

# FRAN Quarterly

ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4







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#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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## List of abbreviations used

<b>BCP</b>	border-crossing point
<b>BCU</b>	border control unit
<b>CeCLAD-M</b>	Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée
<b>CIESTCA</b>	International Centre for Tourism Studies of the Canary Islands
<b>COD, DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa)
<b>COG</b>	Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EDF</b>	European Union Document-Fraud
<b>EDF-ARA</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Annual Risk Analysis
<b>EDF-RAN</b>	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
<b>EMSA</b>	European Maritime Safety Agency
<b>EPN</b>	European Patrol Network
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EUR</b>	euro
<b>FRAN</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
<b>fYROM</b>	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<b>ID</b>	identity document
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>JO</b>	Joint Operation
<b>MS</b>	Member State
<b>RAU</b>	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
<b>SIS</b>	Schengen Information System
<b>TRA</b>	Tailored Risk Analysis
<b>TRACECA</b>	Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
<b>UEFA Euro</b>	European Football Championship of the Union of European Football Associations
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States of America
<b>USD</b>	United States dollar
<b>VIS</b>	Visa Information System
<b>WB</b>	Western Balkans
<b>WB-ARA</b>	Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis
<b>WB-RAN</b>	Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network

## Executive summary

Taken as a whole, in Q2 2012, detections of illegal border-crossing were reduced by nearly half compared to the same quarter in 2011 due to the simultaneous effects of the winding down of the Arab Spring and fewer Albanian circular migrants entering Greece. However, detections at the undisputed long-term hotspot for irregular migration – the Greek land border with Turkey – were some 25% higher than during the same period in 2011 due to increased detections of migrants from Bangladesh and particularly Syria.

Based on detections of illegal border-crossing and on refusals of entry, irregular migration pressure at the external border of the EU increased seasonally during the second quarter of 2012. Indeed, the seasonal increase of more than two-thirds in detections of illegal border-crossing was the most significant change in any indicator at the EU level. Other indicators exchanged by the FRAN community, such as detections of facilitators and illegal stayers, applications for international protection and effective returns, suggested stable or declining trends compared to recent reporting periods.

Consistent with the majority of reporting periods either side of the Arab Spring, at the EU level the migrants most commonly detected illegally crossing the external border were from Afghanistan with 20% of the total and a steady trend compared to the year before. Of all detected Afghans, the majority were detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey, and are believed to have been previously resident in Iran, where permissions to stay have been increasingly revoked. At the EU level, Afghans were also the nationality that (1) submitted the most applications for international protection, mostly

in Germany and also with a steady trend; (2) were most often detected during clandestine entry, mainly into Hungary; (3) were most frequently detected as illegal stayers, primarily at their point of entry – Greece; and (4) were subject to the most decisions to leave – chiefly in Greece.

In contrast to the steady trends reported for the most commonly detected nationality, detections of all other top-six nationalities of illegal border crossers increased compared to a year before. These included: migrants from Bangladesh (+35%), who departed from countries around the Persian Gulf where they had been working legally in the construction business; migrants from Syria (+639%), who do not require visas to enter Turkey and so only needed facilitation from Istanbul in order to reach Greece; and migrants from Somalia (+62%) who were mostly detected arriving at the blue border of Malta on boats from Libya.

Without question in Q2 2012, the most significant development in terms of irregular migration to the EU was increased detections of migrants from Syria where the security situation has progressively deteriorated since the failure of Kofi Annan's 'six point' plan proposed in late March 2012. For example, in Q2 2012 Syrians showed the highest rate of increase in detections of illegal border-crossing, and they were increasingly detected as illegal stayers, in both cases these indicators were almost exclusively reported by Greece. Furthermore, following recent increases Syrians were ranked second among applicants for international protection, mostly in Sweden and Germany, where it was recently declared that Syrian nationals claiming for asylum would be automatically granted refugee status. Elsewhere, most EU Member



States have refrained from forcibly repatriating Syrians back to their country.

Subsequent to the current reporting period a male migrant claiming to be a Syrian national stated that he arrived in Greece just 24 hours after leaving Syria by using an internal flight in Turkey among his modes of transport, showing how little time could pass between events in Syria and arrivals in Europe. The situation in Syria is likely to remain volatile for the foreseeable future. Currently, there are no plans for multilateral military intervention with sufficient support among the international community. In terms of secondary movements from Greece, Syrians were also detected on exit from Greece and on entry to German, Belgian and Dutch airports using counterfeit EU residence permits and forged Greek and Bulgarian travel documents. Consistent with other nationalities entering via Greece, Syrians were also increasingly detected in the Western Balkans especially at the Croatia-Serbia border.

Other nationalities were also detected making secondary movements from Greece. For example, Afghans were the most commonly detected nationality in the Western Balkans most of whom are assumed to have originally entered the EU in Greece. At the Romanian border with Serbia detections increased more than five-fold since the same period last year, mainly of Algerians and Moroccans also making secondary movements from Greece. Many more migrants were detected attempting clandestine entry having crossed the Western Balkans, which suggests that this is becoming the *modus operandi* of choice for over-land secondary movements. As mentioned in previous FRAN quarterlies, the detections in the Greek-Turkish land border also have a direct impact on detections in the Ionian Sea. In 2011, it was estimated that more than 15% of migrants reported at the Greek-Turkish land border were detected soon after in Apulia and Calabria.

At the EU level, the second most affected border section after the Greek-Turkish border was the Greek-Albanian border. Albanian circular migrants were detected crossing the border illegally and, increasingly, using counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. The sharp increase in detections of this *modus operandi* by Greece rendered Albanians the nationality most commonly detected with fraudulent documents at the external EU border. Other important trends in document abuse to enter from a third country included Pakistanis mostly detected in Greece, followed by migrants from Morocco mostly detected in Spain, and Nigerians mostly detected in France. Overall there was an increase in the use of forged passports (British followed by French) and visa fraud continued to decline, possibly in anticipation of the Visa Information System.

In the Central Mediterranean, where detections peaked in 2011 during the Arab Spring, migrants from Somalia were increasingly detected in Malta. Specifically, in May 2012 the arrival of Somali migrants in Malta increased significantly while Italy registered a decrease in the number of Somali migrants apprehended in Sicily and the Pelagic Islands. The detected Somalis were mainly young males many of whom had been imprisoned by police or military forces during their travels through Libya. Taking into account the professional planning of the trips, it is assumed that the *modus operandi* has changed and that Malta is now targeted on purpose, thereby replacing Italy as the preferred destination country for this nationality. The reason for this change has not yet been confirmed; however, in the past Malta resettled some Somali migrants in the United States and in some EU Member States, which might be acting as a pull factor. Also, there is some evidence that facilitation networks located in Malta have tried to forward migrants to Sicily.



Elsewhere, the external borders were affected by migrants both from far afield as well as migrants from neighbouring regions. For example, the Western Balkans route was affected by secondary movements of migrants from Algeria and Afghanistan and also by local migrants from Serbia; the Eastern land borders were increasingly affected by long-distance migrants from Afghanistan and Somalia but also local migrants from Moldova and increasingly from Georgia.

The Western Mediterranean route was apparently dominated by local migrants from Morocco and Algeria but with large numbers of unknown nationalities it is assumed that local migrants were also accompanied by long-distance migrants probably from sub-Saharan Africa. In this region there was a new *modus operandi* involving facilitators dropping off migrants in the Chafarinas Islands, a Spanish archipelago 2 nautical miles away from the Moroccan coastline.

The sharpest increase in refusals of entry was for Georgian nationals at the Polish border

with Belarus (+236 % increase compared to Q1 2012 and a +162% increase compared to the same quarter a year ago). In a similar pattern observed in 2009, this increase corresponds to an increase in asylum applications of Georgian nationals in Poland. This phenomenon is likely to lead to an increase in Georgians staying illegally in other Member States, in particular Sweden and Germany. The Eastern Borders also continued to be the region most affected by cross-border crime. For example, smuggling of cigarettes, petrol, drugs and other excise goods constitute the main challenges to effective border management at this section of the border. The exit of vehicles stolen within the European Union *en route* to destinations in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Central Asia is also a major concern. In early July 2012, authorities in Slovakia also discovered a 700-metre-long tunnel leading from the western Ukrainian city of Uzhorod into Slovak territory used for the smuggling of cigarettes. The tunnel was a sophisticated construction and contained a rudimentary railway line for swift transportation under the border.



# 1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;
2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and

3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

The report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first – to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU and second – to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

## 2. Methodology

The present 16th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between April and June 2012, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member States improve the quality and speed of their identification,

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 6 August 2012

data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active in Q2 2012. Namely, for sea borders they were JO Indalo 2012, JO Poseidon Sea 2012, JO Focal Points Sea 2012; for land borders – JO Eurocup 2012 (combined land and air), JO Poseidon Land 2012, JO Focal Points 2012 Land, JO Neptune 2012; and for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2012, Pilot Project Flexi Force 2012.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.



## 3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1: **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2011				2012		2012 Q2	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on	
							prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	32 923	41 273	38 530	28 325	13 635	<b>23 092</b>	-44	69
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	74	60	64	84	103	<b>126</b>	110	22
2 Facilitators	1 856	1 941	1 546	1 614	2 107	<b>1 785</b>	-8.0	-15
3 Illegal stay	82 327	86 750	88 037	93 834	88 455	<b>84 076</b>	-3.1	-5.0
4 Refusals of entry	28 699	30 076	30 325	29 011	24 635	<b>28 244</b>	-6.1	15
5 Applications for asylum	53 193	61 574	67 413	71 874	56 854	<b>57 989</b>	-5.8	2.0
7A Return decisions issued	50 970	55 716	57 389	67 310	69 904	<b>67 891</b>	22	-2.9
7B Effective returns	34 745	35 076	37 639	41 585	40 229	<b>40 299</b>	15	0.2

Source: FRAN data as of 6 August 2012

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases, as reported by Member States, in thousands

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between first and second quarters



Source: FRAN data



## 4. Situational picture in Q2 2012

- Overall, in Q2 2012 there were 23 092 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU-level, which is a considerable seasonal increase compared to the previous quarter
- Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 were lower than in any other second quarter since FRAN reporting began, probably due to the overlapping effects of the end of the Arab Spring and far fewer detections of circular Albanian migrants in Greece
- In contrast to the EU decrease in detections of illegal border-crossings, in Greece, where two-thirds of all detections at the EU-level were reported, there was a 29% increase compared to the year before
- Without question the most significant development was increased detection of migrants from Syria including the highest rate of increase in detections of illegal border-crossing and increasing detections as illegal stayers. Syrians were also ranked second among applicants for international protection, mostly in Sweden and Germany
- In Q2 2012 the majority of detections (56%) were restricted to a single border section – the land border between Greece and Turkey, where detections were actually 25% higher compared to the same period in 2011
- Consistent with most previous reporting periods, in Q2 2012 the most commonly detected nationality at a single border section was Afghan migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey
- Afghans also submitted the most applications for international protection, were most often detected during clandestine entry, were most frequently detected as illegal stayers, and were subject to the most decisions to leave
- All other top six nationalities of migrants were detected in much higher numbers than the year before; these included migrants from Bangladesh (+35%), Syria (+639%), Algeria (+88%), Albania (+55%) and Somalia (+62%), all of whom were mostly detected in Greece
- Following recent and previously reported increases, the second most-commonly detected nationality of migrant detected at a single border section was Bangladeshis detected at the Greek land border with Turkey
- The second most affected border section was between Greece and Albania, which was still a significant location for illegal border-crossings, albeit of mostly Albanian circular migrants

## 4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Overall, in Q2 2012 there were 23 092 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is a considerable if somewhat expected seasonal increase compared to the previous quarter, and a 44% decrease compared to the same period in 2011 amidst the influx of migrants during the Arab Spring. Taken as a whole, detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 were lower than in any other second quarter since FRAN reporting began. Most probably, the low number of detections was due to the overlapping effects of the end of the Arab Spring in its initial countries (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) and far fewer detections of circular Albanian migrants in Greece. The vast majority of detections were at the EU external land border (77%).

While useful for summary purposes, these EU-level figures conceal considerable variation within and among Member States, nationalities and the major irregular migration routes. For example, in Q2 2012 the majority of detections (57%) were restricted to a single border section – the land border between Greece and Turkey, where detections were


actually 25% higher compared to the same period in 2011 following increased detections of Bangladeshis, Algerians and Syrians.

The second most affected border section was between Greece and Albania, which was still a significant location for illegal border-crossings, albeit of mostly Albanian circular migrants. Ranked third among border sections in Q2 2012 was the blue border of Sicily, where Tunisians, Egyptians and Somalis were increasingly detected. The border section that reported the most notable increases compared to the year before was the Romanian border with Serbia, where detections increased more than five-fold, mainly involving Algerians and Moroccans making secondary movements after having originally entered the Schengen area in Greece.

Consistent with the majority of reporting periods both before and after the Arab Spring, at the EU level the most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan, with little change in the number of detections compared to the year before. In contrast, all other top six nationalities of migrants were detected in much higher numbers than the year before; these included migrants from Bangladesh

Figure 2. In Q2 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing were lower than in any previous second quarter

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders




Source: FRAN data



Figure 3. **Despite increased detections in most Member States, there was an overall decrease at the EU level, driven by far fewer detections in Italy**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2011 and 2012 for nine Member States shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



Source: FRAN data

(+35%), Syria (+639%), Algeria (+88%), Albania (+55%) and Somalia (+62%), all of whom were mostly detected in Greece.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. The second quarter of each year is usually associated with improving weather conditions more favourable for approaching and illegally crossing the external border of the EU. Moreover, conditions that are more favourable for illegal border-crossing are also more favourable for detection. The combination of these two effects tends to produce the highest number of detections during the second quarter of each year.

The 23 092 detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 were the result of combined detections in 15 Member States, many of which experienced differing trends. Figure 3 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among Member States during the second quarters of both 2011 and 2012 (size of circles), and also the degree of change between the two reporting periods (slopes). In Q2 2012 twelve Member States experienced increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period last year but many from relatively low bases. In contrast, just three Member States reported reductions but this group of Member States included Italy, where the absolute reduction was the largest change overall.

Figure 4 shows detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012 distributed among Member States. Greece was the only country placed in the highest category (darkest colouring) as two thirds of all detections were reported by Greece. Despite a reduction compared to the year before during the Arab Spring, in Q2 2012 Italy still ranked second among Member States followed by Spain with a steady trend and Malta with a significant increase. Following increases in Hungary and particularly Romania and Bulgaria, these Member States were assigned to the






Figure 4. **In Q2 2012, all but three Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period in 2011**


third category in Figure 4. According to this interpretation all other Member States were in the lowest category of detections of illegal border-crossing in Q2 2012, despite a suite of considerable increases among these Member States.

As well as looking at the variation among Member States, it is informative to illustrate the same data by nationality of migrants. Figure 5 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among top nationalities during the second quarters of both 2011 and



Figure 5. A steady trend of detections of migrants from Afghanistan contrasts with mixed trends of migrants from different regions, with increased detections of migrants from Syria representing the most significant increase during the reporting period

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q2 2011 and 2012 for the top ten nationalities shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



Source: FRAN data

2012 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes). With 20% of total detections and a steady trend compared to the same period in 2011, in Q2 2012 the most commonly detected migrants at the EU-level were from Afghanistan (Fig. 5). Of these Afghan migrants, four-fifths were detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey. Although a high proportion, this represents a reduction compared to the end of 2011 when 90% of all Afghans were detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey. This slightly more dispersed detection profile was due to increased detections of Afghan migrants at the Hungarian and Romanian land borders with Serbia and the Polish land border with Belarus in Q2 2012.

Without question, during the second quarter of 2012 the migrants that were detected with the most increasing frequency were those from Bangladesh (+35%), Somalia (+62%), Algeria (+88%) and Syria (+639%) (Fig. 5). In fact, more migrants from Syria were detected than ever before (2 024). Detections of most of these nationalities were concentrated at the Greek land border with Turkey, with the exception of Somalis, who were mostly detected in Malta. Indeed, Somalis were particularly notable in that their detections were distributed across a very wide range of locations; as well as Malta and the Greek land border with Turkey, they were also detected in Sicily, Lampedusa and the Slovakian land border with the Ukraine.

Following recent and previously reported increases, the second most-commonly detected nationality of migrants detected at a single border section were Bangladeshi migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, but the largest and most significant increase was in detections of migrants from Syria at the same location. Neither of these two nationalities were detected crossing illegally other border sections in any significant numbers. In contrast, migrants from

Algeria were not only increasingly detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, but also in the Spanish maritime region of Almeria and at the Romanian land border with Serbia. The latter case is assumed to represent secondary movements through the Western Balkans region.

#### 4.2. Routes


In 2011, detections of illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route peaked briefly during the period of turbulent socio-political developments in North Africa, known as the Arab Spring. In contrast, on the Eastern Mediterranean route, detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern over the last two years. Throughout 2011 detections in the Western Mediterranean (land and sea borders with Spain) steadily increased.

As illustrated in Figure 6, the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes reported the most detections of illegal border-crossing in the second quarter of 2012, and were characterised with seasonal increases consistent with previous years, aside the Central Mediterranean region during the Arab Spring.

In Q2 2012, there were 14 125 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, an increase of 27% compared to the same period in 2011 (Fig. 6) rendering this region the undisputed hotspot for illegal entries to the EU during the current reporting period. Elsewhere, detections in the Central Mediterranean showed a seasonal increase but were much reduced (-86%) compared with the dramatic peak during the same period in 2011. Indeed, in the second quarter of 2012 detections in this region resembled the pre-Arab Spring levels reported

Figure 6. The second quarter of 2012 was characterised by seasonal increases on most major irregular migration routes

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs by main irregular migration routes



Source: FRAN data



during the summer of 2010. Detections in the Western Mediterranean were almost equally comparable to Q2 2011, whereas detections increased to a large degree, yet from lower bases, on the Eastern Borders route (+103%), Western Balkans route (+50%) and Western African route (+29%).

These routes not only differed in their magnitudes over time but also in the composition of detected nationalities. Consistent with previous periods, detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route were dominated by migrants from Afghanistan, and more recently Bangladesh, Algeria and Syria. The Central Mediterranean was recently affected by increased detections of Somalis, and a steady trend of Tunisians and Egyptians.

The Western Balkans and Eastern Borders routes were affected both by migrants from far afield (that in many cases would have originally entered the Schengen area and been detected in Greece) as well as migrants from neighbouring regions. For example, the Western Balkans route was affected by secondary movements of migrants from Algeria and Afghanistan and also by local migrants from Serbia; the Eastern land borders were increasingly affected by long-distance migrants from Afghanistan and Somalia but also local migrants from Moldova and increasingly from Georgia; the Western Mediterranean route was apparently dominated by local migrants from Morocco and Algeria but with large numbers of unknown nationalities it is assumed that local migrants are also accompanied by other long-distance migrants probably from sub-Saharan Africa. The exception was the much less used Western African route, which was exclusively affected by local migrants from Morocco.

#### 4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained


its status as a major hotspot of irregular migration. Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year and concentrated at the border between Greece and Turkey, with a shift from the sea border to the land border visible in late 2009 (Fig. 7). Unusually, at the end of 2011 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route remained almost constant between the third and final quarters of the year, resulting in the first recorded example of a sustained peak of detections at that time of year. This was due to an unexpected increase in detections at the Greek land border with Turkey, particularly in October.

According to the FRAN data, during the second quarter of 2012 pressure on this route was increased by 27% compared to the same period in 2011, mostly due to more detections of Bangladeshis, Syrians and Algerians, offset against fewer detections of Pakistanis.

Figure 8 overleaf illustrates a selection of third countries coloured with respect to the number of nationals detected at the Greek and Bulgarian land borders with Turkey in Q2 2012 under JO Poseidon Land. The countries with the most detections are marked with darker shading, while those with fewer detections are indicated by lighter shades. The map clearly shows the very wide geographic range of third countries whose citizens were detected illegally crossing the EU border from Turkey. This range of nationalities may be particularly wide because this region has long been an entry point to the EU and so has gained broad appeal over time, both in terms of attractiveness for migrants and facilitation infrastructure in place. According to operational data, the most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan and Bangladesh with 31% and 20% of the total detections during the operation, respectively. However, consistent with the FRAN data, the most significant increase was in numbers of detected migrants from Syria.

Figure 7. In the Eastern Mediterranean region, the second quarter of 2012 was characterised by a seasonal increase in detections of illegal border-crossing

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs and at the Greek land and sea borders with Turkey



Source: FRAN data

During both JO Poseidon 2011 Land and JO Poseidon 2012 Land several migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh claimed that they had been kidnapped and sometimes beaten by facilitators *en route* to Greece. Apparently, this was an attempt to extort money from the migrants' relatives. For example, one Bangladeshi male, who departed from Abu Dhabi, agreed to be facilitated to Iran for EUR 1 000, but once the migrant arrived in Iran and his father paid the amount via the Hawala system\*, the migrant was offered further facilitation to Greece for an additional EUR 2 000. He agreed, but in Istanbul he was detained in a safe house together with a mixed-nationality group of ~70 other migrants who were told that they would not be permitted to leave the house until their relatives paid additional funds of around EUR 4 000. After a two-week ordeal the money was eventually transferred and the migrant was facilitated along the rest of the way to Greece.


In an attempt to compare temporal variation in detections of several nationalities, Fig-

ure 9 (page 22) illustrates monthly detections of the top six nationalities at the land border between Greece and Turkey according to the FRAN data. This graph clearly shows the seasonal detection peak in 2011 of migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the variation in the extent to which detections of each nationality increased during the second quarter of 2012. This seasonal increase was particularly apparent for migrants from Afghanistan and Bangladesh, which ranked first and second, respectively, at this border section. Detections of migrants from Syria and Bangladesh increased the most, relative to the detections during the second half of 2011, and unusually, detections of migrants from Algeria peaked late in 2011 and fluctuated throughout the first half of 2012. Detections of migrants from Pakistan, which reached a high point in the final quarter of 2011, have so far been much reduced in 2012.

#### Migrants from Afghanistan

Some reports state that in Iran there are currently 2–4 million displaced Afghan nation-

\* <http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Faith%20Hawala%20FINAL.pdf>



Frontex, August 2012

The map of nationalities of irregular migrants apprehended along the Greek-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish border during Q2 2012. The percentage of total is shown for the top ten nationalities.

Source: Frontex Situation Centre – JO Poseidon Land, ESRI geodata

Figure 8. In Q2 2012, the most commonly detected migrants during JO Poseidon Land were from Afghanistan and Bangladesh, followed by increasing numbers from Syria



## Afghan Refugees in Iran

At a recent conference in Geneva, the international community endorsed a 'solutions strategy' for millions of Afghan refugees and those returning to Afghanistan after years in exile. The plan, drawn up between Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR, aims to support repatriation, sustainable reintegration and assistance to host countries.

It will benefit refugee returnees to Afghanistan as well as 3 million Afghan refugees, including 1 million in Iran and 1.7 million in Pakistan. Many of the refugees in Iran have been living there for more than three decades.

Source [www.unhcr.org](http://www.unhcr.org), 1 August 2012



Young Afghan refugees play in a classroom in Mashhad, Iran

© UNHCR/M.H.Salehiara



als who have been residing there for several years. However, an agreement of the Iranian government to provide Afghans with documents to legalise their stay and provide permission to work has recently ceased, rendering many Afghan nationals as illegal stayers in Iran. Some of them work in the black market, but the Iranian government blocks their children access to education. Hence, many now-irregular migrants in this situation are coming to the EU for educational and family reasons. This problem has further been exacerbated by the fact the certain subsidised programmes for Afghan nationals in Iran were also terminated in November 2011. Consequently, it is likely that more Afghan families residing in Iran will arrive in Greece in the near future.

Open sources\* recently reported that during the month of June, both Pakistan and Iran started to deport illegally-staying Afghan nationals. According to the Information Minister of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, where some 400 000 undocumented Afghan migrants are thought to reside, the authorities set the deadline of 30 June 2012 for UNHCR to repatriate irregular migrants. As soon as this date passed law enforcement agencies were ordered to compile lists of irregular Afghans, arrest them, bring them before the court and subsequently deport them to Afghanistan.

However, open sources also indicated that even though undocumented Afghans were threatened with deportation, no increase in



## President of Pakistani Community in Greece Arrested for Human Trafficking

The President of the Pakistani Community in Greece, Javet Aslam, was arrested Monday morning following an Interpol warrant that was pending against him for human trafficking involving Asian illegal immigrants.



Greek policemen arrested Javet in his residence in Kolonos, Athens, Monday [6 August 2012] and he's been held in prison since. The Interpol warrant had been issued after request of the Pakistani authorities that accuse Javet of having received money to contribute in the transfer of illegal immigrants from Pakistan to Greece. Aslam was taken to the Appeals prosecutor where he filed a request to be granted political asylum, which will be examined in the next few days by the Appeals Council.

Source: [greece.greekreporter.com](http://greece.greekreporter.com), 16 May 2012



deportations was noted compared to previous months.

### Migrants from Pakistan


The general profile of migrants coming to the EU or the Schengen area from Pakistan via the Greek-Turkish land border is as follows: single, male adults aged between 21 and 29, unskilled Urdu-speaking workers or students. When illegally crossing the exter-

\* <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/editorials/01-Jul-2012/illegal-afghan-migrants>; <http://www.mideastdaily.org/entry/iran-adament-to-relinquish-migrants-afghan-pleas-to-cut-short-the-returns/>; <http://dawn.com/2012/06/29/afghans-face-mass-deportation-from-pakistan/>



Figure 9. In Q2 2012, detections of migrants from Syria and Bangladesh illegally crossing the Greek land border with Turkey rose more than expected by seasonal variation, whereas detections of migrants from Pakistan were much lower

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs for the top six nationalities



nal border they tend to travel undocumented; the passports are withheld by facilitators in Turkey with the assurance that they will be forwarded on to other facilitators in Greece.

\* FRAN Quarterly Q3 2011, Ref: R123, Fig. 22, p. 57

As reported in previous FRAN Quarterlies\*, the most frequent place of origin is still the northern part of the Punjab province. Accord-

ing to the statements provided in interviews, the main destination countries are Greece, Italy and Spain, but considering the number of returned Pakistani nationals the UK could be the main destination country. In any case, destination countries are determined by the residence of their relatives. The main reason why Pakistanis choose to migrate to the EU is economic due to a lack of employment opportunities in Pakistan.

#### Migrants from Bangladesh

Most of the Bangladeshi migrants interviewed after having illegally crossed the Greek-Turkish land border claimed that they had departed from countries around the Persian Gulf (Fig. 10), where they had been legally working in the construction business. Following the economic crisis in the area, salaries fell and fewer jobs were available; consequently, many migrants decided to try to reach Europe in search of better employment opportunities. In earlier interviews it was established that facilitators working in the Gulf area deceptively assured the migrants that there were plenty of good jobs and high salaries in Greece.

#### Migrants from Syria

Groups of irregular migrants originating from Syria were mainly comprised of males (aged 20–28), but there were also mixed-sex groups, generally aged between 25 and 60 years, including cases of three-generation families travelling together. Syrians do not require visas to enter Turkey and only need facilitation from Istanbul onwards in order to reach Greece illegally. While the increasing number of illegal border-crossings is generally linked to the internal situation in Syria, the prevailing profile of Syrians detected at the Greek-Turkish border remains somewhat different to the refugee flow from Syria into Turkey. Also, the screening activities in the context of Frontex coordinated Joint Operation At-





© www.novinite.com

### First-ever Joint Operation between Hellenic Police and Turkish Military.

Based upon intelligence gathered during debriefing activities, the first-ever Joint Operation between Hellenic Police (The Special Team of Alexandroupolis) and Turkish Military was launched in June 2012. First, in June a bilateral meeting took place between Greek and Turkish authorities to discuss a specific facilitation network operating in Turkey adjacent to the area of BCU Ferres. The network was helping irregular migrants across the River Evros on a daily basis but the facilitators themselves never crossed the river.

To apprehend the facilitators a Joint Operation was launched the following day, by Greek officers who were observing the area while keeping mobile-phone contact with their counterparts in the Turkish military. At approximately 13:00 hrs a group of 5-10 migrants were offloaded in the area and facilitators started to guide them towards the river. The Hellenic Police officers alerted the Turkish military and as a result all the migrants were apprehended. Regrettably, on this occasion the facilitators evaded capture but nevertheless, this first Joint Operation is considered to be a very important step towards closer cooperation between Greek and Turkish authorities in the operational area.

Source: Frontex Weekly Analytical Reports

tica 2012 indicated that roughly 15% of Syrians detected at the Greek-Turkish border during 2012 were in fact not native to Syria. These false claims of nationality (nationality swapping) often occur in conjunction with new or emerging crises and are linked to nationalities with common linguistic and/or geographical circumstances. In this case, migrants falsely claiming Syrian nationality were mostly Iraqis and to a lesser extent also Egyptians, Moroccans, Libyans and Tunisians.

Syrians detected in Greece were predominantly male (74%), while the UNHCR data for the refugee flow into the neighbouring countries suggest that 75% were women and



Figure 10. Most migrants from Bangladesh detected during JO Poseidon Land travelled overland from the Gulf States



© www.um.org

Figure 11. **A Syrian refugee camp in Turkey**

children (Fig. 11). While there were also family units detected, the majority of Syrians arriving in Greece were youths aged between 20 and 28. The main reason for migration is in almost all cases economic, combined with the conflict as the final motivator. There were only few cases when Syrian nationals declared political reasons for their decision to migrate. Almost half of them have relatives in the EU, with Germany and Sweden being their main destination countries.

A German court ruled earlier in 2012 that Syrian nationals applying for international protection are to be granted automatic refugee status on the grounds that the very act of leaving Syria presumably illegally, and then asking for international protection may, upon return to Syria, result in torture and imprisonment. Sweden also declared that Syrian nationals claiming for asylum will be automatically granted refugee status, while other Member States are reviewing their policies (see Section 4.7. Asylum claims).

### Secondary movements

Greece is currently the main entry point for illegal border-crossers. However, it is a Schengen enclave and a transit rather than destination country for the majority of migrants. Thus, the secondary movements originating in Greece are characterised by a similar composition of nationalities of migrants attempting to re-enter the Schengen area heading

for their final destinations as those who enter Greece. In Q2 2012 these movements tended to be reflected in the detections of:

- 1) illegal border-crossing throughout the Western Balkan land borders,
- 2) migrants landing at the blue border of the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria
- 3) clandestines and document fraudsters on board ferries to Italy (Ancona, Venice)
- 4) document-fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports.

**Western Balkans:** In Q2 2012, there were increased detections of illegal border-crossing throughout the Western Balkans land borders compared to the same period in 2011, particularly from Serbia to Hungary, and increasingly Romania. For example, among the most commonly detected non-local nationalities at a single border section were Algerians and Moroccans at the Romanian border with Serbia, followed by Afghans and Pakistanis at the Hungarian border with Serbia (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans).

**Italian Ionian Coast:** For some time there has been a steady flow of Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving in the Southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia with some increases during Q2 2012.

Subsequent to the reporting period (July 2012), JO EPN Aeneas 2012 was launched and is currently scheduled to run until the end of October 2012. There are two operational areas, Apulia and Calabria, covering the sea-shore along the Ionian Sea and part of the Adriatic Sea.

According to Croatian open sources\* in July, some 65 Asian and African migrants presumed to be heading to Italy were found drifting some 47 nautical miles south of Dubrovnik due to a broken engine (Fig. 12). They had been drifting for two days. The migrants,

\* <http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/imigranti-iz-dubrovnika-pod-policijskom-pratnjom-krenuli-u-prihvatni-centar-za-strance-u-jezevu/624240.aspx>



© www.ummultimedia.org

Figure 12. **An adrift sailing boat rescued by Croatian authorities in the Adriatic Sea, carrying migrants hoping to land in Italy**

who had departed from Greece, did not want to be rescued by the Croatian authorities as they wanted to go to Italy. After several hours of negotiations, the authority for search and rescue towed the sailing boat to the nearest Croatian port.

There was also a recent increase in the numbers of Bangladeshis, Iraqis, Moroccans and Syrians arriving in Apulia from Greece but these detections were in much lower numbers than other nationalities.

**Intra-Schengen flights:** There have been reports of large numbers of document-fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports. This trend was reduced in the second quarter of 2012, probably due to the increased price of flights resulting from tourism to Greece at this time of year. According to EDF data, Afghans, Iraqis and increasingly Syrians were detected on exit from Greece and on entry to German, Belgian and Dutch airports.

#### 4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean massively fluctuated in size and composition during 2011, largely due to the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Since Q4 2011, the situation has significantly improved follow-

ing better cooperation between Italian and Tunisian authorities concerning the return of Tunisian nationals.

According to FRAN data, in Q2 2012 there were just 3 685 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the Central Mediterranean route, a massive decrease compared to the peak in last year in Q2 2011 but an increase compared to late 2011 and early 2012. The increase was almost entirely due to more detections of migrants from Somalia (1 094) combined with a steady stream of migrants still arriving from Tunisia. Several nationalities previously detected in high numbers particularly in 2011 were not detected in significant numbers, including Bangladeshis (72) and Nigerians (19).

#### Migrants from Somalia

During May 2012, the arrival of Somali migrants in Malta increased significantly while Italy registered a decrease in the number of Somali migrants apprehended in Sicily and the Pelagic Islands. In most cases, groups of males, females and minors (or families) were found on board rubber dinghies with outboard motors. A few of the boats were detected in Italian territorial waters in some distress after the migrants had called the Italian authorities for help using satellite telephones. The boats that recently headed for Malta were either intercepted by Maltese patrol boats or made it to the island without being intercepted.

Detected Somalis were mainly young males (aged 18–24) with secondary education and low or no income. The main reason for the migration was socio-economic, but in some cases it was military conflict. In Q2 2012, there were no Joint Operations running in the Central Mediterranean Sea, therefore Frontex and the FRAN community are unable to utilise intelligence obtained through the direct debriefing of migrants. However, valuable in-



formation has been obtained from interviews carried out by the Maltese authorities. Such preliminary interviews revealed that some of the Somali migrants arriving in Malta had been promised that they would be brought to Italy. They departed from an unknown location in Libya and travelled for up to three days in boats before either being intercepted by Maltese authorities or reaching the shore. The average fare was said to be around USD 1 000 per person.

#### Migrants from Tunisia

Most Tunisian migrants detected arriving in the Central Mediterranean Region were young (18–35 years) unmarried males with a primary level of education and low previous incomes (EUR 80–180 per month). All interviewed migrants declared to have relatives or friends already in the EU, especially in Italy, and they arrived on boats containing on average 20 migrants (Fig. 13).



© Frontex, JO Hermes 2012

Figure 13. A fishing boat from Tunisia

Throughout the quarter, Italy and Tunisia cooperated efficiently to repatriate Tunisian nationals and so most migrants typically arrived undocumented to delay readmission. Subsequent to the reporting period, JO Hermes 2012 was launched on 2 July and is currently planned to run until 31 October 2012 as a continuation of the deployment of JO Hermes Extension 2011, which ended just before the reporting period, on 31 March 2012. JO Hermes 2012 has been established to support the Ital-

ian authorities in tackling maritime irregular migration along the coasts of Sicily, Pantelleria and the Pelagic islands (Lampedusa, Linosa, Lampione).

#### 4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Western Mediterranean region increased throughout 2011 from just 890 detections in Q1 2011 to 3 568 detections in Q3. In Q2 2012, there were 1 549 detections which almost exactly corresponds to the number of detections the year before in Q2 2011 (1 569). As was the case a year ago, most detections were of Algerians followed by migrants of unknown nationalities (presumed to be sub-Saharan Africans) and Moroccans.

Recently, the size of the sub-Saharan population coming from Algeria has increased in different settlements adjacent to the Melilla border fence. Criminal networks operate more easily in this north eastern region of Morocco and the Spanish authorities treat a large-scale illegal crossing of the fence to the Spanish side as a real possibility. Attempts to cross have been made in the past involving groups of dozens or even hundreds.

JO EPN Indalo 2012 started on 16 May and is currently scheduled to run until 31 October 2012. So far the number of irregular migrants apprehended in the operational areas is almost double that of the same period in 2011. Analysis of the information provided by the Spanish authorities also indicates a new increasing trend in the number of Algerian and Moroccan migrants per boat since the beginning of 2012. The improvement of the weather and sea conditions during the reporting period impacted on the number of boats detected, with a gradual increase of the number of arrivals during the peak period, which according to data from the last two years is from May to October.

## Migrants from Algeria

According to information gathered during interviews, most Algerians were single male adults aged 19–36 on average, but there were also a few females and minors in good health. Most migrants belonged to the lower middle class and, despite having a high level of education compared to sub-Saharan nationals, they suffered from a generalised lack of opportunities, welfare and access to public health services. Nearly all the Algerian migrants spoke Arabic with a few French and English speakers, but all were undocumented to avoid repatriation after arriving in Spain. The majority had relatives or friends in EU Member States, mainly in France and Spain, who could help them to find a job and settle within the ethnic communities already established in these countries.

### 4.2.4. Western African route

In the second quarter of 2012, there were just 31 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, almost exclusively of Moroccan nationals.

As reported in the previous FRAN Quarterly\*, in February 2012 Moroccan and Spanish Ministers of Interior signed a police agreement to create two joint police stations in the Spanish (Algeciras) and Moroccan (Tangiers) territories to cooperate by exchanging operational information and best practices between different police services. The goal of this cooperation is to strengthen the efforts and improve the results against organised crime operating on both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar involved in the smuggling of drugs, international terrorism, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings. Following these developments, both International Police Cooperation Centres became operational during May 2012 (Fig. 14). The International Joint Police Stations are going to be integrated with National Police / Guardia



Figure 14. **The Spanish Minister for Home Affairs and the Moroccan Home Affairs Minister opened the Police Coordination Centres in Tangiers (Morocco) and Algeciras (Cadiz)**

Civil (Spain) and General Direction for National Security (Police) / Royal Gendarmerie (Morocco) staff for a rapid and effective exchange of information.

As reported in previous FRAN Quarterlies, the Western African route from the north of Mauritania to the Western Sahara territory is being reopened by illegal migration facilitation networks. It has been inactive for years but recently an estimated 2 000 sub-Saharanans (particularly from Senegal) settled in the Western Saharan coastal cities of El Aaiún and Dakhla and in the last few months ~20 000 Senegalese nationals have entered Mauritania along these routes to the north.

During the reporting period there was no Frontex operation relevant for the Western African Route.

### 4.2.5. Eastern land borders

The Eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Lithuania, Slovakia, Romanian, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Finland and Latvia. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes possibly due to per-

\* FRAN Quarterly Q1 2012, Ref: R034, p. 30



meability issues and the long distances between major hubs and many of the border sections. In Q2 2012, there were just 549 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is double the figure recorded in Q2 2011 and the highest figure since 2008. This increase was due to more detections of Georgians in Lithuania; Somalis in Slovakia; Afghans in Poland and – to a lesser extent – in Lithuania and Slovakia; and Bangladeshis in Romania.

On 26 April 2012 the President of Belarus decided to relocate some forces from the well-established western border to the south as an answer to EU sanctions against Belarus. Belarus is mainly performing border checks on entry to the country rather than on exit. At the same time, Belarusian border authorities have ceased any form of cooperation with the EU.

Bordering countries appealed to Belarus, complaining that the border had been left wide open. The Belarusian President stated they had no money for border control and asked for financial help in this regard. Belarus started negotiations with the Russian Federation in order to get the railway transportation tariffs reduced and allow Russian Baltic ports to handle their cargo. At the same time, Belarus and Ukraine concluded an agreement to raise the volume of shipment via southern ports.

The main points of exit from Belarus to the EU are Focal Point Terespol at the Polish-Belarusian border and Focal Point Medininkai at the Lithuanian-Belarusian border. The Focal Point Terespol is located at the main road and railway transport route from Moscow and Minsk to Poland and the Focal Point Medininkai at the main road and railway connection between Minsk and Kaliningrad.

**UEFA Euro 2012:** In 2012 Frontex launched JO Eurocup 2012 designed to strengthen bor-

der security measures, by implementing a Joint Operation in close cooperation with Poland and Ukraine including the coordination of enhanced border checks at selected external land and air borders of the European Union (Fig. 15). The Joint Operation was implemented in Poland, at the external air and land borders with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus and in Ukraine. In addition, the operation was implemented at the airports of the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Overall some 134 experts were deployed within the Joint Operation, including experts for border surveillance, border checks, document experts and observers from Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Croatia. The operation was linked with JO Focal Points 2012 Land due to the fact that several Focal Points at EU eastern land borders were included in the operational area of JO Eurocup 2012.

The busiest BCP was Medyka-Shegini, where a third of all checks were performed. The



© Frontex video – Fair play at the borders

Figure 15. **Separate lanes and deployed Guest Officers during the UEFA Euro 2012 championship enhanced border checks and ensured fewer queues**

## New Local Border traffic Agreements\*

### Poland-Kaliningrad

The Polish-Russian Local Border Traffic Regime entered into force on 27 July 2012. Instead of the regular 30 km on both sides of the border, the new agreement covers the whole area of the Kaliningrad region and a corresponding territory on the Polish side. The visa-free movement between Poland and Kaliningrad concerns specific border-crossing points. People living in the territory for at least 3 years will be authorised to obtain permission for crossing the Polish-Russian border in the framework of the agreement after paying 20 EUR. The first permission will be issued for two years, next – for five years. The holder will be able to spend 30 days in the counterpart border zone, for no more than 90 days in every half of the year.



### Norway-Russian Federation

In May, a Local Border Traffic Regime was implemented allowing residents in Norway and the Russian Federation living within 30 km of the border, as well as in the entire territory of Korzunovo municipality, to apply for a local border traffic permit. The holder will be permitted to stay for up to 15 days at a time in the counterpart border zone without a visa. About 9 000 persons in Sør-Varanger municipality on the Norwegian side and 45 000 persons in Pechenga rayon on the Russian side are covered by the agreement. However, uptake has been lower than expected, possibly because Norway's visa-office in Murmansk is only open during the day when most people are at work, or because many prefer to apply for a Schengen visa valid for most of Europe instead of the border-zone card.

\* Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention

Sources: [www.barentsobserver.com](http://www.barentsobserver.com), 2 July 2012; [biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl](http://biuletynmigracyjny.uw.edu.pl) (No. 37, August 2012); [www.kaliningradkg.polemb.net](http://www.kaliningradkg.polemb.net)

heaviest period of traffic was observed around the matches in Lviv, a city located some 70 km from the Polish-Ukrainian border. As predicted, the traffic of supporters coincided with the seasonal migration of Ukrainians and Moldovans to EU countries, which resulted in a number of refusals and visa cancellations.

During Eurocup 2012, only one irregular migrant (Moldovan national) was detected in the operational area, while 27 irregular migrants were reported within JO Focal Points 2012, mostly at the Lithuanian-Belarusian border with Georgians as the top national-

ity. During JO Eurocup 2012 only seven applications for international protection were submitted within the operational area. In contrast, there were 335 detected overstayers, mostly Ukrainian nationals, who were also the nationality most frequently detected with fraudulent documents.

#### 4.2.6. Western Balkans

During the second quarter of 2012 there were almost 8 600 illegal border-crossings between BCPs reported from both sides of common and regional borders (see Fig. 16 for definition of common and regional borders).



Figure 16. General map of the Western Balkans indicating main trade routes, main BCPs, population size, and regional and common borders



In line with the expected seasonal variations, this number was more than one-third larger than during the first three months.

Compared to the same period in 2011 though, the increase was even more pronounced at 52% (see Fig. 17 overleaf). In other words, apart from the border between Hungary and Serbia, all other top five border sections experienced various degrees of increases compared to 2011. Most notably, the increase was the highest in the case of the Romanian-Serbian border, while the border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia reported the highest increase in absolute terms.

Both developments continue to be directly linked with secondary movements of migrants who have initially entered the EU at the Greek-Turkish border. As during the first three months of 2012, two thirds of all detected migrants in the Western Balkans region were composed of claimed Afghans, Pakistanis, Algerians, Moroccans, Somalis and Syrians.

Importantly, with 234 detections, detections of Syrian nationals increased by a massive 220% compared to the previous quarter, by far the highest relative increase for any nationality. The increase was mainly limited to the Croatian-Serbian border and was a mirror image of the same trend for Syrian nationals at the Greek-Turkish border that already commenced during March 2012.

In any case, Albanian nationals were again the top detected nationality with almost 2 000 cases or 18% more than during the same period in 2011. The increase was largely due to more Albanians wanting to avoid Schengen entry bans by going to Greece illegally, either directly or indirectly through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Serbia remained the most affected regional country with 42% share of all detections for illegal border-crossing (the same share as in Q1 2012).

#### **Hiding in vehicles: *modus operandi* on the rise**

Roughly twenty times fewer persons were detected at BCPs compared to those detected between BCPs; however, annual comparison suggests that more migrants *en route* from Greece are now opting to cross the regional and common borders hidden in vehicles (reported in the WB-ARA 2012).

Similarly to illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Serbia detected the largest share of all illegal border-crossing at BCPs. Most were detected at the border between Serbia and Hungary, followed by the one between Croatia and Slovenia where the largest increase was reported compared to the previous quarter and the same three months in 2011. Importantly, the border section between Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was relegated from the top position for the first time since the first quarter of 2011.

Afghans remained the top nationality detected with 39% share (172 cases). They were the top nationality on all major border sections *en route* from Greece to Hungary or Slovenia.

#### **Asylum applications indicate changes in routing**

Claiming asylum while *en route* from Greece through the Western Balkans remained a part of the well-known *modus operandi*. As during the first quarter of 2012, there were significant difference in trends reported by WB-RAN countries and the neighbouring EU Member States. For example, Slovenia reported declines both compared to 2011 and to the




Figure 17. The increased flow at the Greek-Turkish border still has a critical impact on detections at different border sections in the Western Balkans and the neighbouring EU Member States

previous quarter, while in Romania the two trends were completely opposite.

Most worryingly, apart from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, all other western Balkan countries reported significant increases, both compared to the same period last year and the first quarter of 2012. Most notably, asylum applications in Montenegro were five times higher compared to 2011 and a further twelve times compared to the first three months of 2012. Most of the increase was due to applications from persons claiming Algerian origins, pushing this nationality into the top three ranking for the region. These trends are indicative of possible changes in routing.

#### **Detections of false documents indicate attempts to circumvent entry/length of stay provisions in the Schengen area**

The six WB-RAN countries reported almost 140 cases of persons using false documents during the second quarter of 2012.\* Detections in Albania accounted for more than half of this number, followed distantly by Croatia and Serbia.

Compared to the same period in 2011, detections grew by 55%, largely due to more Albanian nationals using false Greek entry/exit stamps in an attempt to hide the fact that they have overstayed in Greece. In fact, most detections were limited to only two nationalities: Albanian and Serbian (please note that more than 70% of detections reported under Nationality as 'Serbia' are in fact persons coming from the territory of Kosovo\*\*).

In terms of the document type, most detections were linked to false passports, followed by entry/exit stamps, residence permits and identity cards. Detections of false visa stickers were negligible. Half of all detected false passports were used by Serbian/Kosovo\*\* nationals. They were mainly abusing Alba-

nian, Slovenian, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgarian passports, detected by Albanian authorities on exit towards Italy (sea borders).

### **4.3. Clandestine entry (1B)**

Restricting Indicator 1B (detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs) to the external land and sea borders of the EU, and also to detections that are confirmed clandestine entries (hiding in transport or other means), results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU in Q2 2012 (126). However, this is still the second highest figure since data collection began in 2008.

Hungary detected the most clandestine entries at the external border mostly of Afghans at the border with Serbia, followed by Slovenia, where Afghans and Serbs were both detected at the border with Croatia. In both cases, the Afghans were thought to have originally entered the Schengen area via the Greek-Turkish land border.

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border (126), there was a higher number of detections within the EU (571) split between the land (293) and sea (278) borders. These detections can often shed light on secondary movements and the final destinations of specific nationalities. For example, Italy, the UK and Romania detected the most internal clandestine migrants, mostly of Afghans, Albanians and Algerians, respectively. In the case of Italy, most Afghans were detected making secondary movements on ferries arriving in Ancona and Venice from Greece, where they are often detected with fraudulent documents.

In the UK, Albanians were detected attempting clandestine entry at land-border controls in mainland Europe and the Schengen area, where they enjoy visa free travel. Recently,

\* Please note that analysis of this indicator is now limited to WB-RAN countries only, given that EU Member States have transitioned to European Union Document-Fraud (EDF) reporting scheme.

\*\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



Albanians have been detected travelling in large groups hidden aboard vehicles and attempting to breach the controls at Coquelles. Although in most cases the individuals were young males; family groups were also encountered travelling with very young children.

At the Romanian land border, Algerians were frequently detected on exit to Hungary. These migrants are assumed to have originally entered the Schengen area at the Greek-Turkish land border.

#### 4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding an increase during the first few months of 2011, detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing. In Q2 2012, there were 1 785 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which is an 8% reduction compared to the same period the year before in 2011.

The total EU-level detections of facilitators of irregular migration tend to be made up of several disparate trends involving unrelated nationalities detected in different Member States. For example, despite a decline in detections of 25% compared to the year previously, France reported the most detections of facilitators of irregular migration, whereas Spain, ranked third at the EU level detected 50% more facilitators over the same period (Fig. 18). Also, facilitators tend to be detected most frequently in their home countries. For example, in Q2 2012, the most significant detections were of Spanish, Chinese and French facilitators, who were detected most frequently in Spain, Italy and France, respec-

tively, who in turn are the Member States that detected the most facilitators.

The biggest increases in detections of facilitators of irregular migration were reported from the Polish land border with the Ukraine, and the Slovenian land border with Croatia. In both cases it was mostly domestic facilitators that contributed to the increases, with the addition of facilitators from neighbouring Croatia also being increasingly detected in Slovenia.

Over the last year, Spain has detected steadily increasing numbers of domestic (Spanish) facilitators. These were almost exclusively detected inland. One criminal organisation, which facilitated the irregular migration of Iranian nationals to the UK, was dismantled on Tenerife, the last point of embarkation towards several British airports. In total nine of the top members of the crime group were arrested (four in Tenerife and five in Madrid) and imprisoned, but this organised group had members posted in several other Member States. The Iranian irregular migrants were hosted for some days in different apartments in Tenerife, which were all owned by the mafia and then they were provided with false passports to fly to the UK. In most cases the passports were British, but Italian passports were also seized during a number of house searches. Organisation members owned other apartments in Madrid, which were also searched and a range of false passports and tools and materials for the falsifications were seized.

Also in Spain, since the beginning of 2011 a Police investigation has been developed in the Canary Islands, with a relevant collaboration of several Spanish Embassies posted in South America, due to a sharp increase of South American students enrolled in CIESTCA (International Centre for Tourism Studies of the Canary Islands) to pursue a Master's degree in tourism, gastronomic catering and




Figure 18 **Despite decreases compared to the year before, France and Italy still detected the most facilitators, but the largest increases were reported by Slovenia and Poland mostly of domestic facilitators**

hotel management in the Canary island of Tenerife, which included 'placements' in several hotels located in the South of the island. All hypothetical students had applied for student visas in the Spanish General Consulates in Colombia and Venezuela (countries with direct flight connections to The Canary Islands), but also in Mexico, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. The Police discovered a well-structured criminal organisation composed of recruiters in South America and receivers and

exploiters in final destinations. The network favoured clandestine migration and dealt with illegal labour using document fraud and victim deception.

Spanish police found that CIESTCA was able to offer private studies, but several master's degrees offered by CIESTCA (Fig. 19) did not have any official status and so could not be used as justification for obtaining a student visa. However, the migrants were convinced



© Spanish Bi-monthly Analytical Report

Figure 19. A fake master's degree certificate issued by the International Centre for Tourism Studies of the Canary Islands (CIESTCA). Enrolment on courses like these was used as justification for issuing student visas

of the legality of the actions at the Consulates and used to pay the organisation EUR 300 every month for the duration of the course once in Spain and worked in several hotels in very crowded tourist areas of the isle for a little money as a practice period to complete the academic formation of the pupils once the theoretical part of the master's programme had finished.

In Q2 2012, both France and Italy detected fewer of their own citizens as facilitators of irregular migration compared with the same period the year before in 2011.

Though Georgian nationals are usually associated with non-facilitated illegal entries across the green border between Lithuanian and Belarus, according to the Lithuanian bi-monthly report there was a case of a criminal intelligence-led operation, resulting in the detection of five Georgian nationals, whose illegal entry to Lithuania had

been facilitated across the green border from Belarus. According to the FRAN data, in Q2 2012 the most commonly detected nationality of facilitator in Lithuania was Latvian, exclusively from the land border with Belarus.

#### 4.5. Detections of illegal stay


In Q2 2012, there were 84 076 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is a stable trend compared to the year before (-3%). This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining longer-term trend over the last two years. However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States.

For the first time since data collection began in 2008, Greece ranked first, ahead of Spain, in detections of illegal stay. The increase was mostly due to Pakistanis, whose detections doubled between Q1 and Q2. In Greece, Pakistani nationals ranked first for detections of illegal stay, while Afghans ranked second. While ranking at a distance, detections of illegal stay of Syrians doubled from Q1 2012 to Q2 2012.

Spain ranked second for detections of illegal stay. A decrease was widespread across all nationalities, which points to a change in law enforcement practices. The decrease started in April 2012, and the three monthly reports for the second quarter being the lowest reported by Spain since data collection began.

Detections of illegal stay reported by Germany have increased since Q3 2011. This rise is mostly due to a higher number of Afghans, which started to soar between Q2 and Q3 2010 following the dismantlement of the so-called 'Calais jungle' in northern France, which was used as a hub by facilitators of illegal migration to the UK, mainly catering for Afghan nationals. This also corresponded to increases in detections of Afghans in Greece, Austria and Sweden as illustrated in Figure 21 overleaf.

Figure 20. Data reported by Member States on Syrians for detections of illegal border-crossing, illegal stay and asylum applications have followed similar trends since early 2011, with asylum applications remaining above the levels of detections for illegal border-crossing or illegal stay



Source: FRAN data

Regarding Syrians, their increase for detections of illegal border-crossing and asylum applications that started in early 2011 also corresponded to a steady increase of illegal stay, with a sharp rise after April 2012, coinciding with a deterioration of the situation in the country. The largest detections of illegal stay have been reported by Sweden, followed by Greece and Germany. A similar trend was also noted in asylum applications, as illustrated in Figure 20.


#### 4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q2 2012, a total of 28 244 refusals of entry were issued at the external borders of the EU. This represents around a 6% decrease compared to the year before in Q2 2011. As in all previous quarters since 2010, there were more refusals at the land border (15 262, 54% of the total) than at the air border (10 863, 38% of the total). In fact, the difference between land and air borders was one of the largest since 2010, due to increase of refusals of entry of

Georgians in Poland at the land border with Belarus and of Albanians in Greece at the land border with Albania (Fig. 21 overleaf).

The sharpest increase was the increase in refusal of entry of Georgian nationals at the Polish border with Belarus. In a similar pattern observed in 2009, this increase corresponds to an increase in asylum applications of Georgian nationals in Poland. This phenomenon is likely to lead to an increase in Georgians illegally staying in other Member States, in particular Sweden and Germany.

Greece reported a significant increase of refusals of entry of Albanians at the land border with Albania. This increase corresponds to an increase in refusals of entry on the ground of not having sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period of stay. This represents almost half of all refusals of entry, as well as an increase in the detection of persons presenting false/counterfeit/forged travel documents. In contrast, the numbers



Sources: Frontex Risk Analysis Unit – FRAN data, ESRI geodata

Figure 21. **Poland reported by far the most refusals of entry and one of the most significant increases compared to the previous year**


of refusals of entry for alert in SIS continue to decrease (Fig. 22).

At the air borders, consistent with previous reporting periods, refusals of entry decreased by 3% compared to previous quarter and 6% compared to one year ago. The decrease cor-

responds to decreases in refusals of entry in the UK and in Spain, mostly due to fewer refusals of entry to Brazilians. This decrease corresponds to a decrease in detections of illegal stay for Brazilians and is explained by stronger economic growths in Brazil, providing more job opportunities than in the EU.



Figure 22. In Q2, refusals of entry of Albanians increased at the Greek land border, and the lack of sufficient means was the main reason for refusing Albanians. The Greek authorities also reported an increase in refusals of entry of Albanians for presenting counterfeit documents (not shown)




Source: FRAN data

Consistent with previous quarters, most refusals of entry (33%) were issued for third-country nationals requiring visa to enter the EU who presented themselves without visa. The second reason was for passengers without appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay (22%). Passengers refused entry for presenting false visa represented less than 1% of all refusals of entry (see Fig. 23).

Following the roll out of the VIS, on 11 October 2011 with North African countries, the number of north Africans refused entry on the ground of false/counterfeit/forged visa (or resident permit) decreased to 69 cases compared to 89 the quarter before. In Q2 2011, before the VIS roll out, there were 68 cases reported by Member States.

Figure 23. In Q2 2012, as in previous quarters, most refusals were issued for lacking visa or lacking justification for the purpose of stay. The grounds least reported was for false visa, representing less than 1%



Source: FRAN data



#### 4.7. Asylum claims

The number of claims for international protection was relatively stable in Q2 2012, with 57 989 applications, which is a stable trend compared to the previous quarter and the same period in 2011.

Consistent with most reporting periods, Germany received the most applications for international protection (however not taking into account asylum applications filed in France elsewhere than at the border, data not reported to the FRAN). As in previous years, applications in Germany decreased between Q1 and Q2. The decrease was mostly due to fewer applications submitted by Serbian nationals.

The largest increase compared to the previous quarter was reported by Austria, mostly due to an increase in Afghans, Russians and Pakistanis. At the EU level, the migrants that submitted the most applications for international protection were from Afghanistan (6 736). Syrians now ranked second among Member States with 3 532 applications, after an increase of 44% compared to the previous quarter, the largest reported increase in this quarter. Syrians applied mostly in Germany and Sweden, together accounting for 57% of all asylum applications of Syrians at EU level.

The reason that Syrians are (currently) concentrating their applications on a small number Member States which they feel promise a higher chance of success. A German court recently ruled that Syrian nationals applying for refuge are to be granted automatic status on the grounds that the very act of exiting Syria in an irregular way and asking for international protection may upon return to Syria result in torture and prison sentences. Sweden declared that Syrian nationals claiming for asylum will be automatically granted refugee status, while

other Member States are reviewing their policies. In general, EU Member States have refrained from forcibly repatriating Syrians back to their country.

Another reason for the high number of asylum applications by Syrian nationals filed in Germany and in Sweden might be the presence of established diaspora communities. For example, according to German figures there are significant communities in Germany, Sweden and France. These communities are characterised by a specific ethnicity; the Syrian community in Germany is mostly Kurdish and correspondingly so are the asylum seekers.

Migrants from Somalia were ranked fourth at the EU level in terms of the number of applications submitted in Q2 2012, with around a third of applications submitted in Sweden, followed by Norway.

#### 4.8. Document fraud

Frontex and the FRAN community have been exchanging data on detections of false-document users since the beginning of 2009. However, it soon became apparent that this indicator had become insufficient to effectively describe and analyse increasingly complex *modi operandi* related to document fraud. Hence, following a brief pilot project in 2011, in January 2012 Frontex and the FRAN community embarked on a much more detailed and ambitious data-exchange project in the field of document fraud, to be overseen by a new specialist sub-network of the FRAN known as the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

Overall the migrants most associated with document fraud in Q2 2012 were from Albania, Afghanistan, the Ukraine and increasingly Syria.

## Migrants from Syria

According to a sample of 26 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, migrants from Syria were increasingly detected as document fraudsters across the EU.

### 4.8.1. Entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries

According to a sample of 26 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, in Q2 2012 there were 2 433 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries. Although long-term comparisons were not possible for Member States new to the EDF, or for those currently unable to meet the strict reporting protocols, it is clear that at the EU level document fraud to enter the EU and Schengen area from third countries is increasing. However, much of this increase was due to a single phenomenon; the use of counterfeit border-crossing stamps by Albanian nationals to fabricate travel history and extend periods of stay. Indeed, Greece reported two-thirds of all fraudulent stamps in the current reporting period and, correspondingly the most commonly detected nationality was Albanian, and the most commonly detected documents were counterfeit Greek and Albanian stamps.

Aside from Albanians using counterfeit stamps, ranked second at the EU level were Pakistanis both mostly detected in Greece, followed by migrants from Morocco mostly detected in Spain, and Nigerians mostly detected in France. Ukrainians have traditionally been detected in very high numbers using counterfeit stamps at the Polish border (as well as fraudulently obtained visas not currently covered by the EDF). However, in Q2 2012 there was a reduction of more than half in the number of detected Ukrainians.



**A people-smuggling gang has been dismantled after 3 men were sentenced for a total of 12 years imprisonment in the Netherlands.**

The trio were found guilty of helping up to 50 Iranian migrants to reach the UK illegally following a joint investigation by the UK Border Agency and Dutch police.

The 3 men, all Dutch citizens of Iranian origin ... masterminded their illegal business from their base in the Netherlands... and are believed to have smuggled, or attempted to smuggle, up to 50 Iranian nationals into the UK via the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Austria.

UK Border Agency officers, based at Schiphol airport in the Netherlands, identified similarities in cases involving Iranian nationals travelling from Amsterdam to the UK with forged and counterfeit documents.

A search of the men's properties uncovered professional equipment to produce forged Dutch ID cards, stolen passports, as well as cash, gold and laptops. Since the ring was disrupted, the number of Iranian passengers attempting to travel from the Netherlands to the UK without adequate documentation has dropped significantly.

Source: [www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk), 17 July 2012



A decrease in the extent to which forged passports were detected was reported in 2011. At the time, this was interpreted as a move away from more sophisticated documents such as passports towards ID cards and visas. However, since that time there has been an increase in the number (and overall proportion) of detected forged passports. For example, in Q2 2012 there were 305 detections of forged passports which is a 50% increase compared to the same period in 2011. In contrast, the number of stolen blank passports declined over the same period, resulting in a stable trend of passports overall. Several Member States that have exchanged high quality data over an



### **Nineteen visa applicants arrested in Bangladesh**

Nineteen London-bound visa applicants have been arrested in Bangladesh following a joint operation involving US and Bangladeshi police.

The group were arrested on suspicion of fraud at the UK Border Agency in Dhaka. The applicants were suspected of providing forged documentation and false bank statements with their business visitor visa applications to attend the Boishaki Mela in East London as stall holders.

The Bangladeshi police worked in close cooperation with [UKBA] officers in Dhaka, discovering that the applicants had misrepresented their employment status and produced forged bank statements.

The group admitted that they had paid agents up to GBP 10 000 each to facilitate their visa applications and provide forged documents.”

Source: [www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk), 29 May 2012



extended period clearly report increased document fraud. For example, in Italy many more migrants from Bangladesh were detected using fraudulent documents, and in the UK more Albanians were reported.

In Spain, where it is currently not possible to differentiate between detections on entry and on exit, detections of fraudulent documents fell by nearly half compared to the same period in 2011.

Detections also nearly halved in Poland compared to the same period in 2011, mostly due

to fewer Ukrainians detected with counterfeit stamps.

At the land border between Slovakia and the Ukraine, the use of false residence permits by COD and COG nationals continued during Q2 2012. The false permits used by irregular migrants were for Belgium, France and Italy, but also Sweden.

The EDF-ARA 2012 included details of a remarkable number of COD nationals, attempting to gain entry with false travel documents at the border between the Russian Federation and Latvia in 2011. In response, Lithuanian border guards were especially focused on profiling passengers of COD nationality.

Document fraud is not only detected on entry to the EU and Schengen area, but also very frequently on exit. Also on exit, several irregular migrants were detected leaving Schiphol airport towards a range of destinations such as Mexico and Turkey. In the former case, two Dutch facilitators of Turkish origin were apprehended accompanying a single female irregular migrant, also from Turkey, and using a counterfeit Bulgarian ID card and passport. According to her statement she lost her own Turkish ID card and bought the counterfeit Bulgarian passport for EUR 1 000 from a Bulgarian woman. The flight tickets had been paid for by the apprehended facilitator.

### **Between the EU and the Schengen area**

In Q2 2012 there were 450 detections of fraudulent documents made at the borders between the Schengen area and non-Schengen EU Member States. The vast majority of detections were made on entry to the EU from the Schengen area (mostly reported by the UK) and on exit from the Schengen area towards non-Schengen EU Member States (reported by a wide range

of Member States). Overall, these flows were reduced compared to the year previously in Q2 2011.

Despite some decline, the most significant phenomenon between the EU and Schengen area was Albanian migrants attempting entry to the UK, often leaving from Italy and increasingly Germany, and often travelling via Ireland. The most common documents used were forged Italian ID cards. Dutch reports included information on Albanians detected travelling from Spain to the UK via Schiphol.

In contrast to the declining trend of Albanians, there was a marked increase in the number of migrants from Iran detected on entry to the UK from the Schengen area. They were detected with a wide range of documents including forged Italian passports and on exit from a wide range of Schengen states, but mostly Germany. Also increasing were the numbers of Indians and Afghans attempting entry to the UK and/or Ireland from Italy using British passports with new bio-pages.

Also on exit from the Netherlands, a Dutch male facilitator of Afghan origin was apprehended on exit from Eindhoven Airport to Dublin accompanying an irregular male migrant from Afghanistan. The migrant was using a counterfeit Hungarian passport. According to his statement, he had paid USD 20 000 for his journey to the UK from Afghanistan.

#### **4.8.2. Intra-Schengen**

There was an increased flow of Ukrainian, Russian and Georgian migrants entering Germany from Poland during the first 4 months 2012. The prevailing pattern for Ukrainian migrants is still to misuse their Polish visas issued for work reasons, which they obtain to be employed by a specific

company. As they hold complete documents, it is extremely difficult for the Polish border guard to determine their true intentions when they cross the Polish-Ukrainian border. When identified in Germany – particularly by mixed German-Polish patrols – they are not able to provide the name of their supposed employer, its location or even the job itself. Instead, they often claim tourist reasons for their travel or apply for work in a Schengen country other than Poland. With respect to Russian nationals, they still tend to attempt family reunification or facilitation of compatriots, there may be some effects in the future referring to the continuing ‘brain drain’ described in the media.

In the direction from Germany to Poland, the effects of the Polish legalisation scheme\* are still visible, though at a lower scale. Similarly, to the previous reporting period, migrants detected at the German border with Poland were mostly Pakistanis. In general in May and June 2012 the detections on entry to Germany from Poland were higher than in the direction to Poland. Irrespective of the nationality, most migrants still tried to enter by car or by bus. Only in some cases they used rail connections. However, it seems that facilitators increasingly opted for a step-by-step method, i.e. using different means of transport through Poland and Germany. They often entered at the Terespol BCP.

In Q2 2012, most detections of document fraud at the Polish air border were related to intra-Schengen travel. Detections included British passports used to fly between Warsaw and Paris, an Indian passport detected on a flight from Athens, and an Italian residence permit on a bus between Germany and Poland. However, as was the case in Germany most cases of document fraud involved intra-Schengen flights Athens – Warsaw. In May a migrant was detected

\* Following on similar legalisation programmes in 2003 and 2007, between 1 January and 1 July 2012 Polish authorities held an amnesty for irregular migrants residing in Poland (without breaks) since 2007 and those seeking refugee status whose applications were rejected after 1 January 2010. In the amnesty period, almost 10 000 migrants applied for legalisation, most of them Vietnamese, Ukrainian, Bangladeshi and Armenian nationals.



using a false Bangladeshi passport (forged bio page and substituted photo) containing a Greek permit of stay.

Also in May, a Pakistani migrant was detected with a false Pakistani passport (new bio page) issued by the Pakistani Embassy in Athens containing a Greek permit of stay. According to the migrant's statement, he was the owner of the document and arrived in Poland for visit purposes. However, personal search revealed an ID card and two expired Pakistani passports, both also issued in the Pakistani Embassy in Athens.



#### Greece to deport 1 600 immigrants arrested in Athens

Greek police say more than 1 600 illegal immigrants will be deported following a major crackdown in Athens in recent days. More than 6 000 people have been detained, though most were released.

Public Order Minister Nikos Dendias defended the crackdown. He said Greece's economic plight meant it could not afford an 'invasion of immigrants'. He called the immigration issue a 'bomb at the foundations of the society and of the state'. 'Unless we create the proper structure to handle immigration, then we will fall apart,' he said. Some 88 illegal immigrants were sent back to Pakistan on Sunday. The Greek authorities have increased the number of guards at the border with Turkey amid fears there may be a sudden influx of refugees entering Greek territory as the situation in Syria deteriorates. More than 80% of migrants entering the European Union do so through Greece, which is in the grip of its worst recession in decades.

Source: [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk), 6 August 2012



#### 4.8.3. Legal channels

Many reports conclude that the abuse of legal channels to enter the EU illegally is in-

creasing. Slovenian reports include details of increased activity of crime groups working as bogus travel agencies to fraudulently obtain residence permits. Most of the detected groups were located in Kosovo and served to enable Kosovo citizens to obtain residence permits. A vast majority of such residence permits were issued for the purpose of labour and employment and were linked to fake companies established in Slovenia to simulate demand for labour force. People in possession of such residence permits were often not aware of the aim and purpose of the residence and work permit issued to them.

Detections of fraudulently obtained visas on entry to Schiphol airport increased by more than a third during the first 6 months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011.

## 4.9. Returns

### 4.9.1. Decisions to return

In Q2 2012, there were 67 891 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was rather similar to the previous quarter (-3%). Excluding Italy, which changed its reporting definition for 2012, the total a year ago also remained relatively stable (+6%). However, this figure is an underestimation of the total number of decisions reached in the EU, as data on decisions were unavailable from, *inter alia*, France and the Netherlands, where it is assumed that relatively high numbers of decisions were reached.

Nearly 60% of the total reported decisions at the EU level were in just three Member States: Greece, Italy and the UK. In Greece, most decisions were taken for Afghans, who were also ranking first for illegal border-crossing and second for illegal stay, while in Italy, most decisions were taken for Tunisians. It should be noted that Greece did not report any de-

decisions to return Pakistanis for the month of June, while there was a large number of returns reported for April and May 2012.

#### 4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q2 2012, there were 40 299 third-country national effectively returned outside the EU, the same number as in Q1. This total does not include effective returns between Member States, but only outside the EU. The UK was the Member State conducting the largest number of returns, mostly to India and Pakistan.

At the EU level, Albanians were returned in the largest number, mostly by Greece, where they were reported as the top fifth nationality for illegal stay and for illegal border-crossing. By contrast, Sweden reported a large increase in detections of Albanians staying illegally, but did not report any effective returns.


Syrians were not returned in large number (less than 300 persons), but while the num-

bers were rather stable in most Member States, Greece reported a sharp increase in returns of Syrians as of June 2012 (Fig. 24).

There was much variation among Member States in the extent to which return decisions translated into effective returns. For example, as was the case throughout 2011, in Q2 2012 Greece implemented by far the lowest number of effective returns per decisions reached. In fact, there are two significant flows into Greece: nearly all the return decisions reflect migrants detected at the Greek border with Turkey, while nearly all the effective returns were of Albanians who originated from the Greek border with Albania.

Among the large increases, Portugal reported a large number of effective returns of Brazilians. At EU level, Brazilians staying illegally are mostly reported by Portugal, showing a steady decreasing trend since early 2011.

Figure 24. A relatively low number of Syrians has been returned since early 2011, but Greece sharply increased the number of Syrians returned in June 2012



Source: FRAN data



## 4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Cross-border criminal activity represents a significant challenge to the effective management of the external border of the EU. The smuggling of tobacco products, drugs and trafficking in stolen vehicles continue to be the most widespread illegal activities along the external border in Q2 2012.

Examples of criminal activity uncovered during Q2 2012 demonstrate the use of highly complex *modi operandi* by criminal groups in order to evade detection and maximise profits. Illustrative examples include the use of a purpose-built railway tunnel used for smuggling cigarettes between Ukraine and Slovakia and a sophisticated trafficking network transporting victims from the Dominican Republic via Turkey and Greece to Spain, where they are exploited as sex workers.

### 4.10.1. Types of illegal activities

#### Smuggling of tobacco, petrol, weapons and other illicit goods

The smuggling of tobacco products remains the most frequently detected and widespread criminal activity along the external border of the EU. Detections of cigarette smuggling during JO Focal Points Land 2012 were almost equally split between the Eastern Borders route, primarily Moldova, Belarus & Ukraine, and the Eastern Mediterranean route along the borders with Turkey (Fig. 25).

Overall the volume of detected smuggled tobacco products in Q2 2012 decreased mini-

mally compared to Q1 2012 possibly due to a shift in reporting priorities and a decrease in local traffic along the border with Ukraine preceding and during the UEFA Euro 2012, which took place in June 2012. However, the overall number of incidents of tobacco smuggling increased significantly due to increased detections at the Bulgarian border with Turkey and Romania's border with Ukraine.

#### Smuggling of drugs

Known to be particularly profitable, the smuggling of drugs continued to be a major challenge to border security along the external borders. For example, the trafficking of heroin from Central Asia into the EU particularly affected the border with Turkey, while the Western Mediterranean route was used primarily for the smuggling of cocaine originating in South America, and marijuana from African suppliers. There are indications that hashish originating from Morocco is smuggled through the Eastern Mediterranean Route in addition to the traditional Western Mediterranean and Western African routes.

EU international airports continued to be under strain from frequent attempts of drug smuggling. The Netherlands reported an increase in attempts to smuggle heroin via cargo transports originating in Asia.

#### Stolen vehicles

Stolen vehicles detected on exit from the EU were primarily reported along the Eastern border, the Western Balkans Route and at the border with Turkey.





### Frontex receives study on anti-corruption measures in EU border control

The Sofia-based think-tank Center for the Study of Democracy\* has delivered a study on corruption perception and attitudes among the border guard community across Europe. The report was commissioned by Frontex and explores both corruption and anti-corruption measures in border guard authorities across EU Member States.

With border guards frequently exposed to bribing attempts in order to facilitate illegal entry or the smuggling of illicit goods, corruption is thought to be a serious issue in border security. Cases in previous years have shown that criminal networks actively seek out and approach border guards with monetary offers in exchange for assistance in the smuggling of cigarettes, petrol or irregular migrants. Any corruption among border guards potentially enables uninhibited and profitable cross-border criminal activities, and thus has the potential to gravely undermine the efforts of Member States and Frontex to secure the external border. The proceeds of illegal activity facilitated by corruption provide additional capital for organised criminal groups, which can be invested in other activities and criminal undertakings.

This extensive new study aims to classify types of corruption, identify environmental factors enabling corruption and compile information on existing anti-corruption policy approaches. Corruption pressures and opportunities represent the main factors enabling corrupt practices among border guards. These include institutional and social factors such as cultural and institutional acceptance of corruption, income disparities and the widespread presence of criminal networks.

The study sets out a number of key anti-corruption measures specifically addressing the operational needs of border guard authorities addressing personnel and deployment management, discipline and integrity testing, internal audit and electronic surveillance. Many of these measures are already shared across the EU member state border authorities and serve as examples of best practice.

The study based its findings on a comprehensive survey sent to all EU member states focusing on current practices and perceptions, rather than measuring the possible extent of corruption among border guards along specific border sections. The report recommends the establishment of common anti-corruption principles across the EU and the inclusion of corruption issues in border security risk assessments.

[http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Research/AntiCorruption\\_Measures\\_in\\_EU\\_Border\\_Control.pdf](http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Research/AntiCorruption_Measures_in_EU_Border_Control.pdf)

\* [www.csd.bg](http://www.csd.bg)

### Trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings continues to pose a challenge to border authorities across Europe. Criminal networks continue to be engaged in this activity and in this quarter there have been reports describing a sophisticated organised criminal group trafficking victims from the Dominican Republic to Spain via

Turkey and Greece. Overall, law enforcement agencies across the EU suffer from a lack of reliable intelligence regarding this activity. Contrary to some media reports, there was no reported increase in the detection of trafficking victims prior to and during the UEFA Euro 2012.



## Joint Operation Eurocup 2012

Frontex's Joint Operation Eurocup 2012 aimed to strengthen border security during the European Football Championship 2012 and to enhance operational cooperation with Poland and Ukraine. The results of JO Eurocup 2012 demonstrate that concerns over a potential significant increase in criminal cross-border activity voiced in the media prior to the event in July 2012 were largely unfounded. The Joint Operation's outcomes were largely in line with the conclusions drawn in Frontex's Tailored Risk Analysis drawn up prior to the UEFA Championship 2012 predicting detections of stolen vehicles and cases of cigarette smuggling.

During the operation, only 80 cases involving the smuggling of goods and 44 detections of stolen vehicles were reported. A majority of the smuggling cases were reported at the border with Belarus – 50 incidents (49 cases of cigarette smuggling and 1 case of smuggling explosives), followed by the border section between Poland and Ukraine (18 cases – only tobacco and cigarette smuggling).



Polish, Bulgarian and Spanish border guards at BCP Korczowa during JO Eurocup 2012



Joint duty of Guest Officer and Polish border guard in Krościenko during JO Eurocup 2012

During the single month of JO Eurocup 2012, BCPs reported the detection of 44 stolen vehicles, of which 15 were registered as stolen in the SIS. In 19 cases border guard officers found altered vehicle identification numbers (VIN). Reports from JO Eurocup 2012 also show an increasing number of stolen motorbikes, carried in a hidden compartment of lorries or mini-vans. The five BCPs with the highest number of reported stolen vehicles were: Dorohusk (11), Medyka (10), Korczowa (4), Hrebennie (3) and Terespol (3).

Source: Polish Border Guard, Bieszczadzki Regional Unit - [www.bieszczadzki.strazgraniczna.pl](http://www.bieszczadzki.strazgraniczna.pl)

### 4.10.2. Irregular migration routes

#### 4.10.2.1. Eastern Borders Route

Unique among border sections, the Eastern Borders of the EU are considered to be more vulnerable to cross-border criminal activity than irregular migration. For example, smuggling of cigarettes, petrol, drugs and other excise goods constitute the main challenges to effective border management at this section of the border. The exit of vehicles stolen within the European Union en route to destinations in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Central Asia is also a major concern. During the second quarter of

2012 there were a number of Frontex coordinated operations along the eastern borders including Focal Points Land 2012 and JO Eurocup 2012 (see box).

#### Smuggling of tobacco products

The smuggling of tobacco remained the most prevalent offence at the eastern border (Fig. 25) despite the overall detected volume of smuggled tobacco and cigarettes decreasing from the first quarter in 2012. Significant price differentials for tobacco products between EU Member States and neighbouring third countries continued to drive smuggling activity along the border.


The external border section with Ukraine remained particularly affected by this problem. For example, in Q2 2012 Hungary, Slovakia and Poland all reported frequent incidents of cigarette smuggling along their border sections with Ukraine. Although there was an overall decrease in the share of detections at the border with the Ukraine during Q2 2012, the smuggling of tobacco products remained a significant problem at these border sections. This decrease might be explained by a shift in reporting priorities during the UEFA Euro 2012, which took place in Ukraine and Poland, as well as an associated substantial reduction in the local cross-border traffic at Polish BCPs with Ukraine. Long queues at the border caused by football fans travelling between Eurocup match locations in Poland and Ukraine, combined with more intensive controls at the border most likely deterred local traffic and individual smugglers throughout May and June resulting in a drop in detections. It is expected that the number of detections will pick up again immediately subsequent to the reporting period.

The Romanian border section with Moldova reported an increase in the number of detections in Q2 compared to Q1 2012; the number of incidents increased two-fold while the quantity of seized tobacco products rose substantially. However, this increase in detections should not be overstated as it may be attributed to the deployment of additional border guards to BCPs newly participating in JO Focal Points Land 2012 along this border section. Detections of cigarette and tobacco smuggling were primarily made during searches of private cars, often revealing hidden compartments in doors, fuel tanks or the vehicle's wheels.

There was increased attention paid to the problem of smuggling of tobacco products in the media with reports of a record high in the consumption of illicit cigarettes in the EU.\* While some of this increase in availability and consumption of illicit tobacco can be

Figure 25. **There was an increase in detections of cigarette smuggling at the border with Moldova and a substantial reduction at the border with Ukraine**

Share of detected incidents of smuggling of tobacco products in Q4 2011, Q1 & Q2 2012 by borders with third countries



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

\* <http://euobserver.com/22/116712>



### Slovak Authorities Discover Sophisticated Smuggling Tunnel

In early July 2012, authorities in Slovakia also discovered a 700-metre-long tunnel leading from the western Ukrainian city of Uzhorod into Slovak territory used for the smuggling of cigarettes. The tunnel was a sophisticated construction and contained a rudimentary railway line for swift transportation under the border. During their raid, Slovak police also seized 2.5 million contraband cigarettes. Slovak Finance Minister Peter Kazimir stated that 'We can assume excise tax evasion could reach up to 50 million euros, in case the tunnel was used for a year.'

Further information received from Slovak authorities contradicted media reports and confirmed that the tunnel was not used for trafficking human beings or the smuggling of irregular migrants. The cigarettes seized as part of the police operation were intended for distribution in the Slovak market as well as other EU countries, primarily the Czech Republic and Germany. The investigation of two Slovak suspects is still underway.



The tunnel crossed the border of Slovakia and Ukraine and featured a railway line to transport illicit goods  
Sources: [www.michalovce.korzar.sme.sk](http://www.michalovce.korzar.sme.sk), [reuters.com](http://reuters.com), [Kyiv Post](http://Kyiv Post)

attributed to illegal tobacco factories in Poland and the Baltic States, the smuggling of tobacco products across the Eastern Borders is also a significant factor in this development. There has been an increase in the detection of smuggled cigarettes and tobacco from the Russian Federation over the past 6 months. These smuggled cigarettes are destined for the German and UK markets via Poland and Lithuania.

There were no significant changes in *modi operandi* used in smuggling cigarettes; depending on the nature and size of smuggling activities, smugglers continue to employ a range of suitable *modi operandi*. So-called individual 'ant

smugglers' frequently cross the border carrying relatively small quantities of cigarettes, while organised crime syndicates aim to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes/tobacco with fewer border crossings in order to reduce the probability of detection. Large quantities of illicit tobacco goods were often concealed in commercial vehicles such as lorries, busses or trains and there were continued reports of detections of this *modus operandi*.

The smuggling of larger quantities of cigarettes in regular passenger vehicles continued to be detected with frequency. In these cases it is not always clear whether the perpetrators operate as individuals or as mem-

bers of a larger criminal network. Passenger vehicles smuggling large amounts of cigarettes were also detected at the Polish-Ukrainian border.

According to information submitted by Polish border guards as part of JO Focal Points Land 2012, there were also repeated detections of smugglers attempting to conceal large quantities of cigarettes in railway engines on trains passing from Belarus to Poland.

### Stolen vehicles

The exit of stolen vehicles and machinery along the Eastern Borders destined for markets in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Central Asia remained a significant problem. Detections have steadily increased during the first half of 2012. The Eastern Borders Route accounts for 60% of all detections of stolen vehicles on exit from the EU during JO Focal Points Land 2012 in Q2 2012.

The border with Ukraine remains the main exit point for vehicles stolen in the EU with a 40% share of detections of all stolen vehicles detected on exit during Focal Points Land 2012. In Q2 2012 the distribution of border sections where stolen vehicles were detected on exit remained roughly the same as in Q1 2012 (Fig. 26).

The smuggling of vehicles in parts, particularly motor bikes, or with the aid of document fraud and use of cloned genuine documents continued to feature as popular *modi operandi*. For example, during May and June 2012 Polish authorities stopped and detained several lorries on exit to the Russian Federation carrying parts of complete stolen vehicles. The smugglers were identified to be of Polish, Czech and Ukrainian nationalities making it difficult to profile at-risk nationalities for searches.

The theft of agricultural and industrial vehicles is becoming an increasing problem in Member States of the EU. Media reports and police sta-

Figure 26. **The distribution of detections of stolen vehicles on exit among border sections varied little over the last three reporting periods**

Share of detected vehicles on exit in Q4 2011, Q1 & Q2 2012 by borders with third countries



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012



© Polish Border Guard, Mazurski Regional Unit

Figure 27. **A recovered stolen excavator at BCP Grzechotki (Poland-Russian Federation)**

tistics from Germany indicated an increase in the theft of agricultural machinery in the border regions with Poland and the Czech Republic. Similarly to passenger cars, it is suspected that these stolen vehicles were mostly des-

igned for the Russian Federation and Ukraine exiting the EU at the Eastern Borders. Few identification marks on these unfamiliar vehicles render the detection of stolen vehicles difficult. Police and industry are cooperating to make it easier to identify specific vehicles once reported stolen. In April 2012 Polish border guards identified and recovered a stolen JCB digger worth approximately EUR 40 000 during the attempted exit to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (Fig. 27).

### Petrol smuggling

Compared to Q1 2012, overall petrol prices in Member States along the Eastern Borders decreased during Q2 2012, however price differentials along some border sections still deliver a significant profit incentive for petrol smugglers (Tab. 2 & Fig. 28).

Table 2: **An overall decrease in petrol prices in Member States at the external border of the EU somewhat reduced the profit incentive of petrol smuggling**

Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel in Q2 2012 in Member States and neighbouring third countries and respective price differences; Comparison of price differential between Member States and third countries in Q1 2012 and Q2 2012 as well as percentage change (in EUR)

Border	2012 Q1			2012 Q2			Change in price differential Q1 to Q2 2012
	EU Country	Third Country	Price difference	EU Country	Third Country	Price difference	
Finland-Russia	1.70	0.74	0.96	1.62	0.73	0.89	-7.3%
Lithuania-Belarus	1.43	0.68	0.75	1.36	0.58	0.78	4.0%
Poland-Belarus	1.40	0.68	0.72	1.35	0.58	0.77	6.9%
Estonia-Russia	1.42	0.74	0.68	1.31	0.73	0.58	-15%
Poland-Russia	1.4	0.74	0.66	1.35	0.73	0.62	-6.1%
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.57	1.09	0.48	1.54	1.10	0.44	-8.3%
Greece-Albania	1.82	1.37	0.45	1.68	1.39	0.29	-36%
Hungary-Ukraine	1.51	1.09	0.42	1.46	1.10	0.36	-14%
Greece-ŷROM	1.82	1.42	0.40	1.68	1.22	0.46	15%
Poland-Ukraine	1.40	1.09	0.31	1.35	1.10	0.25	-19%
Romania-Ukraine	1.28	1.09	0.19	1.25	1.10	0.15	-21%
Romania-Moldova	1.28	1.11	0.17	1.25	1.05	0.20	18%
Hungary-Serbia	1.51	1.36	0.15	1.46	1.36	0.1	-33%
Hungary-Croatia	1.51	1.49	0.02	1.46	1.34	0.12	500%
Slovenia-Croatia	1.49	1.49	0	1.41	1.34	0.07	n/a
Bulgaria-Serbia	1.31	1.36	-0.05	1.21	1.36	-0.15	200%
Romania-Serbia	1.28	1.36	-0.08	1.25	1.36	-0.11	38%
Bulgaria-ŷROM	1.30	1.42	-0.12	1.21	1.22	-0.01	-92%
Greece-Turkey	1.82	1.94	-0.12	1.68	1.93	-0.25	108%
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.30	1.94	-0.64	1.21	1.93	-0.72	13%

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletins (26/03/2012 and 25/06/2012) and open source data for third countries.




Figure 28. Petrol price differentials increasing the profit incentive of smuggling into the EU were most apparent between Member States and Belarus and Russia



### Explosives found by Polish Border Guards during UEFA Euro 2012

On June 27 2012, Polish border guards on patrol discovered a suspicious package on a raft floating on the Polish side of the River Bug (see photo). The package reportedly contained 'some explosives and a cell phone that had the photo of Warsaw's National Stadium in its memory'. The raft also carried a quantity of contraband cigarettes.

The River Bug demarcates a section of the border between Poland and the Ukraine. The river is a popular crossing point for smugglers transporting illicit tobacco products from Ukraine to Poland. Rafts are commonly used by these smugglers. However, until now no link between explosives and cigarette smuggling has emerged.

The incident caused concern among the Polish security community and prompted the elevation of national threat levels from one to four on four-scale. 'We have received certain information that pointed to a potential appearance of a terrorist threat,' said Interior Minister Jacek Cichocki. 'But there is no indication of a concrete danger for a specific place or person.' The ministry said the decision was preventative and was only meant to ensure that 'the services responsible for security are on high alert'.

Sources: [football.uk.reuters.com](http://football.uk.reuters.com); [www.thenews.pl](http://www.thenews.pl), 28 June 2012



Poland's easternmost point, the River Bug bend, Polish-Ukrainian borderland

© Frontex 2012

Specifically, an increase in the price of fuel in Ukraine during Q2 reduced the profitability of petrol smuggling by more than 20%. The price differentials between Poland and Ukraine, Romania and Ukraine, as well as Hungary and Ukraine dropped by 19%, 21% and 14%, respectively. Decreasing petrol prices in Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Poland cut profit margins on petrol smuggled in from the Russian Federation, where prices remained at a level similar to Q1 2012.

#### Smuggling of drugs

The Eastern Borders route is not currently a major entry point for drugs into the EU. However, detections in previous quarters indicate that there is some cross-border smuggling of narcotics from Poland towards the Russian Federation and Ukraine – particularly amphetamines produced in the Polish border region.

Focal Points Land 2012 registered a serious incident at the Romanian border with Moldova when border guards discovered 3 840 pills of anabolic steroids on a Bulgarian national.

#### Trafficking in human beings

Organised crime groups continued to use the Eastern Borders route for trafficking human beings for the purposes of prostitution or forced labour. However, in recent years the importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as source and transit countries for trafficking victims heading to the EU has somewhat decreased. Due to the ease of access and less stringent intra-EU border checks, traffickers have in recent years focused their activities on Romania and Bulgaria, which have consequently emerged as the primary source countries for victims of trafficking in the EU.



#### 4.10.2.2. Western Balkans route

##### Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of drugs, particularly marijuana, along the Western Balkans route is less prevalent compared to the Eastern or Western Mediterranean routes. However, Albania remains a significant producer of marijuana intended for distribution in the EU. Marijuana from Albania is smuggled into the EU along the Western Balkans Route and destined for sale in Germany and France. Focal Points Land 2012 recorded several detections of smaller quantities of marijuana smuggled by individuals of varying nationalities. The small quantities involved indicate that the drugs seized were intended for personal consumption rather than street distribution.

Previously there have been reports of frequent detections of smaller quantities of drugs such as amphetamine, diazepam and other substances both on exit from and entry to the EU along the Western Balkans region.

##### Smuggling of weapons

An abundance of arms of all sizes ranging from rifles and guns to high-grade explosives stemming from the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s is still readily available on the black markets of former Yugoslav states and some weapons continue to be smuggled into the EU via the Western Balkans route. According to the Slovenian bi-monthly report, during the reporting period there was a major case of arms smuggling at the border with Serbia. Slovenian border guards found several assault rifles, hand guns and ammunition in the trunk of a passenger car driven by a Serbian national. Hence, Slovenian authorities believe that the Western Balkans route is still an active route for the smuggling of arms into the EU.



©: Wikipedia Commons

Figure 29. Telescopic truncheon

Several seizures of ammunition during Q2 2012 at the Slovenian border to Croatia and the Hungarian border to Serbia would support this view. However, the extent and nature of the smuggling activity is unclear. There is a lack of intelligence as to whether smuggling is largely restricted to ammunition with some exceptional incidents involving the transfer of weapons or whether this activity is driven by individuals or larger criminal networks.

The majority of illegal weapon detections at the border were of telescopic truncheons (Fig. 29) at the border between Slovenia and Croatia. Telescopic truncheons are illegal in Slovenia and routinely confiscated when discovered upon entry to the country.

##### Stolen vehicles

In Q2 2012 the Western Balkans Route accounted for 30% of all stolen vehicles detected on exit from the EU as part of JO Focal Points Land 2012. Detections were shared equally between the border sections of Hungary-Serbia and Slovenia-Croatia. Most of the stolen cars were luxury passenger vehicles of expensive makes such as BMW, Mercedes or Audi. There was no significant change in the *modus operandi* employed by smugglers of stolen vehicles.



### Smuggling of petrol

High petrol prices in Serbia compared to EU Member States along the Western Balkans route, with the exception of Hungary, makes petrol smuggling an unprofitable activity. In contrast, price differentials of petrol are most significant between Greece and FYROM; however, there have been no reported incidents of petrol smuggling as part of Focal Points Land Borders 2012 in the current reporting period. Previously reported increases in the price differential between Greece and Albania have somewhat receded due to an overall decrease in petrol prices both in Albania and Greece during Q2 2012.

Petrol prices in Croatia are minimally cheaper compared to Hungary and Slovenia, however, it is unclear if this minimal difference is sufficient incentive for petrol smugglers to operate along this border section particularly in light of overall falling petrol prices on both sides of the borders.

#### 4.10.2.3. Eastern Mediterranean route

Cross-border criminal activity on the Eastern Mediterranean route largely consists of the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes and stolen vehicles on exit from the EU. There are reports that this route is also used as an entry point to the EU by organised crime groups engaging in the trafficking in human beings.

### Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of narcotics on this route remains a major concern. Heroin produced in Central Asia (primarily Afghanistan) transits through Turkey and enters the EU concealed in commercial and private vehicles as well as trains. Improvements in the transportation infrastructure linking south-east Europe, Turkey and Central Asia (TRACECA) contributed to an increase in overall legitimate traffic and trade, but also the smuggling of drugs along

this route. The smuggling of large quantities of heroin in lorries or on trains remains popular reducing the probability of detection. In April Turkish authorities seized a lorry driven by a Turkish national transporting 72.3 kg of heroin hidden in a concealed compartment amongst furniture. The heroin was destined for the European street market and authorities were able to establish that the lorry entered Turkey at the Turkish-Iranian border.

Bulgarian authorities seized a record amount of 12 tons worth some EUR 360 million of hashish in a warehouse outside of Sofia (Fig. 30). The drugs were thought to have originated in Morocco and were smuggled to Bulgaria by fishermen arriving at a Black Sea port. Official reports indicated that the drugs were stored at the warehouse prior to their transport to and distribution in Belgium and the Netherlands. This seizure and other operations suggest that some drugs previously smuggled through the Western Mediterranean and Western African routes are being diverted to enter the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route.



© press.mvr.bg

Figure 30. **A total of 12 tonnes of hashish have been discovered in a tool warehouse in the village of Mirovyane, near the capital Sofia in Bulgaria, destined for distribution in the EU**

## “ The difficult truth about trafficking

Commission strategy aims to tackle trafficking.

There are no EU-wide standards for data-collection. As a consequence, there are 'significant intelligence gaps' on human trafficking, according to Europol, the EU's police co-operation agency.

'Assessments of the level of trafficking throughout the EU are based on incomplete data and are, at best, partially informed estimates,' Europol wrote in a report last September. As a result, neither Europol nor the European Commission wants to hazard a guess as to how many people are trafficked each year. The European Commission on Tuesday (19 June 2012) adopted a strategy that it hopes will help combat human trafficking. It sets five broad priorities, including the prevention of trafficking, the provision of assistance to victims, and better prosecution of traffickers. It proposes a range of measures to be taken by the Commission or other parties. Implementation on the Commission side will rest with Myria Vassiliadou, the Commission's anti-trafficking co-ordinator, who started in her newly created post one year ago.

Drafted by the team of Cecilia Malmström, the European commissioner for home affairs, the strategy is careful to stress the primary responsibility of the European Union's member states for dealing with the crime of trafficking. But there is a certain impatience among EU officials with the slow pace of legal harmonisation and other forms of co-operation between the member states.

Source: [www.europeanvoice.com](http://www.europeanvoice.com), 21 June 2012



### Smuggling of tobacco products

Along the Eastern Mediterranean Route, cigarette smuggling was almost exclusively detected at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. This border section alone accounted for 45% of all detected incidents of cigarette smuggling during JO Focal Points Land 2012 in Q2 2012, this share remains unchanged from Q1 2012. Smugglers were mostly Bulgarian nationals carrying either relatively small quantities of cigarettes or larger quantities of up to several kilos of loose tobacco.

### Smuggling of petrol & alcohol

Petrol prices in Turkey are generally higher than in either Greece or Bulgaria providing little incentive for petrol smuggling into the EU in this region. However, the petrol price

differential between Bulgaria and Turkey may actually render petrol smuggling out of the EU a profitable prospect (Tab. 2).

Isolated cases of alcohol smuggling at the Bulgarian-Turkish border indicate that this was not a widespread problem. However, in Q2 2012 a single Bulgarian national was apprehended at Lesovo BCP attempting to smuggle a large quantity of alcohol (916 l) from Turkey to Greece via Bulgaria.

During Q2 2012, the border section between Turkey and Bulgaria also saw several attempts of the smuggling of precious metals such as gold and silver in considerable quantities. In two incidents 2.5 kg of gold and 2.4 kg of silver were seized by border guards.



© Frontex, JO Indalo 2012

Figure 31. **A pleasure boat and rubber dinghy with high-powered engine, both detected smuggling drugs during JO Indalo 2012**

#### 4.10.2.4. Western Mediterranean and Western African routes

The Western Mediterranean and Western African routes are major entry routes for the smuggling of drugs into Europe. The drugs tend to originate in South and Central America (cocaine) as well as Northern and Western Africa (hashish/marijuana) and are smuggled into the EU for street distribution.

May 2012 saw the launch of Joint Operation Indalo 2012, which covers large parts of the Western Mediterranean sea. JO Indalo is the first EU inter-agency cooperation involving Frontex, EMSA, Europol and CeCLAD-M; almost immediately the operation produced promising results. For example, in Q2 2012, some 35 arrests were made following 21 incidents of detected drug smuggling, and the amount of seized drugs (hashish) exceeds 12 tonnes with an estimated market value of EUR 18.8 million. Despite the detection of hashish originating from Morocco along the Eastern Borders Route, the Western Mediterranean Route appears to remain a popular route for drug smugglers transporting hashish from North Africa to Spain for distribution in Europe.

It is believed that the seized hashish originated almost exclusively from Morocco. Smugglers of mostly Spanish or Moroccan nationalities used both pleasure boats as well as rubber dinghies (Fig. 31) to transport drugs from the North African coast to an area just outside Spanish jurisdiction on the seas. Here drug packages are lowered into the water, waiting to be picked by associates on the Spanish coast.

International airports in the EU remain transit and entry points for drugs originating in Africa and South America. For instance, the Netherlands reported an increase in attempts to smuggle heroin via cargo transports originating in Asia.

#### 4.10.2.5. Central Mediterranean route

The Central Mediterranean Route is typically associated with irregular migration originating in Northern Africa. However, the route continues to be used by criminal networks in the smuggling of cocaine and hashish, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of tobacco and counterfeit goods.

## 5. Statistical annex

### LEGEND

**Symbols and abbreviations:** **n.a.** not applicable  
: data not available

**Source:** FRAN data as of 6 August and EDF data as of 17 August 2012, unless otherwise indicated

**Note:** 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1: **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>All Borders</b>									
Afghanistan	1 764	4 606	9 323	7 301	2 153	<b>4 529</b>	-1.7	110	20
Bangladesh	562	1 799	1 370	1 192	1 407	<b>2 435</b>	35	73	11
Syria	126	274	602	614	715	<b>2 024</b>	639	183	8.8
Algeria	908	1 066	1 613	2 570	1 275	<b>2 000</b>	88	57	8.7
Albania	1 017	1 156	1 411	1 554	1 177	<b>1 797</b>	55	53	7.8
Somalia	573	1 035	604	799	1 017	<b>1 673</b>	62	65	7.2
Pakistan	1 051	2 821	5 629	5 874	1 045	<b>1 650</b>	-42	58	7.1
Tunisia	20 476	4 489	3 573	291	493	<b>832</b>	-81	69	3.6
Morocco	747	847	1 031	1 155	612	<b>823</b>	-2.8	34	3.6
Egypt	390	727	482	624	246	<b>626</b>	-14	154	2.7
Others	5 309	22 453	12 892	6 351	3 495	<b>4 703</b>	-79	35	20
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>32 923</b>	<b>41 273</b>	<b>38 530</b>	<b>28 325</b>	<b>13 635</b>	<b>23 092</b>	<b>-44</b>	<b>69</b>	
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Afghanistan	1 344	3 986	8 355	6 711	1 775	<b>3 963</b>	-0.6	123	22
Bangladesh	556	763	1 176	1 080	1 392	<b>2 348</b>	208	69	13
Syria	88	188	400	578	676	<b>1 918</b>	920	184	11
Albania	1 014	1 144	1 379	1 539	1 176	<b>1 736</b>	52	48	9.8
Algeria	678	760	1 069	2 164	1 227	<b>1 481</b>	95	21	8.3
Pakistan	943	2 136	5 154	5 548	915	<b>1 189</b>	-44	30	6.7
Morocco	516	519	453	748	425	<b>570</b>	9.8	34	3.2
Somalia	153	279	380	686	464	<b>567</b>	103	22	3.2
Not specified	299	580	1 131	737	307	<b>463</b>	-20	51	2.6
Iraq	207	189	326	372	156	<b>387</b>	105	148	2.2
Others	2 737	3 224	3 289	4 301	2 690	<b>3 180</b>	-1.4	18	18
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>8 535</b>	<b>13 768</b>	<b>23 112</b>	<b>24 464</b>	<b>11 203</b>	<b>17 802</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>59</b>	
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Somalia	420	756	224	113	553	<b>1 106</b>	46	100	21
Tunisia	20 245	4 298	3 374	96	357	<b>685</b>	-84	92	13
Afghanistan	420	620	968	590	378	<b>566</b>	-8.7	50	11
Egypt	321	658	425	544	186	<b>533</b>	-19	187	10
Algeria	230	306	544	406	48	<b>519</b>	70	981	9.8
Pakistan	108	685	475	326	130	<b>461</b>	-33	255	8.7
Morocco	231	328	578	407	187	<b>253</b>	-23	35	4.8
Eritrea	538	112	25	5	39	<b>223</b>	99	472	4.2
Syria	38	86	202	36	39	<b>106</b>	23	172	2.0
Bangladesh	6	1 036	194	112	15	<b>87</b>	-92	480	1.6
Others	1 831	18 620	8 409	1 226	500	<b>751</b>	-96	50	14
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>24 388</b>	<b>27 505</b>	<b>15 418</b>	<b>3 861</b>	<b>2 432</b>	<b>5 290</b>	<b>-81</b>	<b>118</b>	

Annex Table 2: **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Border Type</b>									
Land	27	29	40	63	67	106	266	58	84
Sea	47	31	24	21	36	20	-35	-44	16
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	7	3	18	30	50	52	1633	4.0	41
Serbia	1	0	1	2	8	16	n.a.	100	13
Pakistan	1	2	2	5	0	11	450	n.a.	8.7
Algeria	25	11	13	6	8	10	-9.1	25	7.9
Morocco	5	4	2	4	3	10	150	233	7.9
Guinea	0	0	0	0	2	5	n.a.	150	4.0
Syria	0	1	0	5	1	4	300	300	3.2
Iraq	1	6	1	6	4	3	-50	-25	2.4
Iran	4	0	0	1	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	2.4
Albania	2	1	1	5	3	3	200	0	2.4
Others	28	32	26	20	24	9	-72	-63	7.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>22</b>	

Annex Table 3: **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Place of Detection</b>									
Inland	1 498	1 521	1 013	1 114	1 489	1 254	-18	-16	70
Land	112	159	195	159	216	177	11	-18	9.9
Land Intra-EU	79	89	103	94	138	122	37	-12	6.8
Sea	49	65	117	93	129	116	78	-10	6.5
Air	91	80	88	108	82	70	-13	-15	3.9
Not specified	27	27	30	46	53	46	70	-13	2.6
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Spain	51	66	92	111	140	144	118	2.9	8.1
China	146	72	52	105	88	101	40	15	5.7
France	131	133	76	64	95	99	-26	4.2	5.5
Egypt	39	53	52	29	37	99	87	168	5.5
Morocco	120	93	86	91	90	95	2.2	5.6	5.3
Italy	180	138	116	134	202	94	-32	-53	5.3
Pakistan	64	84	51	38	59	82	-2.4	39	4.6
Not specified	57	62	48	88	88	77	24	-13	4.3
Algeria	26	38	23	48	42	57	50	36	3.2
Romania	65	77	68	58	136	55	-29	-60	3.1
Others	977	1 125	882	848	1 130	882	-22	-22	49
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 856</b>	<b>1 941</b>	<b>1 546</b>	<b>1 614</b>	<b>2 107</b>	<b>1 785</b>	<b>-8.0</b>	<b>-15</b>	



Annex Table 4: **Illegal stay**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2		per cent of total	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
<b>Place of Detection</b>									
Inland	67 161	70 063	69 572	76 512	72 520	<b>68 204</b>	-2.7	-6.0	81
Air	7 328	7 452	9 361	8 985	8 687	<b>8 380</b>	12	-3.5	10
Land	2 814	4 353	5 259	5 214	4 731	<b>4 766</b>	9.5	0.7	5.7
Land Intra-EU	2 787	2 772	2 032	1 639	1 347	<b>1 427</b>	-49	5.9	1.7
Sea	1 768	1 981	1 519	1 325	1 040	<b>1 084</b>	-45	4.2	1.3
Between BCP	469	129	292	159	130	<b>212</b>	64	63	0.3
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	4 947	5 822	6 777	7 750	6 345	<b>6 160</b>	5.8	-2.9	7.3
Morocco	5 789	5 497	5 026	5 575	6 047	<b>5 643</b>	2.7	-6.7	6.7
Pakistan	2 476	2 838	3 720	3 587	3 752	<b>5 084</b>	79	36	6.0
Tunisia	3 533	7 682	5 289	6 360	4 705	<b>4 226</b>	-45	-10	5.0
Algeria	3 840	3 623	3 925	4 010	4 247	<b>4 044</b>	12	-4.8	4.8
Albania	2 216	2 524	2 382	3 085	3 167	<b>3 613</b>	43	14	4.3
Serbia	2 990	2 838	2 596	4 360	3 784	<b>3 541</b>	25	-6.4	4.2
Ukraine	2 416	2 906	3 788	3 737	3 202	<b>3 033</b>	4.4	-5.3	3.6
Russia	2 433	2 281	3 173	2 427	2 363	<b>2 422</b>	6.2	2.5	2.9
Nigeria	2 376	2 169	2 054	2 191	2 438	<b>2 152</b>	-0.8	-12	2.6
Others	49 311	48 570	49 307	50 752	48 405	<b>44 158</b>	-9.1	-8.8	53
<b>Total</b>	<b>82 327</b>	<b>86 750</b>	<b>88 037</b>	<b>93 834</b>	<b>88 455</b>	<b>84 076</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>-5.0</b>	

Annex Table 5: **Applications for asylum**

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2		per cent of total	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	6 427	7 067	8 552	7 626	6 306	<b>6 736</b>	-4.7	6.8	12
Syria	1 358	1 517	2 750	2 555	2 447	<b>3 532</b>	133	44	6.1
Pakistan	2 123	2 530	3 778	3 904	3 126	<b>3 519</b>	39	13	6.1
Somalia	2 559	3 705	3 288	3 714	2 820	<b>3 294</b>	-11	17	5.7
Not specified	1 825	1 505	1 460	4 172	3 895	<b>3 073</b>	104	-21	5.3
Russia	2 830	2 733	3 643	3 730	2 697	<b>2 775</b>	1.5	2.9	4.8
Iran	2 599	2 376	3 012	3 276	2 488	<b>2 669</b>	12	7.3	4.6
Iraq	3 757	3 380	4 159	3 503	2 660	<b>2 579</b>	-24	-3.0	4.4
Serbia	4 425	2 814	2 832	6 937	4 259	<b>2 380</b>	-15	-44	4.1
Eritrea	1 909	3 040	2 191	2 053	2 129	<b>2 224</b>	-27	4.5	3.8
Others	23 381	30 907	31 748	30 404	24 027	<b>25 208</b>	-18	4.9	43
<b>Total</b>	<b>53 193</b>	<b>61 574</b>	<b>67 413</b>	<b>71 874</b>	<b>56 854</b>	<b>57 989</b>	<b>-5.8</b>	<b>2.0</b>	



## Annex Table 6: Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>All borders</b>									
Ukraine	3 529	3 861	4 499	3 921	3 788	<b>3 994</b>	3.4	5.4	14
Albania	4 943	4 513	3 550	2 941	2 261	<b>3 737</b>	-17	65	13
Russia	1 832	2 465	2 710	2 214	1 839	<b>2 335</b>	-5.3	27	8.3
Georgia	421	686	558	1 136	567	<b>1 692</b>	147	198	6.0
Serbia	1 962	1 685	1 816	1 743	1 555	<b>1 326</b>	-21	-15	4.7
Belarus	1 318	1 501	1 549	1 615	1 106	<b>1 116</b>	-26	0.9	4.0
Morocco	831	1 112	1 211	1 014	1 058	<b>1 081</b>	-2.8	2.2	3.8
Croatia	1 051	1 072	766	867	1 032	<b>1 048</b>	-2.2	1.6	3.7
Brazil	1 373	1 230	1 103	1 071	1 012	<b>859</b>	-30	-15	3.0
YROM	928	817	794	672	508	<b>655</b>	-20	29	2.3
Others	10 511	11 134	11 769	11 817	9 909	<b>10 401</b>	-6.6	5.0	37
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>28 699</b>	<b>30 076</b>	<b>30 325</b>	<b>29 011</b>	<b>24 635</b>	<b>28 244</b>	<b>-6.1</b>	<b>15</b>	
<b>Land Borders</b>									
Ukraine	3 337	3 561	4 191	3 608	3 503	<b>3 723</b>	4.5	6.3	24
Albania	2 876	3 057	1 884	1 161	1 192	<b>2 587</b>	-15	117	17
Russia	1 178	1 431	1 794	1 510	1 289	<b>1 630</b>	14	26	11
Georgia	375	635	496	1 065	493	<b>1 620</b>	155	229	11
Belarus	1 300	1 462	1 504	1 574	1 080	<b>1 086</b>	-26	0.6	7.1
Serbia	1 601	1 298	1 483	1 394	1 288	<b>1 080</b>	-17	-16	7.1
Croatia	987	1 013	713	815	979	<b>1 002</b>	-1.1	2.3	6.6
Morocco	520	787	869	651	666	<b>708</b>	-10	6.3	4.6
YROM	764	667	680	537	400	<b>506</b>	-24	27	3.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	350	402	424	343	347	<b>346</b>	-14	-0.3	2.3
Others	1 152	1 252	1 791	1 100	832	<b>974</b>	-22	17	6.4
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>14 440</b>	<b>15 565</b>	<b>15 829</b>	<b>13 758</b>	<b>12 069</b>	<b>15 262</b>	<b>-1.9</b>	<b>26</b>	
<b>Air Borders</b>									
Brazil	1 358	1 204	1 079	1 056	1 003	<b>841</b>	-30	-16	7.7
Albania	827	736	796	944	617	<b>638</b>	-13	3.4	5.9
United States	495	562	605	557	461	<b>484</b>	-14	5.0	4.5
Not specified	273	352	397	508	435	<b>458</b>	30	5.3	4.2
Nigeria	406	357	393	388	374	<b>435</b>	22	16	4.0
Russia	266	386	459	348	373	<b>389</b>	0.8	4.3	3.6
Algeria	218	236	233	504	269	<b>356</b>	51	32	3.3
Turkey	362	328	282	331	355	<b>352</b>	7.3	-0.8	3.2
India	320	283	233	213	203	<b>286</b>	1.1	41	2.6
Morocco	246	229	244	288	254	<b>259</b>	13	2.0	2.4
Others	7 232	7 609	7 374	7 902	6 879	<b>6 365</b>	-16	-7.5	59
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>12 003</b>	<b>12 282</b>	<b>12 095</b>	<b>13 039</b>	<b>11 223</b>	<b>10 863</b>	<b>-12</b>	<b>-3.2</b>	
<b>Sea Borders</b>									
Albania	1 240	720	870	836	452	<b>512</b>	-29	13	24
Philippines	170	85	254	230	130	<b>371</b>	336	185	18
Russia	388	648	457	356	177	<b>316</b>	-51	79	15
Not specified	26	61	34	29	40	<b>117</b>	92	193	5.5
Morocco	65	96	98	75	138	<b>114</b>	19	-17	5.4
India	11	38	42	44	26	<b>89</b>	134	242	4.2
Syria	8	33	42	19	7	<b>56</b>	70	700	2.6
Iraq	8	7	33	35	35	<b>47</b>	571	34	2.2
Ukraine	17	53	56	29	12	<b>42</b>	-21	250	2.0
Serbia	34	21	78	77	34	<b>39</b>	86	15	1.8
Others	289	467	437	484	292	<b>416</b>	-11	42	20
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>2 256</b>	<b>2 229</b>	<b>2 401</b>	<b>2 214</b>	<b>1 343</b>	<b>2 119</b>	<b>-4.9</b>	<b>58</b>	



Annex Table 7: **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2012 Q2 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>												
Ukraine	3 994	16	21	1 312	5	1 640	158	559	224	17	53	4 005
Albania	3 737	47	422	41	49	481	60	1 370	1 113	73	119	3 775
Russia	2 335	177	2	1 573	28	228	12	143	134	83	34	2 414
Georgia	1 692	2	0	1 532	2	37	0	11	124	0	1	1 709
Serbia	1 326	47	5	236	9	97	310	147	458	28	9	1 346
Belarus	1 116	0	0	584	0	121	4	314	72	29	10	1 134
Morocco	1 081	422	25	101	18	162	5	42	255	60	6	1 096
Croatia	1 048	364	0	15	0	26	211	35	147	238	15	1 051
Brazil	859	4	12	76	0	270	21	66	111	9	291	860
ŕYROM	655	14	5	45	0	168	98	125	198	18	3	674
Others	10 401	905	514	2 810	263	2 473	264	590	450	261	2 152	10 682
<b>Total</b>	<b>28 244</b>	<b>1 998</b>	<b>1 006</b>	<b>8 325</b>	<b>374</b>	<b>5 703</b>	<b>1 143</b>	<b>3 402</b>	<b>3 286</b>	<b>816</b>	<b>2 693</b>	<b>28 746</b>

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union.

Annex Table 8: Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			Highest share	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		per cent of total
<b>All borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	5 934	7 147	8 982	7 803	5 981	<b>8 325</b>	16	39	29	Russia (19%)
E) No justification	6 130	6 584	6 331	6 888	6 108	<b>5 703</b>	-13	-6.6	20	Ukraine (29%)
G) No subsistence	2 686	3 174	2 799	2 965	2 512	<b>3 402</b>	7.2	35	12	Albania (40%)
H) Alert issued	6 455	5 338	4 480	3 970	3 353	<b>3 286</b>	-38	-2.0	11	Albania (34%)
Reason not available	3 183	3 296	3 344	3 038	2 540	<b>2 693</b>	-18	6.0	9.4	United States (15%)
A) No valid document	1 544	2 172	2 186	1 908	1 791	<b>1 998</b>	-8.0	12	7.0	Morocco (21%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 556	1 256	1 333	1 337	1 479	<b>1 143</b>	-9.0	-23	4.0	Serbia (27%)
B) False document	696	676	675	752	913	<b>1 006</b>	49	10	3.5	Albania (42%)
I) Threat	709	707	581	838	762	<b>816</b>	15	7.1	2.8	Croatia (29%)
D) False visa	490	398	403	527	374	<b>374</b>	-6.0	0	1.3	Albania (13%)
<b>Total All Borders</b>	<b>29 383</b>	<b>30 748</b>	<b>31 114</b>	<b>30 026</b>	<b>25 813</b>	<b>28 746</b>	<b>-6.5</b>	<b>11</b>		
<b>Land Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	3 450	4 411	5 874	4 760	3 689	<b>5 528</b>	25	50	36	Georgia (27%)
G) No subsistence	1 753	2 098	1 867	1 977	1 730	<b>2 487</b>	19	44	16	Albania (49%)
E) No justification	2 331	2 454	2 452	2 192	2 184	<b>2 259</b>	-7.9	3.4	15	Ukraine (68%)
H) Alert issued	4 318	3 921	3 005	2 523	2 168	<b>2 183</b>	-44	0.7	14	Albania (28%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 239	1 064	1 137	1 137	1 221	<b>925</b>	-13	-24	6.0	Serbia (31%)
A) No valid document	689	1 039	1 037	749	913	<b>896</b>	-14	-1.9	5.8	Morocco (45%)
I) Threat	521	540	428	606	475	<b>529</b>	-2.0	11	3.4	Croatia (45%)
B) False document	104	60	138	80	310	<b>464</b>	673	50	3.0	Albania (88%)
D) False visa	104	81	141	179	75	<b>109</b>	35	45	0.7	Albania (43%)
Reason not available	1	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>	n.a.	n.a.	0	
<b>Total Land Border</b>	<b>14 510</b>	<b>15 668</b>	<b>16 079</b>	<b>14 203</b>	<b>12 765</b>	<b>15 380</b>	<b>-1.8</b>	<b>20</b>		
<b>Air Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
E) No justification	3 690	3 983	3 732	4 475	3 815	<b>3 316</b>	-17	-13	30	Brazil (8.1%)
Reason not available	3 071	3 152	3 200	2 939	2 466	<b>2 568</b>	-19	4.1	23	United States (16%)
C) No valid visa	2 092	2 250	2 386	2 456	1 991	<b>2 050</b>	-8.9	3.0	18	Russia (9.3%)
G) No subsistence	818	963	829	872	731	<b>821</b>	-15	12	7.3	Albania (9.4%)
H) Alert issued	1 000	804	747	803	721	<b>644</b>	-20	-11	5.7	Albania (25%)
A) No valid document	498	526	627	673	600	<b>589</b>	12	-1.8	5.2	Unknown (37%)
B) False document	575	575	519	642	568	<b>518</b>	-9.9	-8.8	4.6	Unknown (17%)
I) Threat	186	158	145	220	276	<b>267</b>	69	-3.3	2.4	Suriname (15%)
D) False visa	367	246	246	331	277	<b>246</b>	0	-11	2.2	Philippines (15%)
F) Over 3 month stay	312	180	193	194	257	<b>213</b>	18	-17	1.9	Serbia (10%)
<b>Total Air Border</b>	<b>12 609</b>	<b>12 837</b>	<b>12 624</b>	<b>13 605</b>	<b>11 702</b>	<b>11 232</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>-4.0</b>		
<b>Sea Borders</b>										<b>Nationality</b>
C) No valid visa	392	486	722	587	301	<b>742</b>	53	147	35	Philippines (42%)
A) No valid document	357	607	522	486	278	<b>513</b>	-15	85	24	Russia (31%)
H) Alert issued	1 137	613	728	644	464	<b>454</b>	-26	-2.2	21	Albania (72%)
E) No justification	109	147	147	221	109	<b>128</b>	-13	17	6.0	Albania (51%)
Reason not available	111	144	144	99	74	<b>125</b>	-13	69	5.9	Albania (18%)
G) No subsistence	115	113	103	116	51	<b>94</b>	-17	84	4.4	Albania (80%)
B) False document	17	41	18	30	35	<b>22</b>	-46	-37	1.0	Unknown (64%)
I) Threat	2	9	8	12	11	<b>20</b>	122	82	0.9	Albania (70%)
D) False visa	19	71	16	17	22	<b>18</b>	-75	-18	0.8	Morocco (56%)
F) Over 3 month stay	5	12	3	6	1	<b>4</b>	-67	300	0.2	Morocco (50%)
<b>Total Sea Border</b>	<b>2 264</b>	<b>2 243</b>	<b>2 411</b>	<b>2 218</b>	<b>1 346</b>	<b>2 120</b>	<b>-5.5</b>	<b>58</b>		



Annex Table 9: **Document fraud**

Fraudulent documents detected at BCP reported by border type and top ten nationalities claimed

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
<b>Border Type</b>										<b>Nationality Claimed</b>
Air	1 177	1 096	1 093	1 196	1 240	<b>1 263</b>	15	1.9	52	Pakistan (8.4%)
Land	387	453	571	494	740	<b>1 060</b>	134	43	44	Albania (80%)
Sea	92	113	167	145	103	<b>110</b>	-2.7	6.8	4.5	Morocco (42%)
<b>Top Ten Nationalities Claimed</b>										<b>Nationality Document</b>
Albania	35	40	49	75	353	<b>910</b>	2175	158	37	Greece (73%)
Pakistan	41	44	27	28	64	<b>107</b>	143	67	4.4	Greece (46%)
Morocco	163	132	253	211	197	<b>84</b>	-36	-57	3.5	Spain (24%)
Nigeria	80	57	74	63	108	<b>77</b>	35	-29	3.2	France (30%)
Ukraine	162	170	243	144	151	<b>73</b>	-57	-52	3.0	Poland (58%)
Iran	68	41	118	84	79	<b>66</b>	61	-16	2.7	Germany (17%)
Syria	14	16	23	33	31	<b>64</b>	300	106	2.6	Greece (25%)
Bangladesh	32	33	14	18	21	<b>62</b>	88	195	2.5	Italy (50%)
Unknown	111	155	129	151	78	<b>58</b>	-63	-26	2.4	France (17%)
Afghanistan	40	43	30	22	53	<b>55</b>	28	3.8	2.3	United Kingdom (38%)
Others	910	931	871	1 006	948	<b>877</b>	-5.8	-7.5	36	Italy (17%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 656</b>	<b>1 662</b>	<b>1 831</b>	<b>1 835</b>	<b>2 083</b>	<b>2 433</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>100</b>	

Annex Table 10: Document fraud

Fraudulent documents detected at BCP reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2011				2012	2012 Q2		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
<b>PASSPORTS</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>644</b>	<b>723</b>	<b>721</b>	<b>705</b>	<b>674</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>-4.4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>United Kingdom (7.9%)</b>
Forged	229	195	228	285	268	305	56	14	45	United Kingdom (8.9%)
Authentic	178	168	199	220	192	157	-6.5	-18	23	Morocco (8.3%)
Counterfeit	67	89	119	74	98	103	16	5.1	15	Italy (21%)
False-no more details	159	170	165	135	133	98	-42	-26	15	United Kingdom (12%)
Stolen blank	18	17	11	7	14	11	-35	-21	1.6	Germany (45%)
Pseudo	3	5	1	0	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	0	n.a.
<b>ID CARDS</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Italy (35%)</b>
Counterfeit	88	115	113	110	131	117	1.7	-11	45	Italy (41%)
Authentic	56	46	84	77	71	54	17	-24	21	Spain (37%)
Forged	20	22	24	19	11	44	100	300	17	Italy (20%)
False-no more details	33	49	50	39	12	23	-53	92	8.9	Italy (39%)
Stolen blank	8	9	12	12	12	19	111	58	7.4	Italy (84%)
Pseudo	5	2	1	0	1	1	-50	0	0	Bulgaria
<b>VISA</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>-6.6</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>France (34%)</b>
Counterfeit	102	119	123	112	118	93	-22	-21	54	France (47%)
False-no more details	28	38	22	37	17	27	-29	59	16	France (30%)
Forged	52	21	16	18	28	25	19	-11	15	Italy (48%)
Stolen blank	6	4	9	6	11	14	250	27	8.2	Czech Republic (50%)
Authentic	3	9	8	3	8	12	33	50	7.0	Italy (75%)
Pseudo	0	0	0	0	1	0	n.a.	-100	0	n.a.
<b>RESIDENCE PERMITS</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Greece (27%)</b>
Counterfeit	107	132	150	179	172	144	9	-16	44	Italy (44%)
Stolen blank	56	53	61	71	59	81	53	37	24	Greece (74%)
Authentic	65	69	56	85	71	56	-19	-21	17	Spain (39%)
Forged	18	15	19	24	27	34	127	26	10	Greece (50%)
False-no more details	22	16	10	24	16	15	-6.3	-6.3	4.5	Belgium (33%)
Pseudo	0	0	1	1	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	0	Germany
<b>STAMPS</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>960</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Greece (68%)</b>
Counterfeit	140	171	195	160	502	934	446	86	97	Greece (69%)
Forged	0	2	11	8	0	26	1,200	n.a.	2.7	Greece (27%)
False-no more details	39	71	73	57	75	0	-100	-100	0	n.a.
<b>OTHER</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>-29</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Italy (41%)</b>
Counterfeit	57	36	30	52	16	18	-50	13	46	Italy (39%)
Authentic	6	4	5	8	9	12	200	33	31	Italy (67%)
Forged	84	10	32	5	2	5	-50	150	13	Greece (20%)
Pseudo	1	2	2	0	2	3	50	50	7.7	Belgium
False-no more details	3	3	0	6	0	1	-67	n.a.	2.6	Spain
Stolen blank	3	0	1	1	6	0	n.a.	-100	0	n.a.
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 656</b>	<b>1 662</b>	<b>1 831</b>	<b>1 835</b>	<b>2 083</b>	<b>2 433</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>17</b>		

Note:

\* Spain data include detections on entry, exit and transit.

\*\* 2012 Q1 data for Sweden only include fraudulent documents detected in March

\*\*\* Due to reporting and comparability issues data from France has been excluded from this table.

In 2011, 2 962 fraudulent documents were detected at their external borders, For the period January-May 2012, this figure amounted to 970.



Annex Table 11: **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Afghanistan	4 400	6 423	7 243	9 208	6 421	<b>7 198</b>	12	12	11
Pakistan	3 580	5 382	8 569	9 073	5 854	<b>5 782</b>	7.4	-1.2	8.5
Albania	2 153	2 411	1 506	2 140	3 568	<b>4 149</b>	72	16	6.1
Morocco	2 413	2 914	2 392	3 465	4 214	<b>4 022</b>	38	-4.6	5.9
Algeria	2 180	2 916	2 667	4 573	3 696	<b>3 955</b>	36	7.0	5.8
Bangladesh	1 470	2 074	1 924	2 427	3 495	<b>3 382</b>	63	-3.2	5.0
Tunisia	787	1 260	1 475	1 638	3 103	<b>2 761</b>	119	-11	4.1
Serbia	1 898	1 599	1 332	1 585	2 559	<b>2 490</b>	56	-2.7	3.7
India	2 151	1 996	2 091	2 579	3 088	<b>2 467</b>	24	-20	3.6
Nigeria	2 103	1 743	1 610	1 901	2 455	<b>2 251</b>	29	-8.3	3.3
Others	27 835	26 998	26 580	28 721	31 451	<b>29 434</b>	9.0	-6.4	43
<b>Total</b>	<b>50 970</b>	<b>55 716</b>	<b>57 389</b>	<b>67 310</b>	<b>69 904</b>	<b>67 891</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	

Annex Table 12: **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>Top Ten Nationalities</b>									
Albania	2 829	2 887	3 386	3 597	3 034	<b>3 071</b>	6.4	1.2	7.6
Serbia	1 784	2 145	1 951	2 037	2 505	<b>2 854</b>	33	14	7.1
Pakistan	1 216	1 297	1 547	2 193	2 381	<b>2 479</b>	91	4.1	6.2
India	1 866	1 604	1 926	2 271	2 424	<b>2 204</b>	37	-9.1	5.5
Morocco	1 774	1 712	1 582	1 837	2 089	<b>2 008</b>	17	-3.9	5.0
Ukraine	1 202	1 474	1 861	1 963	1 557	<b>1 905</b>	29	22	4.7
Tunisia	416	2 452	2 579	3 176	1 641	<b>1 835</b>	-25	12	4.6
Brazil	1 703	1 378	1 300	1 683	1 386	<b>1 642</b>	19	18	4.1
Russia	1 478	1 583	1 605	1 555	1 758	<b>1 539</b>	-2.8	-12	3.8
China	1 557	903	1 241	1 444	1 759	<b>1 388</b>	54	-21	3.4
Others	18 920	17 641	18 661	19 829	19 695	<b>19 374</b>	9.8	-1.6	48
<b>Total</b>	<b>34 745</b>	<b>35 076</b>	<b>37 639</b>	<b>41 585</b>	<b>40 229</b>	<b>40 299</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>0.2</b>	

Annex Table 13: **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

	2011				2012	2012 Q2			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
<b>TYPE OF RETURN</b>									
<b>Forced</b>	17 692	19 462	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	9.3	8.4	53
Enforced by Member State	14 932	16 844	17 464	20 742	17 077	18 423	9.4	7.9	46
Not specified	2 508	2 370	2 383	2 266	2 211	2 241	-5.4	1.4	5.6
Enforced by Joint Operation	252	248	356	444	337	609	146	81	1.5
<b>Voluntary</b>	14 075	12 501	14 936	15 658	17 708	16 440	32	-7.2	41
Others	8 196	6 643	8 494	8 807	10 171	9 577	44	-5.8	24
IOM Assisted	3 133	3 269	3 531	3 975	4 254	3 852	18	-9.4	9.6
Not specified	2 746	2 589	2 911	2 876	3 283	3 011	16	-8.3	7.5
<b>Not specified</b>	2 978	3 113	2 500	2 475	2 896	2 586	-17	-11	6.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	34 745	35 076	37 639	41 585	40 229	40 299	15	0.2	
<b>TOP TEN NATIONALITIES</b>									
<b>Forced</b>									
Albania	2 740	2 791	3 265	3 436	2 871	2 864	2.6	-0.2	7.1
Pakistan	575	901	968	1 494	1 574	1 759	95	12	4.4
Tunisia	341	2 088	2 067	2 783	1 277	1 511	-28	18	3.7
Serbia	925	1 039	983	1 213	1 047	1 369	32	31	3.4
Afghanistan	777	647	703	1 053	891	950	47	6.6	2.4
India	649	755	696	766	843	872	15	3.4	2.2
Morocco	691	656	649	856	870	847	29	-2.6	2.1
Nigeria	806	711	721	874	586	774	8.9	32	1.9
Bangladesh	349	390	392	650	669	706	81	5.5	1.8
Algeria	489	422	552	609	624	615	46	-1.4	1.5
Others	9 350	9 062	9 207	9 718	8 373	9 006	-0.6	7.6	22
<b>Total Forced Returns</b>	17 692	19 462	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	9.3	8.4	53
<b>Voluntary</b>									
Ukraine	829	1 005	1 380	1 502	1 208	1 482	47	23	3.7
Serbia	853	1 100	967	822	1 454	1 482	35	1.9	3.7
India	1 208	832	1 223	1 500	1 572	1 328	60	-16	3.3
Russia	1 192	1 250	1 278	1 224	1 420	1 171	-6.3	-18	2.9
Brazil	904	657	637	979	773	981	49	27	2.4
China	918	449	685	798	1 064	759	69	-29	1.9
Pakistan	626	384	561	659	785	697	82	-11	1.7
Iraq	465	594	522	625	728	568	-4.4	-22	1.4
YROM	326	448	564	404	395	442	-1.3	12	1.1
Nigeria	609	347	466	534	442	419	21	-5.2	1.0
Others	6 145	5 435	6 653	6 611	7 867	7 111	31	-9.6	18
<b>Total Voluntary Returns</b>	14 075	12 501	14 936	15 658	17 708	16 440	32	-7.2	41



### Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders of the EU, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.







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