania (20%)
C) No valid visa	1 942	2 138	2 606	2 362	2 308	<b>2 401</b>	12	4	16	Russia (7%)
Reason not available	2 148	2 279	2 407	2 491	2 160	<b>2 381</b>	4.5	10	16	Brazil (12%)
G) No subsistence	959	868	1 006	1 324	1 337	<b>1 331</b>	53	-0.4	8.9	Albania (16%)
H) Alert issued	643	657	630	1 040	991	<b>1 188</b>	81	20	8	Albania (40%)
A) No valid document	506	465	431	540	529	<b>769</b>	65	45	5.2	Not specified (23%)
F) Over 3 month stay	510	442	523	579	645	<b>598</b>	35	-7.3	4	Albania (17%)
B) False document	276	207	276	354	305	<b>362</b>	75	19	2.4	Not specified (10%)
I) Threat	221	194	167	198	204	<b>206</b>	6.2	1	1.4	Albania (20%)
D) False visa	132	141	177	166	160	<b>196</b>	39	23	1.3	Morocco (8%)
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>11 299</b>	<b>11 692</b>	<b>12 213</b>	<b>14 407</b>	<b>14 420</b>	<b>14 902</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>100</b>	
<b>Sea Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
H) Alert issued	268	355	502	749	1 056	<b>986</b>	178	-6.6	37	Albania (95%)
E) No justification	386	396	425	504	790	<b>845</b>	113	7	32	Albania (52%)
C) No valid visa	117	173	285	148	124	<b>216</b>	25	74	8.2	Turkey (15%)
Reason not available	160	189	124	242	133	<b>195</b>	3.2	47	7.4	Albania (16%)
A) No valid document	100	120	475	178	227	<b>190</b>	58	-16	7.2	Turkey (22%)
G) No subsistence	290	254	188	314	301	<b>96</b>	-62	-68	3.6	Albania (65%)
F) Over 3-month stay	20	23	35	25	38	<b>62</b>	170	63	2.4	Albania (48%)
I) Threat	31	26	18	25	26	<b>25</b>	-3.8	-3.8	0.9	Albania (88%)
B) False document	9	20	14	8	12	<b>19</b>	-5	58	0.7	Not specified (26%)
D) False visa	5	4	11	11	8	<b>3</b>	-25	-63	0.1	Morocco (67%)
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>1 386</b>	<b>1 560</b>	<b>2 077</b>	<b>2 204</b>	<b>2 715</b>	<b>2 637</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>100</b>	

### Annex Table 8. Document fraud

Fraudulent document users detected on entry from third countries, by border type and top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Border Type</b>									
Air	1 105	957	1 182	1 124	980	<b>1 124</b>	17	15	67
Land	677	607	566	475	532	<b>480</b>	-21	-9.8	29
Sea	60	58	115	118	80	<b>77</b>	33	-3.7	4.6
Unknown	.	.	.	.	23	<b>1</b>	n.a.	-96	0.1
<b>Top Ten Nationalities Claimed</b>									
Ukraine	347	339	326	196	250	<b>252</b>	-26	0.8	15
Morocco	168	142	223	219	202	<b>147</b>	3.5	-27	8.7
Not specified	231	158	172	149	128	<b>146</b>	-7.6	14	8.7
Iran	73	92	95	115	57	<b>88</b>	-4.3	54	5.2
Albania	87	94	67	138	110	<b>81</b>	-14	-26	4.8
Turkey	72	36	52	50	44	<b>65</b>	81	48	3.9
Russia	24	39	39	41	83	<b>52</b>	33	-37	3.1
Syria	67	52	55	60	41	<b>48</b>	-7.7	17	2.9
Senegal	31	25	35	20	20	<b>41</b>	64	105	2.4
Congo (D.R.)	28	31	39	25	15	<b>37</b>	19	147	2.2
Other	714	614	760	704	665	<b>725</b>	18	9	43
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 842</b>	<b>1 622</b>	<b>1 863</b>	<b>1 717</b>	<b>1 615</b>	<b>1 682</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 9. Document fraud

False documents detected on entry from third country to the EU or Schengen area, by type of document

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on		
							year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Document Type</b>									
Passports	744	613	701	712	656	783	28	19	38
ID cards	256	268	281	371	299	311	16	4	15
Visas	580	502	629	404	465	459	-8.6	-1.3	22
Residence permits	289	258	318	302	298	282	9.3	-5.4	14
Stamps	197	195	223	218	183	179	-8.2	-2.2	8.6
Other	55	46	41	64	61	56	22	-8.2	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 121</b>	<b>1 882</b>	<b>2 193</b>	<b>2 071</b>	<b>1 962</b>	<b>2 070</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 10. Return decisions issued

Return decisions issued, by top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Ukraine	4 402	5 954	6 582	7 711	6 459	<b>7 191</b>	21	11	10
Morocco	5 773	5 509	5 336	5 823	5 356	<b>6 891</b>	25	29	9.9
Albania	4 610	4 132	4 367	5 072	4 162	<b>4 483</b>	8.5	7.7	6.4
Afghanistan	6 706	8 728	8 774	10 188	6 424	<b>4 030</b>	-54	-37	5.8
Iraq	5 805	6 579	7 350	8 730	5 062	<b>3 938</b>	-40	-22	5.7
Pakistan	4 468	3 340	4 368	3 862	3 696	<b>3 583</b>	7.3	-3.1	5.1
Algeria	1 692	1 874	2 651	3 277	2 183	<b>2 373</b>	27	8.7	3.4
Syria	2 210	1 800	2 272	3 567	1 914	<b>1 809</b>	0.5	-5.5	2.6
India	2 314	2 148	1 898	1 999	1 924	<b>1 740</b>	-19	-9.6	2.5
Brazil	986	1 313	1 252	1 472	1 544	<b>1 619</b>	23	4.9	2.3
Other	28 067	32 457	33 821	34 126	30 091	<b>32 017</b>	-1.4	6.4	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>67 033</b>	<b>73 834</b>	<b>78 671</b>	<b>85 827</b>	<b>68 815</b>	<b>69 674</b>	<b>-5.6</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>100</b>

### Annex Table 11. Effective returns

Effective returns to third countries, by top ten nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	prev. Qtr	
							year ago		
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Albania	6 974	6 897	6 509	6 819	6 303	<b>6 351</b>	-7.9	0.8	18
Ukraine	3 704	4 859	5 836	6 607	4 873	<b>6 153</b>	27	26	18
Morocco	3 054	2 166	1 803	1 663	1 631	<b>1 574</b>	-27	-3.5	4.6
Pakistan	2 084	1 734	1 184	1 371	2 076	<b>1 389</b>	-20	-33	4
Iraq	3 983	3 407	2 328	2 154	1 937	<b>1 167</b>	-66	-40	3.4
Serbia	1 832	1 914	1 630	1 465	1 321	<b>1 134</b>	-41	-14	3.3
Russia	858	914	992	927	1 068	<b>1 133</b>	24	6.1	3.3
Algeria	927	844	769	899	1 123	<b>983</b>	16	-12	2.9
Kosovo*	2 159	1 904	2 104	1 491	1 336	<b>935</b>	-51	-30	2.7
India	3 252	2 505	1 336	1 309	1 587	<b>932</b>	-63	-41	2.7
Other	18 354	19 317	15 331	17 099	16 681	<b>12 716</b>	-34	-24	37
<b>Total</b>	<b>47 181</b>	<b>46 461</b>	<b>39 822</b>	<b>41 804</b>	<b>39 936</b>	<b>34 467</b>	<b>-26</b>	<b>-14</b>	<b>100</b>

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. Since October 2015 data for Austria are not available.



Annex Table 12. **Effective returns by type of return**

Effective returns to third countries, by type of return and top ten nationalities

TYPE OF RETURN	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share	Nationality
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on				
							year ago	prev. Qtr			
<b>Voluntary</b>	<b>25 352</b>	<b>24 993</b>	<b>20 231</b>	<b>21 518</b>	<b>20 976</b>	<b>17 477</b>	<b>-30</b>	<b>-17</b>	<b>51</b>		
Others	18 034	15 883	12 360	15 240	13 972	<b>12 424</b>	-22	-11	36	Poland (42%)	
IOM assisted	3 750	5 821	6 719	4 870	5 870	<b>4 155</b>	-29	-29	12	Greece (32%)	
Not specified	3 568	3 289	1 152	1 408	1 134	<b>898</b>	-73	-21	2.6	Spain (51%)	
<b>Forced</b>	<b>17 425</b>	<b>21 435</b>	<b>19 583</b>	<b>20 198</b>	<b>18 755</b>	<b>16 949</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>-9.6</b>	<b>49</b>		
Enforced by Member State	12 393	15 748	14 134	15 777	14 254	<b>13 575</b>	-14	-4.8	39	Greece (25%)	
Not specified	4 102	4 116	3 693	3 386	3 083	<b>2 586</b>	-37	-16	7.5	Spain (38%)	
Enforced by Joint Operation	930	1 571	1 756	1 035	1 418	<b>788</b>	-50	-44	2.3	Germany (69%)	
<b>Not specified</b>	<b>4 404</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>-80</b>	<b>0.1</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>47 181</b>	<b>46 461</b>	<b>39 822</b>	<b>41 804</b>	<b>39 936</b>	<b>34 467</b>	<b>-26</b>	<b>-14</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>TOP TEN NATIONALITIES</b>											
<b>Voluntary</b>											
Ukraine	3 270	4 351	5 306	5 987	4 402	<b>5 451</b>	25	24	31		
Iraq	3 732	3 226	1 742	1 930	1 734	<b>997</b>	-69	-43	5.7		
Pakistan	1 444	1 068	812	944	1 460	<b>979</b>	-8.3	-33	5.6		
Albania	1 668	1 407	1 226	1 225	1 130	<b>901</b>	-36	-20	5.2		
Russia	707	681	760	576	719	<b>767</b>	13	6.7	4.4		
India	2 855	2 181	948	904	1 201	<b>666</b>	-69	-45	3.8		
Afghanistan	619	1 465	1 048	937	1 016	<b>527</b>	-64	-48	3		
Georgia	189	302	332	391	447	<b>456</b>	51	2	2.6		
Moldova	167	268	371	494	407	<b>445</b>	66	9.3	2.5		
Algeria	138	186	184	307	436	<b>427</b>	130	-2.1	2.4		
Other	10 563	9 858	7 502	7 823	8 024	<b>5 861</b>	-41	-27	34		
<b>Total Voluntary Returns</b>	<b>25 352</b>	<b>24 993</b>	<b>20 231</b>	<b>21 518</b>	<b>20 976</b>	<b>17 477</b>	<b>-30</b>	<b>-17.0</b>	<b>100</b>		
<b>Forced</b>											
Albania	3 172	5 471	5 279	5 558	5 162	<b>5 433</b>	-0.8	5.1	32		
Morocco	1 890	1 885	1 642	1 486	1 378	<b>1 167</b>	-38	-15	6.9		
Serbia	1 128	1 308	1 061	814	800	<b>778</b>	-41	-2.7	4.6		
Ukraine	413	507	530	620	471	<b>702</b>	37	48	4.1		
Tunisia	484	623	635	988	598	<b>668</b>	10	15	4.1		
Kosovo*	1 378	1 293	1 384	896	784	<b>631</b>	-51	-20	3.7		
Algeria	602	658	585	592	687	<b>556</b>	-16	-19	3.3		
Nigeria	438	358	353	398	535	<b>437</b>	22	-19	2.6		
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	341	547	391	397	332	<b>431</b>	-21	30	2.6		
Pakistan	342	666	372	427	616	<b>410</b>	-38	-33	2.4		
Other	7 237	8 119	7 351	8 022	7 392	<b>5 716</b>	-30	-24	33		
<b>Total Forced Returns</b>	<b>17 425</b>	<b>21 435</b>	<b>19 583</b>	<b>20 198</b>	<b>18 755</b>	<b>16 949</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>100</b>		

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Annex Table 13. **Passenger flow on entry**

Passenger flow reported at the external borders, by border type and group of nationalities

	2016				2017		2017 Q2		per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. Qtr	
<b>Border Type</b>									
Air	36 532 437	39 424 006	49 336 400	38 346 824	33 119 225	<b>38 591 770</b>	-2.1	17	54
Land	25 761 705	24 966 971	34 558 469	24 979 444	23 004 582	<b>28 650 431</b>	15	25	40
Sea	2 892 076	5 383 035	7 986 795	3 017 360	2 040 773	<b>4 286 045</b>	-20	110	6
<b>Nationality</b>									
Not specified	42 449 591	47 499 753	60 489 692	43 650 662	34 753 279	<b>42 292 194</b>	-11	22	59
EU	12 069 085	12 448 972	19 756 131	12 238 250	11 314 528	<b>15 368 665</b>	23	36	21
Third country requiring visa	9 030 387	8 127 838	9 465 170	8 741 198	10 377 955	<b>11 606 157</b>	43	12	16
Third country not requiring visa	1 637 155	1 697 449	2 170 671	1 713 518	1 718 818	<b>2 261 230</b>	33	32	3.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>65 186 218</b>	<b>69 774 012</b>	<b>91 881 664</b>	<b>66 343 628</b>	<b>58 164 580</b>	<b>71 528 246</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100</b>

## Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data concerning all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked countries including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain, and in Greece (these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A). Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data concerning the apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data concerning detections on exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders of Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For the United Kingdom, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.

The data on return decisions issued (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not available for Ireland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data on effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7B) are not available for Ireland. In addition, the data of effective returns are not disaggregated by return operation (voluntary and forced) for Spain. The data on voluntary effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7A) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (IOM-assisted and others) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland and the Netherlands. The data on forced effective returns (FRAN Indicator 7B) are not disaggregated by type of return operation (enforced by Member States and by Joint Operations) for Belgium, Finland, Iceland and the Netherlands.



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**For public release**

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 24200/2017

TT-AF-17-002-EN-N  
ISSN 2363-0566

Warsaw, December 2017