(10)

In June 2020, air carriers certified in Armenia were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/736 (6).

(11)

As part of the continuous monitoring activities the Commission identified that the air carrier Aircompany Armenia has been rebranded and its new commercial name is AIR DILIJANS.

(12)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that with respect to air carriers from Armenia, the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union, should be amended to include AIR DILIJANS in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, and to remove Aircompany Armenia from that Annex.

(13)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Armenia with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(14)

Air carriers certified in Egypt have never been included in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(15)

As part of the continuous monitoring of TCO authorisations, issued pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 452/2014, and as a result of the analysis of ramp inspections carried out under the SAFA programme in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, air carriers certified by Egypt have shown a growing number of safety concerns. Significant findings for a number of Egyptian TCO authorised air carriers have been noted. In addition, the TCO authorisation of Almasria Universal Airlines has been suspended on safety grounds for a second time in a two-year timeframe.

(16)

On 21 June 2023, the Commission addressed a letter to the Egyptian Civil Aviation Authority (‘ECAA’) expressing its concerns regarding the safety performance of air carriers certified by the ECAA, and requested a set of documents describing the organisation and illustrating its oversight capacities and associated activities.

(17)

On 13 July 2023 the ECAA provided a first set of information and documentation about their organisation, staffing, inspectors’ training, procedures, manuals, as well as an overview of the audits performed and planned, and occurrence reporting, for the period 2020-2023.

(18)

Assessment of the documents, done with the assistance of the Agency experts, revealed that the ECAA did not provide all the requested information on the number of staff and personnel qualification requirements, inspector training requirements, and actual training performed. Therefore, the Commission addressed a second letter to the ECAA on 5 October 2023 for the missing documents and information, which was subsequently received on 13 November 2023, and is currently being reviewed and analysed. The Commission will organise a technical meeting with the ECAA in the first quarter of 2024.

(19)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Egypt.

(20)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Egypt with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(21)

Where any pertinent safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards, further action by the Commission may become necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(22)

In December 2015, the air carrier Iraqi Airways was included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2322 (7).

(23)

Fly Baghdad applied for a TCO authorisation on 10 February 2022. The Agency assessed Fly Baghdad’s TCO application in accordance with the requirements as set out in Regulation (EU) No 452/2014.

(24)

The Agency, in conducting its assessment, raised concerns regarding the lack of ability by Fly Baghdad to respond to identified safety concerns. Notably, it determined that Fly Baghdad did not control and ensure that the planned and accomplished flight times, flight duty periods, duty periods and rest periods are within the limitations pursuant to the prescriptive fatigue management regulations established by Iraq.

(25)

Fly Baghdad’s inability to address these safety concerns was evidenced by submission of an unacceptable Corrective Action Plan (‘CAP’) to deal with the identified safety concerns. As such, Fly Baghdad did not demonstrate compliance with applicable international safety standards associated with the identified safety concerns. The Agency therefore concluded that further assessment would not result in the issue of an authorisation to Fly Baghdad, and that therefore it did not meet the applicable requirements of Regulation (EU) No 452/2014. Consequently, on 22 December 2022, the Agency rejected, on safety grounds, the TCO application of Fly Baghdad.

(26)

On 11 February 2023, Fly Baghdad, in accordance with Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8), lodged an appeal contesting the Agency’s decision of 22 December 2022 refusing Fly Baghdad’s application for a TCO authorisation. The decision of 7 September 2023 of the EASA Board of Appeal, established pursuant to Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, rejected Fly Baghdad’s appeal as unfounded, thus confirming the validity of the Agency’s decision of 22 December 2022.

(27)

On 20 April 2023, as part of the Commission’s ongoing monitoring activities, a technical meeting took place involving the Commission, the Agency, Member States, and the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority (‘ICAA’). During that meeting, the Commission conveyed to the ICAA that, based on the negative decision made by the Agency regarding Fly Baghdad’s application for a TCO Authorisation, the air carrier would undergo further review by the EU Air Safety Committee.

(28)

On 2 October 2023 the Commission wrote to the ICAA and Fly Baghdad, to inform both parties that the case of Fly Baghdad had been placed on the agenda of the 14 to 16 November 2023 meeting of the EU Air Safety Committee, and that both the ICAA and Fly Baghdad would be given the opportunity of being heard before the EU Air Safety Committee in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(29)

The ICAA and Fly Baghdad were heard by the EU Air Safety Committee on 15 November 2023. Amongst other elements, the ICAA reported that it has oversight responsibility for seven AOC holders, including Fly Baghdad, as regards ensuring the application and implementation of international safety standards and Iraq Civil Aviation Regulations, in compliance with ICAO Convention obligations.

(30)

The ICAA also provided an overview of its surveillance policy and activities, highlighting relevant audits planned and conducted for Fly Baghdad in 2023. Furthermore, the ICAA provided a summary of planned actions aimed at strengthening its oversight capabilities, notably by means of availing itself of services of experts in the fields of flight operations, airworthiness, and personnel licensing. With specific regard to the safety concerns identified by the Agency as part of its TCO authorisation process, the ICAA provided an overview of how it has investigated and is ensuring relevant follow up, with Fly Baghdad, to implement the appropriate corrective actions.

(31)

Fly Baghdad’s presentation to the EU Air Safety Committee focussed on the actions taken by it to address the safety concerns identified by the Agency as part of its TCO authorisation process. The detailed overview included information pertaining to its root cause analysis and the consequential actions taken in terms of the organisation, procedures, training, and compliance. While expressing Fly Baghdad’s commitment to continuous safety improvement, the presentation addressing the individual safety concerns, did not provide sufficient evidence of the detailed functioning of Fly Baghdad’s safety and quality management system.

(32)

The information provided by Fly Baghdad was not sufficient in nature to fully address the safety concerns from which the decision by the Agency to refuse the TCO authorisation of Fly Baghdad emanated. The CAP provided by Fly Baghdad, notably the associated root cause analysis, did not demonstrate the air carrier’s ability to implement appropriate measures to assure compliance with international safety standards.

(33)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, it is therefore assessed that the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union should be amended to include the air carrier Fly Baghdad in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006. Furthermore, the Commission intends to carry out, with the assistance of the Agency and the support of Member States, a Union on-site assessment visit to Iraq to verify whether certification and oversight of air carriers by the ICAA is conducted in compliance with the relevant international safety standards. This Union on-site assessment visit will focus on the ICAA and selected air carriers certified in Iraq.

(34)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Iraq with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(35)

Where any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards, further action by the Commission may become necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(36)

In December 2016, air carriers certified in Kazakhstan were removed from Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006, by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/2214 (9), with the exception of Air Astana, which had been removed from Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 already in 2015 by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2322.

(37)

On 13 October 2023, as part of its continuous monitoring activities, the Commission, the Agency, Member States and representatives of the Civil Aviation Committee of Kazakhstan (‘CAC KZ’) and the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan Joint Stock Company (‘AAK’) held a technical meeting.

(38)

During the meeting, CAC KZ and AAK reported on the progress made in executing and improving their CAP. On 19 October 2023, and again on 7 November 2023, AAK provided the Commission with information to substantiate their claim that they have addressed all observations and recommendations. According to their statement, thirty-five of these issues are now considered fully resolved, three partially resolved, and one remains outstanding due to its long-term implementation process.

(39)

AAK introduced its new organisational structure, aligned with ICAO requirements, and reported on the progress made in its transition towards becoming a self-financing organisation by means of a new financing scheme established as of July 2023.

(40)

In terms of the Kazakh aviation legislative framework, AAK and CAC KZ noted the revision of the Primary Aviation Law, which was formally enacted in December 2022. Subsequent to the enactment of this law, AAK proceeded to revise forty four secondary aviation regulations throughout 2023. At the time of the meeting, they were actively engaged in the revision of an additional thirteen secondary regulations, which, according to their statements, are expected to be updated before the end of 2023. Furthermore, from the start of 2023 up to the date of the meeting, AAK has approved a number of both new and updated procedures and guidance materials, with twelve having received full approval and more than fifteen in their final draft stages. However, it’s still unclear whether the secondary regulations have only integrated the recent amendments to the Primary Aviation Law, or if they have also been updated to align with the latest amendments to the ICAO Annexes.

(41)

While various matters and concerns were deliberated during the technical meeting, it was agreed that a Union on-site assessment visit would be appropriate in order to verify the effective implementation of the indicated changes. Agreement was reached that such a visit should take place in the first quarter of 2024.

(42)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers from Kazakhstan.

(43)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kazakhstan with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of all those carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(44)

Where any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards, further action by the Commission may become necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(45)

Air carriers certified in Kenya have never been included in Annex A or B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006.

(46)

A number of accidents and incidents occurred in June and July 2022, involving aircraft registered in Kenya operating flights into airports in South Sudan. The circumstances surrounding these accidents and incidents prompted the Commission to address a letter, on 20 September 2022, to the Civil Aviation Authority of Kenya (‘KCAA’) requesting information about the status of these aircraft in the Aircraft Registry of Kenya, their air carriers and/or lessors, as well as the outcome of any preliminary reports from the accident investigations.

(47)

As a follow up to this correspondence, the Commission organised a call with the Director-General of the KCAA and his services on 31 May 2023 to discuss and clarify the nature of the request.

(48)

On 21 June 2023 the Commission addressed a letter to the KCAA and requested a set of documents describing the organisation and illustrating its oversight capacities and associated activities with regards to air carriers it has certified. As part of this request, the Commission specifically requested information about effective oversight of its air carriers and aircraft operating outside of Kenya, notably as regards the two companies whose aircraft were involved in the June and July 2022 accidents and incidents.

(49)

On 18 July 2023 the KCAA provided a first set of information and documentation about their organisation, staffing, inspectors’ training, procedures, manuals, as well as audits performed and planned, and occurrence reporting, for the period 2020-2023.

(50)

Detailed examination of the information and documents received, done with the assistance of the Agency experts, has revealed that certain areas need additional documents and further clarification on behalf of the KCAA to allow a clear understanding. Therefore, the Commission addressed a follow up letter on 5 October 2023 requesting the missing documents and information.

(51)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Kenya.

(52)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Kenya with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(53)

Where any pertinent safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards, further action by the Commission may become necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(54)

In December 2013, air carriers certified in Nepal were included in Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2013 (10).

(55)

As a follow up to the EU Air Safety Committee deliberations in May 2022, experts from the Commission, the Agency and Member States conducted a Union on-site assessment visit in Nepal between 11 and 15 September 2023 at the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (‘CAAN’), including a sample assessment of two air carriers certified in Nepal, namely Shree Airlines and Nepal Airlines.

(56)

The assessment visit focused its activities on CAAN in view of its role and responsibility for the oversight activities of the air carriers certified in Nepal. The assessment revealed discrepancies between the approved organisational structure and the actual distribution of sections, departments, and personnel. This inconsistency highlights the need for a comprehensive revision of the organisational structure to more accurately reflect current activities and staff allocation. Such a revision is critical to ensure a robust and effective safety oversight system that aligns with both national and international obligations, ultimately enhancing the operational efficiency and safety standards of air carriers in Nepal.

(57)

CAAN’s current practices in Personnel Licensing requirements and flight examiner systems show non-compliance with international safety standards, necessitating an urgent alignment of its regulations with such standards, especially as regards examiner designations in the area of flight crew licensing. Notably the absence of a robust framework for the designation and monitoring of flight examiners and instructors in the context of helicopter operations, underscores the need for CAAN to establish clear criteria, privileges, and effective surveillance mechanisms for Designated Check Pilots and examiners. Implementing these measures will significantly enhance the safety and competency standards across the aviation sector in Nepal, ensuring a more consistent and reliable oversight of aviation professionals.

(58)

Moreover, the assessments have identified a gap in the effective monitoring and documentation of training for CAAN’s Personnel Licensing Inspector and assistant inspector roles.

(59)

The assessment also noted significant gaps in CAAN’s Flight Operations Division of, notably as regards overseeing fatigue related to duty period limitations and ensuring comprehensive compliance checks during the approval process. These failures indicate an urgent need for CAAN to implement robust fatigue management protocols and strengthen their technical evaluation and approval processes. Additionally, the lack of specific training and qualifications among inspectors, particularly concerning type ratings for aircraft operated by air carriers, raises concerns about the effectiveness of CAAN’s certification and surveillance activities.

(60)

The assessment furthermore identified a systemic issue in the Flight Operations Division’s approach to reviewing, evaluating, and validating air carriers’ flight safety documentation and specific approvals. The observed discrepancies, such as non-compliances in Traffic Collision Avoidance System (‘TCAS’) requirements, fuel calculations, and oversight of flight time limitations, significantly impact flight safety.

(61)

The Airworthiness Inspection Division exhibits a lack of maturity in critical aspects such as audit control, training programme completeness, and document review diligence. CAAN has to address these issues by enhancing the training programme and adopting a more rigorous audit approach, and should endeavour to transition to more efficient digital record-keeping systems.

(62)

Despite the identified areas for improvement, the discussions with CAAN staff indicate a strong commitment to enhancing Nepal’s aviation safety oversight system. It is crucial for CAAN to continue fostering this commitment, ensuring alignment with international safety standards, and effectively addressing the operational and safety challenges identified during the assessment.

(63)

Shree Airlines, established in 1999, was subject to a dedicated visit by the Union assessment team on 13 September 2023.

(64)

Shree Airlines should significantly enhance its Safety Management System (‘SMS’) and operational policies to align with international safety standards and Nepalese legislation. This includes revising the Safety Management Manual (‘SMM’), audit checklists, and addressing deficiencies in its maintenance documentation and procedures, such as inaccuracies in work orders and equipment calibration.

(65)

Operational and safety compliance issues at Shree Airlines extend to aspects of flight planning, crew fatigue management, and adherence to regulatory requirements in de-icing procedures, TCAS requirements, and the Minimum Equipment List for specific aircraft types.

(66)

Furthermore, the observed deficiencies in managing the validity and quality of training certificates, coupled with unclear or incorrect instructor feedback, point to a need for a more robust system to monitor and improve crew competencies and training efficacy.

(67)

Nepal Airlines, established in 1958, was subject to a dedicated visit by the Union assessment team on 14 September 2023.

(68)

The assessment of Nepal Airlines highlighted deficiencies in its SMS and operational compliance. Issues include inadequate hazard identification and management, repetitive findings in annual audits, and insufficiently detailed quality audit checklists. Additionally, there are concerns about the effectiveness of the Quality Assurance department, the lack of a comprehensive hazard log in Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation and Approved Maintenance Organisation, and shortcomings in manpower analysis.

(69)

The visit showed Nepal Airlines’ challenges in maintaining operational oversight, with evident issues across various areas including training competencies, flight time limitations, document management, and compliance monitoring.

(70)

The observations raised during the assessment visit suggest that Nepal Airlines requires a substantial overhaul of its systems and processes to achieve the necessary maturity in its SMS and ensure a robust understanding and management of its airworthiness approvals and operational oversight.

(71)

On the basis of the outcome of the Union on-site assessment visit, the Commission invited CAAN and the air carriers Shree Airlines and Nepal Airlines to a hearing before the EU Air Safety Committee on 15 November 2023.

(72)

The CAAN presented a summary to the EU Air Safety Committee that included an overview of air carriers certified in Nepal, the number of aircraft registered in Nepal, the latest outcomes from the ICAO USOAP Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) audit, and Nepal’s progress in improving its ICAO USOAP implementation scores.

(73)

Regarding the EU’s assessment report, CAAN detailed actions taken immediately following the Union on-site assessment visit. This included organisational restructuring and developing an Integrated Management Manual. Key actions highlighted were the inclusion of a compliance monitoring function in the audit department and initiating the drafting of a Quality Management System Manual.

(74)

The EU Air Safety Committee was informed about CAAN’s CAP to address issues noted during the Union on-site assessment visit. CAAN has performed root cause analysis for each observation, with immediate and long-term corrective actions. However, it was unclear if the in-depth root cause analysis principles were consistently applied.

(75)

The Commission and the EU Air Safety Committee recognised and encouraged CAAN’s efforts, noting the importance of the Nepalese government’s continued support. They reiterated their commitment to continuing to support CAAN with its efforts to improve its safety oversight capabilities, noting the Director General’s dedication for such further developments of the CAAN.

(76)

Despite these efforts, it is deemed that CAAN’s ability to enforce international safety standards and ensure compliant operations by its certified air carriers is insufficient. The evidence, including observations from the Union on-site assessment visit, suggests that CAAN capabilities to oversee the aviation activities in Nepal are not complying with the applicable minimum international safety standards. This evidenced the need for further improvements in CAAN’s oversight capabilities, personnel management, staff training and certification processes.

(77)

Shree Airlines presented a comprehensive overview, detailing their current fleet, resources, and facilities. They also shared the corrective actions implemented following the observations from the Union on-site assessment visit. This included the outcomes of the root cause analysis for each observation raised by the Union assessment team. Additionally, Shree Airlines outlined their CAP developed from these analyses, specifying both short- and long-term plans.

(78)

The information provided by Shree Airlines fell short of fully addressing the safety concerns highlighted during the Union on-site assessment visit. The CAP provided by Shree Airlines, notably the associated root cause analysis, did not demonstrate the air carrier’s ability to implement appropriate measures to assure compliance with international safety standards.

(79)

Nepal Airlines delivered an in-depth presentation showcasing their history as Nepal’s national flag carrier, along with their fleet and resource capabilities. The presentation comprehensively covered the actions they have undertaken in response to the Union on-site assessment visit observations. The air carrier detailed the outcomes of root cause analysis conducted for each observation and recommendation made by the Union assessment team. Moreover, the air carrier presented their CAP.

(80)

Despite these efforts, the information conveyed by Nepal Airlines, while extensive, did not meet the requirements needed to fully resolve the safety issues stemming from the Union on-site assessment visit. The CAP provided by Nepal Airlines, notably the associated root cause analysis, did not demonstrate the air carrier’s ability to implement appropriate measures to assure compliance with international safety standards.

(81)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Nepal.

(82)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Nepal with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(83)

In March 2007, Pakistan International Airlines was included in Annex B to Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 235/2007 (11), and subsequently removed from that Annex in November 2007 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2007 (12).

(84)

On 1 July 2020, the Commission opened consultations with the Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority (‘PCAA’) pursuant to Article 3(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 473/2006 (13), on the basis of the TCO authorisation suspensions of Pakistan International Airlines and Vision Air, and a statement made by the Pakistan Transport Minister about fraudulently obtained pilot licenses in Pakistan.

(85)

In that context, the Commission, in cooperation with the Agency and Member States, has organised a number of technical and information meetings with the PCAA. Those discussions focused on efforts made by the PCAA in dealing with safety oversight concerns identified by the Commission and the Agency experts, as well as those identified by ICAO during its USOAP visit that took place between 29 November and 10 December 2021.

(86)

On 23 August 2023, the Commission, the Agency, Member States and representatives of the PCAA held another technical meeting, the purpose of which was for the PCAA to inform about and demonstrate developments that have taken place since the last technical meeting of 25 October 2022. Of particular interest was information pertaining to the adoption of the Civil Aviation Authority Ordinance (2023), the status of the ICAO USOAP CAP, and actions to address the EU concerns expressed in previous exchanges.

(87)

On this basis, and reflecting the November 2022 views of the EU Air Safety Committee, the Commission informed the PCAA that it will carry out, with the Agency and Member States, a Union on-site assessment visit to Pakistan between 27-30 November 2023 to assess the situation of PCAA in terms of conducting effective safety oversight.

(88)

In accordance with the common criteria set out in the Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005, the Commission considers that at this time there are no grounds for amending the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban within the Union with respect to air carriers certified in Pakistan.

(89)

Member States should continue verifying the effective compliance of air carriers certified in Pakistan with the relevant international safety standards through prioritisation of ramp inspections of those air carriers, pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012.

(90)

Where any relevant safety information reveals imminent safety risks resulting from non-compliance with the relevant international safety standards, further action by the Commission can become necessary, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005.

(91)

Regulation (EC) No 474/2006 should therefore be amended accordingly.

(92)

Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 recognise the need for decisions to be taken swiftly and, where appropriate, urgently, given the safety implications. It is therefore essential, for the protection of sensitive information and the traveling public, that any decisions in the context of updating the list of air carriers, which are subject to an operating ban or restriction within the Union, are published and enter into force immediately after their adoption.

(93)

The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the EU Air Safety Committee established pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005,